Fishwives Pty Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd - [2001] NSWCA 193

NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION: FISHWIVES PTY LTD v FAI GENERAL INSURANCE CO LTD & ORS [2001] NSWCA 193

FILE NUMBER(S):
40286/99

HEARING DATE(S): 17 May 2001

JUDGMENT DATE: 27/06/2001

PARTIES:
FISHWIVES PTY LTD v FAI GENERAL INSURANCE CO LTD & ORS

JUDGMENT OF: Mason P Meagher JA Handley JA

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): DC 9474/97

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Delaney DCJ

COUNSEL:
Appellant: P M Biscoe QC/ CA Vindin
1st & 2nd Respondent: D L Davies SC
3rd Respondent: P T Taylor

SOLICITORS:
Appellant: Pryor Tzannes & Wallis
1st & 2nd Respondent: Blake Dawson Waldron
3rd Respondent: Phillips Fox

CATCHWORDS:
Insurance - claims made and notified policy - failure to disclose "circumstances which may give rise to a claim" - scope of s6(4) of Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (ND)

LEGISLATION CITED:

DECISION:
Appeal dismissed with costs. Cross appeal by FAI General Insurance Co Ltd dismissed with costs.

JUDGMENT:

THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 40286/99
DC 9474/97
MASON P
MEAGHER JA
HANDLEY JA
Wednesday 27 June 2001

