FBG17 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
[2024] FedCFamC2G 888
•13 September 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
FBG17 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 888
File number(s): MLG 2479 of 2017 Judgment of: JUDGE J YOUNG Date of judgment: 13 September 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION - application for judicial review – Safe Haven Enterprise Visa - where Immigration Assessment Authority affirmed decision of first respondent that applicant was not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 - whether Authority denied the applicant procedural fairness by failing to provide him with a copy of the Delegate’s decision when requested – found the applicant was validly notified of the Delegate’s decision – whether finding’s made by the Authority were illogical or irrational – found that there was a proper and logical basis for the Authority’s findings – found no jurisdictional error – application dismissed. Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 s 5(1)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss36(2), 494B , 66(1), 473CB , 473DA, 473DB(1), 473DC, 473GA, 473GB, 474, 476, 494B(4), 494C(4)(a)
Cases cited: Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
DGZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 12
Lee v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 464
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 342
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang & Ors [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259
Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another [2018] HCA 16
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 66 Date of hearing: 26 August 2024 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Lees Solicitor for the Applicant: Elderwood Lawyers Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr Cunynghame of Sparke Helmore Second Respondent: Submitting appearance save as to costs ORDERS
MLG 2479 of 2017 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: FBG17
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE J YOUNG
DATE OF ORDER:
13 SEPTEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Amended Application filed 14 August 2024 be dismissed.
2.The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs in an amount to be fixed, if not agreed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE J YOUNG:
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is an Amended Application filed on 14 August 2024, in which the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Authority) dated 25 October 2017. By that decision, the Authority affirmed a decision of a delegate (Delegate) of the first respondent (Minister) to refuse to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa (Visa).
CONTEXT
The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka.
On 25 April 2013 the applicant arrived in Australia by boat as an unauthorised maritime arrival.
On 9 May 2016, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Department) sent the applicant an invitation to apply for a Temporary Protection visa or a Safe Haven Enterprise visa.
On 25 June 2016 the applicant appointed a legal representative to act on his behalf (Representative) in relation to the Visa.
On 26 October 2016, with the assistance of the Representative, the applicant applied for the Visa. The applicant’s claims were set out in a Statutory Declaration/Statement dated 7 October 2016 attached to his Visa application. Relevantly, the applicant’s claims for protection can be summarised as follows:
(1)the applicant is a Tamil Hindu who was born in Kilinochchi in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka;
(2)one of the main reasons he departed Sri Lanka was due to his father’s involvement with the LTTE. The applicant knew very little about what his father did for the LTTE, but he thinks he was involved in transportation. On a number of occasions the applicant’s father had been arrested and detained in custody where he was interrogated about the work he did for the LTTE and was assaulted. The applicant’s father was under the scrutiny of the security forces and reported he was treated badly and would be taken in for questioning or detained whenever there was a bomb blast or an incident caused by the LTTE. This became a regular occurrence and the applicant’s father worried about the family and their safety;
(3)on 5 November 1990, the applicant and his family fled to India without his father;
(4)when the applicant and his family arrived in India, they were taken to the Mandapan refugee camp in South India where they stayed for approximately 4 – 5 years until they moved to Batalakundu camp, where they stayed until the applicant came to Australia;
(5)the applicant’s father never joined them in India and he does not know whether his father is dead or alive. He has not seen his father since they left Sri Lanka in 1990;
(6)one of the applicant’s neighbours arrived at their refugee camp and relayed information that his father had been arrested by the security forces and was in custody. Hearing this news made the applicant and his family fear for their safety. They were too afraid to return to Sri Lanka as they would be targeted as a family given the applicant father’s links to the LTTE;
(7)the applicant got married in India but he and his family cannot get citizenship in India and are badly treated. He left India in 2013 and came to Australia;
(8)in February 2014, a routine report that was released on the Department’s website unintentionally enabled access to some personal information about people, including the applicant, who was in immigration detention in January 2014; and
(9)the applicant fears that if he returns to Sri Lanka, he will be identified as being linked to his father and the LTTE and will be targeted for abduction and killing.
On 3 April 2017 the applicant attended an interview with the Department to discuss his Visa application (Visa Interview).
On 10 April 2017 the Delegate refused to grant the applicant the Visa (Delegate’s Decision). On the same day, the Delegate sent a copy of its decision and reasons to the applicant’s Representative, being the postal address provided by the applicant in his Visa application.
