Fitzgerald v Commissioner of Police

[2022] NSWCATAD 315

Civil and Administrative Tribunal

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

Fitzgerald v Commissioner of Police [2022] NSWCATAD 315

Hearing dates:

30 May 2022

Date of orders:

28 September 2022

Decision date:

28 September 2022

Jurisdiction:

Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division

Before:

D Dinnen, Senior Member

Decision:

(1)   The Respondent’s decision to revoke the Applicant’s Category AB firearms licence is affirmed.

(2)   The Confidentiality Orders made 8 April 2022 are continued.

Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW - firearms – revocation of licence – public interest – character – genuine reason – expiration of licence

Legislation Cited:

Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997

Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013

Firearms Act 1996

Firearms Regulations 2017

Security Industry Act

Cases Cited:

AML v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2013] NSWADT 5

Bailey v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2022] NSWCATAD 214

Barlow v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service [2003] NSWADT 254

CIC Insurance Limited v Bankstown Football Club (1997) 187 CLR 384

Comalco Aluminium (Bell Bay) Ltd v O’Connor and Others (1995) 131 ALR 657

Commissioner of Police v Toleafoa [1999] NSWADTAP 9

Constantin v Commissioner of Police [2013] NSWADTAP 16

Cusumano v Commissioner of Police [2001] NSWADT 50

Davos v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2013] NSWADT 7

Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith (1991) 1 VR 63

Drake v Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1970) 2 ALD 60

Hoffman v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service [2003] NSWADT 89

Kocic v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2014] NSWCA 368

Lynch v Commissioner of Police (GD) [2006] NSWADTAP 43

Martin v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2017] NSWCATAD 97

Martin v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2010] NSWADT 276

Masterson v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2017] NSWCATAP 206

Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355

Sawires v Commissioner of Police [2010] NSWADTAP 68

Tucker v Commissioner of Police [2021] NSWCATAD 214

Vella v Commissioner of Police [2003] NSWADT 91

Ward v Commissioner of Police [2000] NSWADT 28

Texts Cited:

none

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Leslie John Fitzgerald (Applicant)
Commissioner of Police (Respondent)

Representation:

Solicitors:
Applicant (Self-represented)
Lindsay Taylor Lawyers (Respondent)

File Number(s):

2022/00012001

Publication restriction:

Paragraphs 39, 40, 41, 42: not for publication pursuant to s 64(c) and 64(d) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013

REASONS FOR DECISION

1. Leslie John Fitzgerald (the Applicant) held Category H Firearms Licences between 1998 and 2009. He also held a Category AB Firearms Licence from 19 July 2011 until 13 July 2020, when it was revoked by the Commissioner of Police (the Respondent). This application seeks review of the Respondent’s decision to revoke the Applicant’s Category AB Firearms Licence.

2. Following the revocation of his Category AB Firearms Licence, the Applicant sought internal review and provided the Respondent with written submissions prepared by a solicitor, Simon Munslow. The Respondent finalised the Internal Review on 20 December 2021, affirming its original decision to revoke the firearms licence relying on s 24(2)(d) of the Firearms Act 1996 (the Act) and Clause 20 of the Firearms Regulations 2017 (the Regulations) that it was not in the public interest for the Applicant to continue to hold the licence. The reason for this decision was stated to be the Applicant’s relationship and “association with others necessitates adverse intervention” in circumstances where his submissions about his living arrangements were not consistent with information obtained by the Police (the reviewable decision). In the meantime, the Applicant’s firearms licence had expired on 9 September 2021.

3. The Applicant sought review of the Respondent’s reviewable decision on 14 January 2022. The respondent made an application for suppression orders which was heard on 8 April 2022, with confidentiality orders made pursuant to ss 64(1)(c) and 64(1)(d) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (CAT Act) restricting disclosure and publication of certain evidence, documents and matters contained within them to the Respondent, its legal representatives and the Tribunal (the Confidentiality Orders). The hearing of the Applicant’s application for review took place on 30 May 2022 by AVL.

