Ferguson v Apex Steel Supplies Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)

FERGUSON v APEX STEEL SUPPLIES PTY LTD

[2018] SASC 89

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Stanley

26 June 2018

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY - DEFAULT JUDGMENT

MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT - PROCEDURE - TIME FOR APPEAL AND EXTENSION

MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT - POWERS OF COURT - FRESH EVIDENCE

Appeal against the entry of a default judgment in the sum of $14,512.07 and a subsequent order dismissing an application to set aside that judgment. Application to admit fresh evidence on appeal. Application for extension of time within which to appeal.

Held:

1.  The appellant has failed to demonstrate he has an arguable defence on the merits.

2.  The application to extend the time within which to appeal from the order for default judgment is refused.

3.  The appeal from the order for default judgment is dismissed.

4.  The appeal from the order refusing to set aside the default judgment is dismissed.

5.  Parties to be heard as to costs.

Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 2013 (SA), referred to.
Ventura v Sustek (1976) 14 SASR 395; Goldus Pty Ltd v Australian Mining Pty Ltd [2015] SASCFC 193; Sandery v Kowalski & Anor [2016] SASC 175; Walton Stores v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, applied.

FERGUSON v APEX STEEL SUPPLIES PTY LTD
[2018] SASC 89

Magistrates Appeal

STANLEY J:

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal against the entry of a default judgment in the sum of $14,512.07 and a subsequent order dismissing an application to set aside that judgment. 

  2. The respondent to this appeal (Apex Steel Supplies) was the plaintiff in an action commenced in the Magistrates Court civil division claiming $14,112.07 from the appellant to the appeal (Mr Ferguson) who was the defendant to the action in the Magistrates Court.  The basis of the claim was that Apex Steel Supplies had supplied to McEwan Ferguson Pty Ltd, trading as Bsmart Housing, goods on credit in an amount of $13,063.07.  McEwan Ferguson Pty Ltd failed to pay and Apex Steel Supplies sought to recover that sum from Mr Ferguson on the basis that on 23 July 2013 he had personally guaranteed payment of goods supplied on credit by Apex Steel Supplies to McEwan Ferguson Pty Ltd. 

  3. Mr Ferguson entered a defence to the claim, the particulars of which were:

    1.Deny.  Another entity other than McEwan Ferguson Pty Ltd was the applicant;

    2.The quantum of sum owed is incorrect; and

    3.The defendant is neither a director or shareholder of the principal.

  4. Apex Steel Supplies brought an application for summary judgment which eventually was heard on 13 December 2017 after Mr Ferguson had previously sought an adjournment of the hearing of the application.

  5. On 13 December 2017 Mr Ferguson failed to attend the hearing of the application and judgment was entered in default in the sum of…

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Details
Case
[2018] SASC 89
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Ferguson v Apex Steel Supplies Pty Ltd, the plaintiff, Ferguson, sought to appeal against the dismissal of an application to set aside a default judgment obtained by Apex Steel Supplies in the Magistrates Court of South Australia. The dispute involved commercial litigation, where Ferguson failed to respond to a claim by Apex Steel, resulting in a default judgment being entered against him. The primary issue before the court was whether the plaintiff's application for an extension of time to appeal against the refusal to set aside the default judgment should be granted. The court also needed to determine whether the plaintiff had an arguable case on the merits and a reasonable excuse for the default.

The court examined the principles governing the setting aside of default judgments, referencing the relevant rule in the Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 2013 (SA) and previous cases. The court highlighted the importance of the defendant demonstrating an arguable case on the merits and a reasonable excuse for the default. It was noted that the application to set aside the default judgment was dismissed because Ferguson did not provide sufficient particularity regarding the merits of his defence, nor did he establish a reasonable excuse for the default. The court's reasoning underscored the necessity of enforcing the rules in a manner that promotes the expeditious determination of proceedings while balancing the need to do justice to the parties.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the application for an extension of time should be refused due to the substantial delay in lodging the appeal. The court found that Ferguson had not suffered significant prejudice from the order granting the default judgment, as he had already brought an application to set it aside, which was determined on its merits. The court emphasised that the public's confidence in the courts' ability to efficiently determine matters must be upheld, and thus, there must be limits to the parties’ entitlement to contest claims where they have fallen into default in their conduct of the litigation. Consequently, the appeal against the refusal to set aside the default judgment was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

