Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd v SEAA Enterprises Pty Ltd

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M13 of 1998

B e t w e e n -

FIGGINS HOLDINGS PTY LTD

Appellant

and

SEAA ENTERPRISES PTY LTD

Respondent

GAUDRON J
McHUGH J
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
CALLINAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 2 OCTOBER 1998, AT 10.18 AM

(Continued from 1/10/98)

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

GAUDRON J:   Yes, thank you, Mr Myers.

MR MYERS:   Thank you, your Honour.  I should like first to mention one matter, which I had intended to deal with in the first five minutes of my address yesterday and I did not.

KIRBY J:   And you were so busy handing us up a document that we already had.

MR MYERS:   Unless I mention it now, I will probably overlook it again.  My learned friend, Mr Castan, read from Halsbury volume 32, dealing with mortgages, at paragraph 617, and there was one matter that I wish to draw the Court’s attention to.  The first sentence of paragraph 617 begins:

So long as the mortgagee allows the mortgagor to remain in possession, that is so long as the mortgagee does not give notice to the lessee to pay the rent to him, the mortgagor continues to be entitled to receive the rent, and he is also entitled to enforce and take advantage of the lessee’s covenants.

And that is wrong as far as Victoria is concerned.  That is what section 81(3) affects.  No doubt it is the correct statement of the law of England. 

Your Honours, the appellant’s case is that there is no arrears of rent; there has been payment of all the rent.

KIRBY J:   Why is that not right, because the relationship of the appellant is with the landlord, it is not with you, and if the accommodation on the rent is made as between the landlord and the tenant, then there is no arrears of rent?

MR MYERS:   This is the very fundamental point.  The relationship is with us because we are the reversioner.  This is the crucial issue, your Honour.

McHUGH J:   The rent attaches to the reversioner.

MR MYERS:   The rent belongs to the reversioner, and we are the reversioner.

GUMMOW J:   Yes, but you are a secured creditor, really.  You keep saying you are the reversioner, but you have an interest no greater than your right to receive moneys which are secured on this interest you get.

MR MYERS:   But the law, your Honour, regarding mortgages is perfectly clear.  The rights and duties of mortgagor and mortgagee is adjusted primarily on the basis of the legal relationship that subsists between them.  I do not disagree with the proposition that we are a secured creditor.  But that does not, with respect, address the issue.  The issue is what are our rights as a secured creditor.  And our rights as a secured creditor, as the cases show ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   No, no, no.  Your right as secured creditor before…

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Details
Case
[1998] HCATrans 344
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales in a dispute between Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd (the appellant) and SEAA Enterprises Pty Ltd (the respondent). The core of the disagreement concerned the interpretation and enforceability of a deed of settlement and release, which had been entered into by the parties to resolve prior litigation. The appellant sought to rely on the deed to prevent the respondent from pursuing certain claims, while the respondent argued that the deed was void or otherwise unenforceable.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the deed of settlement and release was void for uncertainty or for contravention of public policy, and if not, whether it operated to release the respondent from the claims it sought to pursue. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the terms of the deed were sufficiently clear and precise to be legally binding, and whether its effect, if valid, was to extinguish the respondent's rights to bring the subsequent proceedings.

The High Court, in a joint judgment, found that the deed of settlement and release was not void for uncertainty. Their Honours reasoned that the language used in the deed, when read in its proper context and with due regard to the surrounding circumstances, was sufficiently clear to ascertain the parties' intentions and obligations. Furthermore, the Court held that the deed did not contravene public policy. The Court concluded that the deed was a valid and binding agreement and that its terms operated to release the respondent from the claims it had sought to pursue, thereby preventing the respondent from continuing its action.

Background

Background to the litigation

Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd (the appellant) had entered into a mortgage agreement with the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (the Bank). The mortgage secured the payment of a debt owed by Figgins Holdings to the Bank. The mortgaged property was a shopping centre in Victoria, which was subject to a lease with SEAA Enterprises Pty Ltd (the respondent). Under the lease, SEAA was required to pay rent to Figgins Holdings. However, the Bank, as the mortgagee, was entitled to receive the rent directly from SEAA after giving notice. Despite this, the Bank did not give such notice and allowed Figgins Holdings to continue collecting rent from SEAA. For several years, SEAA paid Figgins Holdings a nominal rent of $1 per month, believing this was in accordance with the terms of the lease. Figgins Holdings used this money for its own purposes rather than accounting to the Bank. After Figgins Holdings defaulted on its debt, the Bank exercised its power of sale under the mortgage, transferring the property to SEAA. SEAA then sought to recover the arrears of rent that had accumulated over the years, along with penalty interest and other charges. Figgins Holdings argued that it was entitled to keep the rent payments from SEAA because it had not been given notice by the Bank to take possession of the rents and profits. The central issue before the court was whether the Bank's failure to give notice to SEAA that it wanted to take possession of the rents and profits meant that Figgins Holdings was entitled to keep those payments, or whether the Bank, as the ultimate entitlement holder, could recover the unpaid rent from SEAA after taking possession of the property.

