FHY17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs
[2024] FedCFamC2G 1027
•18 October 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
FHY17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1027
File number(s): MLG 2635 of 2017 Judgment of: JUDGE FORBES Date of judgment: 18 October 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection – application for judicial review of decision of Immigration Assessment Authority – alleged denial of procedural fairness – consideration of the fast track review process – whether Authority required to invite applicant to oral interview or hearing – where no new information before the Authority – where Authority conducted review on the materials before it – no error established Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) pt 7AA, s 473CC, 473DB, 473DC, 473DA, 473DD, 473DE, 473FA, 473GA, 473GB Cases cited: BCQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 365
CUZ17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 3074
Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 217
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 65 Date of hearing: 9 October 2024 Place: Melbourne Applicant: In person Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr Mintz; Clayton Utz ORDERS
MLG2635 of 2017 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: FHY17
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE FORBES
DATE OF ORDER:
18 OCTOBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The First Respondent’s name be changed to “Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs”.
2.The Applicant’s application for review filed 5 December 2017 be dismissed.
3.The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs in accordance with the scale prescribed in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) in the sum of $8,371.30.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE FORBES
INTRODUCTION
On 8 November 2017 the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority) affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa (the visa). The applicant seeks judicial review of the Authority’s decision.
In his application for review dated 5 December 2017 the applicant asserts two substantive grounds of judicial error. First, the applicant contends that the Authority constructively failed to review the delegate’s decision by failing to raise critical matters with the applicant and/or extend to him a real opportunity to reply to adverse information. Secondly, the applicant seeks to impugn the decision on the ground that he was refused an opportunity to present his claims to the Authority in an oral interview.
Each of the grounds raised by the applicant alleges a denial of procedural fairness. As I explain later in these reasons, the content of procedural fairness obligations imposed on the Authority in the performance of its review function must be viewed in the statutory context of Part 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
In my view, the application to this Court misunderstands the nature of the Authority’s review function and the limited circumstances in which it can consider new information, conduct an oral hearing or provide an applicant with an opportunity to respond to material issues.
For the reasons set out below, the applicant has not persuaded me that the Authority’s decision is affected by jurisdictional error. Accordingly, the application will be dismissed.
BACKGROUND
The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who entered Australia as an irregular maritime arrival in 2012. He initially fled by boat from Sri Lanka to Cocos Islands and was then detained by Australian authorities.
In his entry interview with an officer of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant claimed that:
(a)he was involved with a friend in a Tamil student society;
(b)a “weaponed group” took him into custody and were now looking for him and his friends;
(c)he lived close to the students association where Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) posters had been put up and that he was suspected of having been involved because he was in hiding;
(d)there was an army camp in front of his house and when he told the army of his claims about the group that was looking for him, they said it “wasn’t their duty”; and
(e)in 2012, after there was a problem on the campus in Jaffna, people had gone to his house, told people they would find him and threatened to kill him.
On 12 and 16 December 2016, the Department invited the applicant to apply for a temporary protection or Safe Haven Enterprise visa. After failing to make an application within the permissible 60 days, the Department issued the applicant a final reminder on 16 February 2017. By that time, support payments that the applicant was receiving through the Department of Human Services had ceased and were restorable only upon him making a visa application.
On 23 February 2017, the applicant appointed a registered migration agent to represent him in relation to his SHEV application.
