Florlim Pty Ltd v India Pty Ltd No. Scciv-03-95

Link copied
Case Copied 5 min read

FLORLIM PTY LTD V INDIA PTY LTD

[2003] SASC 292

Full Court: Bleby, Besanko and Sulan JJ

  1. BLEBY J. On 19 June 2003, a Judge of this Court allowed an appeal by the present respondent, India Pty Ltd, from a decision of a magistrate dismissing the respondent’s claim for damages for wrongful repudiation of a lease. The matter was then remitted to the Magistrates Court for assessment of the respondent’s damages.

  2. The defendants in the Magistrates Court were Florlim Pty Ltd, the lessee of the premises, Mr and Mrs Agalianos, directors of Florlim Pty Ltd, and ACN 066 741 544 Pty Ltd, of which Mr and Mrs Agalianos were also directors.  Although the claim for damages against all defendants was dismissed, the Judge on appeal ordered that the appeal be allowed and the matter be remitted to the Magistrates Court for assessment of damages. There appears to be an understanding between the parties that that can relate only to Florlim Pty Ltd. However, no judgment was entered against any particular defendant.  The present applicant for leave to appeal is Florlim Pty Ltd, the former tenant. The other defendants in the Magistrates Court proceedings are not applicants.

  3. The application for leave to appeal was made on 4 July 2003, one day out of time.  In the absence on leave of the Judge who heard the appeal, the application for leave was incorrectly set down for hearing before the chamber judge who, on 18 July 2003, declined to deal with the matter on the ground that he was precluded from doing so by r 94.01 of the Supreme Court Rules. That requires the application to be made to the Judge appealed from or to the Full Court.

  4. The applicant now seeks to have the application determined by the Full Court pursuant to r 94.01(1)(b)(ii) of the Supreme Court Rules.  At the request of the applicant, the application was initially considered privately by the Full Court in accordance with r 94.03(c). However, the Full Court has heard further brief argument today from both parties.

  5. With the documents required to be lodged by r 94.03 and Practice Direction 13A, there was what purported to be a separate application made to the Full Court bearing a much later date. No such application has been filed.  I ignore that application, which is not necessary, as the original application has not been resolved. It is the original application which should have been included in the documents lodged for consideration by the Full Court.  I am prepared to treat that application as the application which is before the Full Court.

  6. There is also an application for an extension of time within which to make the application for leave. The extension required is one day. An identical application was made by the same solicitor, in another matter, for another applicant, in identical circumstances. In each case, an affidavit in relatively identical terms was filed. The explanation in each case for the failure to comply with the time…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Florlim Pty Ltd v India Pty Ltd No. Scciv-03-95 and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2003] SASC 292
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Florlim Pty Ltd v India Pty Ltd, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia was asked to decide an appeal brought by India Pty Ltd against a decision of the Magistrates Court dismissing their claim for damages for wrongful repudiation of a lease. The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the Magistrates Court for assessment of damages. The former tenant, Florlim Pty Ltd, subsequently applied for leave to appeal to the Full Court. The application was one day out of time, and had been initially considered by a chamber judge who declined to deal with it due to a procedural error. The applicant then sought leave to appeal to the Full Court under the Supreme Court Rules.

The legal issues before the Full Court were whether the applicant's late application for leave to appeal could be accepted and whether the costs incurred by the respondent due to the late application should be borne by the respondent or the applicant. The Court found that the applicant's solicitor had failed to comply with the relevant Rules and Practice Direction, resulting in the unnecessary lodging of an affidavit and an application for an extension of time. The Court emphasised that time limits prescribed by the Rules are to be observed and granted the extension of time for the application to be filed. The Court also granted leave to appeal on the grounds proposed by the applicant in their submissions. Additionally, the Court ordered that the costs of the respondent in relation to the application for the extension of time be the respondent's costs in the appeal, and that the costs of preparing the affidavit of Peter Austin Scragg and the costs of and incidental to the application for an extension of time, are disallowed as between solicitor and client.

In conclusion, the Full Court allowed the late application for leave to appeal and granted leave to appeal on the proposed grounds. The Court also ordered that the costs of the respondent in relation to the application for the extension of time be the respondent's costs in the appeal, and that certain costs are disallowed as between solicitor and client.

Background

Background to the litigation

Florlim Pty Ltd was the lessee of premises in Adelaide, South Australia, under a lease agreement with India Pty Ltd. The lease agreement was terminated by India Pty Ltd, which led to a dispute over whether the termination was wrongful. India Pty Ltd subsequently filed a claim for damages against Florlim Pty Ltd, the Agalianos, who were directors of Florlim Pty Ltd, and ACN 066 741 544 Pty Ltd, also directed by the Agalianos. The claim was initially dismissed by a magistrate, but India Pty Ltd appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of South Australia. The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the Magistrates Court for assessment of damages against Florlim Pty Ltd. Subsequently, Florlim Pty Ltd applied for leave to appeal the decision, despite the application being one day out of the allowed time. The application was initially declined by a chamber judge but later considered by the Full Court at the request of Florlim Pty Ltd. The Full Court also considered an application for an extension of time to make the application for leave to appeal, which was similarly filed one day late. The Full Court granted the extension and leave to appeal on the basis that there was no prejudice to India Pty Ltd and the delay was caused by Florlim Pty Ltd's solicitor.

