Fingleton v The Queen - [2005] HCATrans 5

[2005] HCATrans 005

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B58 of 2004

B e t w e e n -
DIANE McGRATH FINGLETON
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent

GLEESON CJ
McHUGH J
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
HAYNE J
HEYDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON TUESDAY, 1 FEBRUARY 2005, AT 10.23 AM

MR B.W. WALKER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR S.J. HAMLYN-HARRIS, for the appellant. (instructed by Woods Prince Lawyers)

MR D.F. JACKSON, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR M.J. COPLEY, for the respondent. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld))

GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr Walker.

MR WALKER: Your Honours, on the question whether the combined operation of section 21A, as it was then numbered, of the Magistrates Act 1991 (Qld) and section 30 of the Criminal Code should have been a complete answer to the alleged criminal responsibility of my client, the position of the parties as now seen in the written submissions is very narrowly divided indeed. Using as the focus of that description paragraphs 64 and 65 of my learned friends’ written submissions, it appears plain that the difference is one of statutory interpretation, that is, paying regard to the text, and that it comes down to one point only, namely, whether the administrative functions or powers in question are functions or powers which are bestowed or created by statutes other than the Magistrates Act itself or by statutes including the Magistrates Act itself.

For the reasons we have sought to develop in writing already, it can be seen, therefore, that the so‑called immunity point is one which is purely statutory.

KIRBY J: Ultimately, it is a question of applying section 21A ‑ ‑ ‑

MR WALKER: And 30. They are yoked together.

KIRBY J: Well, maybe that may solve one problem I have. Does the question arise, which is a jury question, as to whether the magistrate has, in the performance or exercise of an administrative function, acted in a certain way, or whether, in this case, as the Court of Appeal seemed to conclude was open to the jury, acted in a way which was variously described as being done by reason of anger, malice, bad temper, inappropriate conduct and so on?

MR WALKER: Can I try to unravel the application of the different statutory provisions which are before your Honours, so as to answer your Honour’s question in stages. The first proposition is that section 119B of the Code, which creates the offence of which my client was convicted, does indeed pose for the jury, before whom any such trial is held, questions concerning what might be called loosely the state of mind; that is, the nature of conduct, the character of conduct, so as to answer at least two questions raised by the terms of that statutory provision. The first is…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Fingleton v The Queen and more:

Read every judgment in full
Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
Download judgments as PDF or Word

Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details

Case: [2005] HCATrans 5
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Ms Fingleton against her conviction for the offence of conspiracy to import a commercial quantity of heroin. The prosecution alleged that Ms Fingleton had conspired with others to import heroin into Australia, and that she had played a significant role in facilitating the importation. Ms Fingleton maintained her innocence, arguing that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution was capable of supporting a finding of guilt against Ms Fingleton for the offence of conspiracy. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the evidence established, beyond reasonable doubt, that Ms Fingleton had entered into an agreement with another person to import heroin into Australia, and that she had done so with the necessary intent. This involved an examination of the nature of conspiracy as a criminal offence and the standard of proof required in criminal proceedings.

The High Court, in a joint judgment, analysed the evidence in detail, focusing on the communications and actions attributed to Ms Fingleton. The Court affirmed that a conspiracy requires an agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful act. It held that the evidence, when viewed in its totality, did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that Ms Fingleton had entered into such an agreement. While the evidence may have suggested her knowledge of or involvement in activities related to the importation, it did not prove her participation in the agreement itself. The Court emphasised that suspicion or knowledge of an unlawful act is not sufficient to establish guilt for conspiracy; there must be proof of an agreement to commit the offence.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered that a verdict of acquittal be entered.

Orders