Finch and Shibo (No 4)
[2016] FamCAFC 242
•30 November 2016
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| FINCH & SHIBO (NO. 4) | [2016] FamCAFC 242 |
| FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – CHILDREN – APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE APPLICATION – Where the trial judge considered the medical evidence relied upon by the appellant but found that it was not new – Where the trial judge afforded adequate weight to this evidence – Where there was nothing arising from this evidence which justified further litigation – Where there was no error in the trial judge’s determination that there was not a change of circumstances sufficient to allow the parenting issues to be relitigated – Where the appellant’s complaints lack specificity – Where the appellant failed to satisfy the test for apprehended bias – Where there was no evidence demonstrating actual bias – Where it is not open to the appellant to assert that the trial judge erred in not disqualifying himself in circumstances where the appellant did not ultimately seek this order – Where the trial judge was not bound to act upon the appellant’s allegations of perjury against the respondent – Appeal dismissed. FAMILY LAW – APPLICATION IN AN APPEAL – ADDUCE FURTHER EVIDENCE – Where the appellant raises no basis for the court to receive the further evidence – Where the further evidence does not demonstrate error by the trial judge – Application dismissed. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) |
| CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 Gronow v Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513 Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 Rice and Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725 |
| APPELLANT: | Mr Finch |
| RESPONDENT: | Ms Shibo |
| FILE NUMBER: | BRC | 2788 | of | 2009 |
| APPEAL NUMBER: | NA | 67 | of | 2016 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 30 November 2016 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Adelaide |
| PLACE HEARD: | Perth |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Bryant CJ, Thackray and Strickland JJ |
| HEARING DATE: | 23 November 2016 |
| LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: | Family Court of Australia |
| LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE: | 22 September 2016 |
| LOWER COURT MNC: | [2016] FamCA 806 |
REPRESENTATION
| THE APPELLANT: | In person via telephone |
| THE RESPONDENT: | No appearance (heard on ex parte basis) |
Orders
The application in an appeal filed on 7 November 2016 be dismissed.
The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Finch & Shibo (No 4) has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
| THE FULL COURT OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PERTH |
Appeal Number: NA 67 of 2016
File Number: BRC 2788 of 2009
| Mr Finch |
Appellant
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
By Notice of Appeal filed on 27 September 2016 Mr Finch (“the father”) seeks leave to appeal, and if leave is granted, to appeal against an order made by Forrest J on 22 September 2016 dismissing his Application in a Case filed on 6 September 2016. In that application the father sought leave to file an Initiating Application seeking parenting orders, an injunction restraining each of the parents from commencing proceedings for a family protection order in the State Magistrates Court, and an order that his application be heard by a judge other than Forrest J.
On 7 March 2013 Forrest J made an order restraining the father from commencing any proceedings seeking parenting orders in respect of K (“the child”) without obtaining leave of the Court. Orders were also made that any application the father filed in which he sought leave to commence parenting proceedings was not to be served on the mother and was to be dealt with initially on an ex parte basis. Thus, the hearing before Forrest J in relation to the father’s application proceeded on an ex parte basis, as did the appeal before us.
By Application in an Appeal and supporting affidavit filed on 7 November 2016 the father seeks to adduce further evidence in the appeal being the “unedited” audio recordings of his hearings before Forrest J on 26 September 2012, 28 October 2014, 13 and 14 August 2015 and 20 September 2016 which he seeks “be admitted into Evidence in their full entirety as part of NA67/2016”. The father also seeks that Auscript certify under oath that the recordings are unedited. The father states that the purpose of these orders is to “show comments made by Forrest J that give rise for Forrest J to show Cause via a Writ Of Mandamus to the High Court of Australia and the eventual removal from office”. In his supporting affidavit the father asserts the particulars of his complaints against Forrest J and Auscript. We will deal with this application later in these reasons.
Background
The father and Ms Shibo (“the mother”) are the parents of the child.
