FCA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FCA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 947

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: FCA17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2755
File number: NSD 1873 of 2018
Judge: GLEESON J
Date of judgment: 20 June 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision of the Federal Circuit Court – where the applicant fears harm in Malaysia because of his political opinions – whether the Tribunal’s decision was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant asking the “what if I am wrong?” question – where no sufficient doubt found – application refused   
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 44.12

Cases cited:

AJE17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 111

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; (1991) 33 FCR 397

Ferdinands v The State of South Australia [2017] FCA 32

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 55

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs vWu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719; (1999) 93 FCR 220

Thanh Phat Mav Billings J (Constituting the Refugee Review Tribunal) (1996) 71 FCR 431

Date of hearing: 11 April 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 40
Counsel for the Applicant Mr G Foster
Solicitor for the Applicant: Sentil Solicitor & Barrister
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms Nanson of the Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 1873 of 2018
BETWEEN:

FCA17

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GLEESON J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 JUNE 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal be refused.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GLEESON J:

  1. The applicant seeks leave to appeal from a decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA): FCA17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2755.

  2. The FCCA judge dismissed the applicant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) under r 44.12(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), having found that the applicant was unable to demonstrate an arguable case of jurisdictional error by the Tribunal.

  3. The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

  4. By r 44.12(2), the FCCA decision is interlocutory in nature, and the applicant therefore requires leave to appeal by s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

  5. The applicant is a…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 947
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of FCA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision of the Federal Circuit Court. The applicant, a Malaysian national, sought refugee status in Australia, fearing persecution due to his political opinions if returned to Malaysia. The Federal Circuit Court had dismissed the applicant's claim, and he subsequently applied to the Federal Court of Australia for leave to appeal this decision.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal's decision was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant asking the "what if I am wrong?" question. The applicant argued that the Tribunal had failed to properly consider his claims and that the Tribunal's doubt about the events in 2016 warranted such an inquiry. The court needed to determine if the Tribunal had correctly applied the principle that a decision-maker must ask itself the "what if I am wrong?" question where there is uncertainty about an event significant to the ultimate question of whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of being persecuted.

The court examined the Tribunal's decision and found that it had considered all the evidence provided by the applicant regarding his political involvement in Malaysia. The Tribunal had expressed doubt about the certainty of the applicant's claims but had ultimately made confident findings that the applicant had not suffered any adverse consequences as a result of his political activity. The Tribunal's findings indicated that it was not persuaded that the applicant had ever been politically active in Malaysia and had not been arrested or threatened due to his political activities. Given these findings, the court concluded that there was no real doubt about the issues in dispute, and thus, the Tribunal was not required to ask the "what if I am wrong?" question.

The court further held that the Tribunal's findings were open to it based on the evidence presented and did not disclose any real doubt about the issues in dispute. The court upheld the decision of the Federal Circuit Court and refused the application for leave to appeal. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal be refused.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In written submissions filed on behalf of the applicant, the applicant made submissions in support of the first ground of review identified in the application to the FCCA (except for particular (c) to that ground). Relevantly, the first ground of review was:1.The Tribunal failed to ask itself the what if I am wrong question as findings at 41 appear to have been made without confidence.Particularsa.The Tribunal at 41 states “In view of the above the Tribunal is unable to accept with any certainty the applicant’s claims in respect of his political involvement in Malaysia[”].b.At [40] the Tribunal found an essential integer of the applicant’s claim where two police officers threatened and intimidated him to be “problematic”, this claim was not explicitly refused by the Tribunal, which indicates that the Tribunal was unable to make a finding with certainty.…d.Where the decision maker is uncertain that certain events may have occurred in the past, there is an obligation on the decision maker to assess the claims as though the particular event that it is uncertain to have occurred, actually occurred.e.The Tribunal failed to satisfy itself by asking the what if I am wrong question and therefore committed legal error for this reason.FCCA JUDGMENT The FCCA judge addressed the applicant’s first ground of review at [36]-[42] of his Honour’s reasons relevantly as follows:[36] It is well established that for a decision-maker to ask itself “what if I am wrong?” occurs in circumstances where there is uncertainty about an event significant to the ultimate question as to whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason [see Minister for Immigration v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719; (1993) 93 FCR 220 at [60]-[64]].…[40] The Tribunal next considered the applicant’s past political involvement. In relation to this issue, the applicant claims that the Tribunal’s finding at [40], that his written claims relating to his attendance at a Bersih rally in 2016 and his subsequent assault by two police officers was “problematic”, indicated that the Tribunal was unable to make a finding with certainty.[41] As summarised above, at [41] of its reasons, the Tribunal considered all of the evidence given by the applicant in relation to his claimed political involvement in Malaysia but did not accept that he was ever politically active or arrested and threatened for this reason as a consequence.[42] The Tribunal’s findings were open to it for the reasons it gave and do not disclose any real doubt about the issues in dispute. The Tribunal was not, therefore, required to pose the “what if I am wrong question” and no jurisdictional error arises on the basis alleged by the applicant. The FCCA judge footnoted the reference to the “what if I am wrong question” in [42] of his Honour’s reasons with the following observation:The “what if I am wrong” exercise is only engaged in circumstances where the Tribunal is unable to reach a sufficient state of satisfaction on the evidence to make any factual findings because of deficiencies in the presentation of the applicant’s case: SZSMQ v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 1768 at [57]-[60].APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Further, the applicant submitted that the first sentence of [40] of its decision record was something less than an explicit rejection of the applicant’s claim concerning the conduct of two police officers after his attendance at a 2016 rally.CONSIDERATION At [42] of his Honour’s reasons, the FCCA judge concluded that, on a fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons as a whole, the Tribunal did not have any real doubt about the issues in dispute and therefore was not required to ask the “what if I am wrong?” question. In my view, the FCCA judge’s conclusions on this point were plainly open to him, based on a fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record. In particular, [40] of the Tribunal’s decision record does not disclose uncertainty as to events in 2016. Rather, it records the Tribunal’s consideration of an apparent conflict between the applicant’s written and oral claims. That consideration follows the Tribunal’s factual finding that the applicant did not attend a Bersih rally in 2016 as he had claimed in writing and its observation that the applicant had made an oral claim to have attended a Hindraf rally in 2016, not recorded in his written claims. Ultimately, the Tribunal does not make any finding about events in 2016 at [40] of its decision record. At [41] of the Tribunal’s reasons, the Tribunal makes several observations and findings. The first sentence expresses doubt about the applicant’s claims in respect of his political involvement in Malaysia generally, saying that it is unable to accept those claims “with any certainty”. The next sentence also expresses a degree of doubt in that the Tribunal says that it is “not persuaded” that the applicant was ever politically active in Malaysia. Next, the Tribunal makes the following two confident findings:(1)The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant has ever been arrested as a result of any political activity or monitored, threatened, harassed or intimidated with the threat of false court action over his political activity.(2)It follows that the Tribunal does not accept the cause of any problems the applicant encountered running his businesses was in any way connected with his political activity. The doubt expressed by the Tribunal was that it did not have sufficient confidence about the applicant’s claims to be satisfied about any single aspect of them. In the context of its more specific findings, to the effect that the applicant had not suffered any adverse consequence as a result of his political activity, there was no occasion for the Tribunal to return to the broader questions of the nature and extent of the applicant’s political activity to ask the question “what if I am wrong?”. The answer to that question could only have been that the applicant should have been accepted as to some aspect of his claimed political involvement but, on the basis of the Tribunal’s confident findings, that did not lead to any adverse consequence. In the light of those latter findings, there was no deficiency in the Tribunal’s required consideration of the chances of future persecution.