Flori v Carroll (No. 3)

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QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Flori v Carroll and Anor (No. 3) [2022] QIRC 328

PARTIES:

Flori, Ricky
(Complainant)

v

Carroll, Katarina
(First Respondent)

and

State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)
(Second Respondent)

CASE NO.:

AD/2020/115

PROCEEDING:

Referral of complaint, about a reprisal under s 40 of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010, pursuant to s 166 of the Anti‑Discrimination Act 1991

DELIVERED ON:

19 August 2022

HEARING DATE:

29 July 2022

MEMBER:

HEARD AT:

Merrell DP

Brisbane

ORDER:

The Complainant's complaint is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

COMMUNICATIONS LAW - WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION AND PUBLIC INTEREST DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION - Complainant a former police officer who resigned from the Queensland Police Service - Complainant a plaintiff in proceedings in the District Court of Queensland alleging reprisal for a public interest disclosure made by him within the meaning of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 - District Court proceedings remain on foot - following Complainant's resignation as a police officer, Complainant emailed the First Respondent to obtain certain honours and awards, namely, 25 year clasps for National Medal and Queensland Police Service Medal including rosettes for the ribbon bar - First Respondent deferred making a decision to issue honours and awards sought by Complainant by giving the reason that findings of fact that may be made in the District Court proceedings may affect assessment of Complainant's eligibility for any honours and awards - Complainant made complaint to the Queensland Human Rights Commission alleging contravention by the First and Second Respondents of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010, contending that the decision to defer the issuing of honours and awards was a reprisal within the meaning of s 40 of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 - complaint accepted by the Queensland Human Rights Commission which subsequently referred complaint to the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission - Complainant seeks various declarations, orders and other relief under the Anti‑Discrimination Act 1991 to remedy alleged reprisal - whether First Respondent's decision to defer making decision to issue honours and awards sought by the Complainant was a contravention of s 40(1)(b) of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 and therefore a reprisal within the meaning of s 40(3) of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 - First Respondent's decision not a contravention of s 40(1)(b) of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 - Complainant's complaint dismissed

STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION - construction of s 40(1)(b) of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 having regard to the text and context of the provision

LEGISLATION:

Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, s 166 and s 209

Fair Work Act 2009, s 346

Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 285

Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994 (ACT), s 3

Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010, s 3, s 11, s 40, s 41 and sch 4

Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994, s 41

CASES:

Berry v Ryan [2001] ACTSC 11; (2001) 159 FLR 361

Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay [2012] HCA 32

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Details
Case
[2022] QIRC 328
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Flori v Carroll (No. 3), the complainant, a former police officer, sought various declarations, orders, and other relief under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, alleging that the Queensland Police Service had contravened the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 by retaliating against him for making a public interest disclosure. The complainant alleged that the decision to defer issuing certain honours and awards was a reprisal within the meaning of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010. The Queensland Human Rights Commission accepted the complaint and referred it to the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission, which dismissed the complaint. The complainant sought judicial review of the Commission's decision. The court was required to decide whether the decision to defer the issuing of honours and awards was a reprisal within the meaning of section 40 of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010. The court found that the decision to defer the issuing of honours and awards was not a reprisal within the meaning of section 40(3) of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010. The court found that the motivation of the first mentioned person in respect of their impugned act or omission was the principal consideration in the application of section 40(1)(b) of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010. The complainant's complaint was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