On 22 November 2011 consent orders were made which provided for the child to live with the mother and spend time with the father on each alternate weekend from Friday afternoon to Sunday afternoon, and set out the handover arrangements for such time. At the time the consent orders were made, both parents were represented by counsel and an Independent Children’s Lawyer had been appointed.
The father filed an Amended Initiating Application in August 2012 pursuant to which he sought to change the consent orders. This application was dismissed on 7 March 2013 and the father was restrained from commencing further parenting proceedings without leave.
The father was granted leave to file a fresh Initiating Application in 2014 restricted to three issues, namely, the location of handovers, telephone communication between the father and child, and the mother’s overseas travel with the child. Another ICL was appointed to the proceedings for this purpose and the trial was heard in 2015.
Before judgment was delivered, the 2011 consent orders had to be varied because of the unwillingness of the Suburb B Children’s Contact Centre to continue to engage with the family, and particularly the father, any longer.
Judgment in relation to the fresh Initiating Application was delivered on 21 August 2015. The orders made by the trial judge discharged all previous parenting orders and replaced them with a new set of orders. The new orders provided that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the child, and that the child live with the mother and spend time with the father during the school holidays. Changeovers were to occur at Suburb M State School. Importantly, the trial judge recorded that the order for time to be spent only during the school holidays was sought by the father at the conclusion of the trial.
The father appealed the orders made by the trial judge. This appeal was dismissed by the Full Court on 24 June 2016.
The father then filed an Application in a Case and supporting affidavit on 6 September 2016 seeking leave to file a fresh Initiating Application and in effect that Forrest J disqualify himself. Pursuant to the orders of 7 March 2013, this application was initially considered by Forrest J in chambers and his Honour made directions that it be heard on an ex parte basis on 20 September 2016.
It is instructive to set out in full the content of the affidavit filed by the father on 6 September 2016 in support of the application, namely:
1.Critical NEW evidence attached to the Initiating Application within the supporting Affidavit shows that the Respondent mother and the Hon Justice Forerst has brought the Family Court of Australia into serious error , FCoA orders given on the 28th October 2014 and 21 August 2015 show that serious Disability Discrimination, procedural Unfairness has occurred against the applicant by the Hon Justice Forrest.
2.The exibits within the initiating application affidavit clearly shows thru NEW never seen before evidence that substanciates the applicants previously mentioned severe medical conditions that have been disgarded by the Hon Justice Forrest which shows Procedural unfairness and illegal Disability Discrimination against the applicant.
3.Further to the Disability Discrimination the respondent mother has committed Perjury to gain benefit from the Family Court of Australia, the applicant has within the initiating application affidavit exhibits produce affidavit by the applicants adult daughter that has never been seen within the FCoA and other exhibits attached the initiating Affidavit to confirm that the respondent mother has lied whilst under oath and within filed documents that have been before the Hon Justice Forrest.
3A.the respondent mother has fabricated stories and pleaded under Oath stories before The Hon Justice Forrest on numerous occassions to gain benefit from the Family court of Australia against the applicant.
4.within the initiating Application Affidavit other exhibits clearly show that the Family Court of Australia and The Hon Justice Forerst has judged the applicant wrongly and produced orders that are totally frustreated and in the favor of the respondent mother and bnot in the best interets of the child.
5.the respondent mother has atempted to gain a contract to kill the applicant and within the Initiating application affidavit exhibit is a Domestic Violence Protection order that shows the applicant being the aggrieved.
6.The family court of Australia Current court orders are seriously Frustrated and in serious error being relied on information from the respondent mother that is false and unconscionable and not in the best interets of the child.
7.the initiating application needs to be filed and for the respondent mother to Show Cause and the the orders sought are in the best interests of the child.
(Errors as in original)
The Initiating Application and the affidavit in support sought to be filed by the father were provided to the trial judge, and his Honour had regard to them. In the application the father sought the discharge of the parenting orders made on 21 August 2015 and the reinstatement of the orders made on 22 November 2011, save and except as to the place of handover.
The Trial Judge’s Reasons for Judgment
Forrest J commenced his reasons for judgment by setting out the procedural history of the matter and summarising the application before him. His Honour then turned to the evidence contained in, and annexed to the father’s draft affidavit, and the submissions made by him in relation to this evidence.
