Ford v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue

[2009] NSWADT 192

CITATION:	Ford v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2009] NSWADT 192
DIVISION:	Revenue Division
PARTIES:	APPLICANT Simon John Ford REPSONDENT Chief Commissioner of State Revenue
FILE NUMBER:	096005
HEARING DATES:	3 July 2009
SUBMISSIONS CLOSED:	3 July 2009
DATE OF DECISION:	22 July 2009
BEFORE:	Handley R - Deputy President
CATCHWORDS:	Land Tax exemption – principal place of residence
LEGISLATION CITED:	Land Tax Management Act 1956 Taxation Administration Act 1996 Interpretation Act 1987 Duties Act 1997
CASES CITED:	Ryan & anor v Commissioner of Land Tax [1982] 1 NSWLR 305 Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Coleman [2007] NSWSC 625 Chief Commissioner v McGrath [2008] NSWSC 387 Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Sacco [2008] NSWADTAP 61Castle v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2008] NSWADTAP 62Aoun Investments v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2006] NSWSC 1394 Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Timbs [2006] NSWADTAP 25
REPRESENTATION:	APPLICANT S Ingate, solicitor RESPONDENT I Mescher, counsel
ORDERS:	The Land Tax assessments under review are confirmed.

1 Simon Ford (‘otherwise referred to as the Applicant’) has applied to the Tribunal for the review of decisions of the Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (‘the Respondent’), disallowing Mr Ford’s objections to notices assessing him as being liable for the payment of Land Tax on a property in Greenwich on the ground that it was not his principal place of residence at the relevant times.

Background

2 Mr Ford and his wife, Julie Ford, purchased a property at 5 George Street, Greenwich in their joint names in November 1993. In September 1995, they transferred the property into Mrs Ford’s name alone. In September 1996, Mr Ford purchased 1 George Street. In September 1999, he purchased the adjacent property 1 Gother Avenue, and in November 2004, he purchased 3 George Street. These four properties comprise the land at the corner of George Street and Gother Avenue, Greenwich.

3 Initially, Mr and Mrs Ford and their children occupied 5 George St as their family home. Mr Ford was then posted to London by his employer, and he and his family were absent from Sydney, living in London, for some years, returning in about January 2006. On their return, they recommenced living at 5 George St where they have lived ever since. Mr and Mrs Ford have four children, and the reason for Mr Ford purchasing the adjacent properties was to enable him and his wife to extend the house and garden of 5 George St. After discussions with an architect, a preliminary development application to extend the house at 5 George St onto the land at 3 George St was lodged with the Council on 28 March 2006. Initially, excess furniture that could not be accommodated in 5 George St was stored in the house at 3 George St. In late June 2006, Mr Ford engaged a contractor to demolish the house at 3 George St, and the demolition of the house and the clearance of the site were completed by August 2006. In April 2007, the house at 1 Gother Ave was also demolished.

4 The development application for the extension of 5 George St was approved by May 2007 and excavation of the site commenced on 20 June 2007. Building work continued through 2008 and was finally completed by late December 2008. On 2 July 2009, the Council issued an interim occupation certificate.

5 On 18 July 2007, the Department of Lands registered the consolidation of the parcels of land for 3 and 5 George St and 1 Gother Ave as lot 2 in DP (Deposited Plan) 1112148. The consolidation was a requirement of the Council. 1 George St was not included in the consolidation and continues to be identified separately as lot 1 (although there appears to have been a small adjustment of the boundaries between the former 3 George St and 1 George St). The title to lot 2 was held by Mrs Ford as to the part formerly comprising 5 George St and by Mr Ford as to the part formerly comprising 3 George St and 1 Gother Ave. Mr Ford holds the title to lot 1 (1 George St).

6 On 30 June 2008, Mr Ford transferred that part of lot 2 formerly comprising 3 George St together with that part formerly comprising 1 Gother Ave to himself and Mrs Ford as joint tenants, and Mrs Ford transferred 5 George St to herself and Mr Ford as joint tenants, thereby consolidating the title to lot 2 in DP 1112148 so that Mr and Mrs Ford became the registered owners of the whole of lot 2 as joint tenants.

