Fletcher v Magistrates Court of SOUTH AUSTRALIA - [2013] SASC 201

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)
FLETCHER v MAGISTRATES COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
[2013] SASC 201
Reasons for Decision of The Honourable Justice Nicholson
20 December 2013
MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT - POWERS OF COURT - OTHER MATTERS
MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT - POWERS OF COURT - FRESH EVIDENCE
The appellant was disqualified from holding or obtaining a drivers licence for three consecutive periods of six months by order of a Magistrate on 6 June 2013 pursuant to s70I of the Criminal Law (Sentencing Act) 1988 (SA).
The appellant had committed 45 offences, the majority of which were driving offences. For administrative purposes, all the outstanding fines were collected and separately itemised in a single Magistrates Court file which was then subsequently distributed over three new files. It was with respect to each of these three files that the Magistrate, purporting to exercise the power available under s70I of the Sentencing Act, sentenced the appellant.
The appellant complained on appeal that the Magistrate erred in not exercising other options available to him pursuant to s70I.
Held:
(i) The appeal is allowed in part.
(ii) On file MCBER-13-884 the Magistrate’s order for licence disqualification for six months commencing 12.01am on 29 June 2013 is to stand.
(iii) On file MCBER-13-886 the Magistrate’s order for licence disqualification is set aside. The appellant is ordered to perform 320 hours of community service within 12 months of today.
(iv) On file MCBER-13-885 the Magistrate’s order for licence disqualification is set aside. The appellant is to pay the amount of $4,500 in lieu of the amount of $5,713.10 by instalments of $70 per fortnight until the full amount now due is paid.
(v) As soon as the Magistrates Court fines unit can make the appropriate arrangements the appellant is to increase her repayments from the present $35 per fortnight to $70 per fortnight. All payments will in the first instance be directed to repayment of any balance still due on the compensation file MCPAR-12-201 and thereafter to the payment obligation under order (iv).
Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 s3, s70I; Supreme Court Rules 2006 Rule 295, referred to.
House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499; R v Morse (1979) 23 SASR 98; R v McDonald (1974) 8 SASR 388; Meschino v Police (2003) 229 LSJS 92; [2003] SASC 258, considered.

FLETCHER v MAGISTRATES COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
[2013] SASC 201
Magistrates Appeal: Criminal
NICHOLSON J.
Introduction and background

This is an appeal against orders made by a Magistrate on 6 June 2013 pursuant to s70I(3) of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 disqualifying the appellant from holding or obtaining a drivers licence for three consecutive periods of six months. The total period of disqualification is 18 months.
During the period March 2005 to December 2011 the appellant committed in the order of 45 separate offences for each of which a fine was imposed. Of the 45 offences, 39 were driving or in other respects motor vehicle related offences. In addition, the appellant was convicted of two theft offences (in 2009 and 2011), three regulatory offences concerning ownership of a dog (in May 2010) and one offence of possessing a firearm without a licence (October 2010). The 45 fines, as levied, varied in amount from a minimum of $26.75 to a maximum of $2,429.75 (the possess firearm without licence offence) inclusive of, where appropriate, victims of crime levy.
As at June this year the total of all unpaid fines was $17,025.90. For a period prior to 6 June 2013 the appellant had been making payments at the rate of $35 a fortnight deducted directly from her Centrelink entitlements. For administrative purposes, all the outstanding fines were collected and separately itemised in a single Magistrates Court file, MCPAR-12-1999. That file was subsequently divided into three and the various outstanding fines administratively distributed over three new files being MCBER-13-884, MCBER-13-885, MCBER-13-886.
It was with respect to each of these three files that the Magistrate, purporting to exercise the power available under s70I(3) of the Sentencing Act, embarked upon a reconsideration of the appellant’s liability. His Honour exercised the discretion provided for in that sub-section to convert each of the orders imposing the fines making up the sum of $17,025.90 into three separate orders disqualifying the debtor from holding or obtaining a drivers licence for a period of six months. Each disqualification was ordered to operate cumulatively.
The Magistrate made his orders on 6 June 2013. On file MCBER-13-884 which dealt with a subset of the fines totalling $4,927.50 the Magistrate disqualified the appellant from holding or obtaining a drivers licence for a period of six months commencing 12.01am on 29 June 2013. On file MCBER-13-885 which dealt with a subset of the fines totalling $5,713.10 the Magistrate made an order disqualifying the appellant from holding or obtaining a drivers licence for a period of six months commencing 12.01am on 28 December 2013. On file MCBER-13-886 which dealt with a subset of the fines totalling $6,385.30 the Magistrate disqualified the appellant from holding or obtaining a drivers licence for a period of six months commencing 12.01am on 27 June 2014.
