Finnie v Regina and Regina v Finnie

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

CITATION:      Finnie v Regina and Regina v Finnie [2007]  NSWCCA 38

FILE NUMBER(S):
2006/1629
2006/1704

HEARING DATE(S):               26 September 2006

JUDGMENT DATE: 22 February 2007

PARTIES:
Sydney Thomas Finnie
Regina

JUDGMENT OF:       Sully J Simpson J Latham J   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          04/11/0411

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Murrell DCJ

LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION:    4 May 2005

COUNSEL:
J. A. Girdham - Crown
R. F. Sutherland SC - Appellant

SOLICITORS:
S. Kavanagh - Crown
Brock Partners - Appellant

CATCHWORDS:

LEGISLATION CITED:
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW)
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure Act) 1999 (NSW)

CASES CITED:
The Queen v Chai (2002) 128 A Crim R 101
R v Gulliford (2004) 148 A Crim R 558
Karageorge (1998) 103 A Crim R 157
MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606
MacKenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348
Reg v Hallocoglu (1992) 26 NSWLR 67

DECISION:
Appellant granted extension of time necessary to permit of prosecution of appeal against conviction and application for leave to appeal against sentence
Appeal against conviction dismissed
Leave granted to appeal against sentence
Appeal against sentence dismissed
Crown appeal against sentence dismissed

JUDGMENT:

IN THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEAL

2006/1629
2006/1704

SULLY J
SIMPSON J
LATHAM J

22 February 2007

Sydney Thomas FINNIE  v  REGINA
REGINA  v  Sydney Thomas FINNIE

Judgment

SULLY J:             

Introduction

  1. Between 26 April 2005 and 30 May 2005 the appellant, Mr. Finnie, stood trial in the District Court at Sydney. He was tried upon an indictment containing three counts.

  2. Count 1 charged the appellant with having perverted the course of justice. This offence was alleged to have been committed between 26 November 2000 and 8 December 2000. An offence of this kind contravenes section 319 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). It attracts upon conviction a statutory maximum penalty of imprisonment for 14 years. The jury found the appellant guilty of this charge. He was formally convicted and was sentenced to imprisonment for 18 months commencing on 22 September 2005, the date of his sentencing, and expiring on 21 March 2007. A non-parole period of 9 months was set, to commence on 22 September 2005 and to expire on 21 June 2006.

  3. Count 2 charged the appellant with a further contravention of section 319. The count alleged the same dates as for the Count 1 offence. The jury found the appellant not guilty of this charge.

  4. Count 3 charged the appellant with having committed perjury on 27 November 200. The jury found the appellant not guilty of this charge.

  5. The appellant appeals against his conviction on Count 1. He applies concurrently for leave to appeal against his sentence.

  6. The grounds of appeal against conviction are:

    “1.Count 1 in the indictment is bad in law in that it does not disclose an offence known to law.

    2.The learned Trial Judge’s directions with respect to count 1 were ambiguous, misleading and failed to direct…

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Details
Case
[2007] NSWCCA 38
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Finnie v Regina and Regina v Finnie, the appellant, Finnie, contested both his conviction and the sentence imposed upon him. The appeal against his conviction argued that there was no sufficient basis for the Crown to lead evidence regarding the prospective calling of Dr. Vago, specifically related to a client privileged communication. The appeal against the sentence contended that the objective seriousness of the offence was minimal, warranting a suspended sentence instead of full-time imprisonment. The court had to determine whether the Crown had a sufficient factual basis to permit the evidence concerning the prospective calling of Dr. Vago and whether the sentence imposed was appropriate considering the nature of the offence.

The court carefully examined the evidence and legal principles surrounding the admissibility of the prospective calling of Dr. Vago. It concluded that there was indeed a sufficient factual basis for the Crown to lead such evidence, particularly given the appellant's statements about his medical condition and his intent to influence the bail application process. Regarding the sentence, the court assessed the objective seriousness of the offence and determined that it was in the mid-range, though towards the lower end. Despite the appellant's argument for a suspended sentence, the court found that full-time imprisonment was warranted in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.