4. In support of his application, the Applicant provided the Tribunal with the following documents:

1. Submissions dated 14 January 2022;

2. Referee letter from Shehernaz Bilimoria dated 12 January 2022;

3. Submissions dated 4 April 2022, attaching correspondence from 2003 regarding the Applicant obtaining a Commissioner’s Exemption pursuant to s 23A(6) of the Security Industry Act as a nominated employee of Magnum Security Aust Pty Limited;

4. Submissions dated 27 April 2022, including annexures, responding to the Respondent’s s 58 documents;

5. Referee letter from Wendy Richman, sister of the Applicant, dated 25 April 2022.

6. Written closing submissions with photograph annexures dated 8 August 2022.

5. The Applicant also gave oral evidence and was cross examined at hearing.

6. The Respondent provided the Tribunal with the s 58 documents in addition to material filed for and during the confidential hearing, and written closing submissions dated 25 July 2022.

7. For the reasons that follow, I have decided to affirm the Respondent’s decision to revoke the Applicant’s firearms licence.

Legal Principles

8. The Tribunal has jurisdiction to review the Respondent’s decision pursuant to section 75(1)(c) of the Act and section 30 of the CAT Act.

9. Subsection 63(1) of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (ADR Act) provides that in determining the application, the Tribunal is to decide what the correct and preferable decision is, having regard to the material then before it. The Tribunal can take into account both the material before the original decision maker as well as any new material put before the Tribunal: see Drake v Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1970) 2 ALD 60 at 77.

10. The underlying principles of the Act are, relevantly:

1. to confirm that firearm possession and use is a privilege that is conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety; and

2. to improve public safety by imposing strict controls on the possession and use of firearms and by promoting the safe and responsible storage and use of firearms.

11. Section 24 of the Act provides for the revocation of licences in a range of circumstances, including:

(2) A licence may be revoked:

(a) for any reason for which the licensee would be required to be refused a licence of the same kind, or

(b) if the licensee:

(i) supplied information which was (to the licensee’s knowledge) false or misleading in a material particular in, or in connection with, the application for the licence, or

(ii) contravenes any provision of this Act or the regulations, whether or not the licensee has been convicted of an offence for the contravention, or

(iii) contravenes any condition of the licence, or

(c) if the Commissioner is of the opinion that the licensee is no longer a fit and proper person to hold a licence, or

(c1) if the Commissioner is satisfied that the licensee, through any negligence or fraud on the part of the licensee, has caused a firearm to be lost or stolen, or

(d) for any other reason prescribed by the regulations.

12. Clause 20 of the Regulations prescribes that the Commissioner may revoke a licence if the Commissioner is satisfied that it is not in the public interest for the licensee to continue to hold the licence.

13. Section 24(2)(d) of the Act and Clause 20 of the Regulations work together to provide authority for the revocation of a licence where the Commissioner is satisfied that it is not in the public interest for the licensee to continue to hold the licence.

14. The expression “public interest” is not defined in the Act. It is well established that, in considering the meaning of that term, the Tribunal will have regard to the context in which it appears in the first instance: CIC Insurance Limited v Bankstown Football Club (1997) 187 CLR 384, 408 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ); Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, 381 (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). A discussion of relevant case law with respect to public interest was set out by the Tribunal in the case of Martin v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2010] NSWADT 276 at paragraph [69]-[74]. The concept of "public interest" was discussed by the Administrative Decisions Tribunal (NSW) (the ADT) in Commissioner of Police v Toleafoa [1999] NSWADTAP 9 (Telofea) as follows:

The "public interest" is an inherently broad concept giving an appellant [the Respondent] the ability to have regard to a wide range of factors in choosing whether to exercise a discretion adversely to an individual. As the possibility of refusing an application on the ground of character is dealt with in the same section, it is reasonable to infer that the parliament intended that the public interest discretion operated in areas to which the character ground was not relevant or, possibly, in circumstances where an objection on character grounds would not be sufficient in its own right to warrant refusal.

15. The circumstances in Toleafoa related to the revocation of a security licence under the Security Industry Act 1997 (NSW). In Ward v Commissioner of Police [2000] NSWADT 28 (Ward), the ADT confirmed that these comments apply equally to the Act.

