Fox v Waller

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Fox v Waller [2023] QSC 169

PARTIES:

STEPHEN JAMES FOX and PAUL MICHAEL BANISTER (AS EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOHN LEWIS WALLER)

(applicants)

v
DAVID JOHN WALLER

(first respondent)
JONETTE MARY WALLER
(second respondent)

FILE NO:

BS No 5868 of 2023

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Originating Application

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

4 August 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

21 June 2023

JUDGE:

Cooper J

ORDERS:

1.   It is declared that on the proper construction of the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld), the express power of appropriation under clause 19.1.15 of the last Will and Testament of John Lewis Waller (deceased) executed 6 November 2013, in respect of the assets in the late Mr Waller’s estate being the subdivided lots (which were formerly the Beckwith Street property) gifted under clause 10 of the Will, being more particularly now described as:

(a)   Lot 10 on SP 3267234 contained in Title Reference 51305815, Local Government of Redlands;

(b)    Lot 11 on SP 3267234 contained in Title Reference 51305816, Local Government of Redlands;

(c)    Lot 12 on SP 3267234 contained in Title Reference 51305817, Local Government of Redlands;

(d)    Lot 13 on SP 3267234 contained in Title Reference 51305818, Local Government of Redlands;

(e)    Lot 14 on SP 3267234 contained in Title Reference 51305819, Local Government of Redlands,

is not subject to nor limited by the provisions of ss 31(1)(l)(i) and (ii) of the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld).

2.   The costs of all parties to the application are to be assessed on the indemnity basis and be paid out of the estate of the late Mr Waller.

CATCHWORDS:

EQUITY – TRUST AND TRUSTEES – POWERS, DUTIES, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF TRUSTEES – MISCELLANEOUS OTHER POWERS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES – OTHER PARTICULAR CASES – where, prior to his death, the deceased commenced the process of subdivisional development approval in respect of real property – where the will of the deceased created a testamentary trust – where each of the testamentary trusts is an equal beneficiary of a specific gift under the will of the real property subject to subdivision and the residue of the estate – where the applicants have continued, but not completed, the subdivision process – where the respondents wish for certain of the subdivided lots to be dealt with in different ways in the administration of the estate – where the will contains an express power of appropriation –where the applicants seek a declaration as to whether an express power of appropriation conferred by the will is subject to, and limited by, the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) – whether, on the proper construction of the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld), the express power of appropriation in the will in respect of the subdivided lots gifted is not subject to nor limited by the provisions of ss 31(1)(l)(i) and (ii) of the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld)

SUCCESSION – CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT OF TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS – PRINCIPLES OR RULES OF CONSTRUCTION – GENERALLY…

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Details
Case
[2023] QSC 169
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Fox v Waller, the applicants, who are the executors of the late Mr Waller's estate, sought a declaration as to whether an express power of appropriation conferred by the will is subject to, and limited by, the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld). The respondents, who are the beneficiaries of the will, sought a different outcome in relation to the administration of the estate. The primary issue for the court to decide was whether the express power of appropriation in the will in respect of the subdivided lots gifted is subject to, and limited by, the provisions of ss 31(1)(l)(i) and (ii) of the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld). The court considered the proper approach to statutory construction, which requires the court’s consideration to focus on the text of the relevant provisions, in context. The court determined that the proper construction of the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) is that the express power of appropriation under clause 19.1.15 of the last Will and Testament of John Lewis Waller (deceased) executed 6 November 2013, in respect of the assets in the late Mr Waller’s estate being the subdivided lots (which were formerly the Beckwith Street property) gifted under clause 10 of the Will, is not subject to nor limited by the provisions of ss 31(1)(l)(i) and (ii) of the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld).

The court ordered that the express power of appropriation under clause 19.1.15 of the last Will and Testament of John Lewis Waller (deceased) executed 6 November 2013, in respect of the assets in the late Mr Waller’s estate being the subdivided lots (which were formerly the Beckwith Street property) gifted under clause 10 of the Will, is not subject to nor limited by the provisions of ss 31(1)(l)(i) and (ii) of the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld). The court also ordered that the costs of all parties to the application are to be assessed on the indemnity basis and be paid out of the estate of the late Mr Waller.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. It is declared that on the proper construction of the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld), the express power of appropriation under clause 19.1.15 of the last Will and Testament of John Lewis Waller (deceased) executed 6 November 2013, in respect of the assets in the late Mr Waller’s estate being the subdivided lots (which were formerly the Beckwith Street property) gifted under clause 10 of the Will, being more particularly now described as:

(a) Lot 10 on SP 3267234 contained in Title Reference 51305815, Local Government of Redlands;

(b) Lot 11 on SP 3267234 contained in Title Reference 51305816, Local Government of Redlands;

(c) Lot 12 on SP 3267234 contained in Title Reference 51305817, Local Government of Redlands;

(d) Lot 13 on SP 3267234 contained in Title Reference 51305818, Local Government of Redlands;

(e) Lot 14 on SP 3267234 contained in Title Reference 51305819, Local Government of Redlands,

is not subject to nor limited by the provisions of ss 31(1)(l)(i) and (ii) of the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld).

2. The costs of all parties to the application are to be assessed on the indemnity basis and be paid out of the estate of the late Mr Waller.