On 2 March 2017, the applicant made a SHEV application. The application was accompanied with a Statement of Claims made by the applicant and various other supporting documents. In the Statement of Claim the applicant contended that there were a number of reasons why he feared a return to his country of origin. Those reasons included that:
(a)he had been born and brought up in Jaffna, an area which had been controlled by the Sri Lankan Army, and that the army disrupted his day-to-day life including his schooling;
(b)one of his childhood friends was a member of the Tamil Students Association which supported the LTTE and organised protests against the Sri Lankan authorities. Everyone believed his friend to be an LTTE member;
(c)in March 2009 a group of men approach the applicant in his local temple and questioned him about the whereabouts of his friend;
(d)he recognised one of the men in the interrogation group as the person he had seen shooting a Tamil student in 2006;
(e)he was continually harassed and interrogated by groups of 5-6 men he believed belonged to the army;
(f)after he had been threatened for failing to give information about his friend, he had a gun pointed at him and his photo was taken, causing him to withdraw from school and go into hiding;
(g)between 2009-2012 the applicant was in constant fear, moved from house to house and remained in hiding;
(h)his parents told him that it was not safe for him to remain in Sri Lanka, so arrangements were made for him to flee to Australia using the services of an “agent” who knew how to arrange travel by boat;
(i)after his arrival in Australia, a group of men had gone to his family home in Sri Lanka and threatened members of his family. He believes those making the threats will shoot and kill him if he returns; and
(j)relevantly, at [33] of his Statement of Claims the applicant alleged:
“After arriving in Australia, I have seen some newspaper article with photos of men who used to interrogate me. These articles were about how these men were harassing the Tamils in our area. I provided these articles to the DIBP while I was in detention. I no longer have a copy of these articles and don’t know how to obtain a copy.”
The applicant expressed concern that he remains a target for the Sri Lankan authorities due to his imputed political opinion. He fears that if he returns to his country of origin, he will face a real risk of being tortured, imprisoned and/or killed or being subjected to other types of cruel punishment. He has no faith in the Sri Lankan authorities being able to protect him and does not believe that there is anywhere within the country to which he could relocate to mitigate these fears.
On 19 May 2017 the delegate invited the applicant to attend an interview to discuss his visa application and his claims to be a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations. The applicant was informed that he should bring certain identification documents to the interview and any other evidence which supported his protection claims.
It is noteworthy that the information pack which accompanied the interview invitation included an explanation of the “Fast Track” review process which applied to unauthorised maritime arrivals who entered Australia between 13 August 2012 and 1 January 2014. That information explained that if the visa application was refused, it would be reviewed by the Authority and that the Authority would only be able to consider the material provided to the Department (save for exceptional circumstances).
On 7 June 2017 the applicant attended an interview with a delegate of the Minister. That interview was presumably recorded because the applicant’s representative subsequently sought a copy of the recording. The recording was not in evidence.
On 14 June 2017 the applicant’s representative provided country information to support oral submissions which had been made at the interview. The country information predominantly took the form of press articles and commentary regarding the general state of affairs in Sri Lanka, the ongoing plight for Tamils and the risks of human rights abuses, including kidnappings and torture.
On 18 August 2017 the applicant was informed by the Department that his application for a SHEV had been refused. He was also informed that the Department’s decision had been referred to the Authority for merits review under Part 7AA of the Act. The applicant was also informed that the Department had provided the following information to the IAA:
(a)the delegate’s decision record;
(b)material the applicant had given the Department before the refusal decision was made;
(c)any other material the Department considers to be relevant to the review; and
(d)the applicant’s contact details for the purposes of receiving documents.
On 23 August 2017 the Authority wrote to the applicant to acknowledge that his application had been referred and would be the subject of review. The letter from the Authority stated, inter alia:
“The Department of Immigration and Border Protection (the department) has provided us with all documents they consider relevant to your case. This includes any material that you provided to the departmental officer before they decided to refuse you a protection visa. The IAA will proceed to make a decision on your case on the basis of the information sent to us by the department, unless we decide to consider new information. We can only consider new information in limited circumstances, which are explained in the attached factsheet and Practice Direction.”
It is not necessary for me to recite the contents of the fact sheet and practice direction. Needless to say, those documents set out in considerable detail the nature of the Authority’s review function under Part 7AA of the Act, the information that the Authority would consider as part of its review, that generally the review will be undertaken solely on the basis of that information and that new information would only be considered in exceptional circumstances. Moreover, the documents explain that an applicant can provide a written submission to the Authority about why he disagrees with the Department’s decision and any claim or matter which he believes was not considered.
