Forestry Corporation of New South Wales v South East Forest Rescue Incorporated

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales concerning the standing of South East Forest Rescue Incorporated to bring civil enforcement proceedings against the Forestry Corporation of New South Wales. The dispute arose from the Forestry Corporation's conduct of forestry operations under an integrated forestry operations approval, with South East Forest Rescue seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The primary judge had found that South East Forest Rescue lacked standing due to not possessing a "special interest" in the subject matter of the proceedings.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that, on the proper construction of Part 5B of the *Forestry Act 2012* (NSW) and cognate provisions of the *Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016* (NSW), private persons or entities with a special interest in the subject matter of proceedings have standing to enforce duties and obligations imposed by an integrated forestry operations approval. This involved interpreting section 69ZA of the *Forestry Act 2012* (NSW), which limited certain actions in respect of provisions of the Act that give any person a right to institute proceedings to remedy or restrain a breach, whether or not their rights were infringed.

The High Court reasoned that legislative history and extrinsic materials could not displace the plain meaning of the statutory text. While acknowledging that the provisions in question were clearly directed at partially disapplying open standing provisions found in other environmental legislation, the Court found no clear and unmistakeable intention within section 69ZA or the balance of Part 5B and the cognate provisions of the *Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016* (NSW) to exclude persons whose private rights were affected by a breach of an obligation, or those with a special interest in the subject matter of enforcement proceedings. Applying the rule of construction that any inference of withdrawal or limitation of access to the court must be clear and unmistakeable, the Court concluded that such an intention was not demonstrated.

Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal with costs.