FISHWIVES PTY LIMITED v FAI GENERAL INSURANCE CO LTD & 2 ORS
JUDGMENT

MASON P: The appellant is a hapless plaintiff that sued its architect to judgment for professional negligence only to find the defendant insolvent. The defendant was insured against liability for professional negligence under a claims made and notified policy. Consequently, the appellant sought leave to commence proceedings against three insurers each of whom covered one third of the risk. Leave was refused. This appeal, itself by leave, challenges that order and the two grounds upon which it stands.
Judge Delaney refused leave on two bases, each of which must be overcome if the appellant is to be successful in this appeal:
(i)s6 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (the Act) did not apply to a claims made and notified policy;
(ii)the insurers were entitled to disclaim liability because of the insured’s failure to disclose certain matters in the relevant proposal form.
The facts
In June 1988 the appellant appointed Firth Lee & Partners Pty Ltd (the insured) as its architect to design, document and perform contract administration for a four level office building at Chatswood. The insured prepared the contract documents and supervised the construction work, which was done by Prime Constructions Pty Ltd (Prime) in 1988-1989.
The defects liability period expired in December 1989. In March 1990 several granite tiles fell from the exterior of the building to the footpath. In consequence, the premises were inspected on 22 March 1990 by Mr Stefanatos, one of the principals of the insured. There were also inspections by representatives of Prime, Metro Marble Pty Ltd (the tiling subcontractor) and the distributor of Laticrete (the adhesive specified by the insured and used in affixing the granite tiles).
On 19 March 1990 Mr Geoffrey Lee, another of the principals of the insured, sent a memorandum to Mr Stefanatos as follows:
Last week several granite tiles fell from the above building onto the footpath and naturally both Nick Stergis [the principal of the appellant] and myself are concerned.
We require a full report from both our Professional Indemnity situation, Safety and for Nick Stergis. John, I am concerned that as we specified the adhesives etc. etc. Firth Lee may be negligent.
Could you please investigate and get back to me within the week.
Rectification work was agreed upon at a meeting on 5 June 1990 attended by representatives of the insured, Metro and Prime. Extra expansion joints were added, existing joints were resealed, lost and drummy tiles (approximately 34 in number) were replaced, and there was checking for water penetration. The work was done in late September 1990 by Metro and Prime.
It appears that all of the parties originally involved in the tiling work, including the insured, disclaimed any liability. In Mr Lee’s words “everybody was basically pointing fingers at everybody else”.
On about 1 March 1992 “further granite delamination” took place. (In the evidence this date is sometimes shown as May 1992 (CB 18, 115), but the later date appears to have been the month that the issue was discussed on site (CB 72M). Nothing turns on this unexplained discrepancy.)
The appellant instructed the insured to organise remedial works. There were further discussions on site in May 1992 involving the insured, Prime and its subcontractors. In Mr Stefanatos’ words, “each [party] expressed a variety of opinions as to probable cause of failure” (CB 72).
Further rectification work was commissioned, to be done under the insured’s oversight and on the owner’s instructions, but without express acknowledgment of fault by the various parties. Nevertheless, it is relevant that the insured was advised on 13 May 1992 by a representative of Prime that the render base to walls had been prepared with conventional rendering sand with no Laticrete additives. It is clear that there was discussion as to whether the additive that was used was appropriate and as to whether the work had been done in a proper manner (CB 72P-R). The rectification work had not been completed by the time that the insured submitted the proposal said to contain the material non-disclosure in September 1992.
Mr Stefanatos’ retrospective assessment of the situation, in his memorandum of 27 October 1993, indicates that the insured recognised by that stage that it bore some legal responsibility for the problem (see CB 73M-U). The appellant was clearly of a similar view because, having threatened suit in December 1992, it launched proceedings against the insured in the District Court in October 1993. The proceedings were undefended and judgment was entered in December 1996 for $112,159 plus costs. In 1997 a creditor’s statutory demand issued against the insured, but it was not complied with.
This provided the trigger for the appellant’s application (filed in November 1997) seeking leave under s6 of the Act to commence proceedings against the first respondent (FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (FAI)). Leave was granted in the District Court in March 1998. However, the order was set aside on appeal to this Court and the proceedings were remitted to the District Court for rehearing (FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Fishwives Pty Ltd CA, unreported, 14 September 1998).
An amended application for leave pursuant to s6(4) of the Act was filed in the District Court in November 1997. This time the three insurers for the October 1992 - October 1993 period were joined as respondents.
On 1 April 1999 Delaney DCJ refused leave to proceed and that is the order challenged in this appeal.
The recent appointment of a provisional liquidator to members of the HIH Insurance group including the first and second respondents meant that the appellant was forced to make a belated application for leave to proceed in the appeal against those respondents (see Corporations Law, s471B). That leave was granted at the commencement of the hearing of the appeal whereupon senior counsel for those two respondents withdrew because he had no further instructions in the appeal. It follows that, as matters presently stand, the hapless appellant has encountered two further opponents whose lack of opposition reflects their lack of money. The appeal proceeded against the three respondents, but with counsel for the third respondent (GIO) manning the only labouring oar.
