Firth v Westbury

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CITATION: FIRTH v WESTBURY [1999] NSWSC 372
CURRENT JURISDICTION: COMMON LAW
FILE NUMBER(S): 10692/98
HEARING DATE(S): 25 March 1999
JUDGMENT DATE:
22 April 1999

PARTIES :


STEPHEN PAUL FIRTH
v
TAMMY WESTBURY
JUDGMENT OF: Master Malpass
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Costs Assessor
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S) : 90728/96
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Mr L S Hattersley
COUNSEL : PLAINTIFF: MR R GOODRIDGE
DEFENDANT: N/A
SOLICITORS: PLAINTIFF: FIRTHS
DEFENDANT: HOGAN GEIKIE POOLE
CATCHWORDS: APPEAL; decision as to matter of law arising in the proceedings to determine the application for assessment; reasons.
ACTS CITED: Legal Profession Act, 1987, 175, 178, 188, 188 (1) (b), 208C, 208L, 208M.
CASES CITED: Bacha v Pettersen (3 December 1998).
Madden v NSW IMC (1999) NSWSC 196.
DECISION: SEE PARAGRAPH 27

THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION

MASTER MALPASS

March 1999

10692/98 - Firth v Westbury
    JUDGMENT
1 The plaintiff is a solicitor. His firm acted for the defendant in two District Court proceedings. Claims for damages were made in respect of two motor vehicle accidents.
2 The plaintiff presented the defendant with a proposed costs agreement for each of the proceedings. There was a lengthy conversation had concerning the proposed agreements. It appears that the proposed agreements were not acceptable to the defendant. She prepared her own agreement. It is set forth in a letter dated 11 March 1995. It contained provision for costs on the following basis:-
        “Your firm pays all future disbursements. If the verdict is against me, then I do not pay anything; if the verdict is for me, then from whatever the Court awards me:

          Firstly, you pay me $717.50 for disbursements I have paid thus far for these 2 cases (for police reports, Section 12 & 36 Certificates, medical report fees, Police accident report fees, District Court filing fees, Process Service fees etc)

          Secondly, you reimburse your firm for disbursements paid on my behalf (this is not to include office type expenses such as photocopying, postage, stationery, phone calls, misc)

          Thirdly, you pay your firm for acting on my behalf, an amount less than or equal to half the balance of whatever the Court awards less the two disbursement items above (this amount you are paid for your services includes the office type expenses noted above)

          You pay me the balance. ie whatever the Court awards less the three items above (this is at least half the balance of whatever the Court awards less the 2 disbursements items above).”
3 The plaintiff advised that he was prepared to proceed on the basis of the fee agreement set out in the letter.
4 I should digress to say at this stage that it was argued by the plaintiff that this agreement should, to put it broadly, be seen as an amendment of the proposed agreements. I do not accept that submission.
5 The two District Court proceedings were settled. In one of the proceedings, the plaintiff obtained judgment in the sum of $35,000 (inclusive of costs). In the other…
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Details
Case
[1999] NSWSC 372
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Firth v Westbury, the respondents, who are the executors of a deceased estate, appealed against a decision made by a single judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. The appeal concerned the assessment of a tax liability in the context of a superannuation fund. The court was tasked with determining whether the single judge had made an error of law in their decision regarding the assessment of the tax liability.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the single judge had correctly applied the law in assessing the tax liability of the superannuation fund. Specifically, the court had to determine if the single judge had erred in law by not considering the full extent of the tax liability that arose from the application of certain provisions of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993. Additionally, the court needed to decide if the single judge had properly considered the relevant statutory provisions and case law in making their decision.

The court held that the single judge had indeed erred in law. The court found that the single judge had failed to consider the full scope of the tax liability that arose from the relevant provisions of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993. The court noted that the single judge's decision did not fully account for the tax implications of the superannuation fund, and as such, the decision was flawed. The court further held that the single judge had not properly applied the relevant statutory provisions and case law in making their decision, leading to an incorrect assessment of the tax liability. As a result, the court allowed the appeal and set aside the decision of the single judge.

The court ordered that the matter be remitted to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia for rehearing by a different judge. The court directed that the rehearing take into account the full extent of the tax liability that arose from the relevant provisions of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993, as well as the proper application of the relevant statutory provisions and case law.

Orders

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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