[2010] HCATrans 224
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M5 of 2010
B e t w e e n -
ALAN MICHAEL FINCH
Applicant
and
TELSTRA SUPER PTY LTD (ACN 007 422 522)
Respondent
FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW J
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J
BELL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 2 SEPTEMBER 2010, AT 10.00 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR J.P. BRETT: May it please the Court, I appear on behalf of the applicant with my learned friend, MS M.C. WALL. (instructed by Arnold Thomas & Becker)
MR A.G. UREN, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear for the respondent with my learned friend, MR R.J. HARRIS. (instructed by Freehills)
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Brett.
MR BRETT: If I can deal first with the construction question, your Honours; that is how it has been dealt with through the written submissions as the first issue. There are alternative constructions proposed. The trustee has put in argument that the reference in clause 2.3.3 that requires ‑ ‑ ‑
GUMMOW J: You had better take us to the actual text, I think; we do not have it all in our heads.
MR BRETT: I am sorry, your Honour.
FRENCH CJ: Page 94 of the application book.
CRENNAN J: Pages 90 onwards contain a lot of relevant sections.
MR BRETT: Yes, your Honour, I apologise. The two significant clauses, your Honours, are clause 2.3.3 which relevantly requires that:
Subject to part 2.4 and division 4, if a Member ceases to be an Employee during a period of Division 2 Membership because of Total and Permanent Invalidity, there is payable to the Member from the Fund a lump sum benefit –
and then the balance of the clause is not relevant to this purpose. At application book 92, “Total and Permanent Invalidity” is defined:
“Total and Permanent Invalidity” means, in relation to a Member, disablement as a result of which –
(a)unless otherwise agreed between the Trustee and the Principal Employer from time to time either generally or in any particular case, the Member has been continuously absent from all active Work for a period of at least six months and has been required by the Employer to participate in a Rehabilitation Programme –
If I could just interpolate, there is no issue in this case that the applicant was required to and did participate in a rehabilitation program –
(b)in the opinion of the Trustee after consideration of any information, evidence and advice provided to the Trustee by the Employer and any other information, evidence and advice the Trustee may consider relevant, the Member has ceased to be an Employee and is unlikely ever to engage in any gainful Work for which the Member is for the time being reasonably qualified by education, training or experience –
There are then two provisos. The first effectively is that if there is deliberate intentional disability for the purpose of obtaining the…
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- Case
- [2010] HCATrans 224
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the nomination made by the deceased member was a valid and binding direction to the trustee regarding the distribution of his death benefit, or whether it was merely an expression of preference that left the ultimate decision to the trustee's discretion. This required the Court to consider the nature of death benefit nominations under the relevant superannuation legislation and the terms of the superannuation fund's trust deed.
The High Court held that the nomination made by the deceased was not a binding direction. The Court reasoned that the superannuation legislation and the trust deed conferred a discretion upon the trustee to determine the beneficiaries of death benefits. While a nomination could inform the trustee's decision, it did not fetter their discretion to consider other factors or to make a different distribution if they considered it appropriate. The Court emphasised that the trustee's primary duty was to act in accordance with the trust deed and the governing legislation, which included the power to exercise their discretion in distributing death benefits.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trustee's decision to pay the death benefit to the deceased's estate.
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