Background

Background to the litigation

The application has been brought pursuant to s 6(1) of the Succession Act 1981 (Qld). That provision confers jurisdiction on the court to “hear and determine all matters relating to the estate and the administration of the estate of any deceased person” and “to make all such declarations … as may be necessary or convenient” in that respect. In the circumstances set out in [3] to [15] below, I am satisfied that the declaratory relief sought by the applicants is necessary or convenient for the administration of the estate of the late Mr Waller.Background The application has been brought by the executors of the estate of the late Mr Waller. The late Mr Waller died on 27 August 2019. Probate of the will, made on 6 November 2013, was granted to the applicants on 20 December 2019. The respondents to the application are:(a)the adult children of the late Mr Waller; (b)each one of three trustees and also a principal beneficiary of a testamentary trust constituted under the will (the other two trustees of both of the separate trusts being the applicants);(c)each (along with the other respondent) the equal beneficiary in respect of the personal effects of the late Mr Waller. Each of the testamentary trusts is (along with the other testamentary trust) an equal beneficiary of:(a)a specific gift under the will of a property referred to in the materials as the Beckwith Street property; and(b)the residue of the estate. Prior to his death, the late Mr Waller commenced the process of applying for subdivisional development approval in respect of the Beckwith Street property. Following the grant of probate, after consulting with and obtaining the consent of both respondents, the applicants continued the subdivision process. That subdivision has proceeded in stages. Stage 1 involved subdivision of the property into five lots: lots 10 and 11 (referred to in the materials as the western super lots); lots 12 and 13 (referred to in the materials as the eastern super lots); and lot 14 (referred to in the materials as the house lot, which contains the former residence of the late Mr Waller). As their name suggests, the western super lots and the eastern super lots are capable of being further subdivided. Stage 2 involves the further subdivision of each of the western super lots into three residential lots. The work required to complete the Stage 2 subdivision has commenced but has not been completed. Stage 3 would involve the future subdivision of the eastern super lots into residential lots. From August 2022, each of the respondents informed the applicants that they wished for the western super lots, the eastern super lots and the house lot to be dealt with in different ways in the administration of the estate. The nature of those differences is not relevant to the determination of this application. What is presently relevant is that the applicants have formed the view that relations between the two respondents have deteriorated to the point where the prospect of them cooperating in respect of those matters or reaching agreement in their various capacities is bleak.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

A similar form of words is used in other provisions which address the application of other parts of the Act.[5][5]See s 10 (addressing the application of provisions in Part 2); s 60 (addressing the application of provisions in Part 5); s 65 (addressing the application of provisions in Part 6); s 79 (addressing the applications of provisions in Part 7); and s 111 (addressing the application of provisions in Part 10). A somewhat different form of words is used in s 20, which provides that only two specified provisions within Part 3, apply “despite anything contained in the instrument creating the trust”.Consideration The proper approach to statutory construction requires that the court’s consideration focus on the text of the relevant provisions, in context.[6] The task must begin with a consideration of the text itself, although the meaning of the text may require consideration of the context, which includes the general purpose and policy of the provisions and, in particular, the mischief it is seeking to remedy.[7][6]R v Wassmuth; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2022) 11 QR 82, 89 [26]-[27] applying Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, 381 [69].[7]Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27, 46-47 [47]. The argument in favour of the construction identified in [18](a) above is that it follows from the plain meaning of the words used in s 31(1). On that argument, in circumstances where s 33(1)(l) confers a power of appropriation which is proscribed by the limitations set out in ss 33(1)(l)(i) and (ii), a trust instrument which provides that the trustee is to have a more extensive power of appropriation[8] expresses a “contrary intention” for the purposes of s 31(1). If that is accepted, then the words used in s 31(1) mean that s 33(1)(l) shall apply despite that contrary intention. The result is said to be that the statutory power of appropriation operates in lieu of the power expressed in the trust instrument.[8]In this case cl 19.1.15 of the will confers a power of appropriation that is wider than the appropriation in s 33(1)(l) of the Act: it applies whether or not the appropriation affects the specific legacy; it does not require notice of the appropriation to be given to the beneficiaries affected; and it does not confer on an affected beneficiary the power to challenge the appropriation in court. I am unable to accept that this is the proper construction of s 31(1) of the Act. If it is accepted, it would result in an inconsistency between the operation of s 31(1) – to apply the limits on the statutory power of appropriation in ss 33(1)(l)(i) and (ii) to an express power of appropriation conferred by the trust instrument – and the words of s 4(2) which expressly preserve the ability of a settlor to confer powers on the trustee that are larger than the powers conferred by the Act. In Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority,[9] a majority of the High Court said:[10]“[69] The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute. The meaning of the provision must be determined ‘by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole’. - co_footnote_5146997~FULLTEXT~FTNT.!56In Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos, Dixon CJ pointed out that ‘the context, the general purpose and policy of a provision and its consistency and fairness are surer guides to its meaning than the logic with which it is constructed’. Thus, the process of construction must always begin by examining the context of the provision that is being construed.[70]A legislative instrument must be construed on the prima facie basis that its provisions are intended to give effect to harmonious goals. Where conflict appears to arise from the language of particular provisions, the conflict must be alleviated, so far as possible, by adjusting the meaning of the competing provisions to achieve that result which will best give effect to the purpose and language of those provisions while maintaining the unity of all the statutory provisions. Reconciling conflicting provisions will often require the court ‘to determine which is the leading provision and which the subordinate provision, and which must give way to the other’. Only by determining the hierarchy of the provisions will it be possible in many cases to give each provision the meaning which best gives effect to its purpose and language while maintaining the unity of the statutory scheme.”[9](1998) 194 CLR 355.[10]Ibid, 381-2 [69]-[70] (citations omitted).