Finlay v The State of Western Australia
[2013] WASC 116
•28 MARCH 2013
FINLAY -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2013] WASC 116
| SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA | Citation No: | [2013] WASC 116 | |
| Case No: | MBA:7/2013 | 27 MARCH 2013 | |
| Coram: | SIMMONDS J | 28/03/13 | |
| 15 | Judgment Part: | 1 of 1 | |
| Result: | Report ordered pursuant to s 24A(2) Bail Act 1982 (WA) | ||
| B | |||
| PDF Version |
| Parties: | MICHAEL JAMES FINLAY THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA |
Catchwords: | Criminal law and procedure Bail Accused in custody on charges of possession of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply and possession of money reasonably suspected to have been unlawfully obtained Application of approach to decision as to bail Order for report as to home detention condition |
Legislation: | Bail Act 1982 (WA), s 14, s 22, s 24, s 24A, sch 1 pt C cl 1, cl 3, pt D cl 3 Criminal Code (WA), s 428 Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA), s 6 Misuse of Drugs Regulations 1982 (WA) |
Case References: | Ganeshamoorthy v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASC 123 Hedgeland v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASC 181 Lai v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASC 334 Lewandowski v Sherman [2002] WASC 239 Milenkovski v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 99 Tulloh v The Queen [2004] WASCA 169 |
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA CITATION : FINLAY -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2013] WASC 116 CORAM : SIMMONDS J HEARD : 27 MARCH 2013 DELIVERED : 28 MARCH 2013 FILE NO/S : MBA 7 of 2013 BETWEEN : MICHAEL JAMES FINLAY
- Applicant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
Catchwords:
Criminal law and procedure - Bail - Accused in custody on charges of possession of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply and possession of money reasonably suspected to have been unlawfully obtained - Application of approach to decision as to bail - Order for report as to home detention condition
Legislation:
Bail Act 1982 (WA), s 14, s 22, s 24, s 24A, sch 1 pt C cl 1, cl 3, pt D cl 3
Criminal Code (WA), s 428
Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA), s 6
Misuse of Drugs Regulations 1982 (WA)
Result:
Report ordered pursuant to s 24A(2) Bail Act 1982 (WA)
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant : Mr S F Rafferty
Respondent : Ms D F Brewer
Solicitors:
Applicant : Mr S F Rafferty
Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Ganeshamoorthy v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASC 123
Hedgeland v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASC 181
Lai v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASC 334
Lewandowski v Sherman [2002] WASC 239
Milenkovski v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 99
Tulloh v The Queen [2004] WASCA 169
- SIMMONDS J:
(This judgment was delivered extemporaneously on 28 March 2013 and has been edited from the transcript.)
1 This is an application for bail following the refusal of two such applications made to the same magistrate. The applicant Mr Finlay, I will refer to him as 'the applicant' from now, is in custody on four charges. The following offences are all alleged to have been committed on 27 September 2012, and I will call that 'the alleged offending'. The first charge is contrary to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA), s 6(1)(a), possession of a prohibited drug, namely methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply. The second charge is contrary to the Criminal Code (WA) s 428(1), possession of the sum of $2,795 that was reasonably suspected to have been unlawfully obtained The third charge is contrary to the Misuse of Drugs Act s 6(1)(a), possession of a prohibited drug, namely methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply. The fourth charge is contrary to the Criminal Code s 428(1), possession of $28,650 reasonably suspected to have been unlawfully obtained.
2 The statement of material facts for this alleged offending is in summary as follows. On 27 September 2012, a Thursday, at about 11.20 am police stopped the applicant while he was driving a vehicle in a shopping centre in Midland. A search of the applicant revealed he had cash totalling $7,295 on him. The applicant, in a subsequent interview with police, indicated that $4,500 of that amount was from the sale of a motor vehicle of his. The sum of $2,795 in the second charge is the balance.
3 A search of the applicant after he was taken to the offices of the East Metropolitan District Crime Team revealed in a sock taken from the applicant three clipseal bags with a substance believed to be methylamphetamine, to a total weight of 4.04 g. These are the drugs the subject of the first charge.
