Forstaff Adelaide Pty Ltd v Hills Industries Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 23 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court: Civil)

FORSTAFF ADELAIDE PTY LTD v HILLS INDUSTRIES LTD

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Doyle, The Honourable Justice Duggan and The Honourable Justice Anderson)

28 March 2006

CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS

GUARANTEE AND INDEMNITY - INDEMNITIES - CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT

WORKERS' COMPENSATION - ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION - PERSONS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION

PROCEDURE - MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURAL MATTERS - DECLARATIONS - APPROPRIATE FORM OF RELIEF -- DISCRETION OF COURT

Appeal against decision of the District Court - respondent obtained declarations which the appellant argued were hypothetical, futile and unfair - whether respondent was entitled to an indemnity from the appellant pursuant to a written contract - indemnity was in relation to any sums found due by the respondent to the WorkCover Corporation in proceeding commenced in the Workers’ Compensation Tribunal pursuant to section 54(7) of the Workers’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986.

Held: for a declaration to be made, there must be a real as opposed to a theoretical question - the rights of the appellant are entirely dependent upon the resolution of issues to be litigated between the respondent and WorkCover - the declaration will bind the appellant without the appellant having any input into the judgment - this results in unfairness - generally, questions of indemnity should not be determined in advance of determining liability - declarations are futile and hypothetical until other matters before the Workers’ Compensation Tribunal are resolved - declarations lack utility and are unfair - appeal allowed.

Workers' Rehabilitation Act 1986 s 54(7); District Court Act 1991 s 37, referred to.
Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v National Jet Systems Pty Ltd [2004] SASC 438; Swift Australian Co Pty Ltd v South British Insurance Co Ltd [1970] VR 368; AMP Fire & General Insurance Company Limited v Dixon & Anor [1982] VR 833; Kings College v Allianz Insurance Australia Ltd [2004] 1 QdR 394; Insurance Exchange of Australasia v Dooley & Anor [2000] NSWCA 159; (2000) 50 NSWLR 222; Outboard Marine Australia Pty Ltd v Byrnes [1973] 2 NSWLR 102; Gracechurch Holdings Pty Ltd v Breeze (1992) 7 WAR 518; Shoard v Palmer (1989) 98 FLR 402, applied.
Carter Marine Helicopters Ltd (1996) 9 ANZ Ins Cas 61-299 (HC NZ); SA Housing Trust v State Government Insurance Commission (1988) 51 SASR 1; Workers Rehabilitiation and Compensation Corporation v Commonwealth of Australia (1993) 62 SASR 325; Manners v Transfield (1992) 8 WAR 111, considered.

FORSTAFF ADELAIDE PTY LTD v HILLS INDUSTRIES LTD
[2006] SASC 88

Full Court:  Doyle CJ, Duggan and Anderson JJ

  1. DOYLE CJ           I would allow the appeal.

  2. I agree in substance with the reasons of Anderson J.

  3. I propose to state briefly my reasons for allowing the appeal.  I will not repeat the facts.  They are to be found in the reasons of Anderson J.

  4. Hills Industries Ltd (“Hills”) claims that its contract with Forstaff Adelaide Pty Ltd…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Forstaff Adelaide Pty Ltd v Hills Industries Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2006] SASC 88
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, Forstaff Adelaide Pty Ltd (“Forstaff”) appealed against a decision of the District Court, which had made certain declarations in favour of Hills Industries Ltd (“Hills”). The declarations related to an indemnity that Forstaff was required to provide to Hills in the event that Hills was found to be liable to the WorkCover Corporation (“WorkCover”) in proceedings before the Workers’ Compensation Tribunal. The central issue was whether the declarations were premature, hypothetical, and lacking in utility. The indemnity in question was based on a written contract between Forstaff and Hills, under which Forstaff was to indemnify Hills against any claims for injuries sustained by employees hired by Forstaff and working on Hills’ premises. The appeal raised questions about the appropriate circumstances under which declarations of this nature could be granted, particularly when they depended on the outcome of other ongoing proceedings.

