Fitzsimmons v Nursing Staff Pty Ltd, Baxter and Whitehead
[1997] QCA 272
•5/09/1997
| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL | [1997] QCA 272 |
| SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND |
Appeal No. 363 of 1997
Brisbane
[Fitzsimmons v. Nursing Staff P/L & Ors]
BETWEEN:
DEANNA FITZSIMMONS
(Plaintiff) Appellant
AND:
NURSING STAFF PTY LTD
(ACN 000 036 224)
(First Defendant) First Respondent
AND:
PHILIP JULIUS BAXTER and
PHILIP RICHARD WHITEHEAD
(Second Defendants) Second Respondents McPherson JA
Williams JByrne J
Judgment delivered 5 September 1997
Separate reasons for judgment for each member of the court, each concurring as to orders made.
1. APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS.
2. CROSS-APPEAL ALLOWED WITH COSTS. SO MUCH OF THE JUDGMENT AGAINST THE SECOND RESPONDENTS PRONOUNCED ON 7 JANUARY 1997 AS IS CONTAINED IN PARA.2 ON THE FIRST PAGE OF THAT JUDGMENT IS SET ASIDE. IN LIEU THEREOF, JUDGMENT IS ENTERED FOR THE APPELLANT AGAINST THE SECOND RESPONDENTS FOR $10,590.20 AND ORDERS FOR COSTS AS FOLLOWS: THE SECOND RESPONDENTS PAY THE PLAINTIFF’S COSTS OF AND INCIDENTAL TO THE ACTION, INCLUDING RESERVED COSTS, IF ANY, TO AND INCLUDING 20 OCTOBER 1995 TO BE TAXED ON THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURTS SCALE; AND THE PLAINTIFF PAY THE SECOND RESPONDENTS’ COSTS OF AND INCIDENTAL TO THE ACTION, INCLUDING RESERVED COSTS, IF ANY, ON AND FROM 21 OCTOBER 1995 TO BE TAXED ON THE DISTRICT COURTS SCALE APPROPRIATE TO CLAIMS EXCEEDING $50,000.
CATCHWORDS: | PERSONAL INJURIES - Injuries allegedly sustained while working in nursing home - Findings of credibility by trial judge - Inconsistencies in plaintiff’s evidence - Whether trial judge could have reached his conclusions on the evidence. |
| DAMAGES - Whether manifestly excessive - Minor injury. | |
| APPEALS - Extension of time for service and filing of notice of contention. | |
| O.70 r.4, r.13, r.14 Rules of the Supreme Court | |
| Counsel: | Ms C Holmes for the appellant. Mr R Alldridge for the first respondent. Mr S Williams QC with him Ms R Treston for the second respondents. |
| Solicitors: | Primrose Couper Cronin Rudkin for the appellant. Corrs Chambers Westgarth for the first respondent. Quinlan Miller & Treston for the second respondents. |
| Hearing Date: | 1 August 1997. |
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
Appeal No. 363 of 1997
Brisbane
| Before | McPherson J.A. Williams J. Byrne J. |
[Fitzsimmons v. Nursing Staff P/L & Ors]
BETWEEN:
DEANNA FITZSIMMONS
(Plaintiff) Appellant
AND:
NURSING STAFF PTY. LTD.
(ACN 000 036 224)
(First Defendant) First Respondent
AND:
PHILIP JULIUS BAXTER and
PHILIP RICHARD WHITEHEAD
(Second Defendants) Second Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - McPHERSON J.A.
Judgment delivered 5 September 1997
I agree with the orders proposed by Williams J., and with the reasons he has given for
making them.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
Appeal No. 363 of 1997
Brisbane
Before: McPherson JA.
Williams J.
Byrne J.