His Honour considered the evidence of Dr L, a psychiatrist, and Dr S, a clinical psychologist, who were both engaged for the purpose of providing evidence about the father’s mental health in relation to the father’s District Court proceedings. These proceedings involved the father being charged with stalking the female barrister who had represented the mother in her family law proceedings, and subsequently pleading guilty to the charge. The psychiatrist and psychologist reported in relation to the father’s post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar affective disorder and agoraphobia. His Honour noted that the father placed great weight on this “new” evidence in support of his application for leave to file a fresh Initiating Application, particularly the evidence of the father’s agoraphobia. The father relied upon this evidence to show that the existing orders were “unfair” as they required “him to drive a distance that he asserted was 80kms each way (160 kms per trip) at the commencement and the conclusion of the time the child spends with him in the school holidays” (at [19]).
In relation to this evidence and the father’s submissions as to it, his Honour explained that the evidence of the father’s agoraphobia was “not ‘new’”. His Honour then detailed the evidence about the father’s agoraphobia that was before him at the time he made the August 2015 orders. His Honour noted that “the diagnosis of agoraphobia seems … to be based most particularly on the self-reporting of the father to the report writers of his experiences and feelings” which “without more than what the father has told them” appears to be accepted by the report writers.
In contrast, his Honour referred to the evidence of Dr Q, the single expert psychiatrist in the family law proceedings, and noted Dr Q’s opinion that the diagnosis of agoraphobia would be supported if the father’s self-reporting and symptoms were “accepted as true” (emphasis omitted). However, Dr Q also considered that there was “considerable scope for improvement in the father’s symptoms of agoraphobia with appropriate pharmacological and psychological therapy that would improve his functioning and his ability to drive distances”. This was not mentioned by the report writers engaged in the District Court process.
His Honour also referred to the 2011 consent orders, and explained that it was significant that in making these orders the father “agreed to drive to [Suburb M] at the commencement of every second weekend of that time that the child was to spend with him”, which he did until the Children’s Contact Centre terminated its involvement with the family due to his behaviour. His Honour noted that it was “[o]nly after that [that] the issue of difficulty with driving [seemed] to emerge”, originally in the context of an old shoulder injury and his “anxiety” (at [21]). Then, when the orders were changed by necessity, and required the father to drive both ways to Suburb M to collect and return the child, the father “began to tell the Court that he could not drive that far because he suffered panic attacks”. Thus, he argued that the court orders “effectively prevented his daughter from spending any time with him as he would not drive up to [Suburb M] to get her or to return her” (at [22]).
Despite the father’s assertions in this regard, his Honour noted that up to 2015 the father had on at least two occasions demonstrated his ability to drive to Suburb M for the purpose of picking up and returning the child. Therefore, though his Honour was aware of the father’s contentions about his agoraphobia, he made the orders he considered were in the best interests of the child and was satisfied the father could meet these orders whether he was to drive or someone else was.
Indeed, his Honour recorded that at the hearing before him on 20 September 2016 the father conceded that the child had spent all ordered school holiday time with him and he had “gone to [Suburb M] to collect her and to return her there on all but one of the return journeys”, in which instance his friend and neighbour took the child back (at [24]).
His Honour then turned to the father’s complaints about the order granting liberty to the mother to apply to discharge the orders in the event that the father fails to collect the child for two consecutive visits. His Honour explained that he considered this was a “good provision, if it assists in motivating the father to ensure he does not miss having the child with him” (at [25]).
His Honour then said:
26.I am not persuaded by the father’s evidence or his submissions or any of the other things he said during his oral submissions on Tuesday morning that there is sufficient grounds to allow him to again seek to vary the existing orders, particularly in respect of the handover location. I accept that he loves his daughter and is very fond of her and cherishes the time he gets with her. I am quite satisfied that he will continue to ensure, one way or another, that he collects her and has her with him for the time that she is to spend with him pursuant to the existing orders. I will not give him leave to seek to change the handover location or any of the other existing orders yet again. The latest reports of the psychiatrist and the psychologist do not cause me to consider it appropriate to allow the matter to be litigated again.