The court examined the nature of the declarations and whether they were appropriate in the circumstances. The appeal argued that the declarations were premature and lacked utility because they depended on the outcome of proceedings between Hills and WorkCover, which had not yet been concluded. Forstaff contended that the declarations were hypothetical because they were based on potential liabilities that had not yet been determined. The court considered whether the declarations could be granted when the resolution of the underlying issues was still pending and whether it was fair to bind Forstaff to the declarations without its involvement in the judgment. The court also explored whether questions of indemnity should generally be decided after the underlying liability had been determined.

The appeal was allowed, and the declarations made by the District Court were set aside. The court found that the declarations were indeed premature and hypothetical, as they depended on the outcome of proceedings between Hills and WorkCover. The court held that it was not appropriate to make such declarations when the underlying issues had not yet been resolved. The court emphasised that the rights of Forstaff were entirely dependent on the outcome of the proceedings between Hills and WorkCover, and that it was unfair to bind Forstaff to the declarations without its input into the judgment. The court also noted that questions of indemnity should generally be decided after the underlying liability had been determined. The court allowed the appeal and gave Forstaff an opportunity to consider whether it wished the matter to be remitted to the District Court for further consideration of the claim for indemnity.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

DOYLE CJ DUGGAN J
If Hills claims that it is entitled to be indemnified in respect of the costs incurred and to be incurred before the Tribunal, before the proceedings are finalised and regardless of the outcome of those proceedings, it is entitled to have that issue decided now. That is not a hypothetical issue. Accordingly, subject to submissions, I would be inclined to order, if Hills makes an application, that the matter be remitted to the Judge to consider and decide that issue only.Conclusion I would allow the appeal, and set aside the declarations made by the District Court. I would give Hills the opportunity to consider whether it wishes the matter to be remitted to the District Court for further consideration of a claim by Hills that it is entitled to be indemnified in respect of the costs incurred and to be incurred before the Tribunal. In my view, the appeal should be allowed and the declarations made by the District Court set aside. I agree that we should provide the parties with an opportunity to make submissions on whether the matter should be remitted to the District Court on the issue relating to indemnity for costs before the Workers’ Compensation Tribunal. I agree with the comments made by Doyle CJ and Anderson J to the effect that the claim for indemnity gives rise to issues of a hypothetical nature such as to render the declaratory orders made by the District Court judge inappropriate. I also agree with the Chief Justice’s view that the procedural difficulties occasioned by the fact that the appellant is not a party to the proceedings between the Workers’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Corporation and the respondent place another difficulty in the way of making declarations of this nature. In this matter the respondent (“Hills”) sought and obtained declarations in the District Court that it was entitled to an indemnity from the appellant (“Forstaff”) pursuant to the terms of a written contract. The indemnity claimed was in relation to any sums found due by Hills to the WorkCover Corporation (“WorkCover”) in proceedings which WorkCover commenced in the Workers’ Compensation Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) in 2002. Those proceedings have been stayed pending the result of the appeal. Hills is a manufacturer and employs labour. Amongst those engaged in labour for Hills were workers hired by Hills from Forstaff. Forstaff was in the business of hiring out the services of its employees, and did so pursuant to the terms of a written contact with Hills. The indemnity was said to be contained in two clauses of the written contract as follows:1.Forstaff will pay the WorkCover levy for our employees on your site and meet any claims for accidents or injuries to our employees.2.In the event that one of Forstaff’s employees is injured in the course of his or her work at Hills Industries Ltd Forstaff indemnify Hills against any claim made by any organisation for any loss it may incur. Mr Memisoglou was an employee of Forstaff and hired at the relevant time to Hills when he sustained an injury at work. He was paid compensation by WorkCover. In the proceedings issued in the Tribunal, WorkCover sought to recover from Hills the amounts of compensation paid to Memisoglou by WorkCover and issued proceedings pursuant to s 54(7) of the Workers’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (“the Act”). The Declarations