[Fitzsimmons v. Nursing Staff P/L & Ors]
BETWEEN:
DEANNA FITZSIMMONS
(Plaintiff) Appellant
AND:
NURSING STAFF PTY LTD
(ACN 000 036 224)
(First Defendant) First Respondent
AND:
PHILIP JULIUS BAXTER and
PHILIP RICHARD WHITEHEAD
(Second Defendants) Second Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - WILLIAMS J
Judgment delivered 5 September 1997
This is primarily an appeal by the plaintiff from the judgment of the District Court after a trial in
which she claimed damages for personal injuries with respect to three separate incidents. At all material
times the appellant, who was born 5 November 1942, was employed by the first respondent as a
nursing assistant. She claimed that she injured her back and/or shoulder region in three separate
incidents in the course of that employment; the first occurred on 1 March 1985, the second in or about September/October 1985, and the third on 1 April 1986. She consulted the second respondents, who
were at all material times solicitors, with respect to the first and second incidents but no action claiming
damages for personal injury was commenced within the relevant limitation period with respect to those
incidents. In consequence the appellant sued the second respondents for professional negligence being
their failure to commence an action within time, and the measure of her loss was said to be the damages
she would have recovered with respect to each of the first and second incidents if an action had been
commenced within time. Action was commenced against the first respondent within time with respect
to the third incident. Thus the learned trial judge was faced with a claim for damages for professional
negligence against solicitors with respect to the first two incidents, and a claim for damages for personal
injury against the employer with respect to the third.
At the trial the second respondents did not contest the proposition that the appellant had a
"worthwhile cause of action" against the first respondent in relation to the first incident. They further
conceded in respect of that accident that proceedings were not instituted within time and that there was
no question of contributory negligence with respect to the incident. It followed that the appellant was
entitled to judgment against the second respondent to that extent. The learned trial judge assessed
quantum with respect to that cause of action, and that is challenged by the second respondents on this
appeal. More will be said about that later. The learned trial judge dismissed the appellant's claim
against the second respondents with respect to the second incident primarily because he did not accept
that an incident such as that pleaded had in fact occurred. The appellant appeals against that finding.
The learned trial judge also dismissed the appellant's cause of action against the first respondent
with respect to the third incident. Again that was primarily based on his conclusion that the appellant
had not proved on the balance of probabilities the occurrence of a specific incident causing injury, and negligence on the part of the second respondents with respect to such incident. The appellant appeals
against those findings.
It is clear that the learned trial judge regarded the appellant as a very unsatisfactory witness and
his conclusions with respect to her credibility influenced his reasoning with respect to both the second
and third incidents.
He recorded a finding that she was "a very unimpressive witness" and noted that the appellant's
own counsel had conceded that it was "undeniable that the plaintiff was a vague and erratic historian,
often quite against her own interests". The learned trial judge found that "as well as being vague and
erratic" she was "unreliable on essential and related details".
He regarded as of importance the evidence of Dr Paul de Jager that the appellant did not tell
him in October and November 1985 that she had suffered an injury whilst lifting at work in about
September 1985. The appellant during the course of her evidence branded that doctor a "liar" for giving
that evidence. The learned trial judge said he had no hesitation in rejecting that allegation made by the
appellant.
The appellant was in the witness box for a considerable period of time and the learned trial
judge had ample opportunity of assessing her credibility. In the course of his reasons he noted that the
appellant's "demeanour whilst in the witness box did not give a favourable impression".
Without descending into detail it is sufficient to record that the learned trial judge, on ample
evidence, found that on important issues the appellant's evidence was inconsistent with prior statements
she had made in particular to medical practitioners; further there were inconsistencies as between
various statements on a particular issue she had made to medical practitioners. It is sufficient to note specifically that the appellant's evidence in chief that she was generally in good health prior to the first
of the incidents was totally inconsistent with her medical history.
With respect to the second incident, which was said to have occurred in September-October
1985, the learned trial judge made the following comments and findings. The appellants evidence was
that she and another nurse (Dunbar) were assisting a patient (Larkin) who was incontinent. As Larkin
had slipped off her chair and onto the floor the appellant and Dunbar each took a shoulder and
attempted to lift the patient back into her chair. The appellant's claim was that in the course of that lifting
procedure she injured her lumbar spine. The learned trial judge noted that Mrs Dunbar did not
corroborate the appellant's evidence that she in fact suffered injury on that occasion. He noted that the
appellant did not mention such an injury to Dr Shilton on 14 and 18 October 1985 nor to Dr de Jager
on 24 October 1985. The learned trial judge noted that, in response to a leading question, Thorpe, the
physiotherapist, said that he was told by the appellant on 4 November 1985 that she had been injured
at work "in recent times". A reading of the transcript indicates that the learned trial judge was clearly
justified in not attaching great weight to Thorpe's evidence on that critical matter. The learned trial judge
also referred specifically to the appellant's failure to tell Dr Nothling, the psychiatrist, about important
past events. In evidence Dr Nothling expressed the opinion, recorded in the reasons for judgment, "that
because of the plaintiff's failure to recount significant past events, it was less likely that she had an
unconscious reaction to her injuries rather than a conscious one". The learned trial judge specifically
accepted that evidence and concluded that the appellant was a "very unreliable" witness. He went on:
"I also take the view that the plaintiff's admitted anger towards Dr Nothling is again evidence of her lack of credibility rather than, as submitted by counsel for the plaintiff, a plausible explanation as to why she was unforthcoming during the consultation with the psychiatrist."