Separate to the unpaid fines, the appellant also owed compensation on file MCPAR-12-201 relevant to one of the theft charges. On 30 March 2012 an order was made for compensation in the sum of $1,830.75 to be paid at $35 per fortnight. In accordance with the usual approach,[1] the requirement to pay compensation was given preference over the requirement to pay the unpaid fines. According to the relevant certificate of record in the Magistrates Court, on 30 March 2012 the appellant was “paying fortnightly on compensation file re: 12-201”. As a consequence, the requirement to pay the unpaid fines was deferred for a period of up to two years. According to the appellant, at the appeal, she had completed her obligations to pay the compensation at a time sometime before the making of the 6 June orders and is now in a position to resume payments towards the outstanding fines. According to the appellant, the fines payment unit of the Magistrates Court has continued to receive $35 per fortnight from the appellant by way of Centrelink deductions at all times since and notwithstanding that she is of the belief that the compensation debt has now been fully discharged. If this is so, the fines payment will need to undertake some form of accounting in favour of the appellant.
[1] Consistent with s14 of the Sentencing Act.
However, by email of 19 December 2013, the Crown has advised, as its understanding, that the compensation amount has not yet been fully discharged, although the appellant has been paying the $35 per fortnight. According to the Crown the sum of $374 remains outstanding on the compensation file as at 13 December 2013. I will return to this issue.
The appellant is unemployed and her only income is Centrelink payments for unemployment relief. Even if the $35 per fortnight were to be directed to the payment of the fines, it can be seen that, at this rate of payment, it would take something like 18 and a half years for the total of $17,025.90 to be paid.
The Registrar of the Magistrates Court reviewed the financial position of the appellant pursuant to s70I(1) and exercised the discretion to remit the appellant’s matter to a Magistrate for reconsideration. Section 70I(1) provides:
If the Registrar is satisfied, after an investigation of a debtor’s financial means has been carried out under this division or on such other evidence as the Registrar thinks sufficient, that the debtor does not have, and is not likely within a reasonable time to have, the means to satisfy the pecuniary sum without the debtor or his or her dependants suffering hardship, the Registrar may remit the matter to the Court for reconsideration under this section.
I am satisfied that, given the information before the Registrar, his remitting of the matter pursuant to s70I(1) was within power. After having heard from the appellant on this appeal, it is not to be doubted she does not have and is not likely within a reasonable time to have the means to satisfy the total amount owing by way of fines without her or her dependants suffering hardship.
For completeness sake, it is to be observed that the Registrar purported to reach the requisite state of satisfaction with respect to each of the three files and remitted each of the files as separate matters to be dealt with by the Magistrate. On the facts, this state of satisfaction, reached by the Registrar with respect to each of the three files, was plainly justified.
The appellant was notified by the Registrar that the matter, as remitted to a Magistrate, would be heard at the Berri Magistrates Court on 6 June 2013 at 10am. The appellant was advised that she should attend at the hearing if she wished to be heard but otherwise the Court might hear and determine the matter in her absence. No transcript of the proceedings on that day was taken and no formal reasons were provided by the Magistrate. However, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 2006 295(1)(e) a report was sought from the Magistrate who dealt with the matter. In response to this request, two reports, one dated 25 November 2013 and one dated 27 November 2013 were provided. Copies of both reports were provided to each party. The two reports outlined the general procedure for these matters usually adopted in the Magistrates Court and as adopted by the particular Magistrate concerned.
The Magistrate’s decision and the parties’ submissions on appeal in essence
As I have indicated, the Magistrate arranged for the single file within which all of the fines totalling $17,025.90 had been aggregated to be split into the three separate files identified earlier in these reasons. The Magistrate then considered each file in accordance with the power conferred on him by s70I(3). That sub-section provides as follows.
