Ferdinands v Commissioner for Public Employment

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FERDINANDS v COMMISSIONER FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
[2004] SASC 30

Full Court:      Prior, Debelle and Bleby JJ

  1. PRIOR J               I agree with the reasons given by Bleby J and with the orders he proposes.

  2. DEBELLE J         I am grateful to Bleby J for his summary of the relevant facts and the relevant legislation.  However, for the reasons which follow, I disagree with his conclusion.

  3. Section 40 of the Police Act 1998 invests the Commissioner of Police with powers to act in a wide variety of ways if a member of the police force is found to be guilty of an offence. The width of those powers is best understood by listing them. Section 40(1) lists in paragraphs (d) to (o) how the Commissioner may act. He may act in any one or more of the following ways:

    “(d)termination of the person’s appointment;

    (e)suspension of the person’s appointment for a specified period;

    (f)reduction of the person’s remuneration by a specified amount for a specified period (but not so that the total amount forfeited exceeds the amount prescribed by regulation);

    (g)where the person is a member of S.A. Police,  transfer of the member to another position in S.A. Police (whether with or without a reduction in rank, seniority or remuneration);

    (h)where the person is a member of S.A. Police, reduction in the member’s seniority;

    (i)imposition of a fine not exceeding the amount prescribed by regulation;

    (j)where the person is a police cadet, withdrawal of specified rights or privileges for a specified period;

    (k)a reprimand recorded in the person’s conduct and service history kept under the regulations;

    (l)an unrecorded reprimand;

    (m)counselling;

    (n)education or training;

    (o)action of any other kind prescribed by regulation.”

    Thus, the Commissioner’s powers extend from termination of the officers’ appointment through suspension from duty, reduction in seniority to a reprimand or counselling.  The very width of these powers highlights the possibility that the Commissioner might on some occasion terminate an officer’s appointment when another form of discipline would have been entirely adequate.  For example, a police officer might be found to have been guilty of exceeding the speed limit.  Whilst that might be a poor example for police officers to set to the public, it is unlikely to warrant termination of appointment as a police officer.  One can readily identify a large number of offences where, according to circumstances, termination of the police officer’s appointment would be unjustified.

  4. Although the Police Act 1998 deals with issues affecting the administration of SA Police including discipline and in that respect might be considered to be a special Act in contrast with the more general application of the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994, it was nevertheless enacted against the legislative background of the Industrial and Employee Relations Act and the provisions of Part 6 of that Act relating to unfair dismissal. It is, therefore, reasonable to infer that it was not intended to deny a police officer a right to make an application under Part 6 for unfair dismissal. The absence, therefore, from…

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Details
Case
[2004] SASC 30
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Ferdinands v Commissioner for Public Employment involved Mr Ferdinands, a police constable in the South Australian Police Force, who was dismissed by the Commissioner of Police after being found guilty of assault. Mr Ferdinands sought relief under Part 6 of Chapter 3 of the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994, arguing that his dismissal was harsh, unjust, or unreasonable. The Industrial Relations Court dismissed his application, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's decision to terminate Mr Ferdinands' employment. Mr Ferdinands then purported to appeal to the Supreme Court of South Australia, arguing that the Industrial Relations Court erred in law by not granting him leave to appeal. The Full Court of the Supreme Court considered whether the Industrial Relations Commission had jurisdiction to hear Mr Ferdinands' application and whether the Industrial Relations Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The court found that the Industrial Relations Commission did not have jurisdiction to hear the application as the Police Act 1998 provided a complete code for the discipline and dismissal of police officers, and any termination of employment under s 40 of the Police Act was not subject to review under Chapter 3, Part 6 of the Industrial and Employee Relations Act. The court also found that the Industrial Relations Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, but that Mr Ferdinands' appeal was incompetent as he had not applied for leave to appeal. The court refused leave to appeal, finding that Mr Ferdinands did not have an arguable case that the Industrial Relations Court was wrong in its decision. The court also found that the other issues raised by Mr Ferdinands were not properly before the Industrial Relations Court and could not be the subject of an application for leave to appeal. The court ordered that the purported notice of appeal be treated as an application for leave to appeal, refused leave to appeal, and ordered that costs be awarded to the respondent unless Mr Ferdinands indicated within 14 days that he wished to oppose the order for costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr. Ferdinands was a police constable in the South Australian Police Force who was dismissed by the Commissioner of Police on 22 November 2001. The dismissal was pursuant to his having been found guilty in the Magistrates Court of a charge of assault contrary to s 39 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935. On 22 May 2002, Mr. Ferdinands applied to the Industrial Relations Commission of South Australia seeking a determination that his dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable and seeking an order for re-employment or other alternative relief under the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994. A Commissioner of the Industrial Relations Commission referred questions of law to the Industrial Relations Court regarding the jurisdiction of the Industrial Relations Commission to hear Mr. Ferdinands’ application. The Full Court of the Industrial Relations Court determined that the Commission did not have jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Ferdinands’ application for relief. Mr. Ferdinands then purported to appeal to the Supreme Court of South Australia against that decision and order. The Supreme Court considered whether Mr. Ferdinands’ purported appeal was competent and whether leave to appeal should be granted.

The case of Ferdinands v Commissioner for Public Employment came before the Supreme Court of South Australia as an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Relations Court. Mr Ferdinands, a former police constable, sought to appeal against the Industrial Relations Court's decision that it did not have jurisdiction to hear his application for relief under the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994, following his dismissal by the Commissioner of Police. The appeal to the Supreme Court was initiated by Mr Ferdinands on 4 April 2003, and the Court treated the purported notice of appeal as an application for leave to appeal under section 191(1)(b) of the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994. The matter proceeded with arguments on whether the Industrial Relations Court had jurisdiction to hear Mr Ferdinands' application and if the Police Act 1998 impliedly repealed the application of the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 to police officers. The Supreme Court ultimately found that the Industrial Relations Court did not err in its jurisdictional determination and denied leave to appeal, with an order for costs to follow unless Mr Ferdinands indicated a wish to oppose it within 14 days.

