Fernandez v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Fernandez v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1265

Citation: Fernandez v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1265
Appeal from: Fernandez v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1698
Parties: NERVO WALTER AMADO FERNANDEZ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 809 of 2015
Judge: ROBERTSON J
Date of judgment: 20 November 2015
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – aged dependent relative visa – finding of fact by Migration Review Tribunal (Tribunal) that at the time of the application for the visa the appellant had been sponsored by only one person – whether appellant dependent on sponsor for a reasonable period – whether the appellant was wholly or substantially reliant on the sponsor for financial support where financial support provided equally by two nieces of the appellant

MIGRATION – whether request to Tribunal to refer the matter to the Minister to consider the exercise of his powers under s 351 of the Migration Act may found error reviewable by the Federal Circuit Court

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – whether words in the singular number include the plural – whether contrary intention

Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 2(2), 23
Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth) s 13(1)(a)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 54, 55, 65, 351, 474, 476, 499
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 1.03, 1.05A, 1.20, Sch 2 cll 838.1, 838.2
Cases cited:

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond Corporation Holdings Ltd (1989) 86 ALR 424
Blue Metal Industries Ltd v Dilley (1969) 117 CLR 651 (PC)
Commissioner for Superannuation v Scott [1987] FCA 79; 13 FCR 404
El Ess v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1038; 142 FCR 43
Huynh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 122; 152 FCR 576
Mandalia v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 59; [2015] 1 WLR 4546
Minister for Foreign Affairs v Lee [2014] FCA 927; 227 FCR 279
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Graovac [1999] FCA 1690
Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs v Gray (1994) 50 FCR 189

Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] HCA 31; 246 CLR 636

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Applicants S134/2002 [2003] HCA 1; 211 CLR 441
Sherzad v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 145; 170 FCR 105
Shi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 131; 231 FCR 354
Sin Poh Amalgamated (HK) Ltd v Attorney-General (Hong Kong) [1965] 1 WLR 62

Date of hearing: 4 November 2015
Date of last submissions: 16 November 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 93
Solicitor for the Appellant: Mr RC Turner of Turner Coulson Immigration Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr MP Cleary
Solicitor for the Respondents: DLA Piper

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1265
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Fernandez v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellant, Fernandez, appealing a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) regarding his application for an aged dependent relative visa. The AAT had determined that Fernandez had been sponsored by only one person at the time of his visa application, contrary to the requirements of the Migration Regulations. Fernandez argued that he had been supported by multiple relatives, including two nieces who provided equal financial support, and thus should be considered as having multiple sponsors. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia was tasked with deciding whether the AAT's finding of fact about the number of sponsors was correct and whether the AAT had erred in its interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions.

The primary legal issue was whether the AAT correctly found that Fernandez had only one sponsor at the time of his visa application. Fernandez contended that his reliance on multiple relatives for financial support meant he had multiple sponsors, contrary to the AAT's finding. Another issue was whether the AAT erred in its interpretation of the Migration Regulations, specifically regarding the possibility of multiple sponsors. Additionally, the court needed to determine whether the AAT's finding of fact was subject to judicial review.

The court found that the AAT's determination that Fernandez had only one sponsor at the time of his visa application was correct. The court noted that the appellant's submission that he was supported by multiple relatives did not necessarily mean he had multiple sponsors under the regulations. The court rejected the argument that sections 54 and 55 of the Migration Act override the specific requirement of the regulations. The court also held that the question of whether Fernandez was a sponsor was not a jurisdictional fact for the court to decide anew. The court held that the AAT's finding that there was only one sponsor at the time of the application was supported by the evidence, and therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

The court ordered that the name of the second respondent be amended to "Administrative Appeals Tribunal," upheld the notice of contention, and dismissed the appeal with costs. The court's decision emphasized that the AAT's findings on the number of sponsors were factual and not subject to judicial review unless there was a jurisdictional error.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the second respondent be amended to read “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.