(3)On reconsidering a matter under this section, the Court may—
(a)     make an order—
(i)remitting the pecuniary sum; or
(ii)reducing the pecuniary sum by a specified amount; or
(iii) deferring payment of the pecuniary sum until such time as the Court thinks fit (being a period not more than 2 years after the date of the reconsideration of the matter); or
(iv)converting the order imposing the pecuniary sum into an order for community service; or
(v)converting the order imposing the pecuniary sum into an order—
(A)disqualifying the debtor from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for a period not exceeding 6 months; or
(B)cancelling the debtor's driver's licence and disqualifying the debtor from obtaining such a licence for a period not exceeding 6 months; or
(b)     make an order dealing with specified amounts of the pecuniary sum (that, when aggregated, make up the whole) as follows:
(i)by remitting a specified amount of the pecuniary sum;
(ii)by deferring payment of a specified amount of the pecuniary sum until such time as the Court thinks fit (being a period not more than 2 years after the date of the reconsideration of the matter);
(iii)by converting the order in relation to a specified amount of the pecuniary sum into an order for community service;
(iv)by converting the order in relation to a specified amount of the pecuniary sum into an order—
(A)disqualifying the debtor from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for a period not exceeding 6 months; or
(B)cancelling the debtor's driver's licence and disqualifying the debtor from obtaining such a licence for a period not exceeding 6 months;
(v)by confirming the imposition of a specified amount of the pecuniary sum; or
(c)     confirm the order imposing the pecuniary sum.
I am satisfied that the Magistrate undertook his usual practice, as described in the letter of report dated 27 November 2013, “to explain the effect of the legislation and how it can be applied to an outstanding pecuniary sum such that a debtor can express his or her view as to the appropriate way to discharge their indebtedness to the pecuniary penalties”. As explained in the letter of report dated 25 November 2013, “the usual practice is to explain to a debtor the various alternatives contained in the legislation and discuss the most appropriate resolution”.
The matter having been referred to the Magistrate by the Registrar in accordance with s70I(1), a discretion arose in the Magistrate to exercise one of the powers available under s70I(3). In the present case, the Magistrate himself did not need to reach the state of satisfaction as set out in s70I(2)[2] because this would appear to offer an alternative route to the process of reconsideration under s70I(3), unnecessary to be observed, where the Registrar had already reached such a state of satisfaction and had remitted the matter in accordance with s70I(1).
[2] Sub-section 70I(2) provides that if the Court before which a debtor is appearing in any proceedings… is satisfied that the debtor does not have and is not likely in a reasonable time to have, the means to satisfy the pecuniary sum without the debtor or his or her dependents suffering hardship, the Court may on its own initiative, proceed to reconsider the matter under s70I.
Counsel for the respondent, in her written outline, submitted that there is no reason to find that the Magistrate departed from his usual practice. Counsel pointed out that the appellant, in her summary of argument, accepted that she was given an opportunity to explain to the Magistrate why she needed or wanted to retain her licence. I accept this submission but with this qualification. In her written summary the appellant said this.
I tried to explain my situation and asked if I could retain my licence as I have a medical condition (severe anxiety PTSD). I need to attend counselling appointments and regular doctor appointments also I live in Moorook SA where there is no public transport.
During her oral submissions the appellant expanded on these matters. She said that she was not able to explain her position fully to the Magistrate. I will return to this issue shortly.
The Magistrate’s general practice, which I accept was observed, at least from the Magistrate’s perspective, can be summarised as follows:
(i)discussions were held with the debtor regarding the most appropriate outcome;
(ii)submissions were invited as to health and other issues that may prevent the appellant from doing community service or give rise to any substantial need to retain a drivers licence; and
(iii)consideration was given to the nature of the offences which gave rise to the pecuniary penalties in order to assist in determining whether it was appropriate that the appellant should retain her licence.
The respondent also submitted that the Magistrate must have been aware from the Court file that the vast majority of the unpaid fines arose from repeated traffic offences and speeding fines and that the decision to impose periods of disqualification was therefore entirely appropriate. It was submitted that there is nothing to suggest that the Magistrate erred in the exercise of the discretion open to him and, in particular, that it does not appear that he took into account irrelevant considerations or failed to take into account relevant considerations.[3]
[3] See generally House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505; R v Morse (1979) 23 SASR 98 at 99-100; R v McDonald (1974) 8 SASR 388.
The appellant, who appeared in person, submitted that she tried to explain to the Magistrate her difficult personal circumstances including, in particular, her financial and health problems. She asked the Magistrate if she could retain her licence because of the difficulties she would be caused by being unlicensed. However, she said that she had been unable to fully explain her circumstances and difficulties to the Magistrate in detail. She gained the impression, whether accurately or not I am unable to say, that the Magistrate was “short” with her. I accept from what the appellant said on appeal that, for whatever reason, she was unable to fully present her case to the Magistrate but was better prepared and able to do so at the appeal. Counsel for the respondent, when asked, did not object to me hearing the more detailed account given at the appeal by the appellant and notwithstanding that it was not given by affidavit under oath. Counsel also did not object to my treating it as fresh evidence on the appeal.