In his reasons the learned trial judge also made the observation that the "plaintiff's out of court
statements about her pain are, in my opinion, difficult to reconcile with her allegation that it is really the
accidents alleged in the statement of claim that have caused her problems". It was against the
background of those observations that his Honour then said:
"In short, I have very little confidence in the plaintiff's evidence generally and in
particular her evidence that she injured her lower back at work when she was with Mrs
Dunbar on 29 September 1985. Her evidence on that issue is rejected. Her
demeanour while in the witness box did not give a favourable impression either. In the
circumstances the plaintiff's claim against the second defendants in relation to the
second accident must fail."
The principal submissions of counsel for the appellant with respect to the findings as to the
second incident were that the learned trial judge overlooked and/or failed to attach sufficient weight to
other relevant parts of the evidence. Mention was made of the fact that Mrs Dunbar gave evidence that
the patient Larkin was regularly incontinent and often slid from her chair to the floor. Mrs Dunbar also
gave evidence that she injured herself on 29 September 1985 in the course of lifting Larkin with
assistance from the appellant. That was said to corroborate the appellant's evidence to some extent and
it was submitted that Dunbar's failure to recall the appellant's injury could be explained by the passage
of time. Counsel also made extensive reference to the evidence of Thorpe which has already been
adverted to.
It was submitted that the learned trial judge attached insufficient weight to medical records
relating to the appellant's medical condition prior to the first incident. Whilst the history was lengthy it
was submitted that none of the matters was of sufficient seriousness to warrant time off work. There was also evidence from a number of witnesses that prior to the accidents at work the appellant had been
"fit, normal and competent".
At the end of the day it is clear that the findings of fact relevant to the second incident were
open on the evidence and the learned trial judge was significantly affected in making them by his
assessment of the appellant's credibility. The trial was lengthy; it extended over 5 days and oral
evidence produced in excess of 500 pages of transcript. Exhibits took up a further 300 pages. As the
above analysis of the reasoning of the learned trial judge indicates he made a thorough and careful
analysis of the evidence and each of his findings was supported by evidence.
In the circumstances it cannot be said that the learned trial judge erred in making any finding
relevant to the second incident. The appeal with respect to that part of the claim should be dismissed.
The position with respect to the third incident is somewhat more complicated. The first
respondent was in the invidious position of having to concede that some incident probably occurred on
1 April 1986. Amongst the first respondent's records was the document which ultimately became
exhibit 17; it recorded an accident to the appellant at about 7.00pm on 1 April 1986. That document
described the incident as follows:
"While trying to move wheelchair to help stand patient I didn't realise it had to be
switched on and I strained my upper back."
It is obvious that such a statement does not suggest that the injury occurred either in the course of lifting
or when the patient fell across the appellant's back.
In the statement of claim the following allegation was made with respect to the third incident:
". . . she bent down to disengage the brakes of the said patient's wheelchair so as toremove it from the vicinity when the said patient fell forward onto the plaintiff's back
causing her again to injure the same."
The statement of claim then went on to particularise the alleged negligence; four of the particulars
involved an allegation of "lifting" the patient and others involved an assertion of failure to instruct the
appellant as to "how to disengage the brakes" and of permitting the wheelchair to be used without
establishing that it could be operated by employees such as the appellant. There were some other
general allegations of negligence all of which involved "lifting".
The appellant's evidence in the course of the trial could be regarded as giving another version
of the incident. The appellant and a fellow employee (McMahon) had taken the patient to the toilet in
his wheelchair and were placing him back in his bed. The patient was lifted into a standing position by
the appellant and McMahon near the bed and it was then necessary to push the wheelchair away. In
order to do that the appellant bent down to operate the locking switch and whilst she did so she was
taking some of the patient's weight; she was being lent on by the patient. Then the patient suddenly
became very rigid and fell on her.
