Fitzgerald v Balchin
[2009] NTSC 29
•25/06/2009
Fitzgerald v Balchin [2009] NTSC 29
PARTIES: FITZGERALD, Nikkita v BALCHIN, Viven Lynette TITLE OF COURT: SUPREME COURT OF THE
NORTHERN TERRITORYJURISDICTION: SUPREME COURT OF THE
NORTHERN TERRITORY
EXERCISING APPELLATE
JURISDICTIONFILE NO: JA 22 of 2009 (20824299) DELIVERED: 25 June 2009 HEARING DATES: 25 June 2009 JUDGMENT OF: RILEY J APPEAL FROM: BRADLEY SM CATCHWORDS: REPRESENTATION: Counsel: Applicant: J Franz Respondent: M Chalmers Solicitors:
Applicant: Northern Territory Legal Aid
CommissionRespondent: Office of the Director of Public
ProsecutionsJudgment category classification: B
Judgment ID Number: Ril0909 Number of pages: 4 IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWINFitzgerald v Balchin [2009] NTSC 29
No. JA 22 of 2009 (20824299)
BETWEEN:
NIKKITA FITZGERALD
Applicant:
AND:
VIVEN LYNNETTE BALCHIN
Respondent:
CORAM: RILEY J
EX TEMPORE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered 25 June 2009)
On 13 March 2009 the applicant was convicted in the Youth Justice Court of
two counts of assault. She was sentenced to detention for a period of six
months on each count with the sentences made partially concurrent to
provide an effective sentence of eight months detention suspended after14 days.
A Notice of Appeal against the sentence was filed on the basis that the
learned sentencing Magistrate "erred in imposing a sentence that was not
duly proportionate to the objective gravity of the youth’s involvement in the
offence."
A preliminary issue
The applicant was sentenced under the Youth Justice Act. The right of
appeal under that Act is governed by the provisions of the Justices Act.
Section 171(1) of the Justices Act provides that an appeal shall be institutedby filing and serving a notice of appeal, by entering into a recognizance on
appeal and by payment of the appropriate fee. The appeal shall be instituted within one month from the time of the order appealed against. In the present case the applicant has not entered into a recognizance on appeal and it is the submission of the respondent that the appeal is not competent.
The requirements of s 171(1) of the Justices Act are conditions precedent to
the institution of the appeal. A failure to comply with the conditions
precedent deprives the court of jurisdiction unless the power of dispensation
under s 165 is exercised[1]. Whilst s 171(2) of the Act allows for an extension
of time by reason of remoteness from the seat of the Court of Appeal of the
original court that proviso has no application in the circumstances of this
matter.
Section 165 of the Justices Act permits the court to dispense with
compliance with any condition precedent to the right of appeal if, in the
opinion of the court, the applicant has done whatever is reasonably
practicable to comply with the requirements of the Act. The onus rests uponthe applicant to demonstrate that he or she has done whatever is reasonably
practicable in the circumstances and to, thereby, justify the exercise by the
court of the power to dispense with compliance. It is not necessary to show
that compliance was impossible but it must at least be demonstrated asunreasonable to expect, in the particular circumstances, that exact
compliance should be insisted upon[2]. If such grounds are not shown and the
court does not provide relief the proceedings remain inchoate and do not
reach the stage of being an instituted appeal.
In circumstances where an applicant, who is in custody, has reasonably left
the matter in the hands of an apparently competent solicitor and where the
instructions were given in ample time for the solicitors to comply with the
provisions of the Act it has been held that the applicant has, within the
meaning of s 165, done all that is reasonably practicable to comply with the
provisions of the Act[3].
At the relevant time the applicant was aged 16 years. Her solicitor obtained
instructions to appeal from the applicant through her mother with whom the
applicant was living at the time of sentencing. The Notice of Appeal was filed on 14 April 2009. On 21 April 2009 the solicitor requested that the
mother inform the applicant that she had to sign the recognizance to
prosecute the appeal. Thereafter the solicitor made numerous attempts tocontact the applicant directly by letter and telephone, through her mother and through her supervising officer at Casuarina Community Corrections. The solicitor left messages to be passed on to the applicant emphasising the
importance of her signing the recognizance and informing her that the
appeal could not proceed if the document was not signed. Notwithstanding
the diligent efforts of the solicitor the applicant did not attend to sign therecognizance.
In the present case it appears that the applicant had been properly advised by
her legal representative of the requirement to enter into a recognizance
however she failed to do so. There is no explanation from the applicant as
to why this may have been. She has not responded to the many requests for
her to enter into the recognizance. She has shown no interest in pursuing
the appeal. I bear in mind her personal circumstances in determining the
outcome of the application. This is not a case where the applicant herself has done everything reasonably practicable to institute the appeal and the
failure is attributable to her legal representative. She has done nothing to
pursue an appeal. Any failure rests with the applicant.
The applicant has failed to demonstrate a basis upon which I should
dispense with the requirement that the applicant enter into the prescribed
recognizance. The application to dispense with the requirement is
dismissed.
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[1] Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Arnhem Aircraft Engineering Pty Ltd (1987) 73 ALR 8.
[2] Edrick v Nayda [1994] NTSC 219.
[3] Nottle v Trenerry (1993) 89 NTR 7.
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