A cross-appeal involving costs had been filed by FAI pursuant to leave. It has not been prosecuted and accordingly it will be dismissed with costs in the final orders.
The insurance policy and the issues arising under it
The insured was covered under the Australian Architects’ Indemnity plan from at least as early as 1990. It would appear that the sole insurer may originally have been FAI General Insurance Co Ltd. But during the period 26 October 1992 - 26 October 1993 the three respondents were the insurers, each covering one-third of the risk. It was during that period that the appellant clearly indicated its intention to sue the insured, first by solicitor’s letter and then by the issue of the statement of claim in the District Court which was filed and served in early October 1993.
On 11 November 1993 the insured gave formal notification of the claim to the insurers. One of the printed questions on the Form asked:
On what date did the Insured first become aware of the matter complained of or the circumstances which may give rise to a claim?
The question was answered:
On or about 12 March 1990 first piece of granite dislodged. Various rectification works and investigations carried out between this date and date of claim.
On 16 September 1994 FAI declined indemnity on the basis that the circumstances giving rise to the claim were known by the insured at least as early as 19 March 1990, yet they were not notified under the policy in force as at that date nor was the existence of those circumstances disclosed in connection with subsequent policies in the proposals for those policies or otherwise.
The application for leave to commence proceedings against the three respondents based itself upon the assertion that they were the insurers on risk during the period when the appellant’s claim was made against the insured and notified by the insured to its respective insurers. I am unaware of evidence indicating that the other two insurers on risk in 1992-1993 have disclaimed liability or formally spelt out their reasons for doing so. Nevertheless, the case proceeded in the District Court on the basis that the three insurers made common cause in opposition.
The relevant Proposal is dated 29 September 1992 and signed by Mr Geoffrey Lee. Part 7 of that Proposal reads:
7.(a) Have any claims ever been made against the firm, its predecessors in business, or any present or past Principal? YES/NO
If “YES”, please give full particulars, including parties involved, date of occurrence, date of discovery and amount involved.
(b)Are any of the Principals after enquiry, aware of any circumstances which may give rise to claims against the firm or their predecessors in business or any of the present or former Principals whether you consider yourselves liable or not? YES/NO
If “YES”, please give full particulars, including parties involved, date of occurrence, date of discovery and amount involved.
Question 7(a) was answered Yes, but the two claims particularised had nothing to do with the present dispute. (Interestingly, one was identified as:
Claim made in 1991 by Fishwives Pty Ltd for certification of progress claim on 4-6 Eddy Road, Chatswood. Dismissed.) Question 7(b) was answered “No”.
Senior counsel for the sole contending respondent, GIO, formulated the legal basis for disclaimer of liability based upon the insured’s answers to question 7 in the Proposal Form. It was submitted that the principals of the insured (Mr Lee, in particular) were aware on 29 September 1992 of “circumstances which may give rise to claims against the firm …whether you consider yourselves liable or not”. Failure to disclose that awareness was material non-disclosure, especially in light of Exclusion (e) of the policy which stipulated that there was no indemnity against claims upon the insured:
… arising out of claims and circumstances noted on the proposal form for the current period of cover or on any previous proposal form.
The judgment under appeal
The respondents successfully opposed the granting of leave to proceed on each of the grounds referred to in par 2 above.
As to the first ground, Judge Delaney held that s6 of the Act did not extend to a claims made and notified policy. It is common ground in the appeal that this legal issue is one of significance and difficulty. Each side cites numerous decisions in its favour (see generally, Sutton, Insurance Law in Australia 2nd ed, 1999 §2.119). It is unnecessary for this Court to address this issue if we are of the view that leave was properly refused having regard to the non-disclosures inherent in the answers to questions 7(a) and (b) of the Proposal Form. That in fact is my view, for the reasons which follow.
Before the primary judge the insurers relied upon the following as establishing that the insured failed to make proper disclosure in its proposal of 29 September 1992:
(a)Mr Lee’s memorandum of 19 March 1990;
(b)the facts summarised in Mr Stefanatos’ memorandum of 27 October 1993;
(c)the evidence of Mr Lee (CB 114-122); and
(d)the report and evidence of a consultant architect, Mr J G Poiner who addressed the inferences which an architect acting reasonably would have drawn from the events of March 1990 and “May” 1992 when granite tiles fell from the external wall of the building (CB 104, 122-127).
Judge Delaney summarised the evidence. He concluded that he was satisfied that:
… the first problems arose in relation to the failure of the granite, at least in 1990, and were raised and considered during that time as well as in March and May of 1992. Accordingly, these were issues which were raised between the parties before the policy was taken out in September of 1992.
Later in his judgment his Honour concluded that he had:
… come to the view, on the balance of probabilities, that the failure by Mr Lee to disclose the various matters which appear in [the Stefanatos memorandum] provided in terms of the proviso of s6(4) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act a basis upon which, on the balance of probabilities, I can be satisfied that the insurer was entitled, pursuant to the terms of the contract of insurance, to disclaim liability.