16. In Cusumano v Commissioner of Police [2001] NSWADT 50, the ADT stated:

There is no guidance in the legislation in relation to how these directions [to revoke firearms licences] should be exercised. In my view, the discretion should be exercised in a way which promotes the principles and objects of the Firearms Act.

17. In Lynch v Commissioner of Police (GD) [2006] NSWADTAP 43, the ADT Appeal Panel said that the relevant factors to be considered by the Respondent in determining whether to exercise his discretion include matters of general public policy, which were in turn said to be informed by the principles and objectives of the Act, namely, to confirm firearm possession and use as a privilege conditional upon the overriding need to ensure public safety.

18. More generally, the public interest encompasses broader considerations beyond public safety. It is an inherently broad concept and is designed to give the broader interests of the community priority over private interests. In Comalco Aluminium (Bell Bay) Ltd v O’Connor and Others (1995) 131 ALR 657, it was stated at 681:

The purpose of the reference to public interest is to ensure that private interests are not the only matters taken into account: to make clear that the interests of the whole community are matters for the Commissioner’s consideration. The effect of the reference is to amplify the “scope and purpose” of the legislation.

19. In Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith (1991) 1 VR 63 the Court observed:

The public interest is a term embracing matters, among others, of standards of human conduct and of the functioning of government and government instrumentalities tacitly accepted and acknowledged to be fore the good order of society and for the well-being of its members. The interest is therefore the interest of the public as distinct from the interest of an individual or individuals.

20. In Constantin v Commissioner of Police [2013] NSWADTAP 16 at [33] the Appeal Panel stated:

The “public interest” allows, we consider, for issues going beyond the character of the applicant to be taken into account. These may include concerns in relation to public protection, public safety and public confidence in the administration of the licensing system.

21. In an often-quoted passage, Hennessy DP in Ward at [28] said that in terms of public safety, “the Tribunal must be satisfied that there is virtually no risk”, while acknowledging that the Tribunal could never be totally satisfied that a person would never pose any risk to public safety. Ward was a case on the “fit and proper person” test, but the formulation has been held to apply to the public interest test as well: see Hoffman v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service [2003] NSWADT 89 at [23]; Masterson v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2017] NSWCATAP 206 at [130].

22. Since then, Hennessy DP has cautioned against applying that language in a mechanistic way, noting in AML v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2013] NSWADT 5 at [7] that:

“The ‘virtually no risk’ comment was made in the context of the ‘fit and proper person’ test. It should not be understood as a judicial gloss on the plain meaning of that test, or of the reasonable cause test. The relevant tests are set out in the Firearms Act and comments in cases should not be substituted for those tests”.

23. Other cases have pointed out that the question of risk is not to be viewed as requiring an applicant to discharge an almost impossible burden of proving a near-absolute negative, but in a nuanced way, taking account of all the circumstances, including attitudes, character and prior conduct, with an overriding focus on public safety: see Martin v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2017] NSWCATAD 97, at [64] – [66].

24. Further, the Court of Appeal in Kocic v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2014] NSWCA 368 at [1] observed that the power to grant an application under the Act is tightly constrained, and in particular, significant emphasis is placed upon the need to control risks to public safety, with the concomitant need to assess the trustworthiness of an applicant.

25. In Barlow v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service [2003] NSWADT 254 Senior Member Higgins dealt with an application in relation to firearms licensing under the Act. At paragraph [22] she stated that the fitness and propriety of a person under the Act must be considered in the context of at all times ensuring public safety.

“22 In my opinion, the term "fit and proper person" in s. 11(3)(a) of the Act should also be given a wide meaning. As stated by Mason CJ the breadth and content of the concept must be derived from the Act and the purposes of the Act. In this case, Parliament has expressly stated what the underlying principles of the Act are. This includes the principle that the possession of a firearm is a privilege and that it is conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety (see s. 3(1)(a)). Accordingly, the fitness and propriety of a person under the Act must be considered in the context of at all times ensuring public safety. In my opinion Parliament has made this clear with the additional words in s. 11(3)(a) of "... and can be trusted to have possession of firearms without danger to public safety and the peace." That is, s. 11(3)(a) of the Act requires the Commissioner to determine the fitness and propriety of an applicant for a licence by having regard to the applicant's conduct and whether that conduct is such that he can be satisfied that the applicant can be trusted to have possession of firearms without danger to public safety or to the peace.”

