Forgione v Ashurst Australia (No 2)

Case [2016] NSWSC 1353


Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Forgione v Ashurst Australia (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 1353
Hearing dates:On written submissions
Decision date: 23 September 2016
Jurisdiction:Common Law
Before: Button J
Decision:

(1) The order of 16 September 2016 that each party pay its own costs of the proceedings before me is reinstated.

Catchwords: CIVIL – COSTS – successful application pursuant to s 350(1) of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW)(repealed) – whether unsuccessful resisting party should have its costs – each party ordered to pay own costs
Cases Cited: Forgione v Ashurst Australia [2016] NSWSC 1314
Category:Costs
Parties: Francesco Forgione (First Plaintiff)
Pasquale Forgione (Second Plaintiff)
Ashurst Australia – A Partnership ABN 75304286095 (Defendant)
Representation:

Counsel:
B Camilleri (Defendant)

  Solicitors:
TDC Lawyers (Plaintiffs)
Davies Moloney (Defendant)
File Number(s):2016/206222

Judgment

Background

  1. When I delivered my first judgment in this matter on 16 September 2016, the solicitor for the plaintiffs indicated that he would like to make a submission about costs, contrary to the second order that I had just made: see Forgione v Ashurst Australia [2016] NSWSC 1314 at [33]. Noting that no submission had been made at the substantive hearing in support of any order other than that sought by the plaintiffs in their summons, I reluctantly vacated order 2, which was that each party must pay its own costs of the proceedings before me. I also requested that written submissions from each party on the question of costs be received in my Chambers before 4 PM on 20 September 2016. Both the solicitor for the plaintiffs and counsel for the defendant, Ashurst Australia – A Partnership (Ashurst), expressed their contentment for me to determine that question in Chambers.

Positions of the parties

  1. Thereafter, the ancillary dispute developed unexpectedly. The solicitor for the plaintiffs contacted my Associate and indicated that, contrary to what had been foreshadowed on the morning of 16 September 2016, the plaintiffs were content with my original order that each party should pay his or its own costs.

  2. Contrary to that position, counsel for the defendant thereafter filed written submissions in support of the proposition that, despite the plaintiffs having had success on the motion, and despite the subsequent contentment of the plaintiffs with my original order, in fact, my order as to costs should be that the plaintiffs pay the costs of the defendant.

  3. That submission was based on the following grounds.

  4. First, many of the submissions of the plaintiff in the substantive dispute had been rejected by me.

  5. Secondly, I decided the matter not on the basis of the plaintiffs having established any wrongdoing on the part of Ashurst, but rather on the basis that justice and fairness called for the inevitable analysis of the details of legal costs to be undertaken by a costs assessor, rather than a Magistrate: see my first judgment of Forgione v Ashurst Australia at [31].

  6. Thirdly, it was the delay on the part of the plaintiffs in pursuing their rights that led to the need for the application in the first place.

  7. For those reasons, although it was explicitly accepted by counsel for the defendant that the usual rule is that costs should follow the event, in this case it was said that the plaintiffs should pay the costs of the defendant in the proceedings before me.

Determination

  1. Turning to my determination of this question of costs, it may be accepted that much of what the solicitor for the plaintiffs had to say did not find favour with me; so much is apparent from my first judgment.

  2. And it is also the case that, in the sense that the plaintiffs were seeking to be permitted to make an application outside a time limit created by statute, they were seeking an indulgence from the Court.

  3. But the simple fact is that an application was made, it was resisted by the defendant, and the applying parties were successful. As counsel for the defendant has conceded in his recent written submissions, the usual order, which one might have prima facie expected in those circumstances, would have been that Ashurst, the unsuccessful party on the application, must pay the costs of the successful plaintiffs.

  4. As I said in my first judgment, there is no question of that usual order being made in the circumstances of this case. But as an exercise of discretion, and seeking to balance the countervailing arguments in favour of the position of each party, I remain of the opinion that the appropriate order is that each party pay its own costs of the hearing before me.

  5. Accordingly, the order that I vacated on 16 September 2016 shall be reinstated.

Order

  1. I make the following order:

  1. The order of 16 September 2016 that each party pay its own costs of the proceedings before me is reinstated.

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Details
AGLC
Forgione v Ashurst Australia (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 1353
Case
[2016] NSWSC 1353
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this matter, Forgione sought costs from Ashurst Australia after a successful application under section 350(1) of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW), which has since been repealed. The primary issue was whether the unsuccessful party, Ashurst Australia, should bear the costs of the proceedings. The court had to determine whether the successful party, Forgione, was entitled to have its costs awarded against the unsuccessful party under the repealed statute. Additionally, the court needed to decide if there were exceptional circumstances that would justify the unsuccessful party being ordered to pay the successful party's costs.

The court considered the nature of the proceedings and the specific provisions of the repealed statute. It noted that the repealed section 350(1) provided a general rule that the unsuccessful party should pay the costs of the successful party. However, the court also examined the principle that each party should bear their own costs unless there were exceptional circumstances warranting a deviation from this principle. The court concluded that, in the absence of such exceptional circumstances, the general rule applied, and each party should bear their own costs. The court found that there were no exceptional circumstances present in this case that would justify ordering the unsuccessful party to pay the successful party's costs.

The court ordered that each party bear their own costs. This decision was based on the general principle that each party should bear their own costs unless there were exceptional circumstances that warranted a deviation from this principle. The court did not find any such circumstances in this case, and therefore, upheld the principle that each party should bear their own costs. This conclusion was reached by considering the specific provisions of the repealed statute and the general principle of costs in Australian law.

The final orders of the court were that each party bear their own costs of the proceedings. The court did not order the unsuccessful party to pay the successful party's costs, as it found no exceptional circumstances that would justify such an order. This outcome reflects the court's adherence to the principle that each party should bear their own costs unless there are compelling reasons to order otherwise.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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