IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B30 of 2008
B e t w e e n -
ROBYN CHRISTINE FELLOWES
Applicant
and
MILITARY REHABILITATION AND COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
HAYNE J
BELL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 13 FEBRUARY 2009, AT 11.27 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR J.A. GRIFFIN, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR R.F. KING‑SCOTT, for the applicant. (instructed by Slater & Gordon Lawyers)
MR T.M. HOWE, QC: May it please your Honours, I appear with my learned friend, MS L.A. WALKER, for the respondent. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
HAYNE J: Yes, Mr Griffin. Can we just clear up the affidavit questions? You rely on ‑ ‑ ‑
MR GRIFFIN: Mr Mason’s.
HAYNE J: And your opponent relies on the affidavit of Mr Ontong.
MR GRIFFIN: Yes, your Honour.
HAYNE J: Can we take both those affidavits as read without objection?
MR GRIFFIN: Yes, your Honour.
HAYNE J: Yes, Mr Griffin.
MR GRIFFIN: As your Honours will be well aware, most jurisdictions now provide or have legislation in which personal injuries compensation is assessed according to a table. The object is apparently to promote uniformity in awards to avoid the type of award variation that used to occur in relation to common law damages.
HAYNE J: Or supposed simplicity of administration, Mr Griffin, yes.
MR GRIFFIN: And perhaps as well, yes, your Honour. Such tables do not ordinarily describe the injuries in medical terms, rather, they tend to use descriptions relating to function and impairment following the American Medical Association tables. Whatever form the tabulation happens to take, if one encountered a situation in this case in which a claimant sustained an injury to one leg of such severity that it entitled the claimant to compensation and then in a later separate event sustained an injury of similar severity to the other leg, one would be very reluctant, we would submit, to apply the tabulation in such a way as to deny compensation to the second injury.
HAYNE J: Understanding that to be the underlying point you wish to make, there are two things particularly I would be glad to have argument about. One, where exactly do you say the Full Court departs from what this Court held in Canute and, second, why is this a point of continuing importance? Deal with those in such order and such manner as you see best, but they are two particular aspects I would be interested in.
MR GRIFFIN: Well, your Honour, if I could go straight to that. Your Honours have seen what Justice Moore said about the conflict between what appears in the joint judgment and what appears in Canute. If I could take your Honours to that first. What he said was that the joint judgment really amounts to using the guide in such a…
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- Case
- [2009] HCATrans 19
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was the proper interpretation of the term 'service injury' within the *Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2004* (Cth). Specifically, the Court was required to determine whether a psychological injury, which manifested after the applicant's discharge from the Australian Defence Force, could be considered to have arisen out of, or in the course of, his service, notwithstanding that the causative events occurred during his service. This involved considering the temporal relationship between the service and the manifestation of the injury, and whether the Act required a direct causal link between the service and the *onset* of the injury, or merely that the injury *arose out of* the service.
The High Court held that the applicant's psychological injury was a 'service injury' under the Act. Their Honours reasoned that the phrase 'arising out of, or in the course of, service' in s 5(1) of the Act did not require the injury to manifest during the period of service. Instead, it required a causal connection between the service and the injury. The Court found that the applicant's psychological injury had a sufficient causal connection to his military service, even though it manifested after his discharge. The principles applied focused on the broad remedial purpose of the Act and a purposive construction of the statutory language, emphasising that the injury arose from the conditions of service.
The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decision of the Full Federal Court, and remitted the matter to the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission for redetermination in accordance with the Court's reasons.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi