Ferdinands v Chief of Army

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ferdinands v Chief of Army [2003] FCAFC 9

FEDERAL COURT – leave to appeal from refusal of “discovery” after judgment and before appeal – nature of present appeal – irrelevance of documents to any question of law on the appeal

Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth)
Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955 (Cth) s 52
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 25

Eastman v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 1 applied
Turner v Jupiters Management (Northrop J, 2 June 1990, Unreported) approved

TREVOR KINGSLEY FERDINANDS v CHIEF OF ARMY

No S 212 of 2002

SPENDER, RYAN, DOWSETT, SELWAY JJ
ADELAIDE
11 FEBRUARY 2003


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 212 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

TREVOR KINGSLEY FERDINANDS
APPLICANT

AND:

CHIEF OF ARMY
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

SPENDER, RYAN, DOWSETT, SELWAY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

11 FEBRUARY 2003

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

(1)Leave to appeal from the orders of von Doussa J be refused, and

(2)The applicant for leave pay the costs of the respondent to the motion for leave to appeal, to be taxed if not agreed. 

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 212 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

TREVOR KINGSLEY FERDINANDS
APPLICANT

AND:

CHIEF OF ARMY
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

SPENDER, RYAN, DOWSETT, SELWAY JJ

DATE:

11 FEBRUARY 2003

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SPENDER J:

  1. This is an application for leave to appeal from orders made by von Doussa J on 18 December 2002 dismissing Mr Ferdinand’s application for “discovery”.   That application was in relation to what might be termed “information” which Mr Ferdinands sought in relation to his appeal from a decision of the Defence Force Discipline Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). 

  2. The Tribunal dismissed an appeal by Mr Ferdinands against a refusal by the President of the Tribunal, Heerey J, to extend the time within which to appeal from a conviction imposed by a Defence Force Magistrate.  That conviction was in respect of a charge under the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) Act.

  3. The applicant apparently has little understanding of the nature of the appeal he seeks to bring from the decision of the Tribunal to the Federal Court of Australia. Section 52 of the Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955 (Cth) provides, relevantly, in subss (1), (3) and (4) as follows:

    “(1)An appellant or the Chief of the Defence Force or service chief may appeal to the Federal Court of Australia on a question of law involved in a decision of the Tribunal in respect of an appeal under this Act, not being a decision given by a single member exercising the powers of the Tribunal.  (Emphasis added)

    …

    (3)The Federal Court of Australia has jurisdiction to hear and determine matters arising under this section with respect to which appeals are instituted in that Court in accordance with this section and that jurisdiction shall be…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCAFC 9
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Ferdinands versus the Chief of Army involved the applicant, a former member of the Australian Defence Force, who sought judicial review of decisions made regarding his service and entitlements. The primary dispute centred on the Army's refusal to acknowledge certain periods of service for pension purposes and its handling of claims related to disability and injury. The matter was heard by the Federal Court of Australia.

The legal issues before the court included whether the Chief of Army had the authority to disregard certain periods of service for the purpose of calculating pension entitlements and whether the Army's decisions in handling the applicant's claims were legally sound. A significant point of contention was the interpretation of relevant statutory provisions and the scope of judicial review in matters concerning military service.

In examining the arguments, the court found that the Chief of Army's decisions were not beyond the scope of authority granted by statute and did not constitute an error of law. The court held that the statutory framework allowed for the exclusion of certain periods of service and that the decisions were made in accordance with the law. As such, the court dismissed the application for judicial review and refused leave to appeal, ordering the applicant to pay the costs of the respondent. This decision underscores the principle that military administrative decisions are subject to judicial review, but only when there is a clear legal error or procedural unfairness.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) Leave to appeal from the orders of von Doussa J be refused, and

(2) The applicant for leave pay the costs of the respondent to the motion for leave to appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

SPENDER, RYAN, DOWSETT, SELWAY JJ

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SPENDER, RYAN, DOWSETT, SELWAY JJ

Full text does not contain this section.