[2001] QCA 52
COURT OF APPEAL
de JERSEY CJ
WILLIAMS JA
AMBROSE J
CA No 1461 of 2001
DENNIS DONALD FOUNTAIN Appellant (Applicant)
and
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS Respondent (Defendant)
BRISBANE
..DATE 21/02/2001
JUDGMENT
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: The appellant is Mr Dennis Donald Fountain. He is charged with a series of offences allegedly committed in the year 2000 in relation broadly to the company Herron Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd.
They are extortion, intentional contamination of goods, attempted murder, maliciously administering poison with intent to harm and fraud. He was charged with the offences on 19 December 2000. A Magistrate refused bail on the ground that the applicant might if released reoffend.
On 16 January this year, Justice Fryberg again refused bail. His Honour noted that the appellant had no prior criminal history, that he had an established connection with the State of Queensland and that his medical difficulties would inhibit his departing the jurisdiction. He was conscious that the applicant before him had suggested a condition that he "keep house" if granted bail.
His Honour also noted the appellant's concession that a prima facie case had been established against him. Refusing bail, the learned Judge took the view however that he could not exclude the prospect of the appellant's committing other offences relating to the making of threats and posting of letters if released, or obstructing the course of justice.
The Crown case against the appellant although presently unanswered, and the appellant has at this stage no obligation to answer it in any way, appears to be a strong prima facie case. While there are substantial circumstances which would ordinarily favour a grant of bail, the absence of prior convictions, the link with the jurisdiction, maturity, health problems and so on, the seriousness of the offences charged and the apparent weight of the Crown case should cause a Court to be circumspect. If convicted of these offences, the appellant will face a very lengthy term of imprisonment.
The question now arising on appeal is whether his Honour erred in principle or in fact or whether indeed new circumstances may have arisen since his judgment warranting a different approach. There is no new circumstance.
I am not persuaded that his Honour erred in principle. Additionally, his Honour's findings of fact were open and it is no part of this Court's legitimate function to interpose its own should they differ.
Counsel for the appellant pointed particularly to the learned Judge's reliance for his jurisdiction on section 10 of the Bail Act rather than section 9. Section 9 confirms a prima facie entitlement to bail. His Honour's reliance may be considered at odds with Hughes [1983] 1 Queensland Reports 92-98 and Maher [1986] 1 Queensland Reports 303-309. But the point is of no more than academic interest. The Judge's declining to grant bail was based on the applicability of risks referred to in section 16 of the Bail Act. Their existence would necessitate refusing bail whether the Court worked for its jurisdiction from section…
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- Case
- [2001] QCA 52
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the learned Judge erred in principle or in fact in refusing bail, and whether there were new circumstances warranting a different approach. Counsel for the appellant argued that the Judge should have relied on section 9 of the Bail Act, which confirms a prima facie entitlement to bail, rather than section 10. However, the court found that this point was of academic interest as the Judge's decision was based on the risks outlined in section 16 of the Bail Act. The court also considered whether the Judge erred in considering the risk of serious economic consequences when assessing the acceptability of the risk of reoffending.
The court concluded that there was no error in principle, and the Judge's factual conclusions were reasonably open. The court found that it was permissible to consider the risk to corporations when assessing the risk of reoffending under section 16 of the Bail Act. For these reasons, the appeal was dismissed. The Chief Justice, along with Justices Williams and Ambrose, agreed that the appeal should be dismissed, and the decision to refuse bail was upheld.
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