26. The principal issue in determining public safety is therefore whether or not there is a risk to the safety of the public if the Applicant retains the relevant licence: Vella v Commissioner of Police [2003] NSWADT 91.

27. The legislation requires strict compliance precisely because misuse of firearms can result in catastrophic consequences: Davos v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2013] NSWADT 7, [117].

Consideration

28. The Respondent relied on the following as basis for revoking the Applicant’s firearms licence:

1. Police concerns regarding the Applicant’s associations with members of Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMCG), the Applicant’s daughter, Ashley Fitzgerald, who resides on the Applicant’s property, and another individual, Shane Watts, who resides at the Applicant’s property; and

2. The Applicant’s character; and

3. The Applicant’s lack of genuine reason for the firearms licence.

29. The Respondent provided the Tribunal with the Applicant’s criminal history dating back to 1967. In 1967 at the age of 14 the Applicant was charged with break, enter and steal. In 1968 he was charged with negligent and unlicensed driving. In 1969 he was charged with stealing and in 1970 charged again with stealing and driving in a dangerous manner.

30. In 1995 the Applicant was charged with assault and firearms offences, including entering a building whilst armed. The charges were ultimately dismissed in 1996. In evidence before the Tribunal the Applicant claimed he couldn’t remember specifically what the police had alleged, but he recalled assisting his landlord to get his 15 year old daughter out of a house in which she was living with a number of men. He claimed there was no firearm involved.

31. In 2000, 2006 and 2011 he was charged with a number of second-hand goods offences which he explained to the Tribunal resulted from administrative or typing errors by staff at his pawn shop. In 2010 he was charged with stalk/ intimidate offences which were dismissed. The charges resulted from an incident in which he claimed his daughter and her mother were “being road-raged” and called him for assistance. He “drove over and requested the occupants of following vehicle to move on and leave my family members alone, which they did”.

32. Despite these charges and incidents, the Applicant held firearms licences between 1998 and 2020. He passed safe storage inspections in 2012 and 2020.

Associations

33. The Respondent submitted that the Applicant’s associations supported the revocation of his firearms licence. These associations included the Applicant’s alleged involvement with OMCG, and the residence of two individuals with criminal histories at his home address.

34. The Applicant was spoken to by Police on two occasions in 2001 and 2003 because he had affixed stickers to his vehicles supporting OMCG. The stickers stated words to the effect of “SUPPORT YOUR LOCAL HELLS ANGEL SYDNEY” and the Applicant explained in evidence and submissions that the reason for affixing these stickers was to protect his motorcycle and vehicle from being stolen or vandalised. However, according to the Respondent’s evidence, the Applicant had not provided this explanation to them when he was pulled over by Police in 2001 and 2003.

35. The Applicant vehemently denied ever being an OMCG member or having a desire to become an OMCG member, or knowingly associating with OMCG members. He claimed to not have a OMCG tattoo to represent any OMCG, which he believed was a requirement of OMCG members. He gave evidence that he owns a Harley-Davidson motorcycle and is a motorcycle enthusiast, attended many bike shows and celebrated ANZAC Day by riding bikes with hundreds of other bikers. He acknowledged that it could be possible that OMCG members may also be in attendance at these bike shows and rides, and that due to his outer appearance he may look imposing, so may mistakenly appear to be an OMCG member as a result. In written submissions filed on 8 August 2022 the Applicant reiterated that he was not a member or associate of an OMCG, and that “putting a novelty sticker on my very expensive Harley-Davidson to protect it, does not make me a member, associate or supporter”.

36. The Respondent alleged that the Applicant’s association with Ashley Fitzgerald and Shane Watts also supported the revocation of his firearms licence.