4 Later the same day, 27 September 2012, at about 5.25 pm the applicant was present with members of the East Metropolitan District Crime Team at a bed and breakfast facility in Gidgegannup. A search of a room in that facility, alleged to be the applicant's accommodation, revealed two clipseal bags containing what is believed to be methylamphetamine in an esky in a bedside drawer. The total weight of the substance was 23.73 g, one bag containing 10.33 g and another containing 13.4 g. These are the drugs the subject of the third charge.
5 A further search of the same esky revealed a white plastic bag containing the sum of $28,650 in $50 notes. This is the sum the subject of the fourth charge.
6 On 28 September 2012, and again on 26 October 2012, the applicant applied for bail to Magistrate Benn. On both occasions the application was refused.
Approach to the decision as to bail
7 I turn from that introduction to the approach to the decision as to bail. There can be no contest as to the principles applicable to the application. The Bail Act 1982 (WA) regulates it. By s 14 my jurisdiction to grant bail is an original one and is not affected in any way by the determination of any other judicial officer, like Magistrate Benn, whose jurisdiction is inferior to my own. The present is not in any sense an appeal from or review of the magistrate's decision in relation to the applicant's applications for bail.
8 The general approach to the grant of bail is determined by the Bail Act sch 1 pt C cl 1, read with cl 3. Those provisions are themselves to be approached in the way stated in Milenkovski v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 99 [29], [39] - [43] McLure P (Pullin JA & Hall J agreeing) on which I have myself remarked in Hedgeland v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASC 181 [16].
9 From those paragraphs in Milenkovski, I extract the following 10 principles:
(1) there is no express statutory presumption for or against the grant of bail;
(2) the court has a discretion whether to grant bail which involves a weighing or balancing process that may only commence after considering and answering the questions in the Bail Act sch 1 pt C cl 1(a) - (g);
(3) all of the questions, save for par (e), are directed to whether there are positive grounds for refusing bail: par (e) goes to the question whether it is possible to neutralise, wholly or sufficiently, the positive grounds for bail;
(4) the word 'may' in cl 1(a) and (d) means the possibility of the events occurring;
(5) in considering the questions in cl 1(a) the court must have regard to all of the matters in cl 3(a) - (d);
(6) the seriousness of the offence with or without regard to the maximum penalty for it does not produce under the Bail Act the common law result of requiring the applicant to establish exceptional reasons or circumstances for the grant of bail;
(7) it may be, having regard to all of the relevant matters in cl 3, that the nature and seriousness of the offence, with or without the method of dealing with the applicant for it if convicted, are sufficient to enable the court to conclude that the applicant may fail to appear in accordance with their undertaking and the existence and extent of that possibility may, having regard to the answers to all of the other mandatory questions in cl 1, require or justify the refusal of bail;
(8) the court may make a decision to refuse bail solely because of the answer to the question in cl 1(g);
(9) the court is required to consider, in addition to the answers to the mandatory questions in cl 1, the answers to any other questions it considers relevant. For that purpose, I note the opening words of cl 1 refer to any other questions than those listed in cl 1(a) - (g); and
(10) in cases where the bail application is determined under cl 1, bail would have to be granted if there is no material before the court providing a proper foundation for refusing bail.
10 In view of my readings of a number of the authorities that were cited to me in connection with the present application, I should add the following.
11 Milenkovski must now be taken as the principal reference point for analysis of applications such as this one. As I indicated in Hedgeland [15], referring to particular paragraphs in Milenkovski, earlier statements from authorities of and on the common law approach cannot be so taken. For a listing of such authorities see Ganeshamoorthy v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASC 123 [10], a decision of my own.
The application
12 I turn to the present application. The application for bail is undated but was filed on 11 March 2013. I will call it 'the present application'. It is principally supported by an affidavit of the applicant sworn 8 March 2013 - 'the applicant's affidavit' - with the annexed statement of material facts of the alleged offending. I have drawn on that statement of material facts and I specifically confirm, of course, that that statement is simply a set of allegations.