The appellant challenges these conclusions and submits that his Honour erred in using them as the basis for refusing leave in the event (contrary to his Honour’s view) that s6 applied to the policy in question.
So far as relevant, s6 provides:
6.   Amount of liability to be charge on insurance moneys payable against that liability
(1)   If any person (hereinafter in this Part referred to as the insured) has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, entered into a contract of insurance by which the person is indemnified against liability to pay any damages or compensation, the amount of the person's liability shall on the happening of the event giving rise to the claim for damages or compensation, and notwithstanding that the amount of such liability may not then have been determined, be a charge on all insurance moneys that are or may become payable in respect of that liability.
(2)…
(3)…
(4)   Every such charge as aforesaid shall be enforceable by way of an action against the insurer in the same way and in the same court as if the action were an action to recover damages or compensation from the insured; and in respect of any such action and of the judgment given therein the parties shall, to the extent of the charge, have the same rights and liabilities, and the court shall have the same powers, as if the action were against the insured:
Provided that, except where the provisions of subsection (2) apply, no such action shall be commenced in any court except with the leave of that court. Leave shall not be granted in any case where the court is satisfied that the insurer is entitled under the terms of the contract of insurance to disclaim liability, and that any proceedings, including arbitration proceedings, necessary to establish that the insurer is so entitled to disclaim, have been taken.
(5)   Such an action may be brought although judgment has been already recovered against the insured for damages or compensation in respect of the same matter.
(6)   Any payment made by the insurer under the contract of insurance without actual notice of the existence of any such charge shall to the extent of that payment be a valid discharge to the insurer, notwithstanding anything in this Part contained.
(7)   No insurer shall be liable under this Part for any greater sum than that fixed by the contract of insurance between the insurer and the insured….
In my view, Judge Delaney properly concluded that the insured was on notice of undisclosed circumstances which might give rise to a claim against the firm, when Mr Lee completed the Proposal Form on 29 September 1992. A fortiori, having regard to the concluding words in question 7(b) (“whether you consider yourselves liable or not”). His Honour’s conclusions were based in part upon his assessment of Mr Lee’s oral evidence, when he was cross-examined about his perception of risk of liability as revealed in his memorandum of 19 March 1990 in light of the “further granite delamination” of March 1992. Having regard to the terms of that memorandum and the somewhat inadequate oral evidence of Mr Lee endeavouring to explain it away, the conclusions were well open, in my opinion.
The appellant submits that the judge was not entitled to draw comfort from the evidence of the expert witness, Mr Poiner; and that there were specific errors in his Honour’s analysis of Mr Poiner’s evidence. I do not accept these criticisms.
Mr Poiner’s evidence casts some light on the issue of whether the insured, as a professional architect, was in September 1992 aware of circumstances which may give rise to claims. It was not incumbent on his Honour to refer to every aspect of Mr Poiner’s cross-examination. This was a classic case of a trial judge being entitled to form an overall impression based upon what he saw and heard from the witness. For my part, Mr Poiner’s evidence does not carry great weight, but it is certainly not irrelevant to the issue.
With or without the limited assistance of Mr Poiner’s evidence, his Honour was also entitled to view the objective circumstances as disclosing the insured’s awareness of a significant risk that what eventuated in October 1993 might eventuate in September 1992 when the Proposal Form was completed. It is sufficient to refer to Mr Lee’s awareness of his firm’s role in designing, documenting and administering of the building project; the early sign of a serious problem demanding action and betokening fault; the explicit terms of the Lee memorandum; the mutual accusations of the parties involved in the building work; the intimations by the appellant itself that responsibility lay at the door of one or more of those involved in the building project; the recurrence of the problem in March 1992, despite agreed rectification work having been carried out under the insured’s supervision in late 1990; and the implicit indications that the insured was in fact at fault as disclosed by the details and conclusions of the Stefanatos’ memorandum. It is unnecessary to decide whether the judgment against the insured that was procured by the appellant and proved by the appellant in the instant proceedings was further proof of the falsity of the answers to Question 7(a) and (b) of the Proposal Form.
Mr Lee gave evidence as to what was in his mind in the period March 1990 to September 1992. He said in effect that he had come to the view that his firm was not negligent and that it had nothing to fear arising out of the “delamination” incidents of 1990 and 1992. The primary judge accepted Mr Lee as a truthful witness while noting the difference between his recollection as a witness (he gave evidence in November 1998) and the apparent indications in the notations made in 1990. This guarded acceptance of Mr Lee’s veracity did not compel the judge to conclude that this was a proper case for leave to proceed against the insurer. In the first place, honesty is not the same as accuracy. Secondly, Mr Lee was endeavouring to focus upon his state of mind at a precise and fairly distant point of time (September 1992), something that is never easy to do. Thirdly, Mr Lee’s belief that his firm had not been negligent was ultimately not to the point because the relevant inquiry was as to his awareness of objective circumstances which may give rise to claims against the firm whether or not he considered the firm liable or not. The objective circumstances were weighty.