37. The Applicant explained that Ashley Fitzgerald is his daughter. She is bi-polar and used to self-medicate on drugs, and would be known to Police for fare evasion and possession of drugs and drug-related paraphernalia. The Applicant claimed that she was never charged with any offences and that she is now closely monitored by mental health specialists, and her mental health is effectively controlled by medication. She lives on the Applicant’s property in a self-contained granny flat which is located approximately 18 metres away from his house, and hardly ever leaves the property.

33. Shane Watts, who the Respondent submitted had a criminal history, was identified by the Respondent as sharing the Applicant’s residential address. The Applicant claimed to not know anything about his criminal record or background. According to the Applicant, Mr Watts had been a customer of the Applicant’s pawn shop and the Applicant had allowed him to live in his caravan on the Applicant’s property for 3 years, although this arrangement was meant to only be temporary. He never gave Mr Watts permission to use his home as a mailing address. Mr Watts and his caravan permanently vacated the Applicant’s property in June/July 2020 and the Applicant had not seen him since that time.

34. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION

35. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION

36. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION

37. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION

38. The respondent submitted that there was a risk that Ashley Fitzgerald would be able to access the Applicant’s firearms if they were located at his residence, because she was resident at the same address. The Applicant provided the Tribunal with photographic evidence of Ashley’s granny flat and its location at the Applicant’s property, claiming that she did not have access to his residence and he did not have access to hers. He also provided the Tribunal with a letter from Shane Watts declaring that he does not live at the Applicant’s address.

39. On the basis of the evidence before the Tribunal, I accept that neither Ashley Fitzgerald nor Shane Watts currently live with the Applicant. Whilst Ashley’s residence is on the Applicant’s property, I accept the Applicant’s evidence, substantiated by the photographs provided by him, that her residence is separate to the Applicant’s. In my view the Applicant’s domestic circumstances are not a basis for revoking his firearms licence.

40. I also accept the Applicant’s submission that he is not currently a member of any OMCG, although as a result of the Confidential material, I do have concerns about the Applicant’s association with identified and unidentified individuals engaging in criminal conduct, whether or not those individuals have been charged or convicted with particular criminal offences.

41. I acknowledge that the confidentiality orders made over the Confidential material mean that it is untested, but on the assumption it is reliable, I accept the Respondent’s submission that it supports a finding that it is not in the public interest for the Applicant to continue to hold a firearms licence. Even without the Confidential material, however, I am not satisfied of the Applicant’s suitability to hold a firearms licence, where doing so is a privilege conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety. As discussed below, the Applicant has not satisfied me that he is of sufficient good character or has a genuine reason to hold a firearms licence.

Character

47. The concerns I expressed above in relation to the Applicant’s associations impact on my assessment of his character. As submitted by the Respondent, the Applicant’s attempts to demonstrate to the world that he is an associate or supporter of the OMCG is not the conduct that one would expect of a person of good character. The allegations against the Applicant of his use of threats or intimidation against members of the public, which supported criminal charges in 1995 and 2010 against him, are also not indicative of good character.

48. The Applicant provided references from his sister, Wendy Richman, and a close family friend, Shehernaz Bilimoria. Ms Bilimoria states that she has known the Applicant for over 20 years and has known him to be sincere, of excellent character, a law-abiding citizen and always caring for his daughter. Ms Richman’s reference is similar. Whilst both make reference to the licence revocation, neither refers to the Applicant’s criminal history or the criminal histories of his associates, and neither gave oral evidence to the Tribunal. Ms Richman has a close familial relationship with the Applicant and his daughter, and Ms Bilimoria acted as an assistant and occasional advocate for the Applicant during the hearing and had to be reminded during the Applicant’s cross examination that she could not answer the questions for him. The Applicant’s correspondence with the Tribunal during the proceedings also came from her email address.

49. In the circumstances I cannot consider Ms Richman or Ms Bilimoria to be independent character witnesses and I give each of their references no weight in these proceedings. There is therefore no objective evidence before the Tribunal corroborating the Applicant’s submissions in relation to his character, so I am not satisfied that he is of “good character” or that his character thereby demonstrates or supports his suitability to hold a firearms licence.