On 13 April 2017, the Delegate’s Decision was referred to the Authority for review.
On 16 August 2017, the applicant’s Representative emailed the Authority requesting a copy of the Delegate’s Decision, stating that:
…Unfortunately, the applicant, was going through some personal issues, and did not receive the letter of decision and from the department or the referral letter…
On 25 October 2017, the Authority affirmed the Delegate’s Decision not to grant the applicant the Visa.
IMMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY DECISION
The Authority issued its statement of decision and reasons on 19 October 2017 (Authority Decision).
At paragraph [4] of the Authority Decision, the Authority stated that it had regard to the material referred to it by the Secretary under s 473CB of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).
At paragraph [6] the Authority summarised the applicant’s claims.
At paragraphs [10] – [11] of the Authority Decision, the Authority noted that the Delegate found inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence in relation to his father’s involvement in the LTTE and whether the father was deceased. The Authority accepted that it was plausible the applicant’s father was killed and was not satisfied the applicant had been deliberately inconsistent. Further, the Authority accepted the applicant’s explanation as to why he had not claimed his father was involved with the LTTE earlier, being that he was fearful the information would be related to the Sri Lankan authorities.
At paragraphs [12] – [13], the Authority considered the applicant’s claim that his father helped the LTTE transport weapons and was arrested on more than one occasion by the SLA. Upon considering relevant country information, the Authority considered the applicant’s evidence to be plausible and accepted that the applicant’s father had assisted the LTTE with transporting supplies before and during the renewed hostilities in 1990. However, the Authority found that the father was seen as a supporter rather than a member of the LTTE given the applicants evidence about the circumstances of his arrests and releases by the SLA. At paragraphs [14]-[16], the Authority accepted that the applicant believed his father stayed behind in Sri Lanka to fight with the LTTE, but ultimately was not satisfied his father became a member. At paragraph [17], the Authority considered that the events occurred 27 years ago when the applicant was 12 years old and was not satisfied that the applicant had any profile as a real or imputed supporter of the LTTE arising from his father’s involvement. Accordingly, the Authority was not satisfied that there was a real chance of harm to the applicant for any reason associated with his father.
At paragraph [18] of the Authority Decision, the Authority considered the applicant’s claim that in May 2018 he was involved in a number of protests against the Indian government’s plans to return Sri Lankan refugees to Sri Lanka. The Authority noted that the applicant had not provided evidence of the nature of the protests he claimed to have been involved in and was not satisfied he faced a real chance of harm on this basis.
At paragraphs [19] – [20], the Authority was not satisfied that, even if the Sri Lankan authorities had accessed the applicant’s data released in the Department’s data breach, that this would lead to any interest apart from his illegal departure to India as a 12 year old in 1990 or that he would face a real chance of harm on this basis.
At paragraphs [21] – [29] and [31] – [32], the Authority considered country information which indicated that the situation in Sri Lanka has improved since the applicant left. At paragraph [30], the Authority found that the country information relied upon by the applicant was dated. At paragraphs [30] the Authority reiterated its finding that the applicant had no adverse profile with the Sri Lankan authorities and at [36] was not satisfied that the applicant faced a real chance of harm from the Sri Lankan authorities because of any real or imputed association with the LTTE or for being a young Tamil male from the North or a Hindu.
At paragraphs [37] – [43] of the Authority Decision, the Authority considered the applicant’s claim to fear harm as a returning asylum seeker who departed illegally. Having considered relevant country information, the Authority accepted that the applicant would be questioned and investigated on return to Sri Lanka and may be charged and fined under the Immigrants and Emigrants Act (I&E Act). However, the Authority found that the applicant had no adverse profile with the authorities and did not accept that the applicant would be imputed with any real or imputed LTTE association. Accordingly, the Authority was not satisfied that the applicant faced a real chance of harm on the basis of being a returning asylum who departed illegally. Further, at paragraph [38], the Authority noted that there was no evidence that returnees from India faced discrimination.
Accordingly, the Authority was not satisfied that the applicant met the criteria in sections 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act and thereby affirmed the Delegate’s decision.
APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
The applicant applied for judicial review of the Authority Decision on 17 November 2017 and filed an Amended Application on 14 August 2024. The Amended Application contains the following grounds for judicial review (without amendment):
Ground 1: The IAA denied the Applicant procedural fairness by not providing the Applicant with a copy of the delegate’s reasons upon request.
