MARY ANN CAROLINE FLINN (who is sued as the Executrix of the Estate of William Charles George Flinn deceased and in her personal
capacity)
Appellant
v
DANIEL FLINN
and
Respondents
BRONWYN ELLEN FLINN
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JUDGES:
BROOKING, CHARLES and BATT, JJ.A.
WHERE HELD:
MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING:
22-24 June and 19 July 1999
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
4 August 1999
MEDIA NEUTRAL CITATION:
[1999] VSCA 109
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CONTRACT – Promise to leave property by will – On condition of payment of reasonable sum to third person – Too uncertain. ESTOPPEL – Proprietary estoppel – Plaintiffs working on farm after promises of gift by will – Whether promises too uncertain – Detrimental reliance.
William (“Bill”) Flinn was a successful beef farmer and, until 1976, also a logging contractor. He followed both occupations in partnership with his wife, Mary. Bill was born in 1914 and Mary in 1920. They had a son named Robert (“Robbie”), born in 1941. Mary had two children from her former marriage, Philip and Gary. I shall call Bill and Mary by those names, occasionally describing them – ignoring gender – as the testators. Bill died on Sunday, 23 January 1994. (The evidence shows confusion about the date.) His wife is still alive. This case is about a dairy farm which they owned and which was run for some years by Daniel (“Danny”) Flinn and his wife, Bronwyn. Daniel Flinn, born in 1953, was Bill’s nephew. I shall call Daniel and his wife by their given names, at times designating them as the plaintiffs. They say they should have the farm. The judge upheld their claim. Because his findings are attacked, it is necessary to combine a summary of the clearly established facts with a long summary of parts of the evidence.
Daniel’s mother died when he was very young. His father was an alcoholic and Bill and Mary brought him up and treated him as a son. He left school at the age of 14 and began working for a dairy farmer. From the age of 16 he worked for Bill, either on one of his two farms or in his logging business. Daniel married in 1975. His wife, a registered nurse, continued to work after the marriage, subject to the need to care for the two children of the marriage. She and Daniel lived in Bairnsdale. At the time of her marriage she was about 20 and her husband about 22.
In 1976 Bill sold his logging business and Daniel began working for another logging contractor. He was still driving a log truck in 1983, when Bill, who also lived in Bairnsdale, suggested to…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Flinn v Flinn [1999] VSCA 109
Case
[1999] VSCA 109
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of Flinn v Flinn was brought before the court by Bronwyn and Daniel Flinn, who sought to enforce certain agreements and promises made to them by Bill Flinn, who passed away before the trial. The plaintiffs claimed that Bill had promised them that they would be allowed to remain on his property if they paid a reasonable sum to a third party. Additionally, the plaintiffs sought relief on the basis of proprietary estoppel, alleging that they had detrimentally relied on Bill’s promises of a gift by will. The dispute involved numerous legal issues, including the enforceability of the agreement to leave the property upon payment to a third party, the certainty of the promises made, and the applicability of proprietary estoppel. The court also needed to determine the appropriate equitable remedy in the form of a constructive trust to satisfy the equity arising from the plaintiffs' claims.
The court meticulously examined the evidence presented by the plaintiffs, particularly considering the credibility of Bronwyn and Daniel as witnesses. The judge found that the plaintiffs were credible and honest, and rejected the defendant’s attacks on their credibility. The judge also found that any agreements or promises made by Bill were done with the knowledge and consent of his wife. The court assessed the various documents and conduct of the plaintiffs, concluding that the plaintiffs' account of the promises made should be accepted. The court found that the plaintiffs were under economic pressure and acted reasonably in light of their circumstances. The court further concluded that the promises made by Bill were too uncertain to be enforceable, and while the plaintiffs had relied on Bill’s promises, they did not establish a proprietary estoppel.
