Flowers v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application for Judicial Review)

FLOWERS v LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER

[2017] SASC 62

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Lovell

28 April 2017

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - STANDING TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS - PARTICULAR CASES

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - LAWYERS

Judicial review of determination of Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner that a practitioner had not breached their professional obligations - whether plaintiff had standing - whether plaintiff should have sought remedy other than judicial review.

Held:

1.  Plaintiff has standing for judicial review.

2.  Discretion not exercised to refuse the plaintiff remedies should he be successful on judicial review. The alternative remedies available to the plaintiff were not equally effective and convenient.

Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 77K, s 77J, s 77B(2), s 82; Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989   (Cth), referred to.
McLeod v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner [2016] SASC 151, applied.
Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v Commonwealth of Australia (1980) 146 CLR 493, distinguished.
Argos v Corbell (2014) 254 CLR 394; Viscariello v Livesey [2013] SASC 99, discussed.
Davies v Minister for Urban Development and Planning (2011) 109 SASR 518; Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; Estate of the Late Sir Donald Bradman v Allens Arthur Robinson (2010) 107 SASR 1; Olnus v Alcoa of Australia Ltd (1981) 149 CLR 27; Attorney General (NSW) v Quinn (1990) 170 CLR 1; Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82; Sarkis v Greyhound Racing New South Wales [2015] NSWSC 1987; Re Carey; Ex parte Exclude Holdings Pty Ltd (2006) 32 WAR 501; Carnley v Grafton Ngerrie Local Aboriginal Land Council [2010] NSWSC 837; Jackson v Chrisp [2013] WASC 380; R v Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police; Ex parte Calveley [1986] QB 424, considered.

FLOWERS v LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER
[2017] SASC 62

Determination of issue of standing for judicial review

LOVELL J:

Introduction

  1. Mr Flowers was involved in a long-running family law dispute that commenced in approximately June 2007 and culminated in a six-day trial in the Family Court of Australia in September 2014. Mr Flowers was unhappy about the conduct of his former wife’s solicitor, Ms Hicks, and made a complaint against her to the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board on 16 January 2013. Initially the complaint was suspended pending the outcome of Family Court proceedings.

  2. After amendments to the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) (the Act), effective from 1 July 2014, the plaintiff’s complaints were to be determined by the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner.

  3. The investigation was re-enlivened on 13 February 2015. Further complaints were made by Mr Flowers against the practitioner. The dates of the further complaints made by Mr Flowers are not relevant to the current application.[1]

    [1]    Mr Flowers considers the dates important in relation to the merits of his application.

  4. The substance of the complaints against Ms Hicks were summarised in the following extract from the defendant’s determination…

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Details
Case
[2017] SASC 62
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Flowers v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner involved the plaintiff, Mr Flowers, seeking judicial review of a determination made by the defendant, the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner. The determination dismissed complaints against a legal practitioner. The primary legal issue was whether Mr Flowers had standing to institute the proceedings for judicial review, and if not, whether there were alternative remedies available to him. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of South Australia.

The court had to decide if Mr Flowers had standing to seek judicial review, considering that he was not the direct object nor directly affected by the alleged misconduct. Additionally, the court had to consider whether there were other remedies available to Mr Flowers that he had not pursued. The Commissioner argued that Mr Flowers lacked standing and that the court should exercise its discretion to refuse a judicial review and dismiss the proceedings. The Commissioner's argument was based on the grounds that Mr Flowers was a party to Family Law Court proceedings where he had already exhausted all avenues of his complaints against the practitioner.