In light of the events of March-May 1992, this was not a case where the threat of a claim had “passed into history” (cf FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Hendry Rae and Court (1993) 10 WAR 322 at 340).
The appellant cited the analysis in FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v McSweeney (1999) 10 ANZ Insurance Cases ¶61-443 at 75,033-4 where Lindgren J discussed the meaning of circumstances which “may give rise to a claim”. His Honour said:
In my opinion, it is not desirable to attempt to define precisely the shade of meaning signified by the expression “may give rise to a claim”. The appropriate connection between the known circumstances and the claim referred to in [the question in the proposal] is, perhaps, best described by saying that circumstances “may give rise to a claim” if they would, as at the time of the proposing of the insurance, immediately suggest to a reasonable person in the proponent insured’s position who reflected upon those known circumstances, that the bringing of a claim against the insured in respect of them was a “definite risk” or a “real possibility” or “on the cards”. Perhaps the notion of the “springing to mind” of the making of a claim also appropriately expresses the shade or meaning intended.
The expression is concerned with the making of a claim as distinct from the mere existence of legal liability. Ordinarily it can be expected that what will be known will include the fact that the circumstances have actually led a person at least to contemplate the making of a claim. However, I do not exclude the case where the underlying circumstances establishing liability themselves, of their nature, would prompt a reasonable person immediately to foresee the making of a claim as a real possibility. In such a case, the length of time that has passed without any suggestion of a claim and the degree of obviousness of liability may assume importance….
In my view it is unnecessary to express a concluded view on this helpful summary. The question is ultimately one of fact and, in the present case, the conclusion reached by the primary judge was well open to him. The recurrence of the “delamination” problem in 1992, after it had been apparently rectified in 1990, must have brought home to the insured an actual awareness of circumstances which might give rise to claims against it. The fears implicitly stated in Mr Lee’s memorandum of March 1990 must have been reactivated.
The prescription at the end of section 6(4)
The appellant submitted that it was not open to the primary judge to refuse leave on the basis of his satisfaction as to the insurer’s entitlement to disclaim, because the “necessary” proceedings to establish that entitlement had not been taken. This submission was based upon the prescriptive words at the end of s6(4) which read:
Leave shall not be granted in any case where the court is satisfied that the insurer is entitled under the terms of the contract of insurance to disclaim liability, and that any proceedings, including arbitration proceedings, necessary to establish that the insurer is so entitled to disclaim, have been taken.
If the appellant’s submission were correct, it would seem to follow that the Court would be bound to grant leave to proceed against an insurer even in the clearest of cases of the insurer’s entitlement to disclaim or avoid liability, simply because the insurer had not initiated proceedings to establish its entitlement to disclaim. There is authority to the contrary (see Andjelkovic v AFG Insurances Ltd (1980) 31 ACTR 17 at 23, Seery v John R Carr & Associates Pty Ltd, Supreme Court unreported, Giles CJ Comm Div, 3 November 1995 at p5).
A modified version of this submission was to the effect that leave ought to be given when, notwithstanding that the Court was satisfied on the material before it that the insurer was entitled to disclaim, nevertheless there was an arguable case to the contrary. Reliance was placed upon statements indicating that an arguable case on the indemnity issue should suffice for a grant of leave, just as it would normally suffice in relation to the issue of the plaintiff’s case against the insured (see Oswald v Bailey (1987) 11 NSWLR 715 at 734, AFG Insurances Ltd v Andjelkovic (1981) 54 FLR 398 at 400 , Travel Compensation Fund v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (1999) FCA 1214).
These words prescribing when leave must be refused do not appear in the New Zealand legislation upon which s6 seems to have been modelled (see generally Bailey v New South Wales Medical Defence Union Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 399 at 440ff).
The uncertain role of the prescription is discussed in earlier case law (see eg Lissenden v Yorkville Nominees Pty Ltd(in Liq) [1984] 3 NSWLR 138 at 142-4, AFG Insurances at 400, Dixon v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd (1998) 90 FCR 390 at 399). Among matters that have been debated were: did the prescription exclusively cover any and if so which field? What is the meaning of “entitled under the terms of the contract of insurance”? What circumstances are encompassed by the second condition in the proscription which speaks of “proceedings … necessary to establish that the insurer is … entitled to disclaim” having been taken?
Fortunately, these issues are addressed in extended and authoritative dicta in the High Court in Bailey. McHugh J and Gummow J discussed the meaning of s6, and s6(4) in particular, at 448-450. The other members of the Court (Brennan CJ, Deane J and Dawson J) expressed their agreement with what McHugh and Gummow JJ wrote upon the effect of s6 (see at 415).
I shall not set out the lengthy passage from the joint judgment of McHugh J and Gummow J. It is sufficient to observe that their Honours read the prescription as mandatory where it applies, but as not precluding the power to refuse leave in other cases. “Other cases” include cases where there is an issue (at the leave stage) as to the insurer’s entitlement to disclaim for non-disclosure, misrepresentation or pursuant to contractual entitlement. The reason why the prescription appears to cover no field exclusively lies in s6(1)’s express recognition that no charge will attach unless and until insurance moneys become payable in respect of the insurer’s liability. It is sufficient to quote one paragraph (at 449-50):
The phrase in s6(1), “insurance moneys that … may become payable”, is apt to deal with the situation where, whilst the charge has descended, there is as yet no sum which could be identified as presently payable by the insurer to the insured. In such a case, the statutory charge operates, by loose analogy to an agreement for a charge on after-acquired property, upon such moneys as and when they do become payable. However, there will be nothing in respect of which the charge may be enforced if the moneys never become payable by reason of the exercise by the insurer of rights to avoid the contract or of a vitiating factor in its formation. So also is the case of a breach which, pursuant to the terms of the contract (135) or the general law, entitles the insurer to disclaim liability and this state of affairs exists when action is brought by the claimant under s6(4) or, as necessary, leave is sought to commence that action. In all these cases, there were no insurance moneys which were payable when the charge arose and none have become payable. (emphasis added)
The words I have emphasised form the basis for my conclusion that the passage as a whole shows that, in a proper case, leave may be refused in a proper case even though the insurer has not itself taken “proceedings … necessary to establish that the insurer is so entitled to disclaim”.
I do not accept the appellant’s submission that the judge was bound to grant leave if there was an arguable case on the non-disclosure issue. I can readily accept that leave may be given where the Court is satisfied that there is an arguable point on the insurer’s indemnity issue. It is now established that the grant of leave to proceed against an insurer does not foreclose the insurer’s right to litigate issues going to its liability to indemnify the insured in the substantive proceedings. Dixon’s Case shows the insurer lives to fight another day. But it does not follow, in my view, that a court that is positively satisfied of the insurer’s entitlement to disclaim, after issue has been joined on that matter as between the plaintiff and the insurer, must exercise the discretion in favour of the grant of leave. The court is “seized of the discretion to grant leave” (National Mutual Property Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Citibank Savings Ltd (1996) 138 ALR 409 at 418 per Lindgren J), but it is not driven to exercise the discretion in a particular way.
In the present case Delaney DCJ was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the insurer was entitled to disclaim. He was in my view entitled to reach this conclusion.