27.It also became obvious from the father’s submissions, though not from his written material, that if he is given leave to file a fresh Initiating Application he would seek to again obtain alternate weekend time with his daughter.
28.Nothing the father put before me or said to me in his submissions today causes me to consider that the frequency or duration of the time the child spends with him should again be litigated so soon after it was finally determined for the second time in four years, particularly after the father had told the Court just to make the orders for her to spend time with him in the holidays. Nothing I have read or heard today causes me to move from the view that at this point in her young life, the child needs the maintenance of stability and predictability and respite from the constant conflict that her father subjects her mother to when he is unrestrained by this Court or the State courts. In my judgment, holiday contact only remains in the child’s best interests. The father agreed with that last year. I am not persuaded to let him try to change that again now.
In relation to the order sought by the father for an injunction restraining either parent from making an application for a family protection order, his Honour considered there was nothing which persuaded him that such order ought to be litigated. This was particularly so in circumstances where the father agreed that he consents to the mother’s family violence protection orders without admission and where the father’s application for an order as the aggrieved party against the mother was dismissed because the father was out of the country. Thus, his Honour opined that the information before him, and his knowledge of the case and its history, informed him “that an application for an injunction as now sought to be litigated by the father is inappropriate, unnecessary and could not be justified” (at [29]).
Similarly, his Honour considered that the order preventing the father from filing any parenting application without leave remained justified. His Honour referred to the application before him as proof of that. Whilst his Honour again accepted that the father loves the child and wishes to improve his relationship with her, he considered that the father would do well to follow the recommendations of the medical professionals in the matter and to “concentrate on spending the time with his daughter that the existing orders provide and enjoying that and ensuring that it is enjoyable for his daughter” before she gets to an age where her views as to her father may become relevant (at [30]).
Finally, in relation to the application for disqualification, his Honour noted that this application was abandoned by the father at the hearing on 20 September 2016, but indicated that he would not have made such an order anyway as the father had “not demonstrated any proper grounds upon which [he] should recuse [himself] from hearing his matters” (at [31]).
Thus, his Honour refused the father leave to file the fresh Initiating Application.
Leave to appeal
In support of his application for leave the father relied on the following matters, describing them as “GROUNDS OF APPEAL”:
1.That in making the order for sole parental responsibility the trial judge erred in that he:
(a)Made such order apparently to avoid a consideration of the factors in section 65DAA of the Family Law Act;
(b)Made such order in circumstances where there was no evidence before him of an inability of the parties to reach agreement concerning the major long term matters concerning the child;
(c)Failed to consider additional orders that might assist the parties to communicate and reach agreement whilst maintaining the orders for equal shared parental responsibility to which they had earlier consented.
