Fleet Trans Pty Ltd v Gulf Transport Co. Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

LOCATION:   PERTH

CITATION:   FLEET TRANS PTY LTD -v- GULF TRANSPORT CO. PTY LTD [2017] WADC 87

CORAM:   DERRICK DCJ

HEARD:   21 JUNE 2017

DELIVERED          :   21 JUNE 2017

FILE NO/S:   CIV 2148 of 2017

BETWEEN:   FLEET TRANS PTY LTD

Plaintiff

AND

GULF TRANSPORT CO. PTY LTD
First Defendant

STRATHAVEN (NT) PTY LTD
Second Defendant

Catchwords:

Landlord and tenant - Alleged failure to return bank guarantee - Application for interim interlocutory injunction

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Application for interim interlocutory injunction allowed

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Mr K de Kerloy

First Defendant             :     No appearance

Second Defendant         :     No appearance

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     Herbert Smith Freehills

First Defendant             :     Not applicable

Second Defendant         :     Not applicable

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Australian Blue Metal Ltd v Hughes (1962) 79 WN (NSW) 498

City Bank of Sydney v McLaughlin (1909) 9 CLR 615

Jones v Peters [1948] VLR 331

Klement v Pencoal Ltd [1999] QSC 90

Okewood Pty Ltd t/as Perth Glory v Football Federation Australia Ltd [2015] WASC 127

Twinside Pty Ltd v Venetian Nominees Pty Ltd [2008] WASC 110

Union Bank of Australia v Rudder (1911) 13 CLR 152

DERRICK DCJ:

Introduction

  1. The plaintiff makes an ex parte application for an interim interlocutory injunction restraining the defendants from making demand for payment on a bank guarantee number DG459163095 in the amount of $151,250 dated 5 February 2016 issued by the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (the Bank Guarantee).  The Bank Guarantee relates to obligations under an extension and variation of a lease.

  2. The application is supported by an affidavit sworn by Mr Graeme Brentson on 20 June 2017.  Mr Brentson is a corporate counsel employed by the plaintiff.

Background facts

  1. The plaintiff is the wholly owned subsidiary of Bis Industries Limited.

  2. The defendants are the registered proprietors of 102 Kurnall Road in Welshpool (the Premises).

  3. In or about 2010 the defendants (as landlord) entered into a lease with a company called Gulf Transport Co Pty Ltd (GT Pty Ltd) (as tenant) in respect of the Premises (the Lease).

  4. On or about 16 December 2010 the plaintiff entered into a deed with the defendants and GT Pty Ltd for the assignment and variation of the Lease (the Varied Lease).

  5. On or about 18 December 2015 the plaintiff entered into an agreement with the defendants to further extend and vary the Varied Lease for a term of two years due to expire on 31 August 2017 (the Second Varied Lease).

  6. Schedule 1, Item 5(1) of the Second Varied Lease provided as follows:

    The parties acknowledge and agree that effective from the date of this Deed, the Lease shall be varied by:

    (1)Inserting the following new clause 1 in Item 10 of the Schedule to the Lease:

    1.Bank Guarantee

    (1)Tenant to provide bank guarantee

    The Tenant must arrange for the immediate issue, by an Australian Bank of an unconditional and irrevocable bank guarantee in favour of the Landlord for an amount equal to the…

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Details
Case
[2017] WADC 87
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Fleet Trans Pty Ltd v Gulf Transport Co. Pty Ltd, the dispute arose between the plaintiff, Fleet Trans, and the defendant, Gulf Transport, concerning the alleged failure of Gulf Transport to return a bank guarantee. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The plaintiff sought an interim interlocutory injunction to compel the defendant to return the bank guarantee, claiming that it was entitled to the return of the guarantee as part of a settlement agreement between the parties.

The primary legal issues for the court to decide were whether there was a serious question to be tried or whether the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case. The court also had to determine whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury for which damages would not be adequate compensation unless an injunction was granted, and whether the balance of convenience favoured the granting of an injunction. The plaintiff argued that the terms of the settlement agreement included the waiver of all claims against it by the defendant and the release of the bank guarantee. The defendant, on the other hand, contended that no such agreement was reached because the settlement document was not properly executed, the person who negotiated the settlement did not have the authority to bind the defendant, and the terms of the settlement were not explained to the relevant person within the defendant's company.

The court considered the principles governing the grant of an interim or interlocutory injunction, which include whether there is a serious question to be tried, whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, and whether the balance of convenience favours the granting of the injunction. The court found that the plaintiff had not made out a prima facie case, as there were significant issues with the execution and authority to enter into the settlement agreement. As a result, the balance of convenience did not favour the plaintiff, and the application for an interim interlocutory injunction was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As Mitchell J said in Okewood Pty Ltd t/as Perth Glory v Football Federation Australia Ltd [2015] WASC 127 [5], referring to Beech J's judgment in Twinside Pty Ltd v Venetian Nominees Pty Ltd [2008] WASC 110, the principles governing the grant of an interim or interlocutory injunction are well known. The three primary interrelated considerations are whether there is a serious question to be tried or the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury for which damages will not be adequate compensation unless an injunction is granted and whether the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction. In Twinside Pty Ltd v Venetian Nominees Pty Ltd Beech J, in relation to the prima facie case requirement, said the following [9], [11] (citations omitted):9.… The phrase 'prima facie case' does not mean that the plaintiff must show that it is more probable than not that at trial the plaintiff will succeed. It is sufficient that the plaintiff show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify, in the circumstances, the preservation of the status quo pending the trial. How strong the probability needs to be depends upon the nature of the rights the plaintiff asserts and the practical consequences likely to flow from the orders the plaintiff seeks.…11.As the apparent strength of the applicant's case diminishes, the balance of convenience moves against the making of an order … The grant of an injunction involves balancing the injustice which might be suffered by the defendant if the injunction is granted and the plaintiff later fails at trial, against the injustice which might be suffered by the plaintiff if the injunction is not granted and the plaintiff later succeeds at trial. The plaintiff's case is, in essence, that on 12 October 2016, and as a result of the exchange of the above referred to emails between Mr Brentson and Mr Le Grange, the plaintiff and the defendants entered into an agreement the terms of which were those set out in the Deed. In particular, the plaintiff's case is that by the agreement the defendants, in consideration of receiving the settlement sum, waived all actions, suits, claims, demands and causes of action and the costs thereof that they had or may have had against the plaintiff, and released and discharged the plaintiff from all claims or liabilities arising directly or indirectly out of or in connection with the Lease. Therefore, the plaintiff contends, it has no liability to pay any amount in respect of the cranes on the Premises and consequently has a right to the return of the Bank Guarantee. It is apparent from the above referred to letter from the defendants' solicitors to the plaintiff dated 16 June 2017 that the defendants' argument in opposition to the plaintiff's claim is that no agreement as alleged was arrived at because:1.The Deed was not properly executed by the defendants;2.Mr Le Grange did not have authority to bind the defendants to the agreement; and3.The terms of the Deed were never explained to Mr Cooper (Snr).