Ford and Bell

Case [2011] FMCAfam 635


FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FORD & BELL [2011] FMCAfam 635
FAMILY LAW – Parenting – relocation – insufficiency of evidence – declaration of intention by one parent to relocate regardless of Court order – procedural fairness – ‘best interest’ considerations in curial power/discretion to restrain parent from relocating – ‘best interests’ of Grandparents versus the best interests of children – nature and goal of s.69ZT of Family Law Act to facilitate child-related proceedings rather than to remedy defects in or lack of evidence.
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss.60B(1), (2), 60CA, 60CC(1), (2), 60CC(3)(a) – (l), 61DA, 65DAA(1)-(4), 68B, 69ZT, 94AAA, 114(3)

Ahcraft v Haber [2010] FamCA 6
AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160
B & B [2006] FamCA 1207
KB & TC (2005) FLC ¶93-224
Cales & Cales (2010) 44 Fam LR 376
Collu & Rinaldo [2010] FamCAFC 53
Cowley v Mendoza (2010) 43 Fam LR 436
Davis v Davis (2007) 38 Fam LR 671
F v F (2008) 38 Fam LR 52
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
Godfrey v Sanders [2007] FamCA 102
Goode v Goode (2006) 36 Fam LR 422
Halifax v Fabian (2011) 44 Fam LR 554
Hepburn & Noble (2010) FLC ¶93-438
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298
Keach & Keach (2007) FLC ¶93-353
Lamereaux & Noirnot (2008) FLC ¶93-364
M v S (2007) 37 Fam LR 32
McAuliffe & Davies [2010] FMCAfam 1481
McCall v Clark (2009) 41 Fam LR 483
Mazorski v Albright (2007) 37 Fam LR 518
Moose & Moose (2008) FLC ¶93-375
MRR v GR (2010) 240 CLR 461
Paskandy & Paskandy (1999) FLC ¶92-878
Payne v Payne [2001] Fam 473
P v P (2005) FLC ¶93-239
Sampson v Hartnett (No.10) (2007) 215 FLR 155 ; (2008) 38 Fam LR 315
Sealey & Archer [2008] FamCAFC 142
Sheldon & Weir (No.3) [2010] FamCA 1138
Smith v Samuels [1976] 12 SASR 573
Starr & Duggan (2009) FamCAFC 115
Taylor & Barker (2007) 37 Fam LR 461
U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238
Wiley & Wiley (2008) FamCAFC 153

B. Fehlberg & J. Behrens, Australian Family Law: The Contemporary Context, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2008)
J.D. Heydon, Cross on Evidence (Eighth Australian Edition) (Sydney: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010)
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J. Behrens, “U v U: The High Court on Relocation,” (2003) 27 Melbourne University Law Review 572
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R. Chisholm, “Unacceptable risk and relocation issues: Partington v Cade,” (2010) 24 Australian Journal of Family Law 115
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AGLC
Ford and Bell [2011] FMCAfam 635
Case
[2011] FMCAfam 635
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Ford and Bell involved a dispute over the relocation of the children and their care arrangements. The court was tasked with determining whether the provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 could be applied to child-related proceedings, specifically regarding the inference that could be drawn under Jones v Dunkel, and whether section 69ZT of the Act could be invoked to remedy gaps in evidence. The case focused on the limited evidence presented by the parties concerning the children's relocation and whether the court could draw an adverse inference based on the absence of evidence.

The court examined whether section 69ZT of the Act allowed for the application of rules of evidence in child-related proceedings when circumstances were deemed exceptional. It also considered whether the Act could be invoked to remedy gaps in evidence, where no evidence had been presented or where the evidence was minimal and insufficient to address the issues before the court. The court had to determine if the lack of relevant evidence in this case constituted an exceptional circumstance under section 69ZT(3) of the Act.

In its reasoning, the court found that the lack of relevant evidence in this case did indeed constitute an exceptional circumstance under section 69ZT(3) of the Act. The court concluded that the extremely limited evidence presented by Dr L and the few statements made by Ms Bell did not meet the appropriate standard for the issues of relocation to be resolved. Consequently, the court determined that the rule of evidence in relation to adverse inference could and should be applied. The court also noted that section 69ZT could be invoked to remedy defects in evidence presented, but not to remedy gaps in evidence where no evidence had been given or the evidence was of minimal importance.

The court issued several orders regarding the care and relocation of the children. The mother was restrained from relocating to Tasmania and from moving the children’s residence outside a 200-kilometer radius of Wagga Wagga until the children completed their schooling. Both parents were granted equal shared parental responsibility for the children, who would continue to live with the mother. Specific arrangements were set for the children's time with the father, including weekend and school holiday visitation schedules. The court also detailed provisions for handovers, communication between parents, and the sharing of information regarding the children’s health and education.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

In the absence of written agreement with the Father or order of the Court, the Mother is restrained from (a) relocating to Tasmania, and (b) relocating the children’s residence outside a radius of 200 kilometres from Wagga Wagga. This Order is to remain in place until all of the children have completed their schooling.

2.

The parties have equal shared parental responsibility for the children [X] born [in] 1994, [Y] born [in] 1996 and [Z] born [in] 1999 (“the children”).

3.

The children live with the Mother.

4.