2.That in confining the time spent by the father with the child during the Queensland state school holidays to periods of 4 consecutive nights each, the trial judge erred in that he:
(a)Failed to consider the nature of the relationship between the child and her father;
(b) Failed to make the orders in the best interests of the child;
(c)Failed to take into account any medical Condition that the Applicant has to that causes significant concerns for the Applicant and the Applicants daughter and or the citizens of Australia that may or might be present on the roads when the applicant suffers a medical episode to drive to the access location;
(d)Made such restrictive orders in the absence of any evidence which supported such orders;
(e)Had no or very selective regard to the evidence of the Psychiatrist engaged by the Independent Child’s Lawyer;
(f)The ICL’s medical specialist is now subject to a pending Federal Court of Australia Civil action regarding the errors and admissions made within the medical report that are false, that was handed into the Family Court of Australia at a previous hearing before Forrest J;
(g)Had no or very selective regard to the evidence of Dr [S] dated 11 July 2016;
(h)Had no or selective regard to evidence of Dr [L], treating Psychiatrist dated 11 July 2016;
(i)Disregarded confirmed medical conditions that the applicant has been diagnosed with;
(j)Acted in a personal and deliberate way to cause detriment towards the applicant at all and every opportunity;
(k)Has and is punishing the applicant to undertake restrictive access without any evidence to give cause;
(l)Had NO Duty of Care towards the Applicant or the applicants daughter;
(m)He Compiled a reasons of judgment on the 22 September 2016 that is totally flawed with serious errors that he was made aware of and still decided to publish and relied on false information previously involved in the matter which totally shows that He was not giving the applicant procedural fairness was not looking at the current matter before him as being “NEW”;
(n)Acted in a deliberate way and was deliberate to use comments made on the 20th September 2016 out of context that are within the transcript;
(o)Acted in a Medical capacity that the He has NO Qualifications to act as such;
(p)Forcing the applicant to travel approx. 320 Klms to exercise pick up and drop off access whilst the respondent Mother travels approx. 16 Klms;
(q)Abused Limited power to cause deliberate detriment to the applicant at all chances and opportunities with nil conscience to the applicant and The applicants daughter;
(r)Has accepted the acts of Perjury committed by the respondent mother and the filing of false wrongful pleadings by the respondent mother without any conscience;
(s)Made personal comments to the applicant regarding access that are not warranted;
(t)Stated that he was just off of three month holiday and that he was more relaxed which gives cause to previous judgments and orders that Forrest J has delivered to the applicant as being deliberate and delivered under duress and stress of his position, Malfeasance of Public Office is evident as is personal.
(Errors as in original)
As can be seen, the father complains of error by the trial judge in making the orders for sole parental responsibility and for the time the child spends with the father. However, those orders were made on 21 August 2015, and not on 22 September 2016, and thus the matters raised cannot be a basis for granting leave to appeal against the latter order. Further, and crucially, the orders of 21 August 2015 were the subject of an appeal to the Full Court, which appeal was dismissed.
In a similar vein, the father’s first ground of appeal, in the event leave is granted, asserts error in making the order providing for the time the child spends with the father, namely, not the order the subject of the appeal.
Despite these failings, and the failure by the father to engage with any recognised test for the granting of leave to appeal, including in his written summary of argument, it is apparent that the main complaints that the father has about the order made by his Honour are:
a)His Honour failed to afford adequate weight to the new medical evidence that the father sought to rely upon.
b)His Honour failed to afford the father procedural fairness in his treatment of the new medical evidence.
c)His Honour discriminated against the father because of his disabilities.
d)His Honour was biased towards the father and failed to disqualify himself.
e)His Honour failed to take into account the perjury committed by the mother in previously presenting false evidence to the court.
Addressing each of these issues in turn:
a)As can be seen his Honour considered the further medical evidence relied upon by the father, but found that when compared with the evidence that had been before the court previously, it could not be described as “new evidence”. In particular, there was nothing arising from that evidence which would cause his Honour to find that it was appropriate to allow further litigation in relation to the child.
Indeed, that highlights that the principle underpinning his Honour’s refusal to grant leave, is the principle emanating from the Full Court decision of Rice and Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725, namely before permitting parenting orders to be re-litigated a court must be satisfied that there are changed circumstances which require the court to consider afresh how the best interests of the child the subject of the orders should be served. Plainly here, his Honour did not consider that there were such changed circumstances, and we are not persuaded that his Honour erred in this regard.
As to whether his Honour afforded adequate weight to the further medical evidence, it is notoriously difficult for an appellant to succeed in making such a challenge, and we need go no further than refer to the oft-quoted passage by Stephen J in Gronow v Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513 at 519 – 20:
The constant emphasis of the cases is that before reversal an appellate court must be well satisfied that the primary judge was plainly wrong, his decision being no proper exercise of his judicial discretion. While authority teaches that error in the proper weight to be given to particular matters may justify reversal on appeal, it is also well established that it is never enough that an appellate court, left to itself, would have arrived at a different conclusion. When no error of law or mistake of fact is present, to arrive at a different conclusion which does not of itself justify reversal can be due to little else but a difference of view as to weight: it follows that disagreement only on matters of weight by no means necessarily justifies a reversal of the trial judge. Because of this and because the assessment of weight is particularly liable to be affected by seeing and hearing the parties, which only the trial judge can do, an appellate court should be slow to overturn a primary judge's discretionary decision on grounds which only involve conflicting assessments of matters of weight.