Florlim Pty Ltd v India Pty Ltd No. Scciv-03-95 is an appeal case that came before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia. Initially, India Pty Ltd pursued a claim for damages against Florlim Pty Ltd, Mr and Mrs Agalianos, and another company in the Magistrates Court, which was dismissed. However, India Pty Ltd successfully appealed to the Supreme Court, resulting in the case being remitted to the Magistrates Court for an assessment of damages. Florlim Pty Ltd then sought leave to appeal the Supreme Court's decision. The application for leave was filed one day out of time and was initially declined by a chamber judge due to procedural errors in lodging the application. Florlim Pty Ltd subsequently sought to have the Full Court consider the application, which was heard with brief arguments from both parties. The application included an extension of time request, which was deemed inadequate due to the lateness of the application and the lack of necessity for an affidavit of merit. Despite the late filing and procedural errors, the Full Court granted the application for leave to appeal and ordered costs against the respondent for the extension of time application.

Decision

Reasons for decision

BLEBY J BESANKO J SULAN J
Issues
1. Was the Full Court required to treat the initial application for leave to appeal as the application before the court, despite the presence of a purportedly separate application dated later?
2. Did the Full Court have jurisdiction to hear the application for leave to appeal, given that it was initially heard by the chamber judge who declined to deal with the matter?
3. Was the affidavit in support of the application for an extension of time adequate, or did the Full Court have reason to consider it inadequate?
4. Should the Full Court grant the application for an extension of time to file the application for leave to appeal, considering the minor delay of one day and the lack of prejudice to the respondent?
5. Should the Full Court grant leave to appeal based on the grounds substantially similar to those contained in the applicant's submissions?
6. Should the costs of preparing the affidavit of Peter Austin Scragg and the costs of and incidental to the application for an extension of time be disallowed as between solicitor and client?

Held
1. The Full Court treated the initial application for leave to appeal as the application before the court, despite the presence of a purportedly separate application dated later.
2. The Full Court had jurisdiction to hear the application for leave to appeal, as the matter was referred at the applicant's request.
3. The Full Court considered the affidavit in support of the application for an extension of time inadequate, as it did not provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay.
4. The Full Court granted the application for an extension of time to file the application for leave to appeal due to the minor delay of one day and the lack of prejudice to the respondent.
5. The Full Court granted leave to appeal on grounds substantially similar to those contained in the applicant's submissions.
6. The Full Court disallowed the costs of preparing the affidavit of Peter Austin Scragg and the costs of and incidental to the application for an extension of time as between solicitor and client.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BLEBY J, BESANKO J, SULAN J

The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia in Florlim Pty Ltd v India Pty Ltd, considered several key issues pertinent to the application for leave to appeal, the jurisdiction of the Full Court, and the adequacy of the affidavit supporting the application for an extension of time. Bleby J, with whom Besanko and Sulan JJ concurred, began by addressing whether the Full Court was required to treat the initial application for leave to appeal as the one before the court, despite the presence of a purportedly separate application dated later. Bleby J decided to treat the initial application as the one before the court, considering the subsequent application unnecessary since the original had not been resolved.

Next, the Full Court considered its jurisdiction to hear the application for leave to appeal. The application was initially declined by a chamber judge who cited rule 94.01 of the Supreme Court Rules as a basis for declining jurisdiction. Bleby J noted that rule 94.01(1)(b)(ii) allowed the Full Court to hear the application as it was requested by the applicant, and thus, the Full Court had jurisdiction to hear the matter.

The Full Court then turned to the adequacy of the affidavit in support of the application for an extension of time. Bleby J found the affidavit inadequate as it did not sufficiently explain the delay in complying with the Rules. The explanation provided by the solicitor, which suggested that the time limits prescribed by the Rules were of little consequence, was not accepted by the court. Bleby J emphasized that the time limits prescribed by the Rules are to be observed strictly and that there was no justification for the delay in this case.

In deciding whether to grant the application for an extension of time, Bleby J noted the minor delay of one day and the lack of prejudice to the respondent. The respondent had indicated that it was not prejudiced by the delay, and Bleby J agreed that the respondent could not point to any prejudice beyond what would have occurred if the application had been made within the allowed time. Consequently, Bleby J decided to extend the time for bringing the application to the date on which it was filed.

Regarding the granting of leave to appeal, Bleby J decided to grant leave to appeal on grounds substantially similar to those contained in the applicant's submissions. This decision was supported by Besanko and Sulan JJ.

Lastly, Bleby J ordered that the costs of preparing the affidavit of Peter Austin Scragg and the costs of and incidental to the application for an extension of time be disallowed as between solicitor and client. This decision was also supported by Besanko and Sulan JJ.

The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the Full Court has jurisdiction to hear an application for leave to appeal under rule 94.01(1)(b)(ii) of the Supreme Court Rules, and it may grant an extension of time for the application if the delay is minor and there is no prejudice to the respondent. Furthermore, the Full Court may disallow costs associated with an inadequate affidavit and the application for an extension of time if the explanation for the delay is unsatisfactory and suggests a disregard for the Rules.