Ground 2: The IAA acted unreasonably in finding that the Applicant’s father was a ‘supporter’, not a ‘member’ of the LTTE
Ground 3: The IAA erred in failing to consider the claim that the Applicant feared persecution because of the Sri Lankan authorities believing that his father had been affiliated with the LTTE.
Ground 4: Altternatively to ground 3, if the Court deems that the IAA did consider whether the Sri Lankan authorities believed that the Applicant’s father was an LTTE ‘member’, the IAA irrationally erred by finding that the non-investigation of the Applicant by Indian authorities was grounds to find that the Applicant was not under monitoring by the Sri Lankan authorities due to his links to his father
At hearing the applicant confirmed that they did not press Ground 3.
The following material was also filed by the applicant in support of the Amended Application:
(1)an affidavit annexing a copy of the Authority Decision filed 17 November 2017;
(2)an affidavit of the applicant filed on 14 August 2024;
(3)written submissions filed on 14 August 2024; and
(4)a list of authorities filed on 13 August 2024.
The Minister filed a Response on 12 December 2017. The Response sought orders that the Application be dismissed and orders as to costs on the ground that the Authority Decision is not affected by jurisdictional error.
The Minister also filed written submissions on 16 August 2024.
Hearing
The Hearing took place on 26 August 2024.
The applicant was represented by Mr Lees of Counsel. The Minister was represented by Mr Cunynghame, solicitor.
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A “privative clause decision” as defined at s 474 of the Act is final and not amenable to judicial review in any Court. Absent identification of jurisdictional error, the Court has no jurisdiction to grant relief in respect of the Tribunal’s decision: s 476 of the Act; Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 at [76].
The task on judicial review is not to undertake a general review of the decision or to substitute it with a decision which the Court may consider ought to have been made. The jurisdiction, being supervisory, allows for a decision to be quashed on established grounds, the most important of which is jurisdictional error, and, where appropriate, to order that the matter be remitted and reconsidered according to law: Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at [175].
CONSIDERATION
Ground 1
By Ground 1 the applicant submits that the Authority denied the applicant procedural fairness by failing to provide him with a copy of the Delegate’s Decision when requested. The applicant submits that s 5(1) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (ADJR Act) and s 473DB of the Act permit the applicant to make submissions in response to the Delegate’s Decision.
As stated above at paragraph [9], on 16 August 2017 the applicant’s Representative emailed the Authority requesting a copy of the Delegate’s Decision. The applicant submits that the Authority never responded to this request. It is submitted by the applicant that, as a result of not receiving the Delegate’s Decision, he was prejudiced in his ability to put on submissions to the Authority addressing the matters raised by the Delegate’s Decision. In particular, the applicant submits he was unable to put on additional evidence regarding his father’s involvement with the LTTE.
The applicant relies on Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another [2018] HCA 16 (Plaintiff M174/2016) in support of his submissions.
Consideration
Those submissions are misconceived and are rejected.
The ADJR Act has no work to do with respect to the Authority’s procedural fairness obligations.
The Authority’s review was conducted under Part 7AA of the Act.
Section 473DA provides as follows:
(1)This Division, together with sections 473GA and 473GB, is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to reviews conducted by the Immigration Assessment Authority.
(2)To avoid doubt, nothing in this Part requires the Immigration Assessment Authority to give a referred application any material that was before the Minister when the Minister made the decision under section 65.
Division 3 of Part 7AA (together with ss 473GA and 473GB) is therefore taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice rule in relation to review conducted by the Authority: s 473DA(1).
Relevantly, s 473DB(1) provides as follows
Immigration Assessment Authority to review decisions on the paper
(1)Subject to this Part, the Immigration Assessment Authority must review a fast track reviewable decision referred to it under section 473CA by considering the review material provided to the Authority under section 473CB:
(a) without accepting or requesting new information; and
(b) without interviewing the referred applicant.
…
Section 473DC provides as follows:
Getting new information
(1)Subject to this Part, the Immigration Assessment Authority may, in relation to a fast track decision, get any documents or information (new information) that:
(a)were not before the Minister when the Minister made the decision under section 65; and
(b) the Authority considers may be relevant.
(2)The Immigration Assessment Authority does not have a duty to get, request or accept, any new information whether the Authority is requested to do so by a referred applicant or by