According to the appellant, she had been, in the past, in a relationship with another person who drove her car a lot. A number of the fines arose from that person’s conduct. However, “I couldn’t prove that it was them, but a lot of it was that and I just had to take it on the chin…”. Of more significance, is that the appellant moved to the Riverland after seeing a murder in Davoren Park. She moved because she did not want to be around “that kind of thing”.
The appellant lives in Moorook where “there is no shops or anything”. It is a small town with no public transport. She has no family in the Riverland. Her father lives in Adelaide. He has been able, on occasion, to drive to the Riverland to pick her up and bring her to Adelaide for essential matters, such as for example, court appearances. She also has to make regular trips to Adelaide to see her family, in particular, her grandmother is unwell and in hospital.
Of most significance to the appellant, insofar as her loss of licence is concerned, is the fact that she suffers from post-traumatic stress and severe anxiety as a consequence of witnessing the murder. She has been undertaking counselling with “Headspace” firstly on a weekly and now on a fortnightly basis. That counselling occurs in Renmark or Berri. The distance from Moorook to Berri is approximately 30kms and from Moorook to Renmark approximately 45kms. There being no public transport, it is not possible for the appellant to attend her counselling sessions other than by private vehicle. The appellant also needs to see her general practitioner fortnightly and usually on the same day that she attends for counselling sessions. Her general practitioner is trialling various medications which he likes to monitor.
The appellant has no close friends yet in Moorook. Although she has made some friends she has not known them for very long and they are not the kind of people that she could rely on to take her to her counselling sessions and back on a regular basis. Furthermore, they are not the kind of people to whom she would want to disclose her health problems.
Since the appellant’s licence was suspended back in June she has been compliant and has been barely doing anything. She has explained to her Headspace counsellor her difficulty and has been having phone appointments which, understandably, are not particularly satisfactory.
The appellant tried to explain to the Magistrate that she would be capable of performing community service instead of having her licence disqualified but, according to the appellant, the Magistrate took the view that the amount of the fines outstanding were simply too large to be dealt with by way of a community service order. I agree that it would be inappropriate to exchange the whole of the outstanding amount, $17,025.90 for the maximum amount of community service that can be ordered, that is, 320 hours. However, that is not to say that some hours of community service might be used as a component of an overall alternative sentencing package.

The appellant expressed a willingness during submissions to perform community service. In addition, now that she has moved to the Riverland her financial position has settled somewhat. The appellant receives a little over $500 a fortnight from Centrelink including for rent assistance. This is her only income for the foreseeable future. However, she has worked out that she now would be in a position to pay up to $70 a fortnight in repayment of fines. That is double the amount that she has been paying to date.
The appellant made it plain that she was prepared to do whatever might be required in order to get her licence back. She said that she would rather continue to pay the money that she owes over time but that she was prepared to perform community service.
Counsel for the respondent submitted that on the information before the Magistrate no error had been made and that the three periods of licence disqualification were within the discretion available to him. However, counsel also accepted that, given the fresh evidence heard on the appeal, it would be open to the Court to craft a different sentencing package so as to take account of the appellant’s circumstances, as more fully explained in this Court.
Disposition of the appeal
Section 70I confers a power on the Court to make substituted orders where a person lacks the capacity to satisfy a “pecuniary sum”. In s3(1) of the Sentencing Act the term “pecuniary sum” is defined to mean, inter alia,
(a)    a fine; or
(b)   …
(c)    …
(d)   ...
(e)    any other amount payable pursuant to an order or direction of a Court.
Pecuniary sum also includes a levy imposed under the Victims of Crime Act or a corresponding previous law.
When read literally, s70I confers its discretionary powers in relation to each and every pecuniary sum, including each and every fine, that may be owed by a debtor. In the present case, the appellant, prior to the Magistrate’s reconsideration under s70I was liable for 45 separate fines or pecuniary sums. It was open to the Magistrate upon referral from the Registrar (s70I(1)) or on his Honour’s own initiative (s70I(2)) to reconsider, in accordance with the powers conferred in s70I(3), each of the appellant’s 45 fines as a separate matter. However, as a matter of administrative convenience the fines were grouped and dealt with as three much larger sums.
