FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Fletcher v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 874
Citation: Fletcher v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 874 Appeal from: Application for extension of time: Fletcher & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 80 Parties: JAMES LAWRENCE FLETCHER and TENZIN PEMA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: SAD 99 of 2013 Judge: MANSFIELD J Date of judgment: 30 August 2013 Date of hearing: 12 August 2013 Place: Adelaide Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No catchwords Number of paragraphs: 33 Counsel for the Applicants: The applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondents: M Alderton Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
SAD 99 of 2013
BETWEEN: JAMES LAWRENCE FLETCHER
First ApplicantTENZIN PEMA
Second ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MANSFIELD J
DATE OF ORDER:
30 AUGUST 2013
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal, and application for leave to appeal, from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (formerly the Federal Magistrates Court) made on 12 April 2013 is refused.
2.The applicants pay to the first respondent costs of the application.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
SAD 99 of 2013
BETWEEN: JAMES LAWRENCE FLETCHER
First ApplicantTENZIN PEMA
Second ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MANSFIELD J
DATE:
30 AUGUST 2013
PLACE:
ADELAIDE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
This decision concerns an unsuccessful application for a “Carer” visa by Tenzin Pema, sponsored by James Fletcher. After it was refused, a further application for a “Carer” visa was submitted and granted, so Ms Pema now has a “Carer” visa.
The refusal of the first application was challenged in the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia (now the Federal Circuit Court of Australia). The challenge was summarily dismissed, because it would be futile to progress the claim as the second application had by then succeeded.
This application concerns that summary dismissal decision. It is an application from an interlocutory decision, and is a little out of time.
Mr Fletcher clearly feels very confronted by the refusal of the first application. He is persuaded that it was wrong, and is searching for sinister motives for it. He is resentful of the need to make the second application, and complains of the time and expense involved and the adverse effect on his health of the decision on the first application.
However, for reasons which appear below, in my view his application for an extension of time, and for leave to appeal, from the orders of the Federal Circuit Court must be refused. Whilst I would be prepared to extend the time to apply…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Fletcher v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2013] FCA 874
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court had to decide were whether the applicants had any prospect of succeeding on their proposed appeal and whether there would be substantial injustice if leave to appeal were refused. The court had to consider whether the Federal Magistrate had exercised his discretion correctly in dismissing the application for judicial review as futile and in awarding costs against the applicants. The court also had to consider whether the applicants had any real chance of succeeding on their proposed appeal.
The court held that the applicants had no real prospect of succeeding on their proposed appeal because there was no utility in the proceeding being pursued in the Federal Magistrates Court in the circumstances, nor in the Court of Appeal. The court held that the Federal Magistrate had exercised his discretion correctly in dismissing the application for judicial review as futile and in awarding costs against the applicants. The court held that there was no real prospect of the applicants establishing that the exercise of that discretion by the Federal Magistrate was wrong in the particular circumstances. The court held that the decision was not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by the Court. The court held that it was not possible to argue successfully that the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court to award costs in the circumstances in which those costs were awarded involved a discretionary error of the type addressed in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the applications for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal and for leave to appeal, and ordered that the applicants pay to the Minister the costs of the applications.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal, and application for leave to appeal, from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (formerly the Federal Magistrates Court) made on 12 April 2013 is refused.
2. The applicants pay to the first respondent costs of the application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the applicants are entitled to an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal.
2. Whether the applicants are entitled to leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (formerly the Federal Magistrates Court) made on 12 April 2013.
Held
1. The court concluded that the applicants are not entitled to an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal, and the application for an extension of time was refused.
2. The court concluded that the applicants are not entitled to leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 12 April 2013, and the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The discretionary power to grant leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision is also not a power to be “automatically” exercised upon application being made. Section 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) confers on the Court “an unfettered discretion” in “unqualified terms”: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 399 per Sheppard, Burchett and Heerey JJ. In order for the Court to grant leave to appeal the applicant must satisfy the Court of the cumulative test set out in Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 399 namely:(1)whether in all the circumstances the judgment of the primary judge is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by this Court, and(2)whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused supposing the decision to be wrong.CONSIDERATION If Mr Fletcher and Ms Pema had any prospect of succeeding on the proposed appeal, although the explanation for the delay is a short one, I would be disposed to grant an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal. The explanation for the delay is in essence a lack of awareness of the relevant time limits. However, the delay is relatively short, about 10 days, and it is not suggested that the Minister would materially suffer detriment if an extension of time to seek leave to appeal were granted. However, on both the extension of time application and on the leave to appeal application, it is necessary to determine whether the judgment from which leave to appeal is sought is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by the Court so that there is merit in the proposed appeal, and whether prejudice or substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong. I am conscious that formulation compounds the separate tests referred to above. That formulation should be understood as a short way of asking whether Mr Fletcher and Ms Pema have any real chance of succeeding on their proposed appeal. If they do not, there will be no injustice to them by refusing the application. In this case, I agree with the submissions of counsel for the Minister that the proposed appeal could not succeed, because there was no utility in the proceeding being pursued in the Federal Magistrates Court in the circumstances, nor in this Court. The grant of constitutional relief setting aside a decision for jurisdictional error is discretionary: Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex Parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82. The Federal Magistrate exercised his discretion to dismiss the application because the visa had been granted. There is no real prospect of Mr Fletcher and Ms Pema establishing that the exercise of that discretion by the Federal Magistrate was wrong in the particular circumstances. The decision is not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by this Court. I do not think it is possible to argue successfully that the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court to award costs in the circumstances in which those costs were awarded involved a discretionary error of the type addressed in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505 for the reasons explained by the Federal Magistrate.