Relevant to the grounds of review in this case, the information provided to the applicant by the Authority noted that interviews would only be held in very limited circumstances “in accordance with the provisions set out in the Migration Act”. The applicant was also informed that the Authority may extend an invitation to provide new information or to comment on new information that may be adverse to his case.
On 11 September 2017, the applicant’s representative requested a copy of the recorded interview conducted by the delegate. The protection visa interview recording was provided by the Department the following day.
Neither the applicant nor his representatives made any written submission to the Authority about any matter. The Authority conducted its review of the protection visa application “on the papers”. It did not seek further information from the applicant, it did not seek to interview him, and it did not convene an oral hearing.
Authority’s decision
By letter dated 8 November 2017, the Authority notified the applicant of its decision to affirm the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant the visa.
In reaching its decision to affirm the delegate’s refusal, the Authority:
(a)summarised the applicant’s claims for protection, noting that he had been harassed by the Sri Lankan Army, feared for his safety and gone into hiding;
(b)acknowledged the applicant was fearful that, if returned to Sri Lanka, he may be subject to serious harm by reason of his Tamil race, political opinion, suspected association with the LTTE and status as a failed asylum seeker;
(c)assessed the applicant against the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act and found that -
(i)he was not a person of ongoing interest to the Sri Lankan authorities for suspected links to the LTTE;
(ii)any interest on the part of the authorities related to his friend and they never suspected the applicant of being involved in similar activities;
(iii)he was never arrested or charged or detained by the Sri Lankan authorities, even after being interrogated;
(iv)the applicant’s claims of fearing for his life and going into hiding to avoid capture by the authorities lacked credibility;
(v)while the applicant claimed he had evidence from newspapers that people were looking for him, none of the newspapers or documents before the Authority identified the applicant or named him as a person of interest;
(vi)the applicant and his family members have never been involved or affiliated with the LTTE and therefore, the authorities would have no interest in the applicant on the basis of his imputed political opinion because of his friendship;
(vii)he did not put up anti-government posters and was not suspected by the authorities of having done so;
(viii)the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for reason of being a Tamil;
(ix)based on relevant country information, the applicant would not face a real chance of harm, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, if he returned as a failed asylum seeker who left Sri Lanka illegally.
(d)concluded, after considering the applicant’s claims both individually and cumulatively, that he did not meet the criterion for refugee protection;
(e)also concluded that the applicant did not meet the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
Application for judicial review
On 5 December 2017, the applicant, now self-represented, filed an application for judicial review. The applicant advances two substantive, but broad grounds, expressed as follows:
(1)The Second Respondent constructively failed to review the First Respondent’s decision, denied the applicant procedural fairness in its failure to sufficiently raise critical matters with the applicant and/or extended to him a real opportunity to reply to adverse information.
(2)The Second Respondent denied the applicant procedural fairness and/or made an error of law because the applicant was refused to represent his claims/comments orally. By refusing to schedule an oral interview with the applicant, the Second Respondent fell into error/denied the applicant procedural fairness.
Despite being afforded the opportunity to do so, the applicant did not file any written outline of submissions or otherwise seek to particularise the grounds prior to the hearing.
The Minister, on the other hand, did file an outline of submissions but was left to speculate about how the applicant would argue jurisdictional error. In any event, the Minister opposes the application and submits that the Authority discharged its statutory task according to law.
The application for judicial review was heard on 9 October 2024. The applicant appeared self- represented and was assisted by a Tamil interpreter. Mr Mintz, a solicitor, appeared on behalf of the Minister.