It may be that the Magistrate, when he arranged for the initial file dealing with all of the fines totalling $17,025.90 to be divided into the three new files, was purporting to proceed pursuant to s70I(3)(b). If so, his Honour presumably took the view that the total amount of $17,025.90 was the “pecuniary sum” in issue. If so, and if correct in this respect, his Honour was entitled under s70I(3)(b) to make orders dealing with specified amounts, or components, of that pecuniary sum. It is unnecessary that I form a final view but my inclination is that s70I(3)(b) does not expressly authorise this practice. I incline to the view that at no time was this appellant liable for a “pecuniary sum”, as defined in s3 of the Sentencing Act, in the amount of $17,025.90. At no time has the appellant become liable to pay “a fine” (or any of the other alternatives within the definition of “pecuniary sum”) in that amount.
Strictly, as I have earlier indicated, the appellant has at all times been liable for 45 separate fines or pecuniary sums for the purposes of s70I. However, and this is why it is strictly unnecessary to decide this point, I am satisfied that the Magistrate had the power to act in the manner he did in any event.
The Magistrate could have approached the matter in a long and protracted way by dealing with each pecuniary sum (fine) individually, forming a view (insofar as might be necessary) as to the appellant’s capacity to pay each such fine (but bearing in mind of course, in the context of her means, the other 44 fines that were due and payable) and then making a substitute order with respect to each such pecuniary sum. That substitute order might be a remittance of a pecuniary sum, a reduction of a pecuniary sum by a specified amount, a deferral of payment or a conversion of the order imposing the pecuniary sum into an order for community service, or a conversion into an order for disqualification of drivers licence. It would be open to the Magistrate proceeding in this manner, in a case such as the present involving a large number of fines of different values, to make a series of substitute orders for disqualification of licence each one being only days or weeks in length.
It would be open to the Magistrate in such a case to make each of the substitute orders cumulative. Following an accumulation of all such orders the same result could be achieved as, in this case, was in fact achieved by first accumulating the pecuniary sums before applying any conversion rate for an alternative order.
In the Magistrate’s first report dated 25 November 2013, his Honour indicated that the practice in the Magistrates Court was to the effect that 40 days (320 hours of community service) was commonly treated as an equivalent to a pecuniary sum of $4,000 ($100 per day).[4] The practice also is to the effect that a pecuniary penalty of $4,000 equates to a licence disqualification of six months. However, this is only a practice and it is flexibly applied. Furthermore, where a pecuniary sum is less than $4,000 a pro-rata calculation to impose a lesser period of licence disqualification or community service will be adopted.
[4] See Meschino v Police (2003) 229 LSJS 92; [2003] SASC 258 (Perry J).
However, where the pecuniary penalties substantially exceed $4,000 the practice, again using a flexible approach, is to make more than one order for cumulative licence disqualifications, in lieu of or in addition to any community service that might be ordered. The practice recognises that, as a matter of fairness, a debtor who owes, for example, $8,000 would be expected to face an alternative penalty of broadly twice the penalty faced by a person who only owed $4,000.
With this general practice in mind, the Magistrate took the $17,025.90 owed by this appellant and treated it as three amounts exceeding $4,000 so as to justify three periods of disqualification of licence each for no more than six months. Paragraphs (A) and (B) of s70I(3)(a)(v) provide that any licence disqualification is to be for a period not exceeding six months. However, this restriction is by reference to any substitute order for “the pecuniary sum” (or fine) under consideration. Where more than one pecuniary sum (or fine) is under consideration the six months maximum will apply to each one. When regard is had to this general practice and to the administrative approach adopted by the Magistrate to the accumulation of the 45 pecuniary sums, the appellant has been treated leniently in that the total amount owed might have justified a licence suspension for more than two years.
I am satisfied that had the Magistrate treated each fine individually as a separate pecuniary sum and had he imposed a licence disqualification for a pro-rata period with respect to each such pecuniary sum he would have arrived at a period for licence disqualification of at least 18 months. I am satisfied that the Magistrate has acted within the powers conferred by s70I and notwithstanding the method adopted, for obvious and sensible administrative convenience, in exercising that power.
The Magistrate’s decision of whether or not to make substitute orders pursuant to s70I involves the exercise of a discretion. The discretion must be exercised judicially and in accordance with the well known requirements as set out by the majority in the High Court in House v The King.[5] The appellant has managed to accumulate a very substantial number of pecuniary sums. In all practical senses, it would be impossible for the appellant, in her present circumstances, to discharge the total within anything like a reasonable period of time.