Ultimately, the appeal against the conviction was dismissed as none of the grounds presented constituted a miscarriage of justice. The court found that the appellant's conviction was properly made. Concerning the sentence, the court upheld the imposition of full-time imprisonment, considering the seriousness of the offence and the need for general deterrence. The appeal against the sentence was also dismissed, and the original sentence was maintained.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Her Honour’s ruling of 28 April contains clear and careful analyses of both the relevant legal and factual issues arising from the terms of section 125 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), which section governed the adjudication of the Crown application. It is not now submitted that her Honour erred in her analysis of the relevant legal principles. What is contended is, to quote the relevant submission:“In the circumstances of the trial of the appellant, specifically in relation to the client privileged communication regarding the prospective calling of Dr. Vago, there was an insufficient basis made out factually to permit the evidence to be adduced from the solicitor.” As to that factual basis, her Honour sets out clearly in paragraphs 14 through 22 of the ruling of 28 April her Honour’s process of reasoning to a conclusion that there was a sufficient factual basis to justify the Crown’s being permitted to lead the particular evidence of Mr. Meakin:“14.On 27 November 2000, the accused gave evidence on the bail application concerning a heart condition from which he suffered. He also stated that he was diagnosed with prostate cancer in 1995 and was treated by Dr. Gonski at Royal North Shore with mainstream medicine. He then decided to utilise alternative medicine “which …brought the PSA count down from 160 to 80”. These statements by the accused form the basis of count 3 in the indictment. A PSA count is a prostate specific antigen count. It is a reading obtained from blood analysis which is used to detect the presence of prostate cancer. On 27 November 2000, the accused tendered a report of Dr. Vago, and called Dr. Vago who gave evidence in which he elaborated upon the contents of the report. A report had been provided to the accused’s former solicitors on 30 May 2000. That report noted that the accused had an enlarged prostate and stated:“The prostate condition was diagnosed by Dr. Gonski at Royal North Shore Hospital where a biopsy revealed cancer.”15.In relation to count 1, the act upon which the Crown relies is that the accused instructed his solicitor to call Dr. Vago. As much can be inferred from the fact that the accused was present in court when Dr. Vago gave evidence.16.As far as the issue of the accused’s knowledge that Dr. Vago’s evidence was based on false information is concerned, in these proceedings it is to be Dr. Vago’s evidence that the evidence which he gave on 27 November 2000 was based on what the accused told him, and that he made no independent examination of the accused.17.Inter alia, in his evidence Dr. Vago stated that the accused had had tests to prove that he had prostate cancer, which were undertaken by Dr. Gonski at the Royal North Shore Hospital (p 45 of the transcript of 27 November 2000). Dr. Vago gave evidence about the aetiology and usual progress of prostate cancer. He indicated that, if untreated, prostate cancer is a progressive disease.18.The contentious issue in relation to count 1 appears to be whether the accused knew that he was not and had never suffered from prostate cancer and deliberately provided Dr. Vago with false information that he had been diagnosed with prostate cancer.19.There is ample evidence upon which the Crown can rely to establish the accused’s knowledge of the nature of his condition. In May 1995 Dr. O’Connor undertook a PSA test which was normal, giving a reading of 0.7. The accused was found to be suffering from prostatitis, which can be treated with antibiotics and is a quite different condition from prostate cancer. In August 1995, the accused was treated for heart problems by a Dr. Gluck. In December 1995, he was treated for heart problems at the Royal North Shore Hospital by a Dr. Gunning. Neither doctor took a history of prostate cancer. In September 1997, Dr. O’Connor conducted a colonoscopy but at that time there was no suggestion of prostate cancer. In 1998, the accused wrote to a Dr. Kumar giving a detailed account of his medical problems, one of which was an enlarged prostate, but there was no suggestion that the enlarged prostate was due to cancer. In January 2000, Dr. Varga of the Corrections Health Service found no indication of prostate cancer when he examined the accused. A PSA reading was taken and was 0.7, i.e. normal. The accused did not undertake any biopsy until May 2001. In the absence of a biopsy it would be remarkable if a diagnosis of cancer was made.20.The information provided to Dr. Vago was similar to the contents of the 1995 medical report, which the Crown alleges was false and which is the subject of count 2.21.Anyone would appreciate that, where medical evidence is led that a prisoner is suffering from cancer for which he is not being properly treated in custody, that is a matter which might influence a judge to grant bail. If the accused knew that the information which he provided to Dr. Vago was false, then it could readily be inferred that any instruction to call Dr. Vago was given with the intention of perverting the course of justice. 22.Consequently, in relation to count 1, I am well satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for finding that the offence was committed.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

SULLY J
I would not uphold Ground 6.The Conviction Appeal: Conclusion In my opinion none of the grounds of appeal against conviction has been made good. There was in my opinion no miscarriage of justice in the jury’s finding that the appellant was guilty as charged in Count 1 of the indictment. The appeal against conviction should be dismissed.The Sentence Application: Grounds 7 and 8 The appellant, when he stood for sentence, had an antecedent criminal history. In the wake of his conviction and sentencing he obtained various grants of conditional bail pending appeal. The progress of both the conviction appeal and the sentence application was conspicuously protracted. The relevant chronology is as follows:200411 December The appellant was released from custody in connection with other matters. Thereafter and until 22 September 2005 the appellant was at liberty on conditioned bail.200530 MayJury verdicts returned.29 JuneNotice of intention to appeal filed. Expiry date: 29 December 2005.22 September Appellant sentenced. Head sentence of imprisonment for 18 months. Non-parole period of 9 months: Commence: 22 September 2005 Expire: 21 June 2006The appellant entered custody accordingly.30 September Appeal bail granted, upon conditions by Patten AJ.200625 JanuaryExtension of time for appeal granted to 29 March 2006 The learned sentencing Judge assessed as follows the objective culpability of the offence:“13.As far as the objective seriousness of the offence is concerned, any offence against s 319 strikes at the heart of the judicial system. The community generally is the victim harmed by such offences. Consequently, general deterrence plays an important part in relation to sentencing for such offences. The offender was the instigator and the intended beneficiary of the act in question in this case. The offence was committed while the offender was in custody in relation to matters of dishonesty. The offence was intended to influence the grant of bail. The grant of bail is an important aspect of the criminal justice system, although an intended perversion of a bail application is not generally as serious as an intended perversion of a trial or sentencing proceedings.14.Fortunately, in this case, a perversion was averted. No damage to the system actually resulted because bail was not granted on the basis of a condition of prostate cancer. However, Judge Coorey was minded to grant bail if that condition was established. In seeking bail, the offender was not motivated to escape. Nor was he motivated by any other such serious motive. His motive was to obtain proper medical attention and the best possible medical evidence to present to court as well, no doubt, to enjoy his freedom. Further, it must be noted that testing could not have shown that the offender had prostate cancer. It could only have revealed that he did not have prostate cancer.15.In these circumstances, the offender contends that the level of objective criminality of this offence is very low indeed, so low that it would justify the imposition of a suspended sentence rather than a sentence of full-time imprisonment.16.I do not agree with that submission. In my view, the objective seriousness of the offence is in the mid range, although it is towards the lower end of the mid range. Consequently, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, I would impose a sentence of full-time imprisonment.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SULLY J

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