13 The respondent has also provided me with a number of materials. These include the transcript of a sentencing hearing on 4 November 2008 before her Honour Chief Judge Kennedy of the District Court, including her Honour's sentencing remarks following the convictions of the applicant on offences the subjects of two indictments comprising three offences. I call them collectively 'the prior drug offending the subject of the sentencing hearing on 4 November 2008'.
14 One of the three offences was committed on 15 October 2007, possession of a prohibited drug, namely methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply, the quantity being 7.18 g. I call that 'the 2007 offence'. Two of the offences were committed on 27 February 2008 - I call them 'the 2008 offences' - being one offence of possession of a prohibited drug, namely methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply, the quantity being 1.19 g, and the other offence being possession of a prohibited drug, namely methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply, the quantity being 154 g.
15 Next there are three witness statements from the prosecution brief. One is from a Ms AC who it is common ground before me is the partner of the applicant and the person who, at the time of the discovery of the drugs the subject of the third charge, was occupying a room in the bed and breakfast in Gidgegannup where the drugs the subject of the third charge were found. Another is from an Officer Sanders who was involved in the investigation of the alleged offending. The third is from a Ms LJ who was the owner-manager of the bed and breakfast in Gidgegannup.
16 There is also a note seized from Ms AC which the applicant, while he was in custody for the alleged offending, passed to her. I call it 'the note'. The note consists principally of 21 line items setting out names of persons and amounts those persons are indicated to owe. The amounts range from $100 to $66,000 and total, I was told, $297,000. Finally, I have been provided with a certificate of an approved analyst under the Misuse of Drugs Act, Misuse of Drugs Regulations 1982 (WA), for two quantities of substance, being one quantity of 9.92 g for which methylamphetamine was identified as a component with a content of approximately 67% and one quantity of 12.8 g for which methylamphetamine was identified as a component with a content of approximately 40%.
17 At the hearing before me on 27 February 2013, counsel for the respondent provided me with a Chemistry Centre report on a comparison of five items containing methylamphetamine. I call this 'the comparison report'. It was not in contest before me that two of those items were from the drugs the subject of the first charge and three of those items were from the drugs the subject of the third charge.
18 Also at the hearing before me on 27 March 2013, counsel for the applicant provided me with a forensic biology summary of laboratory findings for various bags taken from the room in the bed and breakfast in Gidgegannup.
19 I also have a criminal history for the applicant dated 2 December 2012, as at 14:47:11.
20 I note that I may, in determining this application, receive and take into account such information as I see fit 'whether or not the same would normally be admissible in a Court of law': Bail Act, s 22. The weight of such information is a distinct consideration. This allows me to receive and take into account material going beyond material the subject of an affidavit. See Lai v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASC 334 [20] - [25] (EM Heenan J).
21 There is provision in the Bail Act for verification of information from an accused by a police officer and for reference of matters more generally to a community corrections officer: Bail Act, s 24, s 24A. I will return to s 24A.
22 In the applicant's affidavit there is an indication that the applicant intends at his next disclosure committal hearing in the Magistrates Court in Perth, which I understand will be on 13 April 2013, to plead not guilty to each of the charges of the alleged offending (see [7]).
23 The applicant's affidavit also indicates that he is prepared to abide by any conditions imposed by the court in the event that bail were granted and he proposes a set of seven discrete conditions, as well as any other conditions considered appropriate (see [10]).
24 The basis for the present application is that, as I understood counsel for the applicant, there was insufficient in the answers to the questions that were possibly relevant, being cl 1(a)(i) and (ii), to prevent bail being granted. At least this was so on conditions the applicant proposed, including one proposed at the hearing on 27 February 2013, home detention bail.
25 I turn now to consider the matters from the Bail Act sch 1 pt C cl 1 read as appropriate with cl 3.
The questions in cl 1(a)(i) - (iv) read with cl 3
26 These are the questions whether, if the accused is not kept in custody he may:
• fail to appear (see cl 1(a)(i));
• commit an offence (see cl 1(a)(ii));
• endanger the safety, welfare or property of any person (see cl 1(a)(iii)); or
• interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice (see cl 1(a)(iv)).