The procedure for the hearing was carefully explained to the applicant and he confirmed, through his interpreter, that he understood the procedure and had no questions to raise about it. I informed the applicant that I could not grant a visa and that the court was limited to determining whether the Authority had performed its statutory task according to law. I am satisfied he understood the explanation. The applicant also confirmed that he had received a copy of the court book and the Minister’s written outline of submissions and list of authorities.
As mentioned, the applicant did not provide any written outline of submissions or any other particulars of his two grounds. I invited the applicant to explain to the Court what mistake or error the Authority made in undertaking its review and what he believes was wrong with the Authority’s decision.
Applicant
The applicant’s oral submissions to the court did not engage with the grounds of review. I endeavoured to assist the applicant by directing his attention to the grounds in his application and by asking him questions about what he meant by the alleged denial of procedural fairness, the failure to raise critical matters with him and the inability to raise claims and comments in an oral interview.
In his oral submission to the Court, the applicant stated that he was 20 years old when he came to Australia. He said he did not know anything about the migration process or what he would have to go through to remain in the country. The applicant explained that he was told certain things by other people on the boat including that he should not tell the authorities everything. He said that this advice led him to provide some information when he was interviewed by the Department, but not everything.
The applicant said that in an interview with the Department in 2013 he provided some documents, including a newspaper article which included a photo image of the men who had threatened him. He said he personally handed a copy of the article to the immigration officer who conducted the interview. He said the photo which appeared in the article was taken after he left Sri Lanka, but it was relevant because the article was about the harassment of Tamils in his area and it depicted at least one of the men he feared.
The applicant said that when he went to the visa application interview in 2017, he was told that the Department did not have that article. He said he was told that the IAA could not get the article and that none of the articles it had referred to him. The applicant said, in reply, that he wanted to rely on the article and the photo but it was not referred to in any of the decisions.
The applicant submitted that he had been living in Australia for 12 years and in all that time he had not been to a court in relation to his visa application. He said that he had been living as a good citizen of Australia and had not done anything wrong. He said the IAA was wrong to believe that he could go back to his country because his brother had been forced to flee and had now been granted protection in Canada. The applicant reiterated that he cannot go back to Sri Lanka but said he would go to any other country.
When I redirected the applicant to his claims, he said that he was not aware that he had to tell all things in the interview. He said he did not know how to explain all of his issues and that if he had to tell his whole story he would have to go back to everything from when he was born.
The applicant submitted that when he was released from detention in 2013 he was told (but did not say by whom) that his case was okay. He said that he was aware that a lot of the boys he met in detention have been released and accepted for protection visas.
Finally, the applicant submitted that the fast-track process was unfair. He submitted that the government has abolished the IAA which proved that the procedure was unfair.
The statutory framework and principles
Before turning to the Minister’s submissions it is useful to set out the statutory framework within which the Authority was required to undertake its review of the delegate’s decision.
The decision of the Authority was made according to the “fast track” review process in Part 7AA of the Act. That process applied to persons who were irregular maritime arrivals who entered Australia between 13 August 2012 and 1 January 2014 and had not been taken to a regional processing country. It applied to those who were subsequently invited to apply for a temporary protection visa or SHEV.
The source of the Authority’s duty to conduct a review of a delegate’s decision is found in s 473CC of the Act:
Review of decision
(1) The Immigration Assessment Authority must review a fast track reviewable decision referred to the Authority under section 473CA.
(2) The Immigration Assessment Authority may:
a. affirm the fast track reviewable decision; or
b. remit the decision for reconsideration in accordance with such directions or recommendations of the Authority as are permitted by regulation.
The explanatory memorandum which accompanied the introduction of Part 7AA into the Act noted that the Minister (or delegate) would refer certain decisions made in relation to fast track applicants to the IAA which would then “conduct a limited review” of those decisions.
As to the nature of that limited review, the High Court observed in Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 217 at [17] that:
“[T]he Authority when conducting a review of a fast track reviewable decision is not concerned with the correction of error on the part of the Minister or delegate but is engaged in a de novo consideration of the merits of the decision that has been referred to it. The task of the Authority [...] is to consider the application for a protection visa afresh and to determine for itself whether or not it is satisfied that the criteria for the grant of the visa have been met.”