The children [Y] and [Z] spend weekend time with the Father as follows:-

(a) Should [Y] or [Z] be enrolled in a winter sport, and on condition that the Mother provide to the Father written confirmation of that enrolment and the duration of the sport’s season; every third weekend from Friday 6.00 pm until Sunday 6.00 pm;

(b) At all other times, each alternate weekend from Friday 6.00 pm until Sunday 6.00 pm.

5.

The children [Y] and [Z] spend school holiday time with the Father as follows:

(a) For three one week periods during the school holidays as follows;

(i) On two occasions, on four weeks written notice by the Father;

(ii)

In 2010 and each alternate year thereafter from 4.00 pm on 26 December for a period of seven days concluding on

2 January;

(iii)

In 2011, and in each alternate year thereafter from

24 December at 4.00 pm for a period of seven days concluding on 31 December;

(iv) At all other times as agreed.

6.

The child [X] be invited to spend time with the Father on each and every occasion that [Y] and [Z] are spending time with the Father.

7.

Handover is to be effected by the Father collecting the children at the beginning of each visit from the Wagga Wagga Children’s Contact Service and the Mother collecting the children at the end of each visit from the Albury / Wodonga Children’s Contact Service, at the times stipulated above or at such times as the Contact Centres can facilitate.

8.

Each party forthwith do all such things and sign all such documents required to complete the intake procedure with both Contact Services.

9.

Each party is authorised to contact school(s) that the children may attend to obtain copies of all reports, examples of work, newsletters, notification of all activities, parent / teacher nights, and to be informed of any emergency, remedial or correctional treatment required by the children as soon as is practicable.

10.

Each party is authorised to contact any treating medical practitioner, hospital or medical practise that the children may attend from time to time to obtain any information regarding the children.

11.

The parents keep one another informed of any sickness or illness of the children.

12.

The Mother and Father notify the other party by telephone when the assistance of a medical practitioner is sought in relation to the children.

13.

The parents keep one another informed of a contact address and telephone number at all times.

14.

The parties shall notify each other within seven days of a change of address and within forty eight hours of a change of telephone number.

15.

Each parent be permitted to telephone the children each Wednesday night between 6.30 pm and 7.30 pm when the children are in the other party’s care and during that time the parent whose care the children are in will ensure that the children are present and as far as practicable the landline to the home is kept free and available to receive the call.

16.

The Mother forthwith inform the Father of the schools that the children attend and the details of such schools, as well as the medical practice and specialists that the children attend, and their contact details.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Can a Jones v Dunkel inference be remedied by s.69ZT of the Act? That section provides:Rules of evidence not to apply unless court decides (1) These provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 do not apply to child-related proceedings: (a) Divisions 3, 4 and 5 of Part 2.1 (which deal with general rules about giving evidence, examination in chief, re-examination and cross-examination), other than sections 26, 30, 36 and 41; Note: Section 26 is about the court's control over questioning of witnesses. Section 30 is about interpreters. Section 36 relates to examination of a person without subpoena or other process. Section 41 is about improper questions. (b) Parts 2.2 and 2.3 (which deal with documents and other evidence including demonstrations, experiments and inspections); (c) Parts 3.2 to 3.8 (which deal with hearsay, opinion, admissions, evidence of judgments and convictions, tendency and coincidence, credibility and character). (2) The court may give such weight (if any) as it thinks fit to evidence admitted as a consequence of a provision of the Evidence Act 1995 not applying because of subsection (1). (3) Despite subsection (1), the court may decide to apply one or more of the provisions of a Division or Part mentioned in that subsection to an issue in the proceedings, if: (a) the court is satisfied that the circumstances are exceptional; and (b) the court has taken into account (in addition to any other matters the court thinks relevant): (i) the importance of the evidence in the proceedings; and (ii) the nature of the subject matter of the proceedings; and (iii) the probative value of the evidence; and (iv) the powers of the court (if any) to adjourn the hearing, to make another order or to give a direction in relation to the evidence. (4) If the court decides to apply a provision of a Division or Part mentioned in subsection (1) to an issue in the proceedings, the court may give such weight (if any) as it thinks fit to evidence admitted as a consequence of the provision applying. (5) Subsection (1) does not revive the operation of: (a) a rule of common law; or (b) a law of a State or a Territory; that, but for subsection (1), would have been prevented from operating because of a provision of a Division or Part mentioned in that subsection. In particular, the ‘rules of evidence’ are applicable in child-related proceedings only where, pursuant to s.69ZT(3), the Court is satisfied (noting that there is no compulsion to do so) that the circumstances are exceptional, and, as noted above, the Court is also satisfied of the other matters mentioned in s.69ZT(3)(b). In my view, the nature and degree of the lack of relevant evidence in this case would, respectfully, entitle the Court to be satisfied that it was something of an exceptional case in accordance with the section. And in those circumstances, the rule of evidence in relation to “adverse inference” could and should be made. To speak somewhat generally, it seems to me that s.69ZT may be invoked in proceedings to remedy defects in any evidence presented. However, it would seem to stretch principle beyond its elastic limit to say that it can be invoked to remedy gaps in evidence where no evidence has been given or the evidence is of such small moment in the nature and purpose of the issues to be determined by the Court. In the present case, the extremely limited evidence of Dr L, and the few statements made by Ms Bell, fall a very long way short of appropriate evidence in relation to the issues of relocation which the Court must resolve.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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