In support of the plaintiff's case evidence was called from a so-called "expert" to the effect that
three persons should have been engaged in lifting the patient from the wheelchair into his bed, or
alternatively some lifting device should have been utilised.
The learned trial judge naturally approached the appellant's evidence with respect to the third
incident in the light of his general findings as to her credibility and his specific findings with respect to the
second incident. Ultimately he concluded he was "not satisfied that the third accident happened as
alleged or at all".
In support of the allegation that the first respondent was negligent in failing to instruct the
appellant as to how to disengage the brakes of the wheelchair the appellant gave evidence that "she had
never seen such a wheelchair before". The learned trial judge said that he doubted "the truthfulness and
accuracy of that evidence". That observation was partly based on other evidence to the effect that,
though the wheelchair was not common, one of that type was usually around the nursing home.
The learned trial judge rejected the proposition that lifting was involved in the third incident, at
least given the appellant's account in oral evidence. In consequence he did not find the "expert's"
evidence helpful; it assumed a lifting was taking place. Then the learned trial judge considered the
submissions that the accident arose because of a failure to provide sufficient staff or a failure to instruct
the appellant how to operate the particular wheelchair. The learned trial judge came to the conclusion
that the plaintiff's alleged lack of knowledge about operating the wheelchair did not have, in the legal
sense, anything to do with the accident; in other words any failure to instruct about the operation of the
wheelchair was not a cause of the incident. In any event the learned trial judge did not accept as a fact
that the appellant did not know how to operate the wheelchair. Further, as lifting was not involved there
was no basis for finding that additional staff should have been involved.
Because of the submissions which were addressed to him the learned trial judge also analysed
the position on the assumption that there was some lifting involved but came to the conclusion that even
on that basis no finding of negligence should be made.
Finally the learned trial judge stated there was "doubt about whether the plaintiff injured herself
in the third accident in the manner alleged". He made that observation partly in the light of other
evidence to the effect that the appellant had told a fellow employee that she had injured her back when she lifted the wheelchair. There was a further statement made by the appellant to a neighbour which
made no mention of an electric wheelchair being involved. His Honour went on:
"These matters in isolation are not determinative, but taken with the plaintiff's general
unreliability, I have concluded that the plaintiff's evidence about how the third accident
happened cannot be believed."
Again there were ample grounds upon which the learned trial judge could have reached that
conclusion. Counsel for the appellant argued that the learned trial judge failed to give sufficient weight
to the time lapse between the incident and trial and that the recollection of the appellant and other
witnesses could have been affected by that. That is a matter which the learned trial judge did take into
account, and those submissions do not establish a basis for rejecting the findings of fact made.
The learned trial judge also rejected a deal of the appellant's evidence with respect to her
medical condition after the third incident. That was relevant to the question of quantum if negligence was
found with respect to the third incident. It is sufficient to say that again there was ample justification for
the findings made by the learned trial judge.
It follows that the appeal by the appellant against the dismissal of her causes of action with
respect to the second and third incidents should be dismissed.
In his reasons for judgment the learned trial judge assessed quantum with respect to the first
incident; that was for the purpose of giving judgment against the second respondents. The reasons for
judgment were published on 18 December 1996, and the reasons as published on that date indicated
judgment would be given for the appellant against the second respondents in the sum of $17,511.00.
The matter was then adjourned until 19 December when an application was made pursuant to the slip
rule to amend the figure for quantum. The matter was again mentioned on 7 January 1997 when a further application was made pursuant to the slip rule to adjust the figure for quantum. Ultimately on 7
January 1997 judgment was pronounced against the second respondents in the sum of $23,207.56
including interest.
The notice of appeal was served on the solicitors for the second respondents on 15 January
1997. At that time the legal representatives for the second respondents were concerned as to quantum
and particularly the remark made by the learned trial judge in his reasons that the figure for pain and
suffering and loss of amenities was determined in the light of a concession made by counsel at trial for
the second respondents. Steps were taken to ascertain whether addresses of counsel were recorded,
and it was ascertained they were not. Ultimately a decision was made to appeal against quantum and
a Notice of Contention pursuant to Order 70 rule 13 was filed on 30 January 1997 and served on the
appellant's solicitors on that day. That Notice of Contention was filed within the time limited by Order
70 rule 4 for the second respondents to appeal against the judgment of 7 January 1997, but outside the
7 day period provided for in Order 70 rule 14 for filing and serving such a notice; that rule provides the
necessary steps must be taken within 7 days of the service of the notice of appeal.