7 On 15 January 2007, the Office of State Revenue (‘OSR’) issued a Land Tax notice of assessment to Mr Ford for the 2007 Land Tax year, which was subsequently varied and re-issued on 19 March 2007. The OSR refused Mr Ford’s request for a principal place of residence (‘PPR’) exemption for 3 George St. (A notice of assessment issued to Mrs Ford on 17 January 2007 granted a PPR exemption for 5 George St.) Mr Ford’s objection to his assessment, lodged on 19 February 2008, was not accepted as a valid objection on the ground that it was out of time. It was, however, treated as a request for a reassessment of tax liability pursuant to s 9 of the Taxation Administration Act 1996 (‘TAA’), but that request was disallowed on 6 May 2008 on the ground that there was no unity of title between 1 Gother Ave and 3 and 5 George St.

8 On 16 June 2008, the OSR issued a Land Tax notice of assessment to Mrs Ford for the 2008 Land Tax year granting a PPR exemption in respect of 5 George St.

9 On 18 June 2008, Mr Ford lodged an objection to the OSR’s decision of 6 May 2008 (in respect of the 2007 Land Tax year), which was disallowed on 25 July 2008.

10 On 30 July 2008, the OSR issued a Land Tax notice of assessment to Mr Ford for the 2008 Land Tax year, refusing the grant of a PPR exemption for 3 George St (which as of 31 December 2007 incorporated 1 Gother Ave). Mr Ford’s objection to this assessment, lodged on 4 September 2008, was disallowed on 14 November 2008.

11 On 13 January 2009, Mr Ford applied to the Tribunal for a review of both the 2007 and 2008 Land Tax assessments.

The Relevant Legislation

12 Pursuant to section 100(3) of the TAA, an applicant for review bears the onus of proving his/her case in the Tribunal.

13 The applicable provisions of the Land Tax Management Act 1956 (‘the LTMA’) were identical for the 2007 and 2008 Land Tax years in issue in this case. Pursuant to sections 7, 8 and 9 of the LTMA, Land Tax was chargeable on the taxable value of land that was not exempt based on the ownership of the land as at midnight on the 31 December of each preceding year for which Land Tax was to be levied. Thus, Mr Ford, being the registered owner of 3 George St, was presumed to be liable for Land Tax on that land for the 2007 and 2008 Land Tax years based on his ownership of the land on 31 December of each preceding year, unless the land was exempt from tax.

14 Section 10(1) of the LTMA provides, relevantly, that except where otherwise provided in the Act, certain lands shall be exempted from taxation under the Act, including:

(r) land that is exempt from taxation under the principal place of residence exemption, as provided for by Schedule 1.

15 The following definitions are included in section 3(1):

" principal place of residence " of a person means the one place of residence that is, among the one or more places of residence of the person within and outside Australia, the principal place of residence of the person.

"Joint owners" means persons who own land jointly or in common, whether as partners or otherwise, and includes persons who have a life or greater interest in shares of the income from the land and persons who by virtue of this Act are deemed to be joint owners.

16 Schedule 1A of the LTMA provides relevantly:

Part 1 - Preliminary

1 Definitions

(1) In this Schedule:

"principal place of residence exemption" – see clause 2.

"residential land" - see clause 3.

"strata lot" means a lot under the Strata Schemes (Freehold Development) Act 1973 or the Strata Schemes (Leasehold Development) Act 1986 .

"taxing date" - means midnight on the thirty-first day of December.

(2) For the purposes of this Schedule, a reference to the owner of land includes, if there are joint owners, any one or more of those joint owners.

Part 2 - Principal place of residence exemption

2 Principal place of residence exemption

(1) Land used and occupied by the owner as the principal place of residence of the owner of the land, and for no other purpose, is exempt from taxation under this Act, in respect of the year commencing 1 January 2005 or any succeeding year, if the land is:


(a) a parcel of residential land, or

(b) a strata lot or, subject to this Schedule, land comprised of 2 or more strata lots.




(2) Land is not used and occupied as the principal place of residence of a person unless:


(a) the land, and no other land, has been continuously used and occupied by the person for residential purposes and for no other purposes since 1 July in the year preceding the tax year in which land tax is levied, or

(b) in any other case, the Chief Commissioner is satisfied that the land is used and occupied by the person as the person’s principal place of residence.




3 Residential land meaning

(1) In this Schedule, "residential land" means land that is used and occupied for residential purposes and for no other purpose, that use and occupation being use and occupation of a building or buildings designed, constructed or adapted for residential purposes, ...

