CITATION: Foakes v Parker [1999] NSWCA 20 revised - 17/02/99 FILE NUMBER(S): CA 40948/98 HEARING DATE(S): 15/02/99 JUDGMENT DATE:
15 February 1999PARTIES :
Geoffrey Foakes v Maria Theresa Gabriella ParkerJUDGMENT OF: Fitzgerald AJA at 1
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S) : 5505/97 LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Williams DCJ
COUNSEL: R Weber (Claimant/Appellant)
D Milne QC/D G Robinson (Opponent/Respondent)SOLICITORS: Blake Dawson Waldron (Claimant/Appellant)
Abbott Pardy & Jenkins (Opponent/Respondent)CATCHWORDS: Application for stay of execution of judgment; trial judge ordered part payment only of judgment; insufficient reason for interference with trial judge's order but proviso added DECISION: Motion for stay granted as to part of judgment and refused as to balance subject to conditions.
- 1 -THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEALCA40948/98
FITZGERALD AJA
Monday, 15 February 1999
Geoffrey FOAKES v Maria Teresa Gabriella PARKER
JUDGMENT
1 FITZGERALD AJA: This proceeding relates to a claim for medical negligence arising out of an incident at Inverell in 1977. The action was not commenced until 1992. It was heard in the District Court by a judge and a jury of four and a verdict was returned in favour of the plaintiff, the respondent to the present motion, in a sum a little under $1 million. During the course of the trial an issue arose concerning the probability, according to medical literature, that the medical condition which had led to the respondent's claim, that is of uterine inversion, was more likely to have been caused spontaneously or by misadventure during the birth. That was plainly extremely material to a principal issue in the action, namely, whether or not the appellant had caused the injury to the plaintiff and hence was liable to her for the damages awarded to her by the jury.
2 There is sufficient basis for concern about the amount awarded for the jury to stay the judgment at least in part. The respondent does not dispute that the condition on the stay which the trial judge granted, namely, payment in part only of the judgment, the sum of $350,000 should stay, but it submits that there should be no stay otherwise, that is, for the balance of the judgment.
3 Subject to what I am about to say, there seems to me to be insufficient reason to depart from the discretion which was exercised by the trial judge when he granted his stay on that condition. However, I would add a proviso. The appeal with respect to liability is at least reasonably arguable with respect to one issue, namely, whether in the course of the evidence given by the medical experts the trial judge acted in an appropriately evenhanded manner in determining what evidence could be given with respect to what was demonstrated by the medical literature.
4 In particular, an issue had been raised in the course of his evidence but not in an earlier report by Professor Crandon, an expert witness for the respondent, suggesting that the…
Continue reading Foakes v Parker
Sign in free to access the full text
Details
- AGLC
- Foakes v Parker [1999] NSWCA 20
- Case
- [1999] NSWCA 20
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In *Foakes v Parker*, the applicant sought a stay of execution of a judgment granted by a trial judge. The respondent had obtained a judgment against the applicant, and the trial judge had ordered that only a portion of that judgment be paid immediately, with the remainder to be paid at a later date.
The primary legal issue before the court was whether there were sufficient grounds to interfere with the trial judge's discretionary order regarding the payment schedule of the judgment debt. The applicant contended that the trial judge's order was not sufficiently justified, while the respondent argued for the preservation of the original order.
Fitzgerald AJA considered the principles governing applications for a stay of execution and the limited circumstances in which an appellate court will interfere with a trial judge's exercise of discretion. His Honour found that while there was insufficient reason to wholly set aside the trial judge's order, a proviso was warranted to ensure the applicant's obligations were clearly defined and secured.
Consequently, the motion for a stay of execution was granted in part, specifically concerning the deferred payment portion of the judgment, and refused as to the immediate payment portion, subject to certain conditions being met by the applicant.
The primary legal issue before the court was whether there were sufficient grounds to interfere with the trial judge's discretionary order regarding the payment schedule of the judgment debt. The applicant contended that the trial judge's order was not sufficiently justified, while the respondent argued for the preservation of the original order.
Fitzgerald AJA considered the principles governing applications for a stay of execution and the limited circumstances in which an appellate court will interfere with a trial judge's exercise of discretion. His Honour found that while there was insufficient reason to wholly set aside the trial judge's order, a proviso was warranted to ensure the applicant's obligations were clearly defined and secured.
Consequently, the motion for a stay of execution was granted in part, specifically concerning the deferred payment portion of the judgment, and refused as to the immediate payment portion, subject to certain conditions being met by the applicant.
Orders
Orders of the court
Motion for stay granted as to part of judgment and refused as to balance subject to conditions.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.