Fek17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship & Multicultural Affairs
[2022] FedCFamC2G 479
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
FEK17 v Minister For Immigration, Citizenship & Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 479
File number(s): MLG 2574 of 2017 Judgment of: JUDGE YOUNG Date of judgment: 8 June 2022 Catchwords: MIGRATION - judicial review of decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal - where applicant claims fear of persecution - applicant could not identify grounds of jurisdictional error - application dismissed. Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 8 Date of hearing: 8 June 2022 Place: Darwin The Applicant: Appearing on his own behalf Solicitor for the Applicant: Ms Stone for the Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
MLG 2574 of 2017 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: FEK17
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE YOUNG
DATE OF ORDER:
8 JUNE 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The Applicant is to pay the Respondents costs fixed in the sum of $6,000.
3.The name of the Respondent be amended to the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Ex TemporeJUDGE YOUNG
This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 15 November 2017. In broad terms, the applicant, who is a citizen of Malaysia, claims that he and a friend borrowed money from Malaysian loan sharks. He said that in about 2013 the friend disappeared without making further payment on the loan and under the terms of the loan the applicant was held responsible for the balance. Further, the applicant said that the interest rate was exorbitant, so that he never had any prospect of repaying the money in its entirety.
The applicant said, despite making some payments, he was unable to keep up the repayments. As such, he said that he was assaulted by the loan shark or their criminal agents and threats were made against him. He said that he feared for his safety and for his life. As I understand what he told me today, he had arranged for his wife and daughter to reside in Indonesia while he fled. He said that the amount of the borrowings had been 30,000 ringgits which was intended to renovate the family home.
It appears clear from the Tribunal’s reasons that it had doubts about the credibility of the applicant and his narrative. Ultimately, the Tribunal decided that Australia did not owe protection obligations to the applicant as a refugee because it was satisfied that there was effective state protection in Malaysia against the depredations of loan sharks. The Tribunal referred at some length to country information about the Malaysian Police Force and its measures against loan sharks. The Tribunal acknowledged that some of that information pointed to corruption within the police force, but overall, the Tribunal was satisfied that there was effective State protection available to the applicant and dismissed his application.
The applicant, who appears self-represented today, filed an application for review which had three grounds. I will paraphrase the grounds as follows:
(1)the Tribunal failed to consider the reasons for his fear in Malaysia or his fear of persecution in Malaysia;
(2)the Tribunal did not take seriously his claims that he could be harmed or killed; and
(3)the Tribunal rejected all of his claims.
Those claims do not identify any conventional ground of jurisdictional error.
I attempted to explain to the applicant what a jurisdictional error might be, that is, a major mistake in the Tribunal’s consideration of his claim. I invited him to make submissions to me in terms of jurisdictional error. The applicant was unable to do that and the arguments he advanced to me today in submissions were, essentially, taking issue with the factual conclusions by the Tribunal in relation to the Malaysian Police Force.
The applicant addressed me largely in English. An interpreter in the Malay language was available by telephone in view of the fact that the court-arranged interpreter cancelled at late notice. Nevertheless, a telephone interpreter was available and I am satisfied they were able to interpret effectively by telephone. I explained to the applicant that he could, at his choice, address me in English, he could address me in Malay through the interpreter, or, he could address me in English and then seek any clarification of anything that I might say or anything he wished to say, using the Malay interpreter. The applicant chose to address me in English, and I am satisfied that he understood at least basic English. He did at one point ask for the interpreter to explain to me what he had said in English, but as the interpreter pointed out, the explanation had been given in English, and the interpreter said that he did not think that any further explanation was necessary. I am satisfied that was correct. I am satisfied that the applicant had a fair opportunity to advance his arguments and claims before me today.
In view of the applicant’s failure to identify a recognised ground of jurisdictional error in his application and his failure to advance any ground of jurisdictional error in his oral submissions, I am not satisfied that there has been any error by the Tribunal.
The application will be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding eight (8) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Young. Associate:
Dated: 17 June 2022
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