Decision

Reasons for decision

PRIOR J (dissent) DEBELLE J (dissent)
Issues
1. Does the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 confer jurisdiction on the Industrial Relations Commission of South Australia to review a decision of the Commissioner of Police to terminate a police officer's employment under s 40 of the Police Act 1998?
2. If the Industrial Relations Commission does not have jurisdiction, is the Industrial Relations Court's decision that it did not have jurisdiction correct?
3. Does the Police Act 1998 provide a complete code in respect of the termination of a police officer's employment, thereby excluding the application of the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994?
4. Is the Industrial Relations Commission's jurisdiction to determine unfair dismissal claims excluded by the existence of the Police (Complaints and Disciplinary Proceedings) Act 1985 and the Police Regulations 1999?
5. Is the applicant estopped from bringing an application for relief under the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 due to his application to the District Court of South Australia?
6. Was the Industrial Relations Court's decision to deny jurisdiction based on an error of law?
7. Can Mr Ferdinands' purported appeal be treated as an application for leave to appeal under s 191(1)(b) of the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994, and should leave to appeal be granted?

Held
1. The Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 does not confer jurisdiction on the Industrial Relations Commission of South Australia to review a decision of the Commissioner of Police to terminate a police officer's employment under s 40 of the Police Act 1998; appeal allowed.
2. The Industrial Relations Court's decision that it did not have jurisdiction is correct; application dismissed.
3. The Police Act 1998 provides a complete code in respect of the termination of a police officer's employment, thereby excluding the application of the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994; application dismissed.
4. The Industrial Relations Commission's jurisdiction to determine unfair dismissal claims is excluded by the existence of the Police (Complaints and Disciplinary Proceedings) Act 1985 and the Police Regulations 1999; application dismissed.
5. The applicant is not estopped from bringing an application for relief under the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 due to his application to the District Court of South Australia; application dismissed.
6. The Industrial Relations Court's decision to deny jurisdiction was not based on an error of law; application dismissed.
7. Mr Ferdinands' purported appeal can be treated as an application for leave to appeal under s 191(1)(b) of the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994, but leave to appeal should be refused; leave to appeal refused.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

The first issue addressed by the court was whether the Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 (Industrial Act) conferred jurisdiction on the Industrial Relations Commission of South Australia to review a decision of the Commissioner of Police to terminate a police officer's employment under s 40 of the Police Act 1998. The court found that the Industrial Relations Commission did not have jurisdiction to review such decisions. The court considered the broad and general jurisdiction of the Industrial Relations Commission under the Industrial Act to deal with unfair dismissals, but held that the specific provisions of the Police Act rendered decisions on the termination of a police officer's employment immune from review by the Industrial Relations Commission. The court relied on its earlier decisions in McQuillan v Commissioner for Public Employment (1993) and Stone v Commissioner for Public Employment (2002) to support this conclusion. The court also considered the principles of statutory interpretation, emphasizing the need to reconcile competing statutes and the presumption that both provisions should operate if possible.

The second issue was whether the Industrial Relations Court's decision that it did not have jurisdiction was correct. The court upheld the decision of the Industrial Relations Court, finding that it was acting within its jurisdiction in answering the questions referred to it by the Industrial Relations Commission. The court found that the Industrial Relations Court correctly determined that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain Mr Ferdinands' application for relief under Part 6 of Chapter 3 of the Industrial Act.

The third issue addressed was whether the Police Act 1998 provided a complete code in respect of the termination of a police officer's employment, thereby excluding the application of the Industrial Act. The court concluded that the Police Act was intended by Parliament to deal exclusively with all terminations of employment of members of the South Australian Police, and that the Industrial Act was impliedly repealed to the extent that it might otherwise apply to members of the South Australian Police. The court found that the Commissioner had complete control over the police force within the statutory parameters set by Parliament, and that this control could not be compromised by a determination of the Industrial Relations Commission.

The fourth issue was whether the Industrial Relations Commission's jurisdiction to determine unfair dismissal claims was excluded by the existence of the Police (Complaints and Disciplinary Proceedings) Act 1985 and the Police Regulations 1999. The court found that the procedures available under these Acts were sufficient to ensure that terminations of employment for disciplinary reasons were not subject to review under the Industrial Act. The court held that the Industrial Relations Commission did not have jurisdiction to review such decisions.

The fifth issue was whether the applicant was estopped from bringing an application for relief under the Industrial Act due to his application to the District Court of South Australia. The court found that the applicant's application to the District Court did not estop him from bringing an application for relief under the Industrial Act. The court held that the two applications were distinct and that the applicant was not estopped from seeking relief under the Industrial Act.

The sixth issue was whether the Industrial Relations Court's decision to deny jurisdiction was based on an error of law. The court found that the Industrial Relations Court was not in error in denying jurisdiction, and that its decision was correctly based on the principles of statutory interpretation and the specific provisions of the Police Act.

The final issue was whether Mr Ferdinands' purported appeal could be treated as an application for leave to appeal under s 191(1)(b) of the Industrial Act, and whether leave to appeal should be granted. The court found that Mr Ferdinands' purported appeal could be treated as an application for leave to appeal, but that leave to appeal should be refused. The court held that Mr Ferdinands did not have an arguable case that the Industrial Relations Court was wrong in its decision, and that the application for leave to appeal should be refused.