The court concluded that Mr Flowers had standing to seek judicial review despite not being directly affected by the misconduct. The court found that the right to seek judicial review was sufficient to allow Mr Flowers to proceed with his claim. The court also noted that it would not exercise its discretion to refuse the plaintiff his remedies if he was otherwise successful in the proceedings. Consequently, the court ruled in favor of Mr Flowers, granting him standing to pursue judicial review of the Commissioner's determination.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The defendant made an initial determination on 11 August 2015 to deal with all the complaints at once. After investigation, the defendant dismissed the complaints in a single determination published on 27 August 2015. The plaintiff seeks to judicially review that determination.Background The plaintiff’s application for judicial review was due to be heard on 14 December 2016. By interlocutory application filed on the 15 November 2016 the defendant sought to have the hearing of the merits of the judicial review application adjourned and have the matter proceed initially only on the question of the standing of the plaintiff to bring on the application. The question of standing (or lack of it) was said to be a complete answer to the application of the plaintiff. The application was granted. On the 14 December 2016 the defendant submitted that the plaintiff’s application for judicial review should be dismissed for the following reasons:1the plaintiff does not have standing to seek judicial review;2the plaintiff was not the object of, nor was he directly affected by, the alleged misconduct;3the plaintiff was a party to Family Law Court proceedings and exhausted all avenues of his specific allegations of complaint against the practitioner throughout those Family Law proceedings; and4in addition to the standing argument there are other more appropriate remedies available to the plaintiff which he has not yet pursued. Therefore, the court should exercise its discretion to refuse a judicial review and dismiss the proceedings. As can be seen, the defendant’s submissions are wider than the grounds stated in the Interlocutory Application. Grounds 2 and 3 appear to be particulars of why the defendant suggests the plaintiff does not have standing. Ground 4 appears to be a separate ground to that of standing. The Interlocutory Application filed by the defendant sought to bifurcate the process and have me determine the question of standing prior to the hearing on the merits. The defendant’s written submissions appear to be, in part at least, based on r 200C, namely an application for summary dismissal rather than a final determination of the issue of standing. Rule 200C(1) provides that the defendant is entitled to file an application for summary dismissal under r 232. Rule 200C(2) provides that if such an application is made by a defendant then the Court must dismiss or strike out the action or statement of grounds, as the case may be, in so far as an order for judicial review is sought, unless satisfied there is a reasonable basis for the claim for an order for judicial review. This was the application before Doyle J in McLeod v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner.[3] On the application before him Doyle J stated:[4]Under r 200C(1) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA), a defendant to judicial review proceedings is entitled to file an application for summary dismissal under r 232, or to strike out the statement of grounds under rr 104, 117 or 193. Under r 200C(2), if a defendant files such an application, the Court must dismiss or strike out the action or statement of grounds, as the case may be, insofar as an order for judicial review is sought, unless satisfied that there is a reasonable basis for the claim for an order for judicial review.The parties have proceeded on the basis that the concluding paragraph of the defendant’s response is to be treated as an application under r 200C(1), and so I too will proceed on that basis.The reference to “reasonable basis” in r 200C(2) mirrors the language of r 232 and so is to be informed by the authorities addressing r 232. There is also a close analogy with the authorities addressing applications to strike out claims under rr 104, 117 or 193 on the basis that the pleadings do not disclose a reasonable cause of action.The power to dismiss proceedings under r 200C should not be exercised lightly.[5] However, beyond that note of caution, the better view appears to be that the words “no reasonable basis” require no elaboration.[6] It is thus unnecessary to consider or determine whether the claim is hopeless, unarguable, obviously untenable or bound to fail. The only issue is whether there is a reasonable basis for the claim in the sense that there is a reasonable prospect that, if the matter went to trial, it would succeed.[7]There are two limbs to the Commissioner’s contention that the plaintiff’s claim does not have reasonable prospects of success. The first is that the plaintiff does not have standing to bring these judicial review proceedings. The second is that the Court should exercise its discretion to decline the relief sought on the basis that the plaintiff has an alternative remedy or remedies available to him.So far as the first of these contentions is concerned, the issue on this application is whether the plaintiff has a reasonable basis for, or reasonable prospects of, establishing standing. So far as the second contention is concerned, despite it involving consideration of a discretion, the test remains the same, namely whether there is a reasonable basis on which the Court’s discretion to grant the relief claimed might be exercised in favour of the plaintiff. [3] [2016] SASC 151.[4] Ibid [20]-[25].[5] Davies v Minister for Urban Development and Planning (2011) 109 SASR 518, [44]; Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118, [60]; Ceneavenue Pty Ltd v Martin (2008) 106 SASR 1; Estate of the Late Sir Donald Bradman v Allens Arthur Robinson (2010) 107 SASR 1, [26]-[29].[6] Davies v Minister for Urban Development and Planning (2011) 109 SASR 518, [44]-[48]; Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118, [56]-[58].[7] In Ceneavenue Pty Ltd v Martin (2008) 106 SASR 1, [94] Debelle J with whom Duggan and Anderson JJ agreed, put the test in terms of “reasonable as distinct from fanciful prospects of success”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

However, on balance, I do not consider that this right is sufficient, in the circumstances of this case, to deprive the plaintiff of his remedies if his claim otherwise is successful.Conclusions I find the plaintiff has standing. I would not exercise the discretion to refuse the plaintiff his remedies if he is otherwise successful in these proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established