The practical role of the Authority under Part 7AA was helpfully explained by Judge Kelly in CUZ17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 3074 at [24] - [25] where his Honour stated:
“[24] In contrast with a review under Pt 5 or Pt 7 of the Act, the fast track scheme provided by Pt 7AA is a mechanism of limited merits review. Division 3 of Part 7AA variously: provides an exhaustive statement of the natural justice hearing rule respecting a review conducted by the Authority; requires that the Authority should ordinarily conduct its review on the papers; provides for the exceptional, and strictly circumscribed, circumstances in which new information or documents may be sought or employed; and authorises and prescribes the manner in which the Authority may conduct an interview of the applicant or otherwise obtain further information.
[25] In general, the Authority must conduct its review without accepting or requesting new or additional information and without interviewing the applicant. The Authority may, but is under no duty to, get any documents or information that was not before the delegate. Section 473DD proscribes the Authority from considering any new information unless the conditions provided by that section are satisfied.” (citations omitted)
The review function of the Authority is constrained by the provisions of Part 7AA. Section 473DA provides that Division 3, Part 7AA of the Act, together with ss 473GA and 473GB, is taken to be an “exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to reviews conducted by” the Authority. Those provisions modify the usual requirements for procedural fairness and any conduct of or discretion exercised by the IAA is to be measured against those modified requirements.
As was said by the Federal Court in BCQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 365 at [71]:
“[71] Part 7AA modifies (by restricting) the common law principles of procedural fairness. The analysis of what might be an unreasonable exercise of, or failure to exercise, a discretionary power contained in Part 7AA must proceed against the statutory context, which includes that modification. Whilst the legislature is taken to have intended that a discretionary power will be exercised reasonably (Li at [63], per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ; [88], per Gageler J), that which is reasonable is informed by the subject matter, scope and purpose of the legislation under which it is conferred. Part 7AA requires the Authority to review a decision and to conduct that review on the basis of the “review material” and, subject to the statutory exceptions contained in Part 7AA, without obtaining “new information” or affording the referred applicant a hearing. The reasonableness of an asserted failure to consider a discretionary power to disclose material to the referred applicant, and the reasonableness of the exercise of the discretion itself, must be assessed against that statutory scheme.”
Part 7AA emphasises that the Authority is under no duty to interview a review applicant, to conduct a hearing or to request new information from the applicant. Relevantly, section 473DC provides as follows:
Getting new information
(1)Subject to this Part, the Immigration Assessment Authority may, in relation to a fast-track decision, get any documents or information (new information) that:
a. were not before the Minister when the Minister made the decision under section 65; and
b. the Authority considers may be relevant.
(2)The Immigration Assessment Authority does not have a duty to get, request or accept, any new information whether the Authority is requested to do so by a referred applicant or by any other person, or in any other circumstances.
(3)Without limiting subsection (1), the Immigration Assessment Authority may invite a person, orally or in writing, to give new information:
a. in writing; or
b. at an interview, whether conducted in person, by telephone or in any other way.
The Authority’s exercise of any statutory discretion – whether it be to request further information, to issue an invitation for a fast track applicant to attend an interview or to conduct a hearing - is subject to the implied condition that it must be exercised reasonably. An instance of an unreasonable failure to exercise discretion might arise where there is a demonstrable information gap which could be remedied by the exercise of the power. However, even then, the mere existence of an informational gap will not necessarily result in the Authority being “disadvantaged in comparison with the delegate”.
Because Division 3 of Part 7AA contains its own exhaustive statement of the natural justice hearing rule, any question of unreasonableness in the exercise of discretion by the Authority must be approached through the lens of the specific statutory scheme and not through the lens of the principles of natural justice unaffected by statute.