In each case, I have had regard to the matters referred to in cl 3.
27 As to cl 1(a)(i), information before me indicates that the applicant has previously answered his bail for other alleged offending which has included prior offending similar to that which is the subject of the first and third charges, being the 2007 offence. I accept this is a factor weighing against finding a reasonable degree of risk of flight, being a risk of the kind referred to in Lewandowski v Sherman [2002] WASC 239 [62], to which counsel for the applicant referred me.
28 I should add that in my view it is not clear to me from Milenkovski that it is only risk of that kind which is capable of being of significance in a bail decision. I do not need to go further than that as it seems to me on the considerations in Lewandowski that a reasonable degree of risk, if not to the extent claimed by counsel for the state, has been shown here.
29 I should begin by indicating that I do not accept that the prior answer of bail can be put aside, as counsel for the respondent appeared to put to me, on the basis that the risk of imprisonment for the 2007 offence was significantly lower than that which the applicant faces here, given the lower quantity involved in the 2007 offence. I am of that view because of the sentencing patterns for offending of that kind, as shown by Tulloh v The Queen [2004] WASCA 169 to which my attention was drawn by counsel for the applicant.
30 At the same time there are a number of matters which weigh substantially in favour of finding a significant risk of flight as a matter of inference from the circumstances as explained in Milenkovski. These matters are ones from which an assessment can be made as indicated in Lewandowski.
31 It was not in contest before me that the applicant faces almost certain immediate imprisonment for a substantial period if convicted on the alleged charges of what is in my view, and not contested, very serious offending.
32 Further, I am satisfied that the evidence against the applicant, at least at this point, is of significant strength, if not as strong as put to me by counsel for the respondent.
33 I consider the strength is to be seen in the combination of matters as follows: the comparison report tends to show some of the drugs the subject of the third charge were from the same source and likely were handled together with some of the drugs the subject of the first charge. There are matters in the witness statement of Ms LJ indicating the applicant was one of the two guests in the room in the bed and breakfast at Gidgegannup, the other guest being the partner of the applicant. Those matters are her evidence as to the registration for the room, the applicant's payment of one instalment of rent and his departures from the room.
34 There are also three further matters requiring closer examination.
35 First, counsel for the respondent laid heavy emphasis on the note. However, there are a number of difficulties with the note which mean that, while the note has some contribution as evidence, it is not a substantial one. It is not clear to me from the text of the note that it relates to debts in connection with the drugs the subject of the first and third charges, as opposed to what may be inferred to be a series of substantial transactions of some kind. Nor is it altogether clear from the note or the circumstances of its being handed over to Ms AC that the note comes from the applicant as recording debts owed to him.
36 Secondly, counsel for the respondent also drew to my attention the evidence of Officer Sanders that scales had been found in the vehicle stopped in Midland. I understood that the reliability of this evidence is strongly contested. At the same time and at this stage of the proceedings, I believe I have been given no reason to doubt that reliability. I consider the evidence of the discovery of the scales to be a substantial contributor to the strength of the evidence against the applicant as a whole.
37 Thirdly, counsel for the state referred me to what she said was a lack of family ties the applicant had to the state and the lack of assets here to which he had ready access, given the freezing order that had been made consequent on his being declared a drug trafficker in 2008.
38 I accept the second but am unable to accept the first. The applicant's parents both live together in this state. While it appears he had been told to leave their residence some time before the time of the alleged offences, I understood that his father was prepared to act as surety for him and his parents would be providing a residence for him under the proposed residential condition and, as I further understood it, the proposed home detention condition. At the same time his partner, Ms AC, was living with the parents of the applicant.
39 I should note that counsel for the respondent also put to me, as I understood her, that an offence of breach of protective bail conditions in the applicant's criminal history tended to show he would not be restrained from flight by a bail undertaking. That was a reference to a conviction in the Perth Magistrates Court on 4 November 2008 for breach of protective bail conditions, for which the applicant received a fine of $300. I was taken to the prosecution notice which referred to two breaches, one of a condition not to drive and the other the residential condition. I was told that these matters came to light at the time when the 2008 offences were investigated.
