IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S107 of 2024
B e t w e e n -
FEL17
Appellant
and
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent
GAGELER CJ
GORDON J
STEWARD J
GLEESON J
JAGOT J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 6 DECEMBER 2024, AT 9.59 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR D.H. GODWIN: May it please the Court, I appear for the appellant with MS B.M. FLAHERTY. (instructed by Herbert Smith Freehills)
MR P.M. KNOWLES, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS K.N. HOOPER, for the respondent. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
GAGELER CJ: Thank you.
MR KNOWLES: Whilst I am on my feet, might I formally seek an order amending the name of the respondent to the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.
GAGELER CJ: Yes, you have that order.
MR KNOWLES: If the Court pleases.
GAGELER CJ: Mr Godwin.
MR GODWIN: Thank you, your Honour. Your Honours will have seen from the oral outlines that this remains a fairly narrow dispute between the parties: the interaction between section 417 and section 48A of the Migration Act. The court below held that the grant of a visa under section 417, which is what happened in this case, did not affect the legal consequences of the delegate’s initial refusal of the appellant’s protection visa application because that refusal continued to have legal effect in its own right and, therefore, the bar under section 48A remained in place. So, your Honours will be aware that after my client was granted the visa he sought a further protection visa and the delegate held that section 48A barred that.
We say that the majority judgment in the court below was erroneous for two reasons. The first is that it does not accord with the plain reading of section 417 of the Migration Act in its legislative purpose to override the outcome of the merits review process, and necessarily, we say that that overrode the delegate’s decision.
The second reason we say that the majority was in error was that when the tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision, that became the source of legal power of the delegate’s decision so that when the tribunal’s decision was substituted by the Minister, the legal effect that the tribunal decision had given to the delegate’s decision was removed so that the delegate’s decision no longer had legal force.
GAGELER CJ: They are alternatives, are they? If you are right on the first one, we do not to bother with the second one.
MR GODWIN: That is correct, your Honour, yes. So, turning to the first one, which is what we call the section 417 as an override power, picking up some words from Justice Edelman in the case of Davis.
First, we say that this is the first case the Court has had where the power under section 417…
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- Case
- [2024] HCATrans 87
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Minister, when considering a request to revoke a mandatory visa cancellation under section 501CA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), was required to consider, as a matter of fact, whether the applicant had demonstrated that they had "re-established" or "re-integrated" into Australian society. This question arose in the context of the Minister's obligation to consider the best interests of minor children in Australia who were part of the applicant's family.
The High Court held that the Minister's obligation under section 501CA(4)(b)(ii) to consider the best interests of a child did not impose a requirement to find that the applicant had re-established or re-integrated into Australian society. Rather, the Minister was required to consider the *actual circumstances* of the child's best interests, which might include factors relating to the applicant's past conduct, their current circumstances, and their prospects of future engagement with the child. The Court clarified that the statutory language did not mandate a specific finding of re-establishment or re-integration, but rather a comprehensive assessment of the child's best interests in light of all relevant considerations.
The appeal was dismissed.
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