In my view the Court should refuse the application for an extension of time. The delay is substantial. While Mr Ferguson submits that he was distracted by his wife’s illness and his business difficulties from attending to the institution of the appeal, ultimately, I am not persuaded that, if an extension is not granted, there will be a miscarriage of justice. I reach that view on the basis that Mr Ferguson brought an application to set aside the default judgment which was heard and determined by the magistrate on its merits. Accordingly, Mr Ferguson has not suffered any prejudice as a result of the order granting default judgment, with the possible exception of the order for costs in the sum of $100 for his failure to attend the hearing on 13 December 2017. Whether that possible prejudice is real depends on the outcome of the appeal from the order dismissing the application to set aside the default judgment. The appeal from the refusal to set aside the default judgment The magistrate considered the application to set aside the default judgment in accordance with the provisions of r 87 of the Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 2013 (SA) which provides for the setting aside of a judgment not being a final judgment. Relevantly r 87(2) prescribes the test for the making of such an order. It provides:(2)The Court must not set aside such a judgment unless the party seeking to set it aside establishes that he or she – (a) has an arguable case on the merits; and(b) has a reasonable excuse for not having complied with these rules, or an order of the Court, or any time limit fixed by these rules or of the Court, in respect of the action or proceeding. The principles applicable to an application to set aside a judgment were considered in Sandery v Kowalski & Anor[5] where Doyle J said:[6][5] [2016] SASC 175. [6] [2016] SASC 175 at [22]-[30].In Cubelic v T & D Lock Pty Ltd, Duggan J heard an appeal from a Magistrate’s refusal to set aside a default judgment under an identically worded r 87 under the preceding version of the Magistrate Court (Civil) Rules. In that case, the plaintiff had personally served the defendant on 14 July 2009. After no response from the defendant, the plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the defendant on 12 August 2009. The plaintiff then sought to enforce the judgment through an application to charge a property in which the defendant had an interest with payment of the judgment debt. On 3 September 2009, at a directions hearing in respect of that application, the defendant was represented by a solicitor and foreshadowed an application to set aside the default judgment. The defendant’s solicitor filed an affidavit in support of the application to set aside the default judgment the following day.The Magistrate dismissed the application to set aside on the basis that neither limb of r 87(2) had been satisfied. Duggan J dismissed the appeal from the Magistrate’s decision, upholding the Magistrate’s decision in respect of both limbs of r 87(2).In respect of the first limb (which required that the defendant establish he had an arguable defence on the merits), Duggan J applied the following passage from the reasons of Walters J in Watson v Anderson:… a mere statement by a defendant that he has a good defence is not sufficient to justify a review of the exercise of a judicial discretion. He must go further and demonstrate “a very compelling reason” for his failure to appear in the action, and, further, that he has a plausible defence either in law or in fact. True it is that on an application to set aside a judgment by default, the court does not pronounce on the law or the facts, but it seems to me that before allowing a defendant to come in and defend, the court should have before it materials which enable it to say how it came about that the defendant found himself bound by a judgment regularly obtained; that the defendant genuinely desires to be allowed to come in and present his case; and that issues are raised in such form as to require serious consideration of the defence which he would put forward. In the words of Jenkins L.J. in Grimshaw v Dunbar “the judge is entitled to satisfy himself that the party applying has a bona fide intention of defending the action, and that there is some possibility of his doing so with success”.Duggan J went on to hold that there needed to be more than a bare and unsupported claim by the defendant. There must be an affidavit as to the merits of sufficient particularity to at least enable the Court to make an assessment of the genuineness of the defence and whether it is arguable on the merits. While the defendant in that case denied that he was acting in the capacity alleged by the plaintiff, his affidavit did not address the circumstances relevant to this issue. In circumstances where the defendant relied merely upon bald assertions, Duggan J upheld the Magistrate’s conclusion that the defendant had fallen short of establishing an arguable case on the merits.In respect of the second limb (which required that the defendant establish that he had a reasonable excuse for the default), Duggan J again relied upon Watson v Anderson. He referred in this context to a passage from the reasons of Bray CJ in that case in which his Honour referred to the words on the summons that made it plain that a response was necessary within a particular timeframe. Bray CJ held that if the defendant in that case had read those words, then he must have understood what was required; and that if he did not, then he was the author of his own misfortune. Either way, there was no reasonable excuse for the default.Applying that approach, Duggan J relied upon the clear words on the claim served on the defendant requiring that a defence be filed within 21 days, and the Magistrate’s finding that the defendant simply chose to ignore the claim for a period of time. Duggan J held that the combination of these matters justified the Magistrate’s conclusion that the defendant had not established a reasonable excuse for not filing a defence. Cubelic v T & D Lock Pty Ltd represents a relatively rigorous approach to the setting aside of judgments. However, that approach is required by r 87(2), particularly when interpreted in light of the overarching requirements of r 3(1)(a). In the case of commercial litigation, there is an imperative to ensure that the rules are interpreted and enforced in a manner conducive to the expeditious determination of proceedings. While this should not occur at the expense of doing justice to the parties and more generally, which remains the paramount concern of the courts, this does not mean that parties will be given unlimited opportunity to pursue or contest a claim. If they have not taken an earlier opportunity reasonably available to them to identify and pursue a proper basis for contesting a claim, then even achieving justice between the parties may not require that they be afforded a further opportunity. But certainly once regard is had to the interest in the just and expeditious administration of civil justice more generally, and in particular the need to ensure that the public’s confidence in the courts’ ability to efficiently determine matters is not undermined, it can readily be seen that there must be limits to the parties’ entitlement to contest claims where they have fallen into default in their conduct of the litigation.Some rigor in the courts’ approach, as demonstrated by the reasons of Duggan J in Cubelic v T & D Lock Pty Ltd, is consonant with, if not required by, the approach of the High Court to applications to amend in Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University. As the reasons of the various members of the Court in that case make plain, commercial litigation has a particular claim to expedition. Delay and disruption in the ordinary course of litigation not only exacerbate the time, cost and inconvenience to the parties, and the uncertainty and strain of litigation to which they are subjected, they also have an undesirable impact on the availability of judicial and court resources to other parties, and upon the public’s confidence in the courts’ ability to administer justice in a commercial setting.[Citations omitted].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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