FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Ferguson v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 706
Citation: Ferguson v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 706 Parties: JOHN FERGUSON v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION File number: ACD 31 of 2012 Judge: EDMONDS J Date of judgment: 5 July 2012 Catchwords: INCOME TAX – whether appeal to this Court competent – s 14ZZ Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) – application for review of decisions in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal sent at same time as notice of appeal against appealable objection decisions in this Court sent – whether in respect of same or different objection decisions
Held: In respect of different objection decisions; appeal competent.
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) s 14ZZ
Federal Court Rules 2011 r 13.01(1)(a)Cases cited: Punin v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation & Anor (2000) 44 ATR 233 referred to
Graspas v Commissioner of Taxation [2011] FCA 1465 referred toDate of hearing: 28 June 2012 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 16 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr JP O’Regan Solicitor for the Applicant: HopgoodGanim Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr DFC Thomas Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
ACD 31 of 2012
BETWEEN: JOHN FERGUSON
ApplicantAND: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent
JUDGE:
EDMONDS J
DATE OF ORDER:
5 JULY 2012
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.Costs of the application be costs in the cause.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Order 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
ACD 31 of 2012
BETWEEN: JOHN FERGUSON
ApplicantAND: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent
JUDGE:
EDMONDS J
DATE:
5 JULY 2012
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
This is an application by the respondent (“Commissioner”) to set aside the applicant’s notice of appeal pursuant to r 13.01(1)(a) of the Federal Court Rules 2011, or, alternatively, for it to be dismissed pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
The basis of the Commissioner’s application is that by the time the applicant’s notice of appeal was recorded as filed in the ACT registry of the Court, he had already commenced proceedings in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) in respect of the same objection decisions. Having made that election it was, according to the Commissioner, no longer open to the applicant to raise the merits of the Commissioner’s assessments before this Court by way of appeal from the objection decisions: s 14ZZ of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (“the TA Act”); Punin v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation & Anor (2000) 44 ATR 233 at [67] per Emmett J; Graspas v Commissioner of Taxation [2011] FCA 1465 at [11] per Gordon J.
The applicant opposed the Commissioner’s application on the basis that the objection decisions he appealed to this Court were not…
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 706
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues in this case were whether the applicant had validly appealed the objection decisions to the Federal Court and whether the AAT application was confined to the decision to disallow the objection to the assessments of shortfall penalty. The Court needed to determine the scope and content of the applicant’s appeal and whether the appeal was correctly lodged in the Federal Court.
The Court found that the applicant's notice of appeal was specifically directed to the disallowance of the objection against the substantive amended assessments, while the AAT application was directed to the disallowance of the objection against the assessments of shortfall penalty. The Court concluded that the appeal to the Federal Court was confined to the disallowance of the objection against the substantive amended assessments and did not include the disallowance of the objection against the assessments of shortfall penalty. Consequently, the Court dismissed the Commissioner’s application to set aside the appeal, holding that the appeal was validly brought and properly before the Court. The Court ordered that the costs of the application be costs in the cause.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
On the other hand, the Notice of Appeal, in its terms, was more specific. It provided:“The Applicant appeals against the decision made by the Respondent on 14 February 2012 under subsection 14ZY(1) of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 to disallow in full the objection of the Applicant dated 1 October 2010 against notices of amended assessment issued on 25 August 2010 for the years ended 30 June 2007 and 30 June 2008.”Clearly, the appeal to this Court was confined to the decision of the Commissioner to disallow the applicant’s objection against the substantive amended assessments and did not extend to, or embrace, the Commissioner’s decision to disallow the applicant’s objection against the assessments of shortfall penalty.CONSIDERATION It is in the context of these findings of fact that the Commissioner’s application has to be considered. This is not a case where the applicant lodged with the Tribunal an application for review of the Commissioner’s decision with respect to the disallowance of both the substantive amended assessments and the assessments of shortfall penalty and then, subsequently, had a change of mind with respect to the decision on the former and lodged a notice of appeal in this Court. If they were the facts, I would have no alternative but to upheld the Commissioner’s application and set aside the applicant’s notice of appeal: s 14ZZ of the TA Act; Punin; Graspas. Here, the applicant, by his solicitors, sent the Notice of Appeal to this Court and the AAT Application to the Tribunal at the same time although the former was not recorded by the registry of this Court as having been filed until four days after it was sent for the reasons set out in [9] above. In these circumstances, I am of the view that the AAT Application has to be read and construed in the context of the Notice of Appeal, and vice versa. So read and construed, it is clear, in my view, that the Notice of Appeal is confined to the Commissioner’s decision to disallow the applicant’s objection in respect of the substantive amended assessments and that the AAT Application is confined to the Commissioner’s decision to disallow the applicant’s objection in respect of the assessments of shortfall penalty.CONCLUSION It follows, in my view, that the Commissioner’s application must be dismissed. I was asked by counsel for the Commissioner that if I was to come to this conclusion, I should nevertheless make no order as to costs. Counsel for the applicant submitted that costs should follow the event. In my view, the costs of the application should be costs in the cause.