Ferdinands v State of South Australia

Link copied
Case Copied 47 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ferdinands v State of South Australia [2018] FCA 589

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Ferdinands v The State of South Australia (No 2)[2017] FCA 1436
File number: SAD 335 of 2017
Judge: KERR J
Date of judgment: 27 April 2018
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for leave to appeal – first instance decision not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration – no substantial injustice in refusing leave to appeal – substantive appeal has no prospects of success – application dismissed
Legislation:

Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 5.23, 26.01

Cases cited:

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1992] FCA 665; (1991) 33 FCR 397

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Soiland Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2010] FCA 168

Ferdinands v The State of South Australia [2016] FCA 1268

Ferdinands v The State of South Australia (No 2) [2017] FCA 1436

Date of hearing: 27 April 2018
Registry: South Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 54
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms S Mitchell
Solicitor for the Respondent: Crown Solicitor’s Office

ORDERS

SAD 335 of 2017
BETWEEN:

TREVOR KINGSLEY FERDINANDS

Applicant

AND:

STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

Respondent

JUDGE:

KERR J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 APRIL 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal and the interlocutory application accepted for filing on 5 April 2018 be dismissed.

2.The Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs as assessed or agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from the transcript)

KERR J:

  1. This is an application for leave to appeal a decision of a judge of this Court in Ferdinands v The State of South Australia (No 2) [2017] FCA 1436. In that decision, the primary judge dismissed proceedings commenced by Mr Ferdinands pursuant to r 26.01(b) and (d) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the Rules) on the basis that they were frivolous, vexatious or otherwise constituted an abuse of process.

    BEFORE THE PRIMARY JUDGE

  2. The primary judge set out the background to the proceedings at first instance as follows:

    1The applicant, Mr Ferdinands, is a former employee of South Australia Police. He was subject to disciplinary and criminal proceedings in connection with his conduct as a police officer and his employment was terminated in November 2001.

    2Mr Ferdinands is a litigant in person. He is nonetheless a seasoned litigator in the sense that he has, over a long period of time, been engaged in a number of legal proceedings following and concerning the termination of his employment.

    3On its face, the present claim appears founded on alleged breaches of copyright said to subsist in literary or artistic works created by Mr Ferdinands. As originally framed, the pleadings alleged that the owner of the copyright was the “Kingsley…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Ferdinands v State of South Australia and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] FCA 589
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Ferdinands v State of South Australia involved an application by Kingsley Ferdinands for leave to appeal a decision of the Federal Court of Australia. The primary judge had dismissed Mr Ferdinands' proceedings as vexatious and an abuse of process, concluding that his claims were intended to revive a long-standing dispute with the State of South Australia. Mr Ferdinands sought to appeal the dismissal, arguing that the primary judge had erred in her decision and that he should be allowed to plead a narrower claim relating to copyright. The State of South Australia opposed the application, arguing that Mr Ferdinands was attempting to use the appeal as a means to re-litigate issues that had already been decided.

The central legal issues in the case were whether the first instance decision was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration and whether refusal to grant leave to appeal, if the decision was wrong, would result in substantial injustice. The court considered the principles established in Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc, which provide that when considering an application for leave to appeal, the court should consider whether the first instance decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration and whether refusal to grant leave to appeal, if the decision was wrong, would result in substantial injustice. The court also noted that it is relevant to consider the prima facie merits of the substantive appeal.

In dismissing the application, the court held that the primary judge's decision was not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration and that there would not be any substantial injustice in refusing leave to appeal. The court found that Mr Ferdinands' primary objective was to bring before the court grievances that had already been determined against him in other proceedings, and that his copyright claim was merely a means to achieve that collateral purpose. The court held that the primary judge's decision not to permit Mr Ferdinands to replead his case on a confined basis would not amount to a substantial injustice because the vindication of Mr Ferdinands' rights in respect of the copyright issue was never his fundamental objective.

The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and the interlocutory application, and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs as assessed or agreed. The court noted that entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal and the interlocutory application accepted for filing on 5 April 2018 be dismissed.