17 Clause 12 provides that for the purposes of the PPR exemption, only one residence may be treated as PPR of all members of the same family. ‘Family’ is defined as meaning a person and his/her spouse, and the dependent children who ordinarily reside with them.

18 Mr Ford objects to the assessment of 3 George St for Land Tax for the 2007 and 2008 Land Tax years on the ground that the land was exempt by reason of the PPR exemption. The PPR exemption sought for the 2008 Land Tax year is for 3 George St incorporating 1 Gother Ave, title to both properties having been held by Mr Ford prior to the consolidation of the three parcels of land on 18 July 2007. The Respondent submits that the PPR exemption was not applicable to 3 George St for either the 2007 or 2008 Land Tax years.

Jurisdictional Issue

19 The Respondent has noted that in respect of the 2007 Land Tax notice of assessment, Mr Ford’s application to the Tribunal was made more than 60 days after the OSR decision dated 6 May 2008. The application was lodged on 13 January 2009, four months out of time. Pursuant to section 99(1) of the TAA, an objection must be made not later than 60 days after the issue of the notice of assessment. However, the subsection also allows the Tribunal to permit an application to be made after the 60 day period:

99(1) An application for review following a determination by the Chief Commissioner of an objection must be made not later than 60 days after the date of issue of the notice of the Chief Commissioner’s determination of the objection. The court or tribunal to which the application is to be made may allow a person to apply for a review after that 60-day period.

20 Mr Ingate explained that there had been a delay in lodging an objection to the OSR assessment because on 17 March 2007, the OSR, after contacting Mrs Ford, varied and re-issued the notice of assessment issued to Mr Ford, who paid the assessed amount. This was done without the OSR informing Mr Ingate, who had been dealing with the matter on Mr Ford’s behalf. Mr Ingate said as soon as he became aware of what had occurred, he lodged an objection on Mr Ford’s behalf. Pursuant to section 90(1) of the TAA, the Respondent has a discretion to permit an objection to be made out of time – that is outside the 60 days permitted for lodging an objection to an assessment under section 89(1). When, on 6 May 2008, the OSR refused to accept the objection out of time, Mr Ingate objected to this by letter dated 18 June 2008.

21 By letter dated 25 July 2008, the OSR said it was treating Mr Ingate’s letter as a request for a reassessment under section 9 of the TAA and not as a valid objection. It was open to the OSR to have accepted the objection out of time pursuant to section 86(3) of the TAA. However, for practical purposes the treatment of Mr Ingate’s letter as a request for a reassessment was essentially similar to accepting it as an objection out of time.

22 Returning to the issue of Mr Ford’s application to the Tribunal being out of time, Mr Mescher said the Respondent neither consents nor objects to the Tribunal exercising the section 99(1) discretion to allow the application to be made outside the 60 day period. I note that a few days after receiving receiving the OSR’s letter dated 25 July 2008, Mr Ford received an assessment for the 2008 Land Tax year – the assessment was dated 30 July 2008. There then followed correspondence between the parties over the next five months about the PPR exemption claimed by Mr Ford.

23 I am satisfied that there is no prejudice to the Respondent from my exercising the section 99(1) discretion to allow Mr Ford’s application to the Tribunal to be made outside the 60 day period. At the same time, I am satisfied that there would be prejudice to Mr Ford if the discretion were not exercised. Noting that the factual situation as at 31 December 2006 and 31 December 2007 was part of a continuum, in my view it is appropriate to exercise the discretion in this case and allow Mr Ford’s application to be made out of time.

The Applicant’s Evidence

24 Mr Ford provided a statutory declaration dated 3 July 2009 and gave oral evidence at the hearing. I have summarised that evidence where relevant below. In addition, Mr Ford provided photographs of the demolition, excavation and construction work involved in the project, a photograph of a model of the extended house at 5 George St used in discussions with neighbours, a copy of DP 1112148, referred to above, copies of the Land Tax notices of assessment issued to Mrs Ford for the 2007 and 2008 Land Tax years, and copies of correspondence between the parties.

25 Mr Ford said he was overseas at the time he purchased the property at 3 George St at auction on 6 November 2004. An agent subsequently inspected the property and advised that it was uninhabitable, there being no kitchen and only an outside toilet, and much of the building being constructed of “fibro”. It was waterproof but could not be rented out. When Mr Ford and his family returned to Sydney in January 2006 and reoccupied 5 George St, they initially used the house at 3 George St to store their excess furniture, their having had a larger house in London. When 3 George St was demolished, they stored their furniture elsewhere.