CONSIDERATION
Each of the grounds of review advanced by the applicant, as elaborated upon by his oral submissions insofar as they were relevant, is to be assessed against the statutory context in which the review was undertaken by the Authority.
The statutory scheme contemplated by Part 7AA is one of limited review on the papers with a default position of not accepting or requesting new information[1]. Section 473FA(1) contains a general exhortation that, in carrying out its functions under the Act, the Authority “is to pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of limited review that is efficient, quick, free of bias and consistent with Division 3 (conduct of review)”.
[1] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 473DB(1)
The review process prescribed in Part 7AA of the Act anticipates that the Authority will conduct its review of the delegate’s decision on the basis of the “review material” and, subject to the statutory exceptions contained in Part 7AA, without obtaining “new information” or affording the referred applicant a hearing. The mere existence of an informational gap between the material before the delegate and the material before the Authority does not of itself give rise to an obligation to seek new information.
Ground one
Ground one asserts the Authority failed to afford the applicant procedural fairness by failing to raise “critical matters” with him or grant him an opportunity to reply to adverse information.
It is not entirely clear what the applicant means by his assertion that the Authority failed to raise “critical matters” with him. What is clear is that the applicant did not present further submissions to the Authority despite being afforded the opportunity to do so. Nor did the applicant seek to challenge the findings of the delegate or seek to advance new information which had not been before the delegate.
As there was no “new information”, the Authority decided its review on the materials before it. The Authority’s discretion to consider “new information” in exceptional circumstances under s 473DD was not enlivened, nor was its obligation under s 473DE to invite the applicant to comment on “new information”.
The newspaper article to which the applicant referred in his oral submissions to the Court was not before the Authority, just as it had not been before the delegate. There is no objective evidence of its existence. The Authority considered the various newspaper articles which had been supplied to the delegate as part of the representative’s submissions and correctly concluded that none of those, or the article which the applicant claimed he had provided, referred to him.
Just as there was no obligation on the Authority to invite the applicant to a hearing, there was also no obligation to put the applicant on notice of the issues that would be dispositive of the review. The applicant was afforded an opportunity to put a submission to the Authority and could have raised issues with the delegate’s reasons. But in the absence of any “new information” there was, in my view, no occasion for the Authority to exercise its discretion to take either of these steps.
None of the oral arguments advanced by the applicant at the judicial review hearing properly engaged with this ground. In essence, the applicant sought impermissible merits review of the decision not to grant him a SHEV.
I accept the Minister’s submission that ground one is not made out.
Ground two
Ground two asserts the Authority denied the applicant procedural fairness and/or committed an error of law by refusing to invite the applicant to a hearing.
As stated above, the exercise of any statutory discretion by the Authority to request further information or to invite a fast track applicant to an interview or a hearing is subject to the implied condition that it must be exercised reasonably.
I accept that jurisdictional error might be revealed where there is a demonstrable information gap which could have been remedied by the exercise of the power. However, here, neither the applicant nor his representatives sought to point to an informational deficit in the materials before the delegate or the Authority. At the risk of repeating myself, the applicant did not seek to introduce any new information or request an interview.
Insofar as the applicant alleges that the Authority committed an error of law by acting unreasonably, the demonstration of legal unreasonableness in the context of Part 7AA carries a “demanding standard”.
Given the high threshold for jurisdictional error, the applicant has persuaded me that there was an informational gap in the evidence or any other relevant occasion which required an exercise of discretion to invite the applicant to a hearing. The Authority was not obliged to invite the applicant to an interview or hearing and was at liberty to conduct its review without doing so.
DISPOSITION
For the reasons set out above, the applicant has failed to persuade the Court that the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority was affected by jurisdictional error.
The application for judicial review should be dismissed. I will hear the parties on the question of costs.
I certify that the preceding sixty-five (65) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Forbes. Associate:
Dated: 18 October 2024
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