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DOYLE CJ, DUGGAN J

Mr Memisoglou was an employee of Forstaff and hired at the relevant time to Hills when he sustained an injury at work. He was paid compensation by WorkCover. In the proceedings issued in the Tribunal, WorkCover sought to recover from Hills the amounts of compensation paid to Memisoglou by WorkCover and issued proceedings pursuant to s 54(7) of the Workers’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (“the Act”). The Declarations Section 37 of the District Court Act 1991 (SA) enables that court to grant declaratory relief. The declaratory relief granted by the learned Judge is based on the terms of the contract entered into between the appellant and the respondent. Hills obtained from the learned Judge, in the proceedings under appeal, declarations as follows:1.That the defendant do indemnify the plaintiff in relation to any sums found due by the plaintiff to the WorkCover Corporation in action 5736 of 2002 in the Workers Compensation Tribunal.2.That the defendant do indemnify the plaintiff on a solicitor and own client basis for all costs incurred by the plaintiff in the said Workers Compensation Tribunal proceedings.3.That the defendant do pay the plaintiff’s costs incurred in this action to be agreed and in default to be taxed. It was argued in the proceedings in the District Court that the indemnity was a term of the contract by the express provisions set out earlier and also based on oral representations which had been made in discussions between the parties. It was argued, that the effect of the oral representations was that Hills, in the case of an injury to any person hired by Forstaff to Hills, “would not be liable in any circumstances”. Forstaff denied that it was liable to indemnify Hills pursuant to the terms of the contract. Findings of the Trial Judge His Honour analysed the arguments relating to the terms of the contract. He made findings based on the evidence presented to him and on the interpretation of the clauses. There was also a question of whether the indemnity extended to cover negligence by Hills itself. His Honour analysed the relevant authorities on this topic. Following that analysis, his Honour concluded that the words contained in the two clauses, set out above, were sufficiently wide to include indemnity for any liability caused by Hills’ negligence. His Honour concluded at [44]:In my opinion, requiring the defendant to indemnify the plaintiff against its own negligence does not produce an absurd result as was submitted on behalf of the defendant, but achieves the commercial consequence that the parties had intended. The learned trial Judge found that the two clauses set out previously were part of the contractual arrangement between the parties. His Honour found that there was no ambiguity or uncertainty about these clauses, and that, therefore, it was not necessary to deal with the argument which had been put to him regarding the contra proferentem rule. Having interpreted the clauses in favour of Hills, his Honour then found that there was no impediment to his making the declarations because there was a real, as distinct from a theoretical or hypothetical question in issue.Amended Grounds of AppealThe grounds of appeal are:1.The learned trial Judge erred in law in exercising the court’s jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief in circumstances where the declaratory relief sought1.1 was premature;1.2 lacked utility in the circumstances;1.3 was based on or depended on findings still to be made with respect to an hypothetical set of circumstances.In the Alternative to Ground 1:2.The learned trial Judge erred in law in finding that the Corporation’s claim fell within the terms of the first provision, on its proper construction (Judgment at paragraph [37]).3.The learned trial Judge erred in law in finding that the Corporation’s claim fell within the terms of the second provision, on its proper construction (Judgment, [38]).4.The learned trial Judge erred in law in finding that the appellant is liable to indemnify the respondent in respect of the Corporation’s claim (Judgment, [42]).5.In the alternative to paragraphs 2 and 4 above, the learned trial Judge erred in law in finding that the first provision required the appellant to indemnify the respondent with respect to its legal costs incurred in defending the Corporation’s claim (Judgment, [47], [48]).6.In the alternative to paragraphs 3 and 4 above, the learned trial Judge erred in law in finding that the second provision required the appellant to indemnify the respondent with respect to its legal costs incurred in defending the Corporation’s claim (Judgment, [47], [48]).7.In the alternative to paragraphs 5 and 6 the learned trial Judge erred in law in finding that the appellant was obliged to indemnify the respondent with respect to costs on a solicitor and own client basis.Arguments on Appeal