26 Mr Ford said they removed a section of the fence between 5 and 3 George St to allow continual and uninhibited access between the two properties, leaving a section of fence of eight to 10 metres, comprising 15 to 20% of the total length, towards the rear end of the boundary because of a difference in the ground levels and to prevent someone falling. Removing the majority of the fence allowed the children and the family dog “to roam over the land surrounding our home”. The remainder of the fence between the two properties, together with the fence between 1 Gother Ave and the rear of 5 and 3 George St, were removed in April 2007 when the house at 1 Gother Ave was demolished. When excavation work for extending the house at 5 George St onto 3 George St commenced in about June 2007 the site was surrounded by a safety fence. Mr Ford provided photographs of the excavation work.

27 Mr Ford said he and his wife had discussions with their architect about extending 5 George St and on 28 March 2006 lodged a preliminary development application with the Council. They engaged a demolition contractor to demolish 3 George St in June 2006. Mr Ford produced photographs of the demolition work being undertaken in August 2006. The work was completed and debris removed in time for the erection of a large marque between 5 and 3 George St for Mr Ford’s 50th birthday celebrations on 26 August 2006. As at 31 December 2006, 3 George St was vacant land used by the Ford family as an extension of their back yard.

28 Mr Ford said the processing of the development application was delayed because of a requirement to have the Aboriginal Land Council inspect the land and to facilitate a tree inspection. It was finally approved by about May 2007, and excavation of the land for the construction work, extending into 3 George St, commenced in June 2007. By December 2007, the construction work was progressing well, including the laying of the ground floor slab and removal of sections of the walls of 5 George St. Mr Ford provided photographs of the work in progress on 7 December 2007. Worked continued through 2008 and was finally completed by the end of December 2008. Notwithstanding the ongoing construction work, Mr and Mrs Ford and their family continued to live at 5 George St throughout this period. An interim occupation certificate for the work undertaken pursuant to the development consent was obtained on 2 July 2009.

The Respondent’s Evidence

29 In addition to the documents produced pursuant to section 58 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997, the Respondent also provided a copy of the Land Tax notices of assessment issued to Mrs Ford for the 2007 and 2008 Land tax years, and a copy of the Deed of Transfer dated 30 June 2008 by which Mr Ford transferred the title to 3 George St to himself and Mrs Ford as joint tenants.

Submissions

30 Mr Ingate provided written submissions filed on 1 June 2009 and further written submissions dated 3 July 2009 at the hearing, when he also made oral submissions. At the hearing, Mr Ingate confirmed that the PPR exemption sought by Mr Ford for the 2008 Land Tax year includes that part of lot 2 which was formerly 3 George St together with that part which was formerly 1 Gother Ave. As at 31 December 2006, 1 Gother Ave was tenanted and Mr Ford does not object to the payment of Land Tax for that land for the 2007 Land Tax year. The house at 1 Gother Ave was demolished about April 2007. On 31 December 2007, 1 Gother Ave was vacant land that had been amalgamated into lot 2. The house at 1 George St has not been demolished and Mr Ford does not dispute the assessment of Land Tax in respect of that land. Mr Ingate also said the Applicant was no longer relying on the Schedule 1A clause 6 concession for unoccupied land intended to be the owner’s PPR, and was not pressing his application for costs. These issues are not, therefore, referred to below.

31 Mr Mescher provided written submissions filed on 12 May 2009, further written submissions filed on 18 June 2009, and made oral submissions at the hearing.

The Applicant’s Submissions

32 Mr Ingate submitted that the decision in Ryan & anor v Commissioner of Land Tax [1982] 1 NSWLR 305 (‘Ryan’) can be distinguished on the facts, and on the basis of the statutory context and further judicial developments. He disputed the Respondent’s contention that the principles in Ryan must be strictly complied with and submitted that this was not what Handley AJ said in Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Coleman [2007] NSWSC 625 (‘Coleman’), who referred with approval, at [20], to the Judicial Member at first instance stating that “the conditions in Ryan’s case had to be complied with precisely”. Moreover, the facts of Coleman involved two buildings whereas in Mr Ford’s case there is only one.