[5] (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-5 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ),
Given the appellant’s history of repeatedly incurring fines and of repeatedly flouting, in particular, the road and traffic rules, it would be quite inappropriate to simply remit a substantial amount of the total or to substantially reduce the amount payable. Similarly, it would not be appropriate to convert such a large amount owing into only 320 hours of community service, being the maximum permissible under the legislation. Furthermore, given the nature of the appellant’s repeated offending over a number of years, a penalty by way of licence disqualification is not necessarily inappropriate. Even if it be accepted that the appellant has a particular need for a drivers licence resulting from her medical condition, this is not uncommon and cannot on its own be a reason to protect the appellant from what, when all the circumstances are taken into account, might be an appropriate exercise of the discretion in this area.
Nevertheless, it is the relative remoteness of Moorook that is the troubling factor. The circumstances of the appellant, as now understood, are such that a licence disqualification for 18 months can be seen as particularly harsh. If the appellant had not already moved to Moorook for the reasons she gave but had stayed in suburban Adelaide with access to friends, family and public transport I would have no doubt that the Magistrate’s determination fell within the discretion open to him. However, the Magistrate has either failed to take into consideration the full extent of the appellant’s personal circumstances or has accorded them insufficient weight. This is not necessarily the fault of the Magistrate given that aspects of the appellant’s material circumstances were revealed for the first time at the appeal. It would seem that the Magistrate also failed to properly consider whether substitute orders other than licence disqualification might be more appropriate in the circumstances. However, I again observe that the full circumstances may not have been before the Magistrate. The Court is in a difficult position in this respect. The Magistrate has been unable to report on what actually occurred, only his Honour’s general practice. The appellant has done her best to explain what occurred but the respondent was not present and has no basis on which to challenge the appellant’s somewhat limited account.
The appeal is allowed in part. Strictly, the appeal concerns the three separate files with respect to which the Magistrate made separate orders. In my view, a range of substitute orders available under s70I should be employed.
On file MCBER-13-884 the Magistrate’s substitute penalty order that the appellant is disqualified from holding or obtaining a drivers licence for a period of six months commencing 12.01am on 29 June 2013 is to stand. To this extent the appeal is dismissed. This period of licence disqualification will expire on 28 December 2013.
On file MCBER-13-886 the Magistrate’s disqualification order for a period of six months commencing at 12.01am on 27 June 2014 is set aside. In lieu thereof and by way of a substitution order for the fines totalling $6,385.30 dealt with on that file and exercising the power available under s70I(3)(a)(iv), I order that the appellant perform 320 hours of community service within 12 months of today. The appeal is allowed to this extent.
On file MCBER-13-885 the Magistrate’s disqualification order for a period of six months commencing 12.01am on 28 December 2013 is set aside. In lieu thereof and by way of substitution order for the fines totalling $5,713.10 dealt with on that file and exercising the power available under s70I(3)(a)(ii), I reduce the amount of $5,713.10 payable by the amount of $1,213.10. The reduced amount payable of $4,500 is to be paid at the rate of $70 per fortnight. This will give rise to a repayment period of a little over two and a half years. However, to the extent that the appellant still has been paying $35 per fortnight during the period of the Magistrate’s substitute orders, and notwithstanding that those substitute orders were intended to cancel the appellant’s indebtedness of $17,025.90, any such payments will need to be accounted for in favour of the appellant.
Orders
(i)The appeal is allowed in part.
(ii)On file MCBER-13-884 the Magistrate’s order for licence disqualification for six months commencing 12.01am on 29 June 2013 is to stand.
(iii)On file MCBER-13-886 the Magistrate’s order for licence disqualification is set aside. The appellant is ordered to perform 320 hours of community service within 12 months of today.
(iv)On file MCBER-13-885 the Magistrate’s order for licence disqualification is set aside. The appellant is to pay the amount of $4,500 in lieu of the amount of $5,713.10 by instalments of $70 per fortnight until the full amount now due is paid.
(v)As soon as the Magistrates Court fines unit can make the appropriate arrangements the appellant is to increase her repayments from the present $35 per fortnight to $70 per fortnight. All payments will in the first instance be directed to repayment of any balance still due on the compensation file MCPAR-12-201 and thereafter to the payment obligation under order (iv).
(vi)For the purpose of arranging community service the appellant is required to report to the Department for Correctional Services at the Courts Probations Unit, Adelaide Magistrates Court Building, 2 Angas Street, Adelaide or the Regional Office of the Department for Correctional Services at 7 Kay Street, Berri within two working days of today unless within that period she receives a notice from the Chief Executive Officer to the contrary.
(vii)The appellant must report to the fines unit of the Berri Magistrates Court on or before Monday 6 January 2014.