2. The notice of contention be upheld and the appeal dismissed, with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Fernandez v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection concerns an appeal against a decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal (Tribunal) regarding an application for an aged dependent relative visa. The appellant, Fernandez, applied for the visa in 2012 and was sponsored by Mrs Arvelo. Fernandez contended that he was also sponsored by Ms Lacroix, one of his nieces, who provided him with financial support equally with another niece. The Tribunal found that Fernandez had been sponsored by only one person at the time of the application, and therefore, he was not dependent on the sponsor for a reasonable period. Fernandez challenged this finding, arguing that he was dependent on more than one relative and thus had more than one sponsor. Fernandez further contended that the Tribunal should have referred the matter to the Minister to consider the exercise of his powers under s 351 of the Migration Act.

Fernandez filed an appeal against the Tribunal's decision, which was initially heard by the Federal Circuit Court. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection filed a notice of contention, arguing that the Tribunal's finding of fact that Fernandez had only one sponsor at the time of the application was not a jurisdictional error. Fernandez contested this contention, arguing that the Tribunal's finding was incorrect and that he was dependent on more than one relative. The Minister also submitted that the request to the Tribunal to refer the matter to the Minister for consideration under s 351 of the Migration Act could not found error reviewable by the Federal Circuit Court. The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal's finding of fact was correct and if the request to refer the matter to the Minister could found error reviewable by the court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As to the Tribunal’s reasoning at [41] that there is no provision within the regulations for the applicant to be sponsored by more than one person, as presently advised I am not persuaded of the correctness of that view. It seems to me to be at least possible to read reg 1.20(1) as providing that the sponsor [or sponsors] of an applicant for a visa is a person [or are persons] (except a person [or persons] who proposes [or who propose] on the relevant approved form another person for entry to Australia as an applicant for a permanent humanitarian visa) who undertakes [or who undertake] the obligations stated in subreg (2) in relation to the applicant.Conclusion I uphold the notice of contention; ground 1 of the notice of appeal does not arise and I reject ground 2. The appeal must be dismissed, with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In oral submissions on his notice of contention, the Minister submitted that only one sponsor was proffered at the time of the application for the visa and Ms Lacroix provided the undertaking that was required in the definition of sponsor only on 11 February 2015 whereas the appellant’s visa application was submitted on 8 June 2012. The Tribunal’s finding of fact, the Minister submitted, was not a jurisdictional fact which the Court should decide for itself.Consideration On an appeal such as the present, this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the merits of the decision of the Tribunal. Ground 1 and the notice of contention In my opinion, there is considerable force in the respondent Minister’s notice of contention. Because, as a matter of fact found by the Tribunal, at the date of application there was only one sponsor, no error was shown in the course taken by the Tribunal, at [41] of its reasons, that it was not necessary to consider further whether Ms Lacroix may now be included as a sponsor of the appellant. Thus the correctness of the first two sentences of [41] of the Tribunal’s reasons: There is no provision within the regulations for the applicant to be sponsored by more than one person. There is no provision for a change of sponsor after the application has been filed. does not arise. In my opinion, the appellant’s attack on the Tribunal’s finding in this respect fails. The appellant’s submission was that because he was dependent, in a non-technical sense, on more than one relative it followed that he had more than one sponsor. I reject this submission. In my opinion, merely because a person is providing some financial support does not mean that reg 1.20(2) is satisfied. The appellant also put that ss 54 and 55 of the Migration Act resolved any difficulty in this respect, but I would not construe those sections as overriding the specific requirement of cl 838.21 that a criterion to be met at the time of the application for the visa is that the visa applicant is sponsored by the relative. Sections 54 and 55 do not deal with the issue of whether or not a criterion is fulfilled at the time of the application. As to the submission that whether or not a person is a sponsor is a jurisdictional fact and so a fact for the Court to decide for itself, I see no basis for that conclusion. Even if it were correct, I would decide on the evidence that at the time of the application for a visa the appellant had only one sponsor, Mrs Arvelo. At that time, only Mrs Arvelo, and not Ms Lacroix, was the person who had undertaken the obligations stated in reg 1.20(2) in relation to the appellant. It follows that the notice of contention should be upheld and the first ground of the notice of appeal does not arise and should be dismissed. I note that [51] of the Tribunal’s reasons seems to involve construing the expression “dependent on that person for a reasonable period, and remains so dependent” as involving a comparison between the normal and the temporary. On that basis, and if it were relevant to do so, I would not accept the approach of the primary judge which was to say that this was merely fact-finding by the Tribunal. A question of construction appears to be involved in the Tribunal’s approach.