Miscellaneous challenges

In its written submissions the appellant raised other complaints, none of which I consider to have merit in light of my reading of the judgment as a whole and of the material upon which it is based.
In my view, the essential reasoning process is adequately disclosed in the reasons for judgment. The precise basis upon which the insurers were found to have been entitled to disclaim liability is not spelt out in the judgment. However, the relevant facts were addressed, in particular the facts establishing the objective falsity of the answers to Question 7 of the Proposal Form being facts actually known to Mr Lee at least when he signed the Proposal Form. It was not necessary for the primary judge to identify a contractual basis for disclaimer of liability (see Bailey, 184 CLR at 448-450).
It is true that the judgment contains no discussion of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), in particular ss21 and 28(3). However, this reflects the way the case was apparently fought at trial. Furthermore, the mistatement and non-disclosure is of such obvious materiality that s28(3) would have been implicitly satisfied on the facts as found, especially in light of exclusion (e). If satisfied, the insurers’ liability under the policy would have been reduced to zero.
Disposition
I propose the following orders:
1. Appeal dismissed with costs.
2. Cross appeal by FAI General Insurance Co Ltd dismissed with costs.
MEAGHER JA: I agree with Mason P.
HANDLEY JA: I agree with Mason P.
***********

LAST UPDATED: 04/07/2001