HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Kitto, Taylor, Menzies, Windeyer and Owen JJ.
FORSYTH v. COMMISSIONER OF STAMP DUTIES
25 February 1966
Constitutional Law (Cth)—Stamp Duties (N.S.W.)
Constitutional Law (Cth)—Inconsistency between Commonwealth and State laws—Commonwealth law excluding from estate of deceased life assured proceeds of policies on his life for benefit of wife or members of family—State law including in dutiable estate of life assured proceeds of life policies payable to any person where premiums paid by life assured—No inconsistency—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), s. 109—Life Insurance Act 1945-1961 (Cth), s. 94 (1)*—Stamp Duties Acts, 1920-1959 (N.S.W.), s. 102 (2) (h)**. Stamp Duties (N.S.W.)—Life assured—Dutiable estate—Life policy—Loan by insurance company to life assured—Proceeds of policy charged with repayment—Agreement that loan may be repaid by deduction from any payment due by company on termination of policy contract—What included in dutiable estate—Total sum due under policy or proceeds after deduction of balance due on loan—Stamp Duties Acts, 1920-1959 (N.S.W.), s. 102 (2) (h)**.
Decisions
1966, February 25.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
KITTO J. This appeal raises two questions. The first is whether the State law contained in s. 102 (2) (h) of the Stamp Duties Acts, 1920-1959 (N.S.W.) is invalidated by s. 109 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth as being inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth namely the provision contained in s. 94 of the Life Insurance Act 1945-1961 (Cth). The provision made by the Commonwealth enactment, so far as material, is that, subject to the Bankruptcy Act, a policy effected by any man upon his own life, and expressed to be for the benefit of his wife, or of his children, or of his wife and children, or any of them, shall create a trust in favour of the objects named in the policy, and the moneys payable under any such policy shall not, so long as any object of the trust remains unperformed, form part of the estate of the person whose life is insured, or be subject to his debts. (at p201)
2. The State law referred to is one of the provisions by which s. 102 of the Stamp Duties Acts determines the composition of the "dutiable estate" of a deceased person (see s. 104) "for the purposes of the assessment and payment of death duty." The "dutiable estate" is made for these purposes to include and consist of certain classes of property described in two paragraphs. The first paragraph describes all the property of the deceased, with the exception of personal property outside New South Wales if the deceased was not domiciled in the State. The second paragraph describes in lettered sub-paragraphs certain classes of property (and the value of certain other classes of property) which did not belong to the deceased at his death but with which he had had some specified form of connexion in his lifetime. Among the sub-paragraphs of par. (2) is sub-par. (h), which comprises any money payable to any person under…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Forsyth v Commissioner of Stamp Duties and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [1966] HCA 5
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the transfer of shares in a company constituted a "conveyance" for the purposes of the Stamp Duties Act, and if so, whether it was liable to stamp duty as a transfer of property. The court was required to interpret the definition of "conveyance" and its application to the transfer of shares, which represent a chose in action rather than a direct interest in the company's assets.
The High Court, by majority, held that the transfer of shares was not a "conveyance" within the meaning of the Act. The majority reasoned that a conveyance, in the context of the Act, referred to the transfer of an interest in land or a chattel, and that shares, being intangible personal property (a chose in action), did not fall within this definition. The court distinguished between the transfer of shares and the transfer of physical assets, emphasizing the nature of the property being transferred.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the taxpayer's appeal, finding that stamp duty was not payable on the transfer of shares under the relevant provisions of the Stamp Duties Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.