Fletcher v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Fletcher v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 874

Citation: Fletcher v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 874
Appeal from: Application for extension of time: Fletcher & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 80
Parties: JAMES LAWRENCE FLETCHER and TENZIN PEMA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: SAD 99 of 2013
Judge: MANSFIELD J
Date of judgment: 30 August 2013
Date of hearing: 12 August 2013
Place: Adelaide
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 33
Counsel for the Applicants: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondents: M Alderton
Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

SAD 99 of 2013

BETWEEN:

JAMES LAWRENCE FLETCHER
First Applicant

TENZIN PEMA
Second Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 AUGUST 2013

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal, and application for leave to appeal, from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (formerly the Federal Magistrates Court) made on 12 April 2013 is refused.

2.The applicants pay to the first respondent costs of the application.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

SAD 99 of 2013

BETWEEN:

JAMES LAWRENCE FLETCHER
First Applicant

TENZIN PEMA
Second Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE:

30 AUGUST 2013

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. This decision concerns an unsuccessful application for a “Carer” visa by Tenzin Pema, sponsored by James Fletcher. After it was refused, a further application for a “Carer” visa was submitted and granted, so Ms Pema now has a “Carer” visa.

  2. The refusal of the first application was challenged in the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia (now the Federal Circuit Court of Australia). The challenge was summarily dismissed, because it would be futile to progress the claim as the second application had by then succeeded.

  3. This application concerns that summary dismissal decision. It is an application from an interlocutory decision, and is a little out of time.

  4. Mr Fletcher clearly feels very confronted by the refusal of the first application. He is persuaded that it was wrong, and is searching for sinister motives for it. He is resentful of the need to make the second application, and complains of the time and expense involved and the adverse effect on his health of the decision on the first application.

  5. However, for reasons which appear below, in my view his application for an extension of time, and for leave to appeal, from the orders of the Federal Circuit Court must be refused. Whilst I would be prepared to extend the time to apply…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 874
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Fletcher v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the applicants, Mr James Fletcher and Ms Tenzin Pema, sought an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (formerly the Federal Magistrates Court) dismissing their application for judicial review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal refusing to grant Ms Pema a visa. The applicants also sought leave to appeal the decision of the Federal Circuit Court. The Minister for Immigration and Citizenship opposed the applications. The applicants argued that the Federal Magistrate had erred in dismissing their application for judicial review as futile and in awarding costs against them. They claimed that the Federal Magistrate had failed to appreciate the importance of the principle that a visa applicant must be sponsored by an appropriate sponsor and that the Federal Magistrate had failed to appreciate the importance of the principle that a visa applicant must be a carer of an Australian relative.

The legal issues the court had to decide were whether the applicants had any prospect of succeeding on their proposed appeal and whether there would be substantial injustice if leave to appeal were refused. The court had to consider whether the Federal Magistrate had exercised his discretion correctly in dismissing the application for judicial review as futile and in awarding costs against the applicants. The court also had to consider whether the applicants had any real chance of succeeding on their proposed appeal.

The court held that the applicants had no real prospect of succeeding on their proposed appeal because there was no utility in the proceeding being pursued in the Federal Magistrates Court in the circumstances, nor in the Court of Appeal. The court held that the Federal Magistrate had exercised his discretion correctly in dismissing the application for judicial review as futile and in awarding costs against the applicants. The court held that there was no real prospect of the applicants establishing that the exercise of that discretion by the Federal Magistrate was wrong in the particular circumstances. The court held that the decision was not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by the Court. The court held that it was not possible to argue successfully that the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court to award costs in the circumstances in which those costs were awarded involved a discretionary error of the type addressed in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the applications for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal and for leave to appeal, and ordered that the applicants pay to the Minister the costs of the applications.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal, and application for leave to appeal, from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (formerly the Federal Magistrates Court) made on 12 April 2013 is refused.