In those circumstances the second respondents sought an extension of time within which to file
and serve the Notice of Contention so that it could be heard on the merits. Given the circumstances
which have just been outlined it is appropriate to grant leave and to consider the Notice on its merits.
When the learned trial judge turned to the issue of quantum in his reasons he began by saying
generally with respect to all three incidents:
"Any spinal or orthopaedic injury suffered by the plaintiff at work was, as I find, of a
minor nature having temporary consequences."
Placed in the context of her overall medical history he made the finding that "those injuries were minor
and the consequences of short duration and cannot explain the plaintiff's ongoing pain and symptoms,
nor her alleged inability to work". The learned trial judge pointed to a considerable body of medical
opinion to the effect that if the appellant had fibromyalgia it pre-existed the three incidents in 1985 and
1986 on which the action was founded.
Of course, quantum only had to be specifically assessed with respect to the first incident and when his Honour specifically turned to that his conclusions were expressed fairly briefly. He found that she should be compensated for the first incident "on the basis that she sustained an injury having consequences for no more than 8 weeks". Relevantly he then went on to say:
"In relation to that accident, counsel for the plaintiff made no submission in relation to pain and suffering based on the conclusions I have reached. Counsel for the second defendants submitted that the range for damages for pain and suffering was $10,000.00 - $15,000.00. I think that is high, but shall allow $10,000.00 without interest up to May 1995 in view of a disability settlement which exceeds that sum. I shall assess loss of earnings on the basis of 8 weeks at $136.00 per week, i.e. $1,088.00. There will be interest at the rate of 6% per annum from March 1985 to May 1995 on part of that sum (viz. $1,088.00 less $392.00: see exhibit 25) which produces an interest figure of $425.00.
. . . In relation to the Griffiths v Kerkemeyer claim, there is evidence that care and assistance was given to the plaintiff during the 1985-86 period. I shall allow 4 hours per day for 56 days i.e. 224 hours at $9.00 per hour which produces a figure of $2,016.00. There will be interest on that sum at the rate of 2% per annum for 10.2 years which is $412.00. In relation to special damages I shall allow $500.00. In relation to travelling expenses I shall allow $500.00. In relation to pharmaceutical expenses I shall allow $500.00.
. . . From the total of $15,441.00 there must be deducted $751.00 (see exhibit 25).
That produces a figure of $14,690.00. I shall allow interest on $14,690.00 at the rate
of 12% per annum for 1.6 years, i.e. $2,081.00."
It was on the basis of those figures that when the reasons were published judgment for
$17,511.00 was proposed. Thereafter, as previously noted, pursuant to the slip rule there were
variations made. Those variations related to interest, primarily interest on pain and suffering and loss of amenities. It was with those adjustments that the judgment figure ultimately became $23,207.56.
Before this court the second respondents sought to rely on an affidavit from their counsel at trial
containing the assertion that he did not in the course of his final address refer to a range of $10,000.00
to $15,000.00 for pain and suffering with respect to the first incident. That range was possibly
mentioned by counsel at trial for either the first or second respondents when dealing with pain and
suffering on a wider basis than the first incident. It is not necessary to finally determine how or why the
range of $10,000.00 to $15,000.00 came to be mentioned. That range is as the learned trial judge
conceded high, and the question for this court is whether or not the figure of $10,000.00 adopted by
the learned trial judge is manifestly excessive for a minor back injury the consequences of which lasted
for no more than 8 weeks. I have come to the conclusion that such an award is plainly manifestly
excessive. Given all of the findings made by the learned trial judge as to the appellant's medical
condition, and his specific finding that this was a minor injury which lasted for no more than 8 weeks,
I am of the view that anything above $5,000.00 would have to be regarded as manifestly excessive for
pain and suffering and loss of amenities. Interest should be allowed on the whole of that sum to May
1995 at the rate of 2%; that gives a figure for interest of $1,000.00.
