Forrest v Chlanda & Anor [2011] NTSC 67
PARTIES: Forrest, David
v
Chlanda, Erwin
and
Erwin Chlanda Pty Ltd
TITLE OF COURT: SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION: SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION
FILE NO: 8 of 2010 (2033396)
DELIVERED: 1 September 2011
HEARING DATES:
JUDGMENT OF: KELLY J
CATCHWORDS:
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: J Stirk
Defendants: E Chlanda
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Povey Stirk
Defendants:
Judgment category classification: C
Judgment ID Number: KEL11017
Number of pages: 13
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT ALICE SPRINGSForrest v Chlanda & Anor [2011] NTSC 67
No. 8 of 2010 (2033396)
BETWEEN:
DAVID FORREST
Plaintiff
AND:
ERWIN CHLANDA
First Defendant
AND:
ERWIN CHLANDA PTY LTD
Second Defendant
CORAM: KELLY J
DECISION ON APPLICATION TO STRIKE OUT PARAGRAPHS 7 AND 9 OF THE AMENDED DEFENCE
(Delivered 1 September 2011)
In the course of making objections to the defendants’ witness statements, the plaintiff made an oral application to strike out paragraphs 7 and 9 of the amended defence, and the reference to paragraph 7 in paragraph 8. As the matter is on a tight timetable to the trial which starts on 5 September 2011, and solicitors for the plaintiff had given informal notice to the defendants of the intention to make the application a week beforehand, I agreed to hear the application at the time set down for the hearing of the objections. No notice of the application was given to the Court.
The plaintiff argued the strike out application on three bases:
(a)the defendants cannot, as a matter of law, plead and justify an alternative meaning to that pleaded by the plaintiff;
(b)the meanings pleaded by the plaintiff at paragraphs 10(b) and (c) of the amended statement of claim are in fact conveyed by the article; and
(c)the evidence sought to be adduced by the defendants is insufficient to prove that there are grounds to suspect fraud and raises no higher that a suggestion of negligence or incompetence.
A strike out application is not the occasion for deciding the factual issues raised in grounds (b) and (c) above. Provided the meaning pleaded by the defendants is a possible meaning – ie one capable of arising from the article complained of, then the meaning in fact conveyed is a matter to be determined at trial. Similarly, it is not appropriate on a strike out application to analyse the evidence with a view to seeing if the defendants’ case can be made out. Provided the pleading of justification pleads facts which could justify the meaning pleaded by the defendants, the question of whether the evidence adduced by the defendants is sufficient to prove the pleaded facts is a matter for trial.
In relation to ground (a) above, the plaintiff relies on obiter dictum of Brennan CJ and McHugh J in Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd[1] at paragraphs [6] to [8], concluding, at paragraph [8]:
“Under the modern system, articulating an alternative meaning could conceivably make explicit the ground for…
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- Case
- [2011] NTSC 67
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the legal principles governing the pleading of alternative meanings in defamation cases. The court found that the remarks of Brennan CJ and McHugh J in Chakravarti did not establish that the Polly Peck defence, in which the defendant pleads and seeks to justify a less serious imputation than that pleaded by the plaintiff, was not available in Australia. The court held that the tribunal of fact was entitled to consider the meaning of the entire matter complained of, notwithstanding the pleaded imputations, and that the defendants should be permitted to plead that the words complained of had a not more serious and not substantially different meaning which the defendants could justify on the facts, provided the meaning pleaded by the defendants was capable of arising from the matter complained of.
The court found that the meaning pleaded by the defendants was a meaning capable of arising from the article, did not arise from a separate and distinct allegation in the article about which the plaintiff did not complain, and was not substantially different from that pleaded by the plaintiff in paragraphs 10(b) and (c) – and not more injurious. The application to strike out the whole of paragraphs 7 and 9 and that part of paragraph 8 of the amended defence which refers to paragraph 7, was dismissed.
The court's decision clarifies the principles governing the pleading of alternative meanings in defamation cases in the Northern Territory and is likely to be of relevance to practitioners in other jurisdictions. The court's approach to the pleading of alternative meanings is consistent with the approach taken in other Australian jurisdictions and the common law approach to defence meanings. The court's decision also highlights the importance of considering the specific circumstances of each case when determining whether a defendant's pleaded meaning is substantially different from and more injurious than the plaintiff's pleaded meaning.
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