cover railway fares. Accordingly, in SO far as any part of this latter expenditure could be regarded as devoted to a capital purpose in the protection of the reversion of the taxpayer in these properties, allowance has been made for that matter by the learned judge.
His Honour found that it was reasonably necessary for the tax- payer to keep books and records and to have them audited and to have a person in attendance in Brisbane to deal with matters affecting his financial affairs which arose during his absence from Brisbane, and his Honour held that it was reasonably necessary to inspect and supervise from time to time the properties from which rents were derived. The evidence supported these findings. The expenditure, a deduction of which is claimed, was incurred in relation to the management of the income-producing enterprises of the taxpayer. If this is SO it is immaterial that there might be a difficulty in holding that the taxpayer was carrying on in a continuous manner an identifiable business of some particular description.
Section 51, it should be observed, is not limited to deductions from income derived as being the proceeds of a business. Section 51 is a general provision relating to deductions claimable in relation to expenses, losses or outgoings incurred in gaining or producing any income whatever and not merely in relation to income derived from a business.
The evidence shows, with respect to what have been referred to as audit fees, which were accountancy fees as well as audit fees, that the accountant not only performed ordinary accountancy work, but that he made out income-tax returns and land-tax returns and advised on income-tax matters which arose. The proportion of his fee-it is a small amount, I think £35 in all-which would be attributable to these particular matters, that is, preparing taxation returns and advising on income-tax matters, must be very small, and SO small really as to be a negligible amount, and for this reason we think that no attention need be paid to it in this case, but we are not to be taken as deciding whether or not the cost of preparing taxation returns or of advising in relation to taxation liability is a deductible expenditure.
For these reasons we are of opinion that the appeal should be dismissed. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed with costs. Solicitor for the appellant K. C. Waugh, Crown Solicitor for the Commonwealth.
Solicitors for the respondent: Tully &Wilson.