The Complainant's complaint is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons given below, I find that the Commissioner's decision did not contravene s 40(1)(b) of the PIDA, the consequence of which is that the Commissioner did not engage in a reprisal against Mr Flori within the meaning of s 40(3) of the PIDA.The relevant facts Mr Flori gave oral evidence as well as evidence by affidavit.[7] Mr Flori was not cross‑examined.[7] Mr Flori's affidavit filed on 18 January 2022 was Exhibit 1. There is no dispute about the civil proceedings. That is:·on 27 April 2017, Mr Flori, pursuant to s 42 of the PIDA, commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court, alleging that he had been the subject of a reprisal, within the meaning of s 40 of the PIDA, because he had made a public interest disclosure within the meaning of s 11 of the PIDA; and·those proceedings were, on 19 June 2020, transferred to the District Court.[8][8] Exhibit 1, para. 8 and Exhibit 1, annexure 2. In oral submissions, the Commissioner and the State did not dispute that Mr Flori, by the civil proceedings, was involved in a proceeding under the PIDA against any person within the meaning of s 40(1)(b) of the PIDA. It is also not in dispute that:·on 2 November 2017, Mr Flori resigned as a police officer;[9] and·by email dated 8 November 2019, Mr Flori emailed the Commissioner seeking her support in obtaining any outstanding honours and awards earned by him during his 28 years of service as a police officer, following the absence of any response from his email sent on 29 March 2019 to the Honours and Awards Unit of the Queensland Police Service ('the Service') about the same matter.[10][9] Exhibit 1, para. 3.[10] Exhibit 1, paras. 2, 3, 12 and 13. The Commissioner initially responded to Mr Flori's 8 November 2019 email by letter dated 12 December 2019. In that letter, the Commissioner relevantly stated:I refer to your e-mail of 8 November 2019, seeking assistance in relation to outstanding awards, a certificate of service and retired police identification.In relation to outstanding awards and a Commissioner's Certificate of Service, I do not intend to make a determination on your eligibility about any of these matters until all of your court appeals are finalised. This is due to your court matters being related to a complaint which you were subject to at the time of your resignation.…Once all your court matters have been finalised, I will provide you with a further response in relation to your eligibility for any outstanding awards and a Commissioner's Certificate of Service.[11][11] Exhibit 1, annexure 4. Following a decision by the Court of Appeal in relation to the civil proceedings, by further letter dated 17 January 2020 to Mr Flori, the Commissioner stated:I refer to your email of 6 January 2020 and my earlier correspondence of 12 December 2019 in which I advised I do not intend to make a determination on your eligibility for any Honours and Awards until your court proceedings are finalised.While I note your view that the Court of Appeal decision found in your favour, I am advised that while the Court of Appeal decision set aside the decision of the Supreme Court on the preliminary question, this dealt with a discrete point of the proceedings but does not resolve the substantive issues in the proceedings.I have been advised that while the State of Queensland has determined not to appeal the decision, the matter will now proceed to trial and will consider issues relating to the actions undertaken by yourself and others, including the Court making findings of fact which may affect the assessment of your eligibility for any Honours and Awards.[12] Exhibit 1, annexure 5.As per my earlier correspondence, I do not intend to further consider your eligibility for any Honours and Awards until your court proceedings are finalised.[12]

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The first issue to consider is whether or not the Commissioner's decision was because Mr Flori was involved in a proceeding under the PIDA against any person.Was the Commissioner's decision because Mr Flori was involved in a proceeding under the PIDA against any person? This requires a consideration of the construction of s 40(1)(b) of the PIDA and then the application of the facts.The parties' submissions Mr Flori In oral submissions, Mr Flori submitted that the whole basis of his case was that the Commissioner's decision contravened s 40(1)(b) of the PIDA because:·the purpose or object of the provision was '… don’t shoot the messenger';[18] ·section 40(1)(b) of the PIDA strictly provides that a person must not cause detriment to another person because the other person is involved in a proceeding under the PIDA against any person;[19] ·if he had not commenced the civil proceedings under the PIDA, then the Commissioner's decision, namely, deferring the decision to issue him the awards, would not have been made;[20] and·by those facts, the Commissioner contravened s 40(1)(b) of the PIDA, which, by the application of s 40(3) of the PIDA, meant the Commissioner had taken a reprisal against him.[21] [18] T 2-5, ll 27-31.[19] T 2-43, ll 4-10.[20] T 2-46, ll 12-14.[21] T 2-46, ll 18-30. Mr Flori, in written submissions, submitted that, having regard to s 40(5) of the PIDA, even if the Commissioner was motivated by other factors, the fact that his involvement in a proceeding under the PIDA was a substantial part of the Commissioner's reasoning, as evidenced by the Commissioner's letters, was sufficient to establish a contravention.[22] Mr Flori made the same point in this oral submissions.[23][22] Mr Flori's written submissions filed on 27 August 2021.[23] T 2-47, l 45 to T 2-48, l 9.The Commissioner and the State In oral submissions, Mr McLeod QC, who appeared on behalf of the Respondents:·referred to the objects of the PIDA in s 3 of that Act and submitted that s 40(1)(b) of the PIDA is not one, as contended by Mr Flori, that provides for strict liability;[24] and·submitted that there was no evidence to warrant any inference that the Commissioner's decision was because of the civil proceedings.[25][24] T 2-32, l 22 to T 2-36, l 28.[25] T 2-36, l 47 to T 2-38, l 45.The construction of s 40(1)(b) of the PIDA I am not persuaded that s 40(1)(b) of the PIDA operates in the way contended by Mr Flori. Mr Flori submits that because the Commissioner actually knew he had commenced the civil proceedings, then any detriment caused by the Commissioner to him was a reprisal in contravention of s 40(1)(b) of the PIDA, irrespective of the Commissioner's motivation. I cannot accept that submission. Having regard to the purpose of s 40 of the PIDA, it is obvious that the motivation of the first mentioned person in respect of their impugned act or omission is the principal consideration in the application of that provision. Relevantly to the present case, one of the clear purposes of s 40(1)(b) of the PIDA is to protect the second mentioned person, who is involved in a proceeding under the PIDA against any person, against detrimental retaliation by the first mentioned person, because of the second mentioned person's involvement in such a proceeding. Clearly, an examination of the motive of the first mentioned person is material to the provision's purpose.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.