CITATION: Forsdike v Lawrence J. Mansour Pty Limited [2001] NSWCA 226 FILE NUMBER(S): CA 40157/00 HEARING DATE(S): 29 June 2001 JUDGMENT DATE:
13 July 2001PARTIES :
Pamela Florence Forsdike v Lawrence J. Mansour Pty LimitedJUDGMENT OF: Stein JA at 1; Rolfe AJA at 2; Fitzgerald AJA at 54
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION : District Court LOWER COURT
FILE NUMBER(S) :DC 5203/99 LOWER COURT
JUDICIAL OFFICER :Patten DCJ
COUNSEL: Appellant - W. R. Haylen QC / M.J. Perry
Respondent - P.J. Deakin QC / Ms E.E. BeilbySOLICITORS: Appellant - Taylor & Scott
Respondent - Price Waterhouse Coopers LegalCATCHWORDS: Practice and procedure - limitation periods - power to extend limitation period under s151D of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 - standard of review of such a decision LEGISLATION CITED: Motor Accidents Act 1988
Workers Compensation Act 1987CASES CITED: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541
Guyra Meatpacking Pty Ltd v E. Wright & Ors [1999] NSWCA 430
Holt v Wynder [2000] NSWCA 143
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Salido v Nominal Defendant (1993) 32 NSWLR 524DECISION: Appeal dismissed with costs.
THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL
CA 40157/00
DC 5203/99
STEIN JA
ROLFE AJA
FITZGERALD AJA
Friday, 13 July 2001
The appellant appealed against the refusal of the District Court to exercise its power under s151D of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 to extend the time within which she might sue the respondent, her former employer. On 30 August 1993, while working, the appellant had tripped over some goods and fallen heavily on her right knee. The statutory period during which the appellant was entitled to bring her action ended three years from that date.PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - Limitation periods - Power to extend limitation period under s151D of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 - Standard of review of such a decision.
- In mid 1995 the appellant first consulted her general practitioner about her right knee, and in March 1998, she first obtained legal advice. To this point, the insurer had paid her medical bills and weekly compensation. In May 1999, she was advised that her left knee would require treatment due to the increased dependence she had placed on it as a result of the injury to her right knee. Counsel advised the appellant that the deterioration of both knees meant that her common law rights might me more valuable than those under the Workers Compensation Act. It was also suggested to the appellant that her lower back problems might be due to the same fall. On 15 October 1999 the appellant sought an extension of time.
- HELD: (per Rolfe AJA, Stein JA and Fitzgerald AJA agreeing):
(1) It is well established that the Court’s decision as to whether to extend the time within which an action may be brought is a discretionary one, and accordingly the right of an appellate court to interfere in…
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- Case
- [2001] NSWCA 226
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court of Appeal was the standard of review applicable to a judge's decision to grant or refuse an extension of time under section 151D of the *Workers Compensation Act 1987*. This involved determining the appropriate level of scrutiny the appellate court should apply when considering such a discretionary decision made at first instance.
The Court of Appeal, in its reasoning, affirmed that the standard of review for a discretionary decision under section 151D of the *Workers Compensation Act 1987* is not one of de novo review. Instead, the appellate court must be satisfied that the judge at first instance erred in principle or made a decision that was plainly wrong. The judges applied established principles regarding the review of discretionary powers, emphasising that an appellate court should not interfere with a judge's exercise of discretion unless there is a demonstrable error.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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