40 However, leaving aside that for which the applicant was convicted, while I would assign some weight to that entry in the criminal record, I would not assign substantial weight to it in view of the size of the penalty - $300.
41 Turning to cl 1(a)(ii), information before me, in the form of the applicant's criminal record, indicates that over the past 10 years the applicant has committed a number of offences relating to the sale of methylamphetamine or the possession of that drug with intent to sell or supply for which he has received sentences of immediate imprisonment. He has been convicted of possession of that drug.
42 The applicant has received sentences of imprisonment for the sale or possession with intent to sell or supply firstly in 2005 and again in 2008. On that last occasion, he was sentenced on the prior drug offending the subject of the sentencing hearing on 4 November 2008 to a total term of immediate imprisonment of 3 years and 10 months, backdated to 28 February 2008, and was declared a drug trafficker as I have indicated. He was released from that term of imprisonment on or about 27 December 2011.
43 The applicant is also indicated by that criminal record to have been convicted since 2007 of a number of offences of possession of stolen or unlawfully obtained property, possession of unlicensed ammunition, possession of a prohibited weapon and possession of an explosive without a licence. Of these the only sentences of imprisonment he received were on 4 November 2008 in the Magistrates Court for two offences of possession of stolen or unlawfully obtained property, sentences of eight months and three months respectively.
44 I also note as appears from the transcript of the sentencing hearing of 4 November 2008, and was much discussed before me, that the applicant committed the two offences in 2008 the subject of that hearing while he was on bail on the 2007 offence.
45 Counsel for the respondent laid particular emphasis on that last matter as indicating that the risk of reoffending was sufficiently high that bail should be refused, at least, as I understood it, when the note was also considered against the backdrop of prior offending in relation to methylamphetamine.
46 I accept there is a significant risk of reoffending in this case, although it is an assessment that requires account to be taken of the limited character of the history of reoffending I have described while the applicant was on bail, and of the matters to do with the note to which I have previously referred.
47 Counsel for the applicant referred to what I understood was put forward as a further matter of qualification of the risk of reoffending. That, counsel for the applicant said, was the matter of the psychological condition of the applicant. This is the condition, as I understood it, described in a report of a clinical and forensic psychologist that was before the Magistrate on 26 October 2012 and was extensively referred to in the transcript of that hearing to which I had access. This report, so far as it appears from the transcript, concerned the impaired mental condition of the applicant apparently stemming from a serious motor vehicle accident in which he had sustained head injuries some years previously. According to that report, as so appears, this condition made him a very vulnerable person and, in fact, the transcript indicates that he had been seriously assaulted twice suffering from a dislocated shoulder on one occasion while he was in custody on the alleged offending.
48 Counsel for the applicant before me put that this condition made custody even more of a deterrent for the applicant than for others similarly placed but without his condition. I accept that last submission but would qualify the assessment of the deterrent it refers to by noting that my attention was not drawn to any incident in custody subsequent to that described to the magistrate on 26 October 2012. This appears to me to be a significant qualification in view of the possibilities for protection of the applicant in custody to which reference is also made in that hearing as appears from the transcript.
49 As to cl 1(a)(iii) and (iv), no argument was addressed to me on those matters by either counsel and it is not evident to me that they apply in this case. Therefore I say no more about them.
50 Turning to the question in cl 1(b), this is the question whether the accused needs to be held in custody for his own protection.
51 There is no information before me indicating that the accused has such a need and neither counsel addressed the matter. I therefore put it aside.
52 The question in cl 1(c) is whether the prosecutor has put forward grounds for opposing the grant of bail.
53 Counsel for the respondent put to me the matters I have previously referred to in relation to the questions in cl 1(a)(i) and (ii) above. There is some further evaluation of those matters I will reach shortly in connection with cl 1(e).
54 The question in cl 1(d) is whether, as regards the period when the accused is on trial, there are grounds for believing that if he is not kept in custody, the proper conduct of the trial may be prejudiced.
55 I do not see that as having an application here. That is because I read cl 1(d) as concerned with the grant of bail during a trial.