2. The Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs as assessed or agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In my view, her Honour was correct to conclude that the proceedings before her were, for the reasons her Honour gave, relevantly an abuse of process. Supposing decision wrong – no substantial injustice However, supposing her Honour’s decision was wrong, I also conclude that there would not be any substantial injustice. But, on that premise, I turn to the pleaded breach of copyright. The primary judge did not permit Mr Ferdinands to replead his cause of action shorn of those aspects which her Honour held demonstrated it to have been relevantly an abuse of process. Her Honour held that the “dispute” forming the subject of Mr Ferdinands’ action had either been determined in the past or was otherwise so poorly articulated that it could not be understood, or both. The primary judge held that in light of the history of the action and the principles to which her Honour referred, Mr Ferdinands should not be permitted any further opportunity to demonstrate that his proceeding was bona fide or that he was willing and able to plead a case in a manner that would enable the Respondent to fairly understand and respond to the case against it. Mr Ferdinands has not explicitly submitted that a substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal the matter limited to the copyright issue were not granted. However it is evident from his application, draft notice of appeal, interlocutory application and affidavits that Mr Ferdinands is seeking to correct what he perceives to be great injustices earlier occasioned against him which appear also to be the subject of the matter over which he claims copyright. There is no reason to doubt Mr Ferdinands’ subjective sincerity in that regard. However, that is not determinative of the outcome of these proceedings. I am satisfied that on the materials before me I am entitled to infer that to the extent that Mr Ferdinands’ statement of claim, but for the primary judge’s decision to dismiss the action, might have been capable of being rearticulated so as to confine it to allegations relating to copyright, shorn of the other issues that would not address the great injustices Mr Ferdinands perceived have been done to him by reason of the State’s conduct in what he asserts to be his malicious prosecution and his dismissal as an employee of the police force. His persistence in rearticulating those grievances demonstrates, I infer, that those are the injustices he wishes to bring before the Court. In that regard, his copyright claim is simply a means to achieve that collateral purpose. In that sense the primary judge’s decision not to permit him to replead his case on a confined basis, even if wrong, would not amount to a substantial injustice because the vindication of Mr Ferdinands’ rights in respect of the copyright issue was never his fundamental objective. In respect of the principle as to whether or not a refusal to grant leave to appeal would potentially give rise to a substantial injustice, the Respondent submits:25The primary Judge found the Statement of Claim contained allegations relating to copyright, but was otherwise defective. Further, the primary Judge concluded that she was “satisfied that the claims as founded in copyright, and all other claims pleaded (or at least intimated) in the Statement of Claim, are intended by Mr Ferdinands to be used as a vehicle to resuscitate his long running dispute with the various agencies of the respondent.”26The Applicant was given the opportunity to confine and clarify his allegations, however was unwilling or unable to do so.27In such circumstances there is no substantial injustice to the Applicant. If, amongst the voluminous materials filed in the proceedings at first instance there was or is a claim at law, which could be articulated and substantiated, the Applicant would be at liberty to bring such a claim in the appropriate jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Respondent submits that the orders sought by Mr Ferdinands in his interlocutory application are for general procedural orders, but many relate to the Applicant’s substantive grievances which are outside the jurisdiction of this Court. CONSIDERATION The primary judge summarily dismissed Mr Ferdinands’ first instance proceedings pursuant to r 26.01(1)(b) and (d) of the Rules on the basis that they were frivolous or vexatious and otherwise constituted an abuse of process. In his written submissions at [2], Mr Ferdinands refers to a dismissal for non-appearance but there appears to be no basis for that submission and I need not consider it no further. I have also earlier concluded that Mr Ferdinands’ present application cannot serve as a vehicle to allow the question of whether the primary judge erred in making orders that the name “Kingsley Ferdinands Film Group” be removed from the title of these proceedings. That question was decided in Ferdinands No 1. Leave has not been sought to appeal that decision and it is not properly the subject of these proceedings. I therefore give no further attention to that purported ground. As to Mr Ferdinands’ other grounds, in so far as I have been able to identify them as set out at [21] above, the relevant principles that the Court should have regard to when considering an application for leave to appeal are, as the Respondent submits, well established. I refer to the case of Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1992] FCA 665; (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-400 which establishes the principles as follows: (1)Whether, in all the circumstances, the first instance decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by the Full Court; and(2)Whether refusal to grant leave to appeal, supposing the decision to be wrong, would result in substantial injustice. It is also always relevant to consider the prima facie merits of the substantive appeal and I refer to: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Soiland Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2010] FCA 168 at [20]. Decision not attended by sufficient doubt I have set out a summary of the primary judge’s decision above (at [2] to [12]) of my reasons. The reason the primary judge gave (at [52]) for dismissing Mr Ferdinands’ action as vexatious was her Honour was satisfied that the claims founded in copyright, and all other claims pleaded (or at least intimated) in Mr Ferdinands’ statement of claim, were intended by Mr Ferdinands to be used as a vehicle to resuscitate his long running dispute with the various agencies of the Respondent, notwithstanding that the underlying dispute had been determined against him in other proceedings. Her Honour reasoned that in all of the circumstances, she was satisfied that to permit Mr Ferdinands’ action to continue would be to allow the Court’s processes to be used as an instrument of unjustified harassment of the Respondent. None of the materials filed by Mr Ferdinands in support of his present application for leave to appeal identify an error in her Honour’s reasoning in having reached that conclusion. In so far as Mr Ferdinands’ application and submissions are comprehensible, what he advances therein does not even purport to put into contest the primary judge’s conclusion regarding his underlying purpose in bringing the action which her Honour held to be an abuse of process.