33 Mr Ingate said there is no reference to ‘unity of title’ in Ryan. The reference there was to the title being ‘undivided’. In the present case, the title cannot be divided. He submitted that the title does not have to be one title. It simply has to be ‘undivided’. In the present case, “it is undivisible and Ryan should be so distinguished” (written submissions at [19]).

34 Since Ryan was decided in 1982, there have been statutory developments including the enactment of the Interpretation Act 1987, which, in section 8(b), states “a reference to a word or expression in the singular form includes a reference to a word of expression in the plural form”. Thus, a reference to a ‘parcel of land’ includes parcels of land: Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Timbs [2006] NSWADTAP 25, particularly at [26]. Mr Ingate submitted that in Mr Ford’s case, while there were two parcels of land for the 2007 Land Tax year, there was only one parcel of land for the 2008 Land Tax year created by the Department of Lands upon registration of DP 1112148 on 18 July 2007. For both Land Tax years, however, the tests set out in Ryan are not applicable.

35 Mr Ingate submitted that the decision in Aoun Investments v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2006] NSWSC 1394 (‘Aoun’) relied upon by the Respondent does not apply here. This was a decision under the Duties Act 1997, not the LTMA, and should be distinguished. Unlike section 9 of the Duties Act, the LTMA does not define the word ‘jointly’, which should be given its ordinary meaning of ‘together’. The exempting provisions of the LTMA should not be narrowly construed so as to defeat the purpose or object of the provision (Interpretation Act 1987, section 33). Mr and Mrs Ford should be considered to ‘jointly’ own lot 2 in DP 1112148.

The Respondent’s Submissions

36 Mr Mescher referred to the principles set out by Hunt J in Ryan, at 310:

“contiguous blocks of land can comprise a ‘parcel of residential land’ within s 10(1)(r)(ii) only where they are undivided not only be physical separation but also in use, occupation and title.”

37 Mr Mescher said that these principles must be strictly applied: see, for example, Coleman at [20]. In Mr Ford’s case, given that he lived at 5 George St with his wife and family from about January 2006, and initially 3 George St comprised a separate contiguous lot, Mr Ford bears the onus of showing that the Ryan principles are satisfied. However, at the very least, it is clear that the title as between 5 and 3 George St was divided during 2006 and 2007, 5 George St being held by Mrs Ford and 3 George St by Mr Ford. It was on the basis of lack of unity of title that the taxpayer failed in Ryan. So equally, given that Mrs Ford was granted the PPR exemption for the 2007 and 2008 Land Tax years, Mr Ford’s claim for an exemption must fail.

38 Mr Mescher also noted the evidence that 3 George St was uninhabitable in 2006 prior to its demolition and was not used for ‘residential purposes’. He submitted that there was no unity of occupation or continuous use with 5 George St and insufficient evidence of lack of physical separation. He said the factual situation was similar to that in Chief Commissioner v McGrath [2008] NSWSC 387, where the McGraths failed to succeed in their claim for a PPR exemption for the adjoining land which they had purchased, on the ground that it was not being used for residential purposes.

39 With regard to physical separation, Mr Mescher referred to the decision in Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Sacco [2008] NSWADTAP 61, at [39], where the Appeal Panel said that the words ‘undivided by physical separation’ “must, at least, bear the connotation ‘significantly’ or ‘substantially’ undivided”, so that a gap in the fence between the two properties would not satisfy this requirement. In Castle v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2008] NSWADTAP 62, at [22], the Appeal Panel said “there must, at least, be a substantial lack of physical division at the boundary for contiguous land to be found to be part of an overall parcel of residential land”.

40 The Respondent contends the evidence suggests that after the demolition of the house on 3 George St in August 2006, it comprised vacant land until construction work commenced in 2007. When building work commenced in June 2007, 3 George St became a construction site. Thus, neither on 31 December 2006 nor on 31 December 2007 was 3 George St used for residential purposes: Coleman. Relevantly, if it was vacant land as at 31 December 2006, or a construction site on 31 December 2007, it did not comprise ‘residential land’ within the meaning of clause 3(1) of Schedule 1A and so did not attract the PPR exemption.