The court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to enforce the agreement to leave the property upon payment to a third party due to the uncertainty of the terms. However, given the plaintiffs' detrimental reliance on Bill’s promises, the court found that a constructive trust was necessary to satisfy the equity arising from the plaintiffs' claims. The court ordered that a constructive trust be imposed over the property to ensure that the plaintiffs' equity is satisfied.
In conclusion, the court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs to the extent of imposing a constructive trust over the property. The plaintiffs were not entitled to specific performance of the agreement to leave the property upon payment to a third party, but the court recognised the equity arising from their detrimental reliance on Bill’s promises. The court’s decision was based on a detailed assessment of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, ultimately finding in favour of the plaintiffs to the extent of the constructive trust.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
The trial of the action began on 15 October and ended on 11 November 1997, lasting thirteen sitting days. Seventeen witnesses were called and documents amounting to about 900 pages were put in evidence. In addition to numerous issues of fact, the questions raised included the suggested illusory character of the alleged variation agreement; the existence of a sufficient note or memorandum in writing; part performance; the suggested inability of Bill as part owner of the farm to perform the variation agreement; the existence of consideration for the variation agreement; laches; waiver by the plaintiffs of their right to relief; the imposition of conditions in granting specific performance; and the statute of limitations. There was in addition a counterclaim for $30,000 arising out of the drawing of a cheque by Bronwyn on the farm bank account very shortly after Bill’s death; this was abandoned near the end of the trial. In the circumstances the judge achieved a remarkable feat in giving judgment on 17 December 1997, when he published reasons running to 74 pages and dealing with a large number of questions of law and fact. The hearing of the appeal extended over four days. We have before us some eleven volumes of materials of various kinds. The judge’s findings and decision His Honour observed that the nature of the claims made it necessary to scrutinise closely the evidence of the plaintiffs. This he proceeded to do, referring at length to the attack made by the defendant on their credit. The judge said he was extremely impressed with Bronwyn as a witness, describing her as a very honest, hard-working and decent person. He described Daniel as a decent, hard-working, country man who did his best to tell the truth and should be accepted as a witness of truth. What the judge called the sustained and unfounded attacks on the plaintiffs were said by him to reflect adversely on those giving instructions on the other side, including in particular Robbie. His Honour accepted both plaintiffs as "credible, honest witnesses”. He went on to give detailed reasons for his conclusion that Robbie’s credibility had been severely damaged and that, in so far as his evidence conflicted with that of either of the plaintiffs, it was to be rejected. The judge also criticised the demeanour of Robbie’s wife, Maureen, describing it as demonstrating a lack of candour, and observing that he rejected her evidence in so far as it conflicted with that of the plaintiffs. Although I shall not deal with them in detail, I make it clear that I have considered each of the elaborate criticisms of the judge’s findings of fact and determinations with regard to credibility put forward in support of the appeal. The judge found that any agreements, promises and representations made by Bill were made with his wife’s knowledge, consent and authority. He dealt at some length with the defendant’s contention that some of the documents in the case, the allegations made in the plaintiffs’ pleadings from time to time and the conduct of the plaintiffs, both before and after Bill’s death, bore, and bore heavily, on whether their account of promises made to them should be accepted. One document relied on was the letter of advice dated 24 March 1994 and sent by Morrison & Sawers to the plaintiffs. His Honour accepted Bronwyn’s evidence that parts of this letter were inaccurate and her explanation of the plaintiffs’ failure to pursue a claim at that time. As regards the curious statement of the grounds of claim in the caveat as amended, the judge took this into account. As to the plaintiffs’ conduct in the months following Bill’s death, including the much discussed matter of the $30,000 withdrawn from the farm bank account, his Honour observed that “the plaintiffs were under economic pressure, they did not have any money to fight a court case, the legal advice given to them was inconclusive and they did not know what to do. It was all brought to a head when they were evicted on Robert’s instructions and they sought and obtained legal aid.” The judge also took into account, in evaluating the plaintiffs’ case, what he described as “the changes, uncertainties and inconsistencies” in their pleadings.