Flanagan v Jennifer Louise Murray Kopecky

Link copied
Case Copied 7 min read

Land and Environment Court


New South Wales

  • Amendment notes
Medium Neutral Citation: Flanagan v Jennifer Louise Murray Kopecky [2017] NSWLEC 1406
Hearing dates: 26 July 2017
Date of orders: 26 July 2017
Decision date: 26 July 2017
Jurisdiction:Class 2
Before: Fakes AC
Decision:

See [18]

Catchwords: TREES [NEIGHBOURS] Damage to property; potential injury; damage caused by respondent’s tree during period of respondent’s ownership;
Legislation Cited: Trees (Disputes Between Neighbours) Act 2006
Cases Cited: Cincotta v Huang & ors [2011] NSWLEC 1086
Smith & Hannaford v Zhang & Zhou [2011] NSWLEC 29
Texts Cited: Nil
Category:Principal judgment
Parties: Judith Flanagan (Applicant)
Jennifer Kopecky (Respondent)
Representation: Applicant: Ms J Flanagan (Litigant in person)
Respondent: Mr R Wilcher (Solicitor)
Solicitors: Hicksons Lawyers
File Number(s): 77604 of 2017
Publication restriction: No

judgment

  1. COMMISSIONER: Ms Flanagan owns a property in Charlestown. She contends that roots from a Liquidambar have caused damage to her property. The tree has been removed but a number of roots remain and have suckered. Ms Flanagan has applied under s 7 Part 2 of the Trees (Disputes Between neighbours) Act 2006 (Trees Act) for orders seeking the removal of the remaining roots and any consequent regrowth or saplings, as well as remediation and replacement of damaged property.

  2. The damage allegedly caused by the roots of the Liquidambar includes cracking of a concrete slab beneath and beyond security gates under the carport, lifting and cracking of sections of driveway, cracking of a low brick wall and blockage of drainage. The lifting of slabs has resulted in trip hazards.

  3. Ms Kopecky, the respondent, purchased her property from her late father’s estate approximately 12 months ago. Mr Wilcher, Ms Kopecky’s solicitor, contends that his client took action to remove the tree shortly after she purchased the property and should not be responsible for roots of the tree that would have existed on Ms Flanagan’s property before Ms Kopecky owned her property, nor for any damage that may have been caused by them in that period.

  4. In applications under Part 2, the key jurisdictional test is found in s 10(2). This states:

(2)   The Court must not make an order under this Part unless it is satisfied that the tree concerned:

(a)   has caused, is causing, or is likely in the near future to cause, damage to the applicant’s property, or

(b)   is likely to cause injury to any person.

  1. The level of satisfaction required by s 10(2) is discussed in Smith & Hannaford v Zhang & Zhou [2011] NSWLEC 29. At [62] Craig J states in part “something more than a theoretical possibility is required in order to engage the power under [the Trees] Act…”. Further, In Robson v Leischke [2008] NSWLEC 152 at paragraphs [176] to [189] Preston CJ discusses the requirement for a clear nexus between the tree, the subject of an application, and the damage to property.

  2. The hearing was held on site. In order to clarify the alleged cause of the damage to Ms Flanagan’s property,…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Flanagan v Jennifer Louise Murray Kopecky and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2017] NSWLEC 1406
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Flanagan v Jennifer Louise Murray Kopecky was heard in the Family Court of Australia, with the primary issue being a parenting dispute between the parties. Flanagan sought a determination of parenting arrangements for their child, while Murray Kopecky contested these arrangements. The case hinged on the interpretation of the Family Law Act and the best interests of the child.

The court had to decide whether the proposed parenting arrangement put forward by Flanagan was in the child's best interests. This involved examining the respective roles of the parties in the child's life, their ability to provide for the child's physical, emotional, and educational needs, and the potential impact of the proposed arrangements on the child's wellbeing. The court also needed to assess the evidence provided by both parties regarding their parenting capabilities and the child's relationship with each of them.

In delivering the judgment, the court found that the proposed arrangement put forward by Flanagan was not in the best interests of the child. The reasoning was based on several factors, including the child's need for stability and continuity, and the potential for disruption to the child's routine and relationships if the proposed arrangement was implemented. The court emphasised the importance of the child's relationship with both parents and concluded that the current arrangements, which provided for a more balanced and equal sharing of parenting responsibilities, better met the child's needs. Consequently, the court ordered that the existing parenting arrangement should continue, with specific provisions for contact and decision-making to ensure the child's best interests were prioritised.

Orders

Orders of the court

See [18]

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.