FBM Corporation v FBM Licence Limited

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   FBM CORPORATION -v- FBM LICENCE LIMITED [2014] WASC 327

CORAM:   BEECH J

HEARD:   ON THE PAPERS

DELIVERED          :   15 SEPTEMBER 2014

FILE NO/S:   CIV 2291 of 2013

BETWEEN:   FBM CORPORATION

First Plaintiff

KUBASHEN NAIDOO
Second Plaintiff

RICHARD NEDILJKO BARBARICH
Third Plaintiff

AND

FBM LICENCE LIMITED
First Defendant

ALISTAIR ROBERT MACKINLAY
Second Defendant

COLIN JOHN BARBOUTIS
Third Defendant

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Pleadings - Strike out application

Legislation:

Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 20 r 19

Result:

Application dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

First Plaintiff                :     No appearance

Second Plaintiff            :     No appearance

Third Plaintiff              :     No appearance

First Defendant            :     No appearance

Second Defendant        :     No appearance

Third Defendant           :     No appearance

Solicitors:

First Plaintiff                :     Solomon Brothers

Second Plaintiff            :     MKI Legal

Third Plaintiff              :     MKI Legal

First Defendant            :     Richard Rowick Barrister & Solicitor

Second Defendant        :     Richard Rowick Barrister & Solicitor

Third Defendant           :     Richard Rowick Barrister & Solicitor

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552

Barclay Mowlem Construction Ltd v Dampier Port Authority [2006] WASC 281; (2006) 33 WAR 82

Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2006] HCA 27; (2006) 226 CLR 256

Casella v Hewitt [2008] WASCA 13; (2008) 36 WAR 1

Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say‑Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89

Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6; (2012) 200 FCR 296

Hasler v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 266

Kimberley Downs Pty Ltd v Western Australia (Unreported, WASC, Library No 6414, 25 August 1986)

Lampson (Australia) Pty Ltd v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd [No 3] [2014] WASC 162

SMEC Australia Pty Ltd v Valentine Falls Estate Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 138

Theseus Exploration NL v Foyster [1972] HCA 41; (1972) 126 CLR 507

Westpac Banking Corporation v Bell Group Ltd (in liq) [No 3] [2012] WASCA 157; (2012) 44 WAR 1

BEECH J: 

Introduction

  1. The defendants apply to strike out the statement of claim or a substantial number of paragraphs in it.

  2. For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the application.

The plaintiffs' claims - broad overview

  1. It should be noted that the first plaintiff is in liquidation and has now discontinued its claim.

  2. The statement of claim[1] is 74 pages in length.  For the purposes of this application, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to detail the allegations in the statement of claim.

    [1] Amended substituted statement of claim of the second and third plaintiffs dated 28 July 2014.

  3. The following is no more than a broad overview aimed at identifying some of the central features of the plaintiffs' claims:

    (1)In 2010, the second plaintiff, Mr Naidoo, invented a building panel known as R9 [1.5].

    (2)In 2011, FBM Corporation, a company controlled by Mr Naidoo, applied for and obtained patents in respect of the R9 products [5] ‑ [6].

    (3)The third defendant, Mr Barboutis, was…

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Details
Case
[2014] WASC 327
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of FBM Corporation v FBM Licence Limited was heard by the court, which was tasked with addressing the plaintiffs' claims for knowing receipt and undue influence. The plaintiffs sought to hold the defendants liable for their involvement in the alleged improper use of their intellectual property and other assets. The defendants challenged the validity of the plaintiffs' claims and sought to have them struck out.

The court had to determine whether the plaintiffs' claims for knowing receipt and undue influence were sufficient to proceed to trial. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the plaintiffs' claims were sufficiently pleaded to warrant a trial and whether the claims could be struck out due to procedural issues. The court also had to examine the requirements for pleading a claim of knowing receipt and undue influence, as well as the applicable legal standards.

The court found that the plaintiffs' claims for knowing receipt were adequately pleaded and could proceed to trial. The court noted that intangibles could be considered property for the purposes of a claim of knowing receipt, and that the requirement of dishonest and fraudulent design did not apply to such claims. The court also found that the plaintiffs' claims for undue influence were sufficiently pleaded and could proceed to trial. The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the plaintiffs' claims were insufficiently pleaded or that they should be struck out.

The court ordered that the defendants' application to strike out the plaintiffs' claims for knowing receipt and undue influence be dismissed. The court found that the plaintiffs' claims were adequately pleaded and that the requirements for pleading such claims had been met. The case was therefore allowed to proceed to trial.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

First, as I read the pleading, this is a plea of knowing receipt, not knowing assistance. Intangibles can be property for the purposes of a claim of knowing receipt.[7] The dishonest and fraudulent design integer does not apply to a claim for knowing receipt.[8][7] Westpac Banking Corporation v Bell Group Ltd (in liq) [No 3] [2012] WASCA 157; (2012) 44 WAR 1 [2156] and following.[8] See for example Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6; (2012) 200 FCR 296 [392] ‑ [393]. Secondly, for the purposes of a strike out application, there is doubt as to what is required for a plea of knowing assistance of breach of fiduciary duty. In Westpac v Bell,[9] Drummond AJA (Lee AJA agreeing) concluded that there was no need to demonstrate moral reprehensibility on the part of the trustee or fiduciary in order to satisfy the requirement of dishonest and fraudulent design. As the defendants' submissions in reply point out, that view has recently been held by the NSW Court of Appeal to be plainly wrong and not followed.[10] Nevertheless, a strike out application is not an appropriate occasion to resolve the differing appellate views on this point. The defendants make several complaints about the plaintiffs' claims in these paragraphs. First, they claim that any loss is the loss of FBM Corporation, not Mr Naidoo. In my view, that is not a ground for striking out their claim. The plaintiffs have conceded that part of their loss, as it relates to FBM Corporation's loss, is not recoverable. Nevertheless, what, if any, losses were suffered by Mr Naidoo, as claimed in par 33, as a consequence of any undue influence as alleged in these paragraphs is a matter for trial. Secondly, the defendants complain that the basis on which it was alleged that Mr MacKinlay was Mr Naidoo's financial adviser is not pleaded. I do not accept that submission. The facts relied on by the plaintiffs are those set out in par 30.1 to par 30.7. In turn, those refer to, among other paragraphs, par 8 and par 9 of the statement of claim. The matters relied on by the plaintiffs are identified. Whether those matters are sufficient to make out the plaintiffs' claim is a matter for trial. Thirdly, the defendants assert that the material facts pleaded may be relevant to claims of misrepresentation, but do not go to establish the dominance or ascendancy over Mr Naidoo's will that is required for a claim of undue influence. As I have said, whether the pleaded facts give rise to a claim for undue influence is a matter for trial. Paragraph 35.1 pleads that FBM Licence has failed to list on the ASX by reason of the decision of members and representatives of Dankevich, MacKinlay and Barboutis deciding on behalf of FBM Licence to not undertake the listing of FBM Licence on the ASX. The defendants complain that they are 'left guessing what this means and when the decision was allegedly made'. This complaint is properly the subject of a request for further and better particulars; it is not a strike out point.