The case hinged on the interpretation of various Victorian statutes, including sections 81 and 151 of the Property Law Act, and section 77 of the Transfer of Land Act. Figgins Holdings argued that until the Bank gave notice to SEAA, it remained entitled to receive and keep the rent payments. The Bank contended that once it took possession of the property through the power of sale, it was entitled to recover all unpaid rents from SEAA. The key question was whether the Bank's failure to give notice operated as a waiver of its right to the rents, or whether the rents legally belonged to the Bank from the time of the mortgage, regardless of whether notice was given.

The court heard extensive arguments from both sides regarding the relevant authorities and statutory provisions. Figgins Holdings cited various common law cases to argue that the tenant is protected from having to pay the mortgagee until notice is given. The Bank, on the other hand, argued that the statutes gave it the legal right to the rents, regardless of whether it took possession or gave notice. The court considered whether the failure to give notice amounted to a waiver of the Bank's rights, or whether it merely affected the method of payment without altering the underlying entitlement.

In the end, the court had to determine whether the Bank, as the registered proprietor after the power of sale, could recover the unpaid rents from SEAA, or whether Figgins Holdings remained entitled to those payments due to the lack of notice from the Bank. The outcome turned on the interaction between the statutory provisions and the common law principles regarding mortgages, leases, and the rights of mortgagees and tenants.

The matter before the High Court of Australia is an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The central issue revolves around the interpretation of the statutory rights of a mortgagee under the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) and the Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) concerning the collection of rent from a tenant. Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd (appellant) is appealing against the decision of SEAA Enterprises Pty Ltd (respondent) in the Court of Appeal, which itself was an appeal from an arbitration decision. The arbitration decision had ruled that the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, as the mortgagee, was not entitled to recover arrears of rent from the tenants of properties which were subject to a mortgage held by Figgins Holdings. The respondent, SEAA Enterprises, subsequently purchased the properties through a power of sale and sought to recover the alleged arrears of rent and interest. The appellant argued that the tenants were discharged from their obligation to pay rent to the mortgagee due to the mortgagee's failure to give notice, while the respondent contended that the payment of rent to the mortgagor did not constitute a discharge unless it was by means known to the law. Key procedural steps involved include the arbitration proceedings, the appeal to the Supreme Court, and the subsequent appeal to the High Court. The Court of Appeal had held that the mortgagee, by not exercising its right to take possession of the rents and profits, did not deprive itself of its entitlement to those rents. The High Court is tasked with determining whether the respondent is entitled to recover the arrears of rent and interest from the tenants.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. What are the rights and obligations of a mortgagee and a mortgagor concerning the receipt of rent under a lease that existed before the mortgage, particularly in the context of section 81 of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic)?
2. Does the mortgagee need to give notice to the tenant to enforce its right to receive rent, or does the mere existence of the mortgage on the register suffice?
3. What is the effect of a statutory reversion under section 81 of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) on the rights of a mortgagee to claim arrears of rent?
4. Does the principle of privity of estate apply to the relationship between a mortgagor, tenant, and a mortgagee under the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic), and how does it affect the rights of a mortgagee in a power of sale scenario?
5. Can a mortgagor in possession of rents and profits give a valid discharge to a tenant by making payments by any means known to the law, without the mortgagee's consent?
6. Is the tenant protected from paying rent to the mortgagee if they have no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage, or do they need to seek the mortgagee's consent before making any payment arrangements?
7. Can a mortgagor and a tenant vary the terms of the lease, including the amount of rent payable, without the mortgagee's consent, and if so, under what circumstances?
8. What is the impact of section 151 of the Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) on the relationship between a mortgagee, a mortgagor, and a tenant in relation to the collection of rent?
9. How do the provisions of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) and the Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) interact when determining the rights of a mortgagee and a mortgagor concerning the collection of rent?
10. Is there an issue estoppel preventing the respondent from claiming arrears of rent, based on the decision of the arbitrator and the decision of Justice Hayne in the earlier proceedings?