56 The question in cl 1(e) is whether there is any condition which could reasonably be imposed under the Bail Act sch 1 pt D which would sufficiently remove the possibility referred to in cl 1(a) and (d); obviate the need referred to in cl 1(b); or remove the grounds for opposition referred to in cl 1(c).
57 This takes me to the conditions proposed in the applicant's affidavit. They are:
(a) a personal undertaking in the amount of $50,000;
(b) a surety in the amount of $50,000;
(c) a residential condition;
(d) a condition to report by telephone to the officer in charge of the Midland police station as often as required;
(e) a condition to undertake urinalysis as required;
(f) a condition to surrender his passport, to which I would add, as submitted to me at the hearing on 27 March 2013, a further condition that he not apply for a passport; and
(g) a condition not to approach within 100 m of any domestic or international departure point.
In addition there is a reference in the relevant paragraph of the applicant's affidavit to 'any other conditions considered appropriate'.
58 At the hearing before me on 27 March 2013 counsel for the applicant put to me that home detention bail could be considered as appropriate in this case. This, as he reminded me, would entail before any final determination of the matter imposing such a condition, my satisfaction as to the matters in the Bail Act sch 1 pt D cl 3(2)(a) - (c). As those provisions indicate, such satisfaction cannot be attained until I have received a report from a community corrections officer about the applicant and his circumstances. As I understood counsel, I should consider requesting a report by such an officer about the suitability of the applicant to be subject to a home detention condition under the Bail Act s 24A(2) and otherwise adjourn the present hearing.
59 Counsel for the respondent took the position on the grounds for objection which I have considered in relation to cl 1(a)(i) and (ii) above, that there were no conditions which would meet the description in cl 1(e).
60 However, I disagree. In my view, although the question is a very close one, conditions of the kind proposed by the applicant, with the addition of a home detention condition and any modifications of the others as appropriate as a result of that, would meet that description. A home detention condition is one I would desire to impose within the terms of s 24A(2) of the Bail Act in view of my answers to the questions in cl 1(a)(i) and (ii) above.
61 As I understood her, counsel for the respondent was of the same view were I not to accept her primary submissions.
62 I turn then to the question in cl 1(g). This is the question: whether the alleged circumstances of the offence amount to wrongdoing of such a serious nature as to make a grant of bail inappropriate.
63 As I have indicated, it is not in doubt - it seems to me it cannot be doubted - that the alleged offending is of a very serious character. At the same time, it was not put to me that the question in cl 1(g) was of significance in this case. I say no more about it.
64 I turn then to other questions from the opening words of cl 1. There was one such question upon which counsel for the applicant laid some emphasis. That was of delay. The applicant, as I understood the matter, has been in custody since 27 September 2012 or thereabouts. As counsel for the respondent confirmed, this matter is not yet ready for committal for trial and at the next hearing in the Magistrates Court, that of 13 April 2013, it is not expected there will be any indication otherwise.
65 In bail application cases, courts have expressed concern about delays which would result in periods in custody before trial exceeding 12 months. See Ganeshamoorthy [36] where I referred to two authorities frequently cited in this connection.
66 Having regard to the period since the applicant went into custody until now, and the confirmation from counsel for the respondent referred to, I consider that a delay of that order is a significant possibility here, while on the present state of the information available to me no more than that.
67 This is a matter that weighs in favour of the grant of bail, while on the present state of information available to me not in my view, as yet, strongly so.
Conclusions
68 I turn then to my conclusions. I have now considered and answered the questions applicable in this case in the Bail Act sch 1 pt C cl 1(a) - (g) and cl 1 opening words.
69 In determining how I would exercise my discretion, I must engage in the weighing or balancing process referred to in Milenkovski.
70 However, for the reasons I have indicated in relation to the question in the Bail Act sch 1 pt C cl 1(e), I cannot yet reach a final determination as to the exercise of that discretion without the benefit of the report which I may request under s 24A(2) for the purposes of sch 1 pt D cl 3(2)(a).
71 Accordingly I consider it is appropriate to adjourn the present hearing until I have had the benefit of such a report and I would make orders accordingly.
72 I will hear from the parties now as to the orders I should make in view of those conclusions.
0
6
4