2. The applicants pay to the first respondent costs of the application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The application is refused.THE FACTS Tenzin Pema, the second applicant, is a citizen of India. On 19 April 2011, she applied to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (the Department) for a Other Family (Migrant) (Class BO) Subclass 116 (Carer) visa (the visa). She was sponsored for the visa by James Fletcher, the first applicant. Mr Fletcher is her brother-in-law and an Australian citizen. The application for the visa was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (the Minister) on 24 September 2011. That decision was reviewed by the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) by application instituted on 30 November 2011. On 22 August 2012, the Tribunal affirmed the decision to refuse to grant to Ms Pema the visa. The reason for the Tribunal’s decision can be shortly stated. Clause 116.212(a) of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations) required Ms Pema to be sponsored by an Australian relative referred to in cl 116.211 or by the Australian relative’s spouse or de facto partner, provided the spouse or partner cohabits with the Australian relative and is himself or herself (relevantly) an Australian citizen. As it happens, the wife of Mr Fletcher, Dolkar Lhamo, is an Australian citizen, and was eligible to sponsor the application for the visa. However, she did not do so at that point. The visa application by Ms Pema also required her to be a “carer” of an Australian relative: cl 116.211(1). By following the definition of “Australian relative”, in reg 1.03 of the Regulations, “close relative” also in reg 113 of the Regulations, and “carer” in reg 1.15AA of the Regulations, it is apparent that a brother-in-law is not an “Australian relative” or a relative for the purposes of sponsorship. As the visa application was not validly sponsored as required by an Australian relative, the Tribunal affirmed the decision. Mr Fletcher and Ms Pema then sought judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal in the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia (now the Federal Circuit Court of Australia) asserting jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. That application commenced on 26 September 2012. Before it came on for hearing, on 14 January 2013, Ms Pema was granted the visa. It is not necessary to explore in detail how that occurred. During submissions, Mr Fletcher said he had resubmitted the same visa application and that on this occasion it had been granted. That outcome has fuelled his discontent. The Minister said that the fresh application included Dolkar Lhamo as a sponsor, so that (as noted in the previous paragraph) the visa could be and was granted. Upon the grant of the visa, solicitors for the Minister encouraged Mr Fletcher and Ms Pema to withdraw the application for judicial review because, in essence, the visa which was the subject of the challenge had been granted in any event. They declined to do so. That led to the Minister applying to have the claim for jurisdictional review of the decision of the Tribunal summarily dismissed on the basis that it was a futile application. That application was made under r 13.10(a) of the then Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (the FMC Rules) (now the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). That application came on for hearing before Federal Magistrate Simpson (now Judge Simpson) on 12 April 2013. His Honour dismissed the application pursuant to r 13.10(a) of the FMC Rules, with costs. He did so because he regarded the application as futile, having regard to the grant of the visa in any event. He awarded costs because he considered that Mr Fletcher and Ms Pema should not have pursued the application once the visa was granted and that the Minister through his solicitors had amply indicated to them that the application was no longer worth pursuing.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the applicants are entitled to an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal.
2. Whether the applicants are entitled to leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (formerly the Federal Magistrates Court) made on 12 April 2013.

Held
1. The court concluded that the applicants are not entitled to an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal, and the application for an extension of time was refused.
2. The court concluded that the applicants are not entitled to leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 12 April 2013, and the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The discretionary power to grant leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision is also not a power to be “automatically” exercised upon application being made. Section 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) confers on the Court “an unfettered discretion” in “unqualified terms”: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 399 per Sheppard, Burchett and Heerey JJ. In order for the Court to grant leave to appeal the applicant must satisfy the Court of the cumulative test set out in Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 399 namely:(1)whether in all the circumstances the judgment of the primary judge is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by this Court, and(2)whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused supposing the decision to be wrong.CONSIDERATION If Mr Fletcher and Ms Pema had any prospect of succeeding on the proposed appeal, although the explanation for the delay is a short one, I would be disposed to grant an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal. The explanation for the delay is in essence a lack of awareness of the relevant time limits. However, the delay is relatively short, about 10 days, and it is not suggested that the Minister would materially suffer detriment if an extension of time to seek leave to appeal were granted. However, on both the extension of time application and on the leave to appeal application, it is necessary to determine whether the judgment from which leave to appeal is sought is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by the Court so that there is merit in the proposed appeal, and whether prejudice or substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong. I am conscious that formulation compounds the separate tests referred to above. That formulation should be understood as a short way of asking whether Mr Fletcher and Ms Pema have any real chance of succeeding on their proposed appeal. If they do not, there will be no injustice to them by refusing the application. In this case, I agree with the submissions of counsel for the Minister that the proposed appeal could not succeed, because there was no utility in the proceeding being pursued in the Federal Magistrates Court in the circumstances, nor in this Court. The grant of constitutional relief setting aside a decision for jurisdictional error is discretionary: Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex Parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82. The Federal Magistrate exercised his discretion to dismiss the application because the visa had been granted. There is no real prospect of Mr Fletcher and Ms Pema establishing that the exercise of that discretion by the Federal Magistrate was wrong in the particular circumstances. The decision is not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by this Court. I do not think it is possible to argue successfully that the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court to award costs in the circumstances in which those costs were awarded involved a discretionary error of the type addressed in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505 for the reasons explained by the Federal Magistrate.