The award under the Griffiths v Kerkemeyer head was premised upon a need for care for 4
hours per day for 8 weeks. That finding is not supported by the evidence. The only relevant evidence
was that of the appellant's husband who was the care provider. He was asked, "During those years 85
and 86 did you have to provide her with any personal assistance?" and he replied, "Yes, when her back
was really chronic I used to help her - had to help her in the shower. . . . had to help her into the bath,
out of the bath. Sometimes helped with her wearing apparel." When asked to estimate the time he spent during the 1985-86 period helping his wife he said: "It's hard to sort of put into hours but, as I
have said, it's within 2, 3 hours a day". Later the husband made reference to doing some vacuuming
in 1985. It must be remembered that in making the assessment under this head the court is only
concerned with an 8 week period from 1 March 1985. Against that background much of the husband's
evidence just referred to is hardly relevant. Certainly there is no suggestion of anything more than 2 to
3 hours a day when the pain was severe. At most that evidence could support a finding of a need for
care for 2.5 hours per day decreasing over the 2 month period. The figure of $9.00 per hour adopted
by the learned trial judge is reasonable. Counsel for the second respondents submitted that in those
circumstances a figure of $630.00 for the cost of care was reasonable and that figure should be
adopted. Interest for the 10 years to May 1995 should be allowed at 2%, namely $126.00.
The other components in the assessment by the learned trial judge (loss of earnings $1,088.00,
special damages $500.00, travelling expenses $500.00, and pharmaceutical expenses $500.00) were
not challenged and should be allowed. Workers' Compensation payments totalling $751.00 were
received and interest should be allowed on $337.00 of the award for loss of earnings; 6% on that figure
to May 1995 gives $202.20 for interest.
That amount of $751.00 has of course to be deducted.
On that basis the assessment would be as follows:
(i) Pain and suffering and loss of amenities $5,000.00 (ii) Interest thereon $1,000.00 (iii) Griffiths v. Kerkemeyer $630.00 (iv) Interest thereon $126.00 (v) Loss of earnings $1,088.00 (vi) Special damages $500.00 (vii) Travelling expenses $500.00 (viii) Pharmaceutical expenses $500.00 (ix) Interest on loss of earnings $202.20
$9,546.20
From that has to be deducted the sum of $751 refundable to the Workers' Compensation Board,
leaving a figure of $8,795.20.
Counsel for the second respondents also conceded interest at 12% thereon to date of judgment,
a sum of $1,795.
The appellant is therefore entitled to judgment against the second respondents for $10,590.20.
On 20 October 1995 the second respondents made an offer to settle pursuant to Part 9 of the
District Courts Rules 1968. The offer was to pay $20,000 in compromise of the plaintiff’s claim against
them.
It was accepted that, if the notice of contention succeeded in reducing the award to less than
$20,000, the trial judge’s orders for the general costs of the action could not stand. Ms Holmes also
accepted that success by the second respondents on their notice of contention meant that the plaintiff
should have her costs against them until 20 October 1995 and, subject to two exceptions it is
unnecessary to discuss, ought to pay the second respondents’ costs of the action thereafter.
The appellant’s appeal should be dismissed with costs. The cross-appeal of the second
respondents should be allowed with costs. So much of the judgment against the second respondents
pronounced on 7 January 1997 as is contained in para.2 on the first page of that judgement should be set aside. In lieu thereof, there should be judgment for the appellant against the second respondents for
$10,590.20 and orders for costs as follows: The second respondents pay the plaintiff’s costs of and
incidental to the action, including reserved costs, if any, to and including 20 October 1995 to be taxed
on the appropriate District Courts scale; and the plaintiff pay the second respondents’ costs of and
incidental to the action, including reserved costs, if any, on and from 21 October 1995 to be taxed on
the District Courts scale appropriate to claims exceeding $50,000.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
Appeal No. 363 of 1997
Brisbane
| Before | McPherson JA Williams J Byrne J |
[Fitzsimmons v. Nursing Staff P/L & Ors]
BETWEEN:
DEANNA FITZSIMMONS
(Plaintiff) Appellant
AND:
NURSING STAFF PTY LTD
(ACN 000 036 224)
(First Defendant) First Respondent
AND:
PHILIP JULIUS BAXTER and
PHILIP RICHARD WHITEHEAD
(Second Defendants) Second Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - BYRNE J
Judgment delivered 5 September 1997
I agree with Williams J.
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