Flint v Webb - [1907] HCA 77

COMPLAINANT,

ON APPEAL FROM A COURT OF PETTY SESSIONS OF VICTORIA. Appeal to Privy Council-Decision as to limits inter se of constitutional powers of

Commonwealth and State-Certificate of High Court-" Special reasona"-The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), sec. 74. MELBOURNE, May 21, 22,

The fact that a decision of the Privy Council, on a question of law as to 23, 24;

the limits inter se of the constitutional powers of the Commonwealth and the June 7, 8.

States, is contrary to a previous decision of the High Court as to which a certificate under sec. 74 of the Constitution has been asked and refused, held not to be of itself a sufficient special reason for granting a certificate as to another decision of the High Court following its previous decision.

The inconvenience caused by the existence of those contrary decisions held not to be a sufficient reason.

Per Griffith C.J., O'Connor J. and Isaacs J.-That inconvenience can be removed by the Commonwealth Parliament exercising its powers under sec. 77 (II.) of the Constitution.

Per Griffith C.J.-That inconvenience can also be removed by the Common- wealth Parliament making its grants to its servants subject to the right of the States to tax them.

Per Higgins J.-Quare, whether, if a State income tax on salaries of federal servants is invalid under the Constitution, the Commonwealth Par liament can validate such a tax.

APPEAL from a Court of Petty Sessions of Victoria.

4 CLR 1179

On the complaint of Thomas Prout Webb, Commissioner of Taxes of Victoria, an order was made against Arthur Loftus Flint, for the payment of £2 11s. 3d., for income tax for the year 1904, with 14s. interest thereon, and £2 2s. costs. It appeared that Flint was an officer in the Department of the Postmaster- General of Victoria employed as a telegraph operator, and he therefore put in a special defence that he was a public servant in the employ of the Commonwealth of Australia, and was not within the jurisdiction of the State of Victoria for taxation purposes SO far as the tax sued for was concerned.

Flint, by special leave, obtained on 19th April 1907, now appealed to the High Court.

Mitchell K.C. (with him Joseph), for the appellant. There is nothing in the reasoning of the Privy Council in Webb v. Outtrim 1 which affects the reasoning of this Court in Deakin v. Webb 2 and D'Emden v. Pedder 3. The intention is clearly indicated in sec. 74 of the Constitution, that in matters there mentioned the High Court is to be the final arbiter-that the decision of the High Court should be final and conclusive in the sense that there should be no appeal to the King in Council by the exercise of the prerogative except in cases where the High Court gave its certificate. The difficulty which it is suggested may arise from conflicting decisions of the Privy Council and of the High Court may be prevented by…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Flint v Webb

Details

AGLC: Flint v Webb [1907] HCA 77
Case: [1907] HCA 77
Decision Date: 8 June 1907

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a Court of Petty Sessions of Victoria. The appellant, Arthur Loftus Flint, an officer in the Postmaster-General's Department, had been ordered to pay income tax to the State of Victoria. Flint contended that as a Commonwealth public servant, he was not subject to State taxation for his salary.

The legal issues before the High Court included whether the Court of Petty Sessions was exercising federal jurisdiction, the validity of section 39 of the Judiciary Act 1903, and, fundamentally, whether a State could tax the salary of a Commonwealth officer, which involved interpreting the constitutional division of powers between the Commonwealth and the States. Following the High Court's decision allowing the appeal, an application was made for a certificate under section 74 of the Constitution to appeal to the Privy Council.

The High Court, in considering the application for a certificate, determined that the existence of conflicting decisions between the High Court and the Privy Council, or the inconvenience arising from such a conflict, did not, of itself, constitute a "special reason" for granting a certificate under section 74. The Court noted that such inconvenience could be remedied by the Commonwealth Parliament exercising its legislative powers.

The application for a certificate was refused. The Court held that while the existence of conflicting interpretations of the Constitution between the High Court and the Privy Council was inconvenient, it was not an "intolerable position" that necessitated a certificate. The Court reiterated that the Commonwealth Parliament had the power to resolve such conflicts through legislation, and that the High Court's role as the interpreter of the Constitution in these matters was paramount unless exceptional circumstances warranted a departure.

Orders