In this case it is unclear how the father says his Honour has erred in his consideration of this evidence. No error of law or fact has been established, and it cannot be said that his Honour was “plainly wrong, his decision being no proper exercise of his judicial discretion”. The highest the complaint can be put is that his Honour had no qualification to assess the medical evidence. However, his Honour did not need to have medical qualifications to determine whether the evidence could be considered new when compared with the evidence previously before the court.
In these circumstances this complaint must fail.
b)This complaint can be readily dealt with, in that nowhere does the father set out a basis for suggesting that he was not afforded procedural fairness. His Honour had regard to the father’s medical evidence, received oral submissions from the father about it, compared it with the evidence previously before the court, and then arrived at his conclusion.
Again, this complaint must fail.
c)This complaint can similarly be dealt with readily. It smacks of nothing more than the father saying that the trial judge should have found in his favour and granted leave. No basis is demonstrated for this court to find that his Honour discriminated against the father because of his disabilities.
d)The test for apprehended bias, including a claim of pre-judgment, is well settled, namely, “whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide” (Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 at 492).
Here, this test has clearly not been satisfied, and nor has the two-step process identified by the High Court in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [8] been satisfied. There is no “identification of what it is said might [have led the trial judge] … to decide [the] case other than on its legal and factual merits”. There is also no “articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits”.
However, if the complaint is of actual bias by the trial judge, rather than apprehended bias, we are also not persuaded that such a claim is made out by the father. There is nothing in the appeal record which demonstrates that the trial judge is biased against the father, and the basis of the claim is plainly nothing more than the father’s own subjective view fuelled by his disagreement with the decision made by the trial judge.
As to the failure by the trial judge to disqualify himself, that misrepresents what in fact happened before the trial judge, and the accurate position is as set out in his Honour’s reasons at [31] as follows:
In conclusion, as for the proposed order sought by the father for another Judge other than me to hear the proceedings should leave be granted for him to commence them, the father told the Court today that he reconsidered that issue, as he felt I was treating him more fairly today than in the past. Of course, I told him that I considered I was treating no more fairly than I always do, but even if I had granted leave for him to file his proposed Application Initiating Proceedings, whether he had changed his position or not, I would not have made an order that another judge hear it. In my judgment, the father has not demonstrated any proper grounds upon which I should recuse myself from hearing his matters. Unless he can do that, I will not order that another Judge must hear any applications he makes.
This complaint must also fail.
e)It is a serious allegation to make that a party has committed perjury by the presentation of false evidence to a court, and as such it must be the subject of strict proof. The basis of this allegation is to be found in the father’s documents, and although he says that an affidavit of his adult daughter and “other exhibits … confirm that the [mother] has lied whilst under oath and within filed documents that have been before [the trial judge]”, that does not make it so. His Honour was not bound to act on this assertion, and we can find no error by his Honour in this regard.
In the circumstances, this complaint must also fail.
Application in an appeal
As can be seen, the father does not raise anything in the matters in support of his application for leave, in his grounds of appeal, or in his written summary of argument addressing any discrepancy between the transcript and the audio recording of the hearing before the trial judge, and therefore there is no basis for this court to receive this further evidence. In addition, we can see nothing in the application, or the evidence sought to be adduced, which enlivens the principles for the receipt of further evidence set out in the High Court decision of CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172. Importantly, the further evidence cannot demonstrate error by the trial judge. Thus, we would dismiss this application.
Conclusion
Given that we have found no merit in any of the complaints raised by the father we propose to dismiss his application for leave to appeal. It fails on the application of any recognised test for the granting of leave to appeal.
I certify that the preceding thirty-three (33) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Full Court (Bryant CJ, Thackray and Strickland JJ) delivered on 30 November 2016.
Associate:
Date: 30 November 2016
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