JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: FBM CORPORATION -v- FBM LICENCE LIMITED [2014] WASC 327
CORAM: BEECH J
HEARD: ON THE PAPERS
DELIVERED : 15 SEPTEMBER 2014
FILE NO/S: CIV 2291 of 2013
BETWEEN: FBM CORPORATION
First Plaintiff
KUBASHEN NAIDOO
Second PlaintiffRICHARD NEDILJKO BARBARICH
Third PlaintiffAND
FBM LICENCE LIMITED
First DefendantALISTAIR ROBERT MACKINLAY
Second DefendantCOLIN JOHN BARBOUTIS
Third Defendant
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Pleadings - Strike out application
Legislation:
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 20 r 19
Result:
Application dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
First Plaintiff : No appearance
Second Plaintiff : No appearance
Third Plaintiff : No appearance
First Defendant : No appearance
Second Defendant : No appearance
Third Defendant : No appearance
Solicitors:
First Plaintiff : Solomon Brothers
Second Plaintiff : MKI Legal
Third Plaintiff : MKI Legal
First Defendant : Richard Rowick Barrister & Solicitor
Second Defendant : Richard Rowick Barrister & Solicitor
Third Defendant : Richard Rowick Barrister & Solicitor
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552
Barclay Mowlem Construction Ltd v Dampier Port Authority [2006] WASC 281; (2006) 33 WAR 82
Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2006] HCA 27; (2006) 226 CLR 256
Casella v Hewitt [2008] WASCA 13; (2008) 36 WAR 1
Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say‑Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89
Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6; (2012) 200 FCR 296
Hasler v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 266
Kimberley Downs Pty Ltd v Western Australia (Unreported, WASC, Library No 6414, 25 August 1986)
Lampson (Australia) Pty Ltd v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd [No 3] [2014] WASC 162
SMEC Australia Pty Ltd v Valentine Falls Estate Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 138
Theseus Exploration NL v Foyster [1972] HCA 41; (1972) 126 CLR 507
Westpac Banking Corporation v Bell Group Ltd (in liq) [No 3] [2012] WASCA 157; (2012) 44 WAR 1
BEECH J:
Introduction
The defendants apply to strike out the statement of claim or a substantial number of paragraphs in it.
For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the application.
The plaintiffs' claims - broad overview
It should be noted that the first plaintiff is in liquidation and has now discontinued its claim.
The statement of claim[1] is 74 pages in length. For the purposes of this application, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to detail the allegations in the statement of claim.
[1] Amended substituted statement of claim of the second and third plaintiffs dated 28 July 2014.
The following is no more than a broad overview aimed at identifying some of the central features of the plaintiffs' claims:
(1)In 2010, the second plaintiff, Mr Naidoo, invented a building panel known as R9 [1.5].
(2)In 2011, FBM Corporation, a company controlled by Mr Naidoo, applied for and obtained patents in respect of the R9 products [5] ‑ [6].
(3)The third defendant, Mr Barboutis, was…
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- Case
- [2014] WASC 327
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the plaintiffs' claims for knowing receipt and undue influence were sufficient to proceed to trial. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the plaintiffs' claims were sufficiently pleaded to warrant a trial and whether the claims could be struck out due to procedural issues. The court also had to examine the requirements for pleading a claim of knowing receipt and undue influence, as well as the applicable legal standards.
The court found that the plaintiffs' claims for knowing receipt were adequately pleaded and could proceed to trial. The court noted that intangibles could be considered property for the purposes of a claim of knowing receipt, and that the requirement of dishonest and fraudulent design did not apply to such claims. The court also found that the plaintiffs' claims for undue influence were sufficiently pleaded and could proceed to trial. The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the plaintiffs' claims were insufficiently pleaded or that they should be struck out.
The court ordered that the defendants' application to strike out the plaintiffs' claims for knowing receipt and undue influence be dismissed. The court found that the plaintiffs' claims were adequately pleaded and that the requirements for pleading such claims had been met. The case was therefore allowed to proceed to trial.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
First, as I read the pleading, this is a plea of knowing receipt, not knowing assistance. Intangibles can be property for the purposes of a claim of knowing receipt.[7] The dishonest and fraudulent design integer does not apply to a claim for knowing receipt.[8][7] Westpac Banking Corporation v Bell Group Ltd (in liq) [No 3] [2012] WASCA 157; (2012) 44 WAR 1 [2156] and following.[8] See for example Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6; (2012) 200 FCR 296 [392] ‑ [393]. Secondly, for the purposes of a strike out application, there is doubt as to what is required for a plea of knowing assistance of breach of fiduciary duty. In Westpac v Bell,[9] Drummond AJA (Lee AJA agreeing) concluded that there was no need to demonstrate moral reprehensibility on the part of the trustee or fiduciary in order to satisfy the requirement of dishonest and fraudulent design. As the defendants' submissions in reply point out, that view has recently been held by the NSW Court of Appeal to be plainly wrong and not followed.[10] Nevertheless, a strike out application is not an appropriate occasion to resolve the differing appellate views on this point. The defendants make several complaints about the plaintiffs' claims in these paragraphs. First, they claim that any loss is the loss of FBM Corporation, not Mr Naidoo. In my view, that is not a ground for striking out their claim. The plaintiffs have conceded that part of their loss, as it relates to FBM Corporation's loss, is not recoverable. Nevertheless, what, if any, losses were suffered by Mr Naidoo, as claimed in par 33, as a consequence of any undue influence as alleged in these paragraphs is a matter for trial. Secondly, the defendants complain that the basis on which it was alleged that Mr MacKinlay was Mr Naidoo's financial adviser is not pleaded. I do not accept that submission. The facts relied on by the plaintiffs are those set out in par 30.1 to par 30.7. In turn, those refer to, among other paragraphs, par 8 and par 9 of the statement of claim. The matters relied on by the plaintiffs are identified. Whether those matters are sufficient to make out the plaintiffs' claim is a matter for trial. Thirdly, the defendants assert that the material facts pleaded may be relevant to claims of misrepresentation, but do not go to establish the dominance or ascendancy over Mr Naidoo's will that is required for a claim of undue influence. As I have said, whether the pleaded facts give rise to a claim for undue influence is a matter for trial. Paragraph 35.1 pleads that FBM Licence has failed to list on the ASX by reason of the decision of members and representatives of Dankevich, MacKinlay and Barboutis deciding on behalf of FBM Licence to not undertake the listing of FBM Licence on the ASX. The defendants complain that they are 'left guessing what this means and when the decision was allegedly made'. This complaint is properly the subject of a request for further and better particulars; it is not a strike out point.