Genuine reason

50. The Applicant’s Category AB firearms licence application was supported in 2016 by the genuine reason of “Hunting Vermin Control – Permission to Shoot”. The Applicant stated that he wanted the licence reinstated so that he could go hunting with friends and his son, who had a firearms licence, but that he didn’t have any requests now to hunt vermin. In oral evidence the Applicant stated to the Tribunal that he was now seeking the reinstatement of his licence because he needed a firearms licence to obtain casual employment in the security industry. He explained that he ran a pawnbroking business between 1996 and 2019, from which he had retired in 2019. He had also worked in the security industry from about 1993, claiming to have held a category 1A, 1B, 1C individual security licence and holding a Master licence for 23 to 25 years, but hadn’t done any armed security work since 2009 when his category H licence expired. The last time he had worked as a security guard had been around 2018.

51. Following his retirement in 2019 he had been living off his superannuation but this was “all gone”, so he wanted to make some extra money now by working as a casual security guard. He didn’t believe this work would be financially worthwhile unless he had a firearms licence, as the pay would then be 25-50% higher as an armed guard, and he would be more in demand. He hadn’t pursued any offers of work in the industry to date because he didn’t yet have the firearms licence.

52. When it was pointed out to him that the subject of his application, being a category AB firearms licence, was not valid for the purposes of an armed security licence, he stated that if granted, he intended to “upgrade” the Category AB firearms licence to allow him to work as an armed guard.

53. It is unclear why the Applicant believed an application to set aside the Category AB licence with the genuine reason of recreational hunting and vermin control would somehow assist him to act as an armed security guard. Even if the Applicant is successful in these proceedings he would have to seek a licence with a genuine reason of business or employment. Additionally, the Applicant’s Category AB firearms licence has expired and so even if the Tribunal were to set aside the Respondent’s decision, the Applicant would still need to apply for a new licence.

54. In the circumstances I am not satisfied that the Applicant has a genuine reason for holding a Category AB firearms licence.

Correct and Preferable

55. Subsection 63(1) of the ADR Act provides that in determining the application, the Tribunal is to decide what the correct and preferable decision is, having regard to the material then before it. In that context there are two possible ‘correct and preferable’ decisions in these proceedings: either the licence should be revoked, or it should not be. In my view, considering the lack of evidence demonstrating that the Applicant is of sufficient good character and suitable to hold a firearms licence, and his lack of genuine reason to retain a Category AB firearms licence, the correct and preferable outcome is for the Respondent’s licence to be revoked. This decision takes into account the Applicant’s previous compliance with legislation requiring the safe storage of firearms, demonstrated by his passing of inspections in 2012 and 2020 and the evidence he provided the Tribunal at hearing, including photographs, of his current safe storage facilities. His compliance with those parts of the Act and Regulations with respect to safe storage do not counteract his inability to provide sufficient evidence to this Tribunal of good character or a genuine reason for holding the Category AB firearms licence.

56. For the reasons discussed above, taking into account the principles discussed above – in particular those referred to at [23] to [27] above, the correct and preferable decision is for the Tribunal to affirm the Respondent’s decision to revoke the Applicant’s Category AB firearms licence.

57. The Applicant’s firearms licence has expired since its revocation. As discussed in Tucker v Commissioner of Police [2021] NSWCATAD 214 (Tucker) and Bailey v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2022] NSWCATAD 214 (Bailey), relying on Sawires v Commissioner of Police [2010] NSWADTAP 68 at [12], even if the Tribunal were to decide the licence should not be revoked, that would not result in the reinstatement of the earlier licence since it has already expired. Neither the Respondent nor the Tribunal on review has power to reissue an expired licence. The Applicant would need to make a fresh application to the Firearms Registry.

58. In Bailey the Tribunal commented at [58] that whilst its decision had no practical effect on the Applicant’s licence being reissued, it could be taken into account in a fresh application by the Applicant to the Respondent for a licence. A similar point was made in Tucker at [34]. Likewise, this decision may be relied on by the Respondent in determining any future application by the Applicant for a firearms licence.

Orders:

1. The Respondent’s decision to revoke the Applicant’s Category AB firearms licence is affirmed.

2. The Confidentiality Orders made 8 April 2022 are continued.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.

Registrar

Decision last updated: 28 September 2022