Fewin Pty Ltd v Burke (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Fewin Pty Ltd v Burke (No 2) [2016] FCA 739

File number: NSD 1222 of 2015
Judge: MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 23 June 2016
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for indemnity costs
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43
Federal Court Rules 2011 r 39.04
Cases cited:

Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 11) [2009] FCA 590

Colgate Palmolive Co v Cussens Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225

Fewin Pty Ltd v Burke [2016] FCA 503

Silverfox Co Pty Ltd v Lenard’s Pty Ltd (No 3) (2004) 214 ALR 621

Yevad Products Pty Ltd v Brookfield [2005] 147 FCR 282

Date of hearing: 10 March 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 19
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr A P Cheshire SC
Solicitor for the Applicants: Martin Place Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J T Johnson
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr M J Heath
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Third Respondent: The Third Respondent did not appear
Table of Corrections
28 June 2016 In the Appearances on the cover page “Counsel for the First Applicant: Mr J J Johnson” and “Counsel for the Second Applicant: Mr A P Cheshire SC” has been amended to “Counsel for the Applicants: Mr A P Cheshire SC”
28 June 2016 In the Appearances on the cover page “Counsel for the Respondents: Mr M J Heath” has been amended to “Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J T Johnson” and “Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr M J Heath”
28 June 2016 In the Appearances on the cover page “Solicitors for the Respondents: Gillis Delaney Lawyers” has been amended to “Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor”
28 June 2016 In the Appearances on the cover page “Counsel for the Third Respondent: The Third Respondent did not appear” has been added.

ORDERS

NSD 1222 of 2015
BETWEEN:

FEWIN PTY LTD ABN 64 051 132 453

First Applicant

RONALD MICHAEL COSHOTT

Second Applicant

LJILJANA COSHOTT (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Applicant

AND:

JOHN BURKE

First Respondent

OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY

Second Respondent

MAXWELL WILLIAM PRENTICE

Third Respondent

JUDGE:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 JUNE 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicants pay the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy’s costs of the interlocutory application filed on 29 January 2016 to set aside the subpoena to produce documents issued on 18 December 2015 at the request of the applicants on an indemnity basis. 

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MARKOVIC J:

  1. On 12 May 2016 I made orders and gave judgment in three interlocutory applications which have been filed in these proceedings: see Fewin Pty Ltd v Burke [2016] FCA 503 (Fewin v Burke). Two of those interlocutory applications concerned the…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 739
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Fewin Pty Ltd v Burke (No 2) involved a legal dispute between Fewin Pty Ltd and the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy. The case was heard by the Federal Court of Australia and revolved around an application for indemnity costs. The Inspector-General in Bankruptcy sought indemnity costs related to an application to join her as a party and a subpoena for document production issued by Fewin Pty Ltd. The Inspector-General argued that the applications were without merit and that she should be awarded indemnity costs under the principles set out in Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Inspector-General was entitled to indemnity costs in relation to the application to join her as a party and the subpoena for document production. The court had to consider whether the applications were so lacking in merit that the applicants should be required to pay the Inspector-General's costs on an indemnity basis. The court also had to determine if there were any special circumstances that would warrant an indemnity costs order.

The court found that the Inspector-General's application for indemnity costs in relation to the joinder application should not be granted. The correspondence upon which the Inspector-General relied had not been previously considered by the court and was not unreasonable in its contents. The court noted that the Inspector-General had not provided any special reason or unusual feature that would cause the court to depart from the usual practice of awarding costs on a party-and-party basis. The court upheld the previous order that the applicants pay the Inspector-General's costs of the joinder application on the usual basis. However, the court did grant the Inspector-General's application for indemnity costs in relation to the subpoena for document production, finding that the subpoena was without merit and should be set aside.