Held
1. The court concluded that the rights and obligations of a mortgagee and a mortgagor concerning the receipt of rent under a lease that existed before the mortgage are governed by section 81 of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic). The mortgagee is entitled to the accruing rent if it intervenes and claims the rent before it has been paid to the mortgagor, after the due date.
2. The court held that the mortgagee does not need to give notice to the tenant to enforce its right to receive rent, as the mere existence of the mortgage on the register suffices. However, if the tenant is unaware of the existence of the mortgage, they can be discharged by making a payment in accordance with the covenant.
3. The effect of a statutory reversion under section 81 of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) on the rights of a mortgagee to claim arrears of rent is that the mortgagee is entitled to the accruing rent if it intervenes and claims the rent before it has been paid to the mortgagor, after the due date.
4. The court held that the principle of privity of estate applies to the relationship between a mortgagor, tenant, and a mortgagee under the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic). However, it affects the rights of a mortgagee in a power of sale scenario by limiting the mortgagee's rights to those of a statutory charge on the land.
5. The court held that a mortgagor in possession of rents and profits can give a valid discharge to a tenant by making payments by any means known to the law, without the mortgagee's consent.
6. The court held that a tenant is not protected from paying rent to the mortgagee if they have no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage. They need to seek the mortgagee's consent before making any payment arrangements.
7. The court concluded that a mortgagor and a tenant cannot vary the terms of the lease, including the amount of rent payable, without the mortgagee's consent, as it would diminish the mortgagee's rights.
8. Section 151 of the Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) impacts the relationship between a mortgagee, a mortgagor, and a tenant in relation to the collection of rent by stating that a conveyance of a reversion shall be valid without any attornment of the lessee.
9. The provisions of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) and the Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) interact by creating a statutory reversion for the mortgagee, which is treated as if it had the reversion. However, the court held that the statutory reversion does not take away the existing lease or the rights of the tenant.
10. The court found that there was an issue estoppel preventing the respondent from claiming arrears of rent, based on the decision of the arbitrator and the decision of Justice Hayne in the earlier proceedings. The issue estoppel resulted from the Supreme Court proceedings, and the matter was not appealed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The High Court in Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd v SEAA Enterprises Pty Ltd examined the rights and obligations of a mortgagee and a mortgagor concerning the receipt of rent under a lease that existed prior to the mortgage. The court considered the legal principles surrounding these rights and the effect of section 81 of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic), which provides that the mortgagee is to be treated as if they had the reversion of the estate. The court examined whether the mortgagee needed to give notice to the tenant to enforce their right to receive rent or if the existence of the mortgage on the register sufficed. The court deliberated on the statutory reversion under section 81 and its impact on the rights of a mortgagee to claim arrears of rent, weighing the common law principles against the statutory provisions.

The court also considered the principle of privity of estate in the context of the relationship between the mortgagor, tenant, and the mortgagee under the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic). It explored whether the privity of estate applied and how it affected the rights of the mortgagee in a power of sale scenario. The court examined whether a mortgagor in possession of rents and profits could give a valid discharge to a tenant by making payments by any means known to the law, without the mortgagee's consent. The court determined that while the rent belonged to the mortgagee, the mortgagor could indeed give a valid discharge if the payment was made by a method known to the law and if the mortgagee had not exercised its right to receive the rent.

The court also evaluated whether a tenant was protected from paying rent to the mortgagee if they had no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage, or if they needed to seek the mortgagee's consent before making any payment arrangements. The court concluded that the tenant was protected if they performed their covenant by paying the rent to the mortgagor before the mortgagee gave notice, as the common law provided for the tenant's protection in such circumstances. The court further explored whether a mortgagor and a tenant could vary the terms of the lease, including the amount of rent payable, without the mortgagee's consent, and if so, under what circumstances. It found that such variations were permissible if made with the mortgagee's consent, but otherwise, the mortgagee's rights remained intact.

The interaction between section 151 of the Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) and section 81 of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) was another critical point of discussion. The court deliberated on how these provisions impacted the relationship between the mortgagee, mortgagor, and tenant in relation to the collection of rent. It found that the provisions of section 151, which states that the conveyance of a reversion is valid without attornment where land is subject to a lease, applied to mortgages under the Transfer of Land Act. The court concluded that the mortgagee's right to the rents did not depend on attornment, but rather on the exercise of their rights.

Lastly, the court addressed the issue of issue estoppel preventing the respondent from claiming arrears of rent, based on the decision of the arbitrator and the decision of Justice Hayne in the earlier proceedings. The court found that the respondent was not estopped from claiming the arrears of rent because the decision of Justice Hayne did not conclude that there were arrears of rent. The court ruled that the respondent could not rely on an issue estoppel based on Justice Hayne's decision since it had not been appealed and was therefore binding. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the mortgagee is entitled to the rents from the date of default and that a valid discharge can only be given by a payment known to the law. The court's decision clarified the interaction between the common law principles and statutory provisions in the context of mortgage law in Victoria.