41 Mr Mescher said that it appears that the exemption sought by Mr Ford for the 2008 Land Tax year is in respect of the whole of the consolidation of 5 George St, 3 George St and 1 Gother Ave, comprising lot 2 in DP 1112148. The Respondent submits that as at 31 December 2007, the registered proprietors of this lot were Mr Ford, as to the part formerly comprising 3 George St and 1 Gother Ave, and Mrs Ford as to the part formerly comprising 5 George St. Mr Ford was not a ‘joint owner’ of lot 2 within the meaning of the term set out in section 3(1) of the LTMA. Mr Ford did not hold the land jointly or in common: the reference in the section 3(1) definition to ‘jointly’ should be interpreted as a reference to persons holding land as ‘joint tenants’. Rather, Mr Ford and his wife owned lot 2 in severalty. (See Aoun at [29]ff.) There was no unity of title. Thus, given that Mrs Ford was granted a PPR exemption for what was formerly 5 George St, Mr Ford is not entitled to a PPR exemption for lot 2 for the 2008 Land Tax year. Mr Mescher noted that the title to lot 2 was not unified until 30 June 2008 when Mr and Mrs Ford became joint tenants of the whole of lot 2.

Consideration

42 Central to this matter is whether the principles set out by Hunt J in Ryan apply. The Respondent submits that those principles apply. The Applicant submits that Ryan can be distinguished on its facts. In that case, Mr and Mrs Ryan jointly purchased one block of land and Mr Ryan purchased the contiguous block. A large house was constructed on the first block and the second block was used as a garden for the house on the first block. There was no physical separation between the two blocks and Hunt J found that both blocks had been used and occupied together at all times as the one residential area. Mr Ryan relied on a PPR exemption similar to that in issue in the current matter in respect of ‘residential land’. ‘Residential land’ was defined in almost identical terms to the current definition in section 3(1) of the LTMA, meaning “land that is used and occupied for residential purposes and for no other purpose, that use and occupation being use and occupation of a building or buildings designed, constructed or adapted for residential purposes ...”.

43 Hunt J stated, at 310, that:

“contiguous blocks of land can comprise a ‘parcel of residential land’ within s 10(1)(r)(ii) only where they are undivided not only be physical separation but also in use, occupation and title.”

44 That decision has been followed and the principles applied in cases in both the Supreme Court and the Tribunal. For example, in Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Coleman [2007] NSWSC 713, Handley AJ approved the application of the principles at first instance by a Judicial Member of the Tribunal – who said that the Principles in Ryan “must be complied with precisely”, and allowed an appeal against the Appeal Panel decision which held that the Judicial Member’s analysis was “too precise”. I note that the decision in Coleman post-dated the enactment of the Interpretation Act 1987 to which Mr Ingate referred. The Ryan principles were also applied in McGrath, although the relevant issue in that case was the ‘use’ of the adjoining land.

45 In my view, the principles in Ryan apply in this matter so that to constitute a parcel of ‘residential land’ title to the land must be undivided. This was not the case on either of the relevant Land Tax dates, 31 December 2006 or 31 December 2007. The title to the land formerly comprising 3 George St, which from 18 July 2007 comprised part of lot 2 in DP 21112148, was not consolidated until 30 June 2008.

46 I note that pursuant to clause 1(2) of Schedule 1A, the reference to ‘owner’ in the Schedule includes a reference to any one or more of joint owners of land. Mr Ford was not a joint owner of lot 2 for the 2008 Land Tax year. In my view, the reference to ‘joint owner’ must be construed as a reference to a person who holds the whole of the land as a joint tenant (or, in accordance with the definition, as a tenant in common) and not, as in Mr Ford’s case, a person who holds only a part of the land. I agree with the Respondent that Mr and Mrs Ford owned lot 2 in severalty: Aoun. I am not satisfied that this interpretation – which is by reference to the two usual forms of joint ownership - is one that defeats the purpose or object of the LTMA.

47 I also note that from June 2007 when excavation work on the site commenced, until late December 1998 when the construction work was completed, the land formerly comprising 3 George St was not ‘residential land’ within the meaning of this term in clause 3(1) of Schedule 1A – and, therefore, relevantly at 31 December 2007, the taxing date for the 2008 Land Tax year. As at 31 December 2006, the taxing date for the 2007 Land Tax year, the evidence supports a finding that 3 George St was used as part of the garden of 5 George St and was not physically separated. However, because of the application of the Ryan principles on the issue of title, that does not assist the Applicant.

Decision

48 In conclusion, I am not satisfied that the Applicant has established that the PPR exemption is applicable to the land at 3 George St for either the 2007 or 2008 Land Tax years. The Land Tax assessments under review must therefore be confirmed.