In conclusion, the Federal Court of Australia determined that the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy was entitled to indemnity costs in relation to the subpoena for document production issued by Fewin Pty Ltd. However, the court found that the Inspector-General was not entitled to indemnity costs in relation to the application to join her as a party. The applicants were ordered to pay the Inspector-General's costs of the subpoena application on an indemnity basis, but the costs of the joinder application were to be paid on the usual party-and-party basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicants pay the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy’s costs of the interlocutory application filed on 29 January 2016 to set aside the subpoena to produce documents issued on 18 December 2015 at the request of the applicants on an indemnity basis.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 11) [2009] FCA 590 Collier J observed the following at [7] to [8] in relation to an award of indemnity costs:7.In Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 8) [2008] FCA 1556 I discussed in some detail principles relevant to the award of indemnity costs by the Court in appropriate circumstances. A number of those key principles are:Ÿthe purpose of an order for costs is to indemnify or compensate the person in whose favour it is made, not to punish the person against whom it is made;Ÿthe usual rule is that costs should be on a party-party basis, but that the Court has a wide and unfettered discretion to award costs on an indemnity basis in appropriate cases in particular circumstances;Ÿeach case depends upon its own particular facts;Ÿindemnity costs can be awarded where it appears that a proceeding is commenced or continued in circumstances where the applicant properly advised should have known there was no chance of success.8.As I also observed in Citrus (No 8) [2008] FCA 1556, a long – and non-exhaustive – list of relevant issues for the Court in considering whether to award indemnity costs can be found in such cases as Colgate-Palmolive v Cussons (1993) 46 FCR 225 and InterTAN Inc v DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd [2005] FCAFC 54.EVIDENCE RELIED ON BY THE INSEPCTOR GENERAL The Inspector-General relied on a letter dated 15 January 2016 from her solicitors, the Australian Government Solicitor, to Martin Place Lawyers, the solicitors for the applicants. That letter, which was marked “without prejudice save as to costs”:(1)in relation to the application to join the Inspector General:(a)set out the Inspector-General’s view of the application to join her and why, in her view, the application was doomed to fail including that:(i)the draft pleading did not comply with the Federal Court Rules 2011;(ii)there was no plea of breach of duty;(iii)even if the applicants were to remedy the deficiencies in the pleading the duties that were alleged to be owed by the Inspector-General under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) were misconceived; and (iv)the immunity provided to regulators by s 44 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) would apply in respect of the alleged failure on the part of the Inspector-General;(b)invited the applicants to withdraw the interlocutory application on the basis that the Inspector-General would not seek any order for costs thrown away by reasons of the application;(c)put the applicants on notice that if their application was not withdrawn they should expect the letter to be used to support an application for an order for payment of the Inspector-General’s costs incurred in connection with the application on an indemnity basis. The letter also notified the applicants that the offer in it was made in accordance with the principles in Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333;(2)in relation to the subpoena which had been issued to the Inspector-General at the request of the applicants: (a)pointed out that the documents sought by the subpoena remained in the custody of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and had not yet been returned to the Inspector-General;(b)invited the applicants to withdraw the subpoena; (c)put the applicants on notice that if the subpoena was not withdrawn the Inspector-General would apply to have it set aside, would seek an order for payment of her costs in connection with the subpoena and the application to set it aside on an indemnity basis and would produce a copy of the letter in support of the latter application.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the absence of a resolution of the matter between the parties the matter proceeded to judgment and the subpoena issued by the applicants to the Inspector-General was set aside.CONSIDERATIONApplication for indemnity costs in relation to the application to join the Inspector-General The applicants submit that their counsel was not favoured with copies of the correspondence upon which the Inspector-General now relies, they understood that there was no Calderbank offer and that the Inspector-General’s application is based on the general law. They also submit that, given the finding at [66] of the judgment in Fewin v Burke in relation to the costs of the joinder application, the Inspector-General should not be permitted to re-agitate her claim for costs on an indemnity basis and that, in any event, there has already been a finding that there is no special reason or unusual feature that would cause the Court to depart from the usual practice of awarding costs. It is not the case that the applicants’ counsel was not favoured with a copy of the correspondence on which the Inspector-General relies in support of her application for indemnity costs. That correspondence was provided to counsel for the applicants appearing before me on 19 May 2016 when the Inspector-General’s applications for indemnity costs were to be heard. In any event, the correspondence is between the parties’ solicitors and must have been received by the applicants’ solicitors. There can be no issue that the applicants were not aware of the correspondence. Further, counsel who appeared for the applicants did not oppose its tender. In Fewin v Burke at [66] in considering the submission in the Inspector-General’s written submissions that, if the application to join her was refused, she should be awarded costs on an indemnity basis I said:In her written submissions the Inspector-General submits that if the application to join her is refused, an order should be made that the applicant should pay her costs on an indemnity basis. No further submissions were made as to why that should be so. While the application has not succeeded, there is no special reason or unusual feature that would cause the Court to depart from the usual practice in awarding costs. The Inspector-General is entitled to her costs of the application but that order will be made on the usual party and party basis. At that time, quite properly, the letter dated 15 January 2016 from the Inspector-General’s solicitors to the applicants’ solicitors by which they invited the applicants to withdraw their application, set out their reasons why they should do so and put them on notice that if they did not withdraw the application they would rely on the letter to seek costs on an indemnity basis was not before the Court. The Inspector-General seeks to vary that order on the basis of the evidence now before the Court. I have considered the letter from the Inspector-General’s solicitor. Having done so I do not think that the rejection of the Inspector-General’s offer contained in the letter dated 15 January 2016 was unreasonable. The joinder application failed but not only for the reasons raised by the Inspector-General in the letter. I do not think the applicants’ pursuit of the joinder application was so unreasonable or that it could be said there was no chance of its success. It remains the case that there is no special reason or unusual feature that would cause the Court to depart from the usual practice in awarding costs. The costs order made by me on 19 May 2016 that the applicants pay the Inspector-General’s costs of the application to join her should not be disturbed and those costs should be paid on the usual basis.The application to set aside the subpoena