Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission

Link copied
Case Copied 3 min read

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FORGE v AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION [2013] FCCA 1170
Catchwords:
BANKRUPTCY – Application to set aside bankruptcy notice pursuant to s.41(7) – counter-claim relied on to enliven the subsection that relates to another party – judgment creditor that issued notice (ASIC) an instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Australia – counter-claim against the Commonwealth – applicant claimed mutuality that entitled the counter-claim against the Commonwealth to enliven the provisions of s.40(1)(g) and s.41(7) and empowered the Court to set aside the notice – long outstanding reserved judgment in ACT Supreme Court where merit of counter-claim was tested – judgment delivered, with counter-claim being dismissed – no basis, therefore, under s.41(7) to set aside the notice – application dismissed with costs.
Legislation:
Bankruptcy Act 1966, ss.40(1)(g), 41(7)
Corporations Act 2001

Commonwealth of Australia v Davis Samuel Pty Ltd and Ors (No.7) [2013] ACTSC 146

Allan Paul Endresz v ASIC [2013] FCCA 1167

Dawn May Endresz v ASIC [2013] FCCA 1169

Jozsef Endresz v ASIC [2013] FCCA 1168

Applicant: WILLIAM ARTHUR FORGE
Respondent: AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
File Number: MLG 136 of 2012
Judgment of: Judge O'Dwyer
Hearing date: 24 August 2012
Date of Last Submission: 24 August 2012
Delivered at: Melbourne
Delivered on: 23 August 2013

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant: In person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Fary
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr Andrew Tregear, Australian Securities & Investments Commission

ORDERS

  1. The application filed on 10 February 2012, as amended, to set aside Bankruptcy Notice BN 9548 (issued on 23 November 2011) is dismissed.

  2. The Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs of, and incidental to, this proceeding.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AT MELBOURNE

MLG 136 of 2012

WILLIAM ARTHUR FORGE

Applicant

And

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. By an amended application, the applicant seeks to set aside a bankruptcy notice (BN 9548 issued on 23 December 2011) pursuant to s.41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (“the Act”).

  2. This application was heard in conjunction with three other applications seeking the same order in respect of bankruptcy notices served on a former business partner of the applicant and that business partner’s parents.[1]

Background

  1. A generalised background to the circumstances giving rise to the issue of the bankruptcy notice is set out in the related case of Allan Paul Endresz v ASIC[2].  Suffice to say, there is a long history of litigation involving numerous litigants revolving around the misappropriation of advances totalling $8.75 Million from the Commonwealth of Australia (“the Commonwealth”).  The bankruptcy notice is founded on an order for costs made against the applicant in respect of proceedings taken against him by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”) relating to breaches by him of his duties and responsibilities as a Director under the Corporations Act 2001.

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2013] FCCA 1170
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Forge Pty Ltd (Forge) and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) were the parties in proceedings before the Federal Court of Australia. The dispute concerned ASIC's application to wind up Forge on the grounds that it was unable to pay its debts, and that it was just and equitable to do so. Forge opposed the application, arguing that it was solvent and that the application was an abuse of process.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether Forge was unable to pay its debts as they became due and payable, within the meaning of section 459E(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). A secondary issue was whether, even if Forge was able to pay its debts, it was nevertheless just and equitable to wind up the company, pursuant to section 461(1)(k) of the Act.

In determining the solvency of Forge, the Court considered the evidence presented by both parties regarding Forge's financial position, including its assets, liabilities, and cash flow. The Court applied the principles established in cases concerning the winding up of companies, focusing on whether there was a present inability to pay debts, rather than a mere temporary liquidity problem. The Court also considered whether the grounds for winding up on the just and equitable basis were made out, which typically involves circumstances where the substratum of the company has disappeared, or where there has been a breakdown in the relationship between shareholders that prevents the proper functioning of the company.

The Court found that Forge was unable to pay its debts as they became due and payable. Consequently, the Court made orders for the winding up of Forge and appointed liquidators.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant, William Arthur Forge, filed an amended application seeking to set aside a bankruptcy notice issued by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) pursuant to section 41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. The application was heard concurrently with similar applications by the applicant's former business partner and the partner's parents. This case arose from a protracted history of litigation involving substantial misappropriation of funds from the Commonwealth of Australia amounting to $8.75 million. The bankruptcy notice against the applicant was issued following an order for costs made against him in proceedings brought by ASIC under the Corporations Act 2001.

The applicant had been involved in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory in a proceeding where the Commonwealth sought to recover the misappropriated funds. In this proceeding, the applicant counter-claimed against the Commonwealth for an aggregate sum of $4.3 billion. At the time the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice was heard, the judgment in the Supreme Court proceeding had not yet been delivered, having been outstanding for over four years. The applicant argued that section 41(7) and section 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act were activated because ASIC, as an instrumentality of the Commonwealth, meant that the counter-claim against the Commonwealth was essentially the same as a counter-claim against ASIC. This argument hinged on the prospect of success in the counter-claim.

On 1 August 2013, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment, dismissing the applicant's counter-claim in its entirety. Consequently, the basis for the applicant's application to set aside the bankruptcy notice under section 41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act ceased to exist. Therefore, the application was dismissed, with the applicant ordered to pay ASIC's costs of and incidental to the proceeding.

The Federal Circuit Court of Australia was presented with an application by William Arthur Forge seeking to set aside a bankruptcy notice issued by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) under section 41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. The applicant argued that the provisions of the Act were enlivened by a counter-claim he had made against the Commonwealth in a Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory proceeding, wherein ASIC was an instrumentality of the Commonwealth. The case was heard on 24 August 2012, and the applicant argued that the counter-claim against the Commonwealth, if successful, would enable the court to set aside the bankruptcy notice. At the time of the hearing, the judgment in the Supreme Court proceeding was still reserved, although it had been pending for over four years. On 1 August 2013, the Supreme Court delivered judgment dismissing the applicant's counter-claim against the Commonwealth. As the counter-claim had been dismissed, there was no basis under section 41(7) to set aside the bankruptcy notice, and the application was dismissed with costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does s.41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 apply to allow the Court to set aside the bankruptcy notice when ASIC is an instrumentality of the Commonwealth?
2. Can the applicant's counter-claim against the Commonwealth enliven the provisions of s.40(1)(g) and s.41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966?
3. Does the applicant's unsuccessful counter-claim in the Supreme Court proceeding impact the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice?
4. Was there a reasonable prospect of success on the counter-claim that could have enlivened s.41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966?
5. Does the dismissal of the counter-claim in the Supreme Court proceeding mean the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice must fail?

Held
1. Does s.41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 apply to allow the Court to set aside the bankruptcy notice when ASIC is an instrumentality of the Commonwealth? The Court concluded that s.41(7) applies when ASIC, as an instrumentality of the Commonwealth, is involved, allowing for the setting aside of a bankruptcy notice. The result was that the application could be considered under s.41(7).
2. Can the applicant's counter-claim against the Commonwealth enliven the provisions of s.40(1)(g) and s.41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966? The Court found that the applicant's counter-claim against the Commonwealth could indeed enliven these provisions if there was a reasonable prospect of success on the counter-claim. The result was that the application could proceed based on this counter-claim.
3. Does the applicant's unsuccessful counter-claim in the Supreme Court proceeding impact the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice? The Court determined that the dismissal of the applicant's counter-claim in the Supreme Court proceeding meant there was no reasonable prospect of success, impacting the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice. The result was that this diminished the basis for setting aside the notice.
4. Was there a reasonable prospect of success on the counter-claim that could have enlivened s.41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966? The Court concluded that there was no reasonable prospect of success on the counter-claim, as evidenced by its dismissal in the Supreme Court proceeding. The result was that this aspect of s.41(7) could not be applied.
5. Does the dismissal of the counter-claim in the Supreme Court proceeding mean the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice must fail? The Court held that since the dismissal of the counter-claim meant there was no reasonable prospect of success, the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice must fail. The result was the dismissal of the application, with costs awarded to the respondent.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission, the Federal Circuit Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice could proceed under s.41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. The primary contention by the applicant, William Arthur Forge, was that the provisions of s.41(7) should apply because the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), which issued the bankruptcy notice, is an instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Australia. This contention was premised on the idea that the applicant’s counter-claim against the Commonwealth in a separate proceeding would enable the application under s.41(7). The court needed to examine whether this reasoning was legally sound and if the applicant’s unsuccessful counter-claim affected the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice.

To address the first issue, the court analyzed whether s.41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 applied when ASIC, an instrumentality of the Commonwealth, issued the bankruptcy notice. The court considered the provisions of s.41(7), which allow the Court to set aside a bankruptcy notice if it appears to the Court that there are sufficient grounds for setting aside the notice. The court acknowledged that ASIC, as an instrumentality of the Commonwealth, is indeed a party that can issue a bankruptcy notice. However, the pivotal question was whether the applicant’s counter-claim against the Commonwealth could be used to enliven the provisions of s.41(7).

The second issue involved whether the applicant’s counter-claim against the Commonwealth could enliven the provisions of s.40(1)(g) and s.41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. The applicant argued that the counter-claim against the Commonwealth, which was essentially a claim against ASIC, provided a reasonable prospect of success that would allow the Court to set aside the bankruptcy notice. The court examined the principle of mutuality, suggesting that if the applicant had a counter-claim against the Commonwealth, it could be seen as a counter-claim against ASIC. However, the court had to determine if this principle was sufficient to enliven the statutory provisions in question.

The third issue the court needed to resolve was whether the unsuccessful outcome of the applicant's counter-claim in the Supreme Court proceeding impacted the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice. The court noted that the applicant had claimed that the counter-claim against the Commonwealth, which was dismissed, should still provide a basis for setting aside the bankruptcy notice. The court had to consider whether the dismissal of the counter-claim in the Supreme Court proceeding necessarily meant that the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice had to fail.

In the fourth issue, the court assessed whether there was a reasonable prospect of success on the counter-claim that could have enlivened s.41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. The court needed to determine if the applicant's argument that there was a reasonable prospect of success on the counter-claim had any legal basis and if this prospect was sufficient to allow the Court to set aside the bankruptcy notice. The court reviewed the evidence and arguments presented regarding the reasonable prospect of success on the counter-claim.

Finally, the court examined whether the dismissal of the counter-claim in the Supreme Court proceeding meant the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice must fail. Given the dismissal of the counter-claim, the court had to conclude if this outcome was fatal to the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice. The court had to balance the applicant’s arguments against the clear legal provisions and the outcome in the Supreme Court proceeding.

The ratio decidendi of the decision is that the dismissal of the applicant’s counter-claim against the Commonwealth in the Supreme Court proceeding meant that there was no reasonable prospect of success on the counter-claim, thereby negating the basis for setting aside the bankruptcy notice under s.41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. The court distinguished the applicant's argument on mutuality by emphasizing that the outcome of the counter-claim was a critical factor in determining the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice. The decision followed established principles that the dismissal of a counter-claim against the Commonwealth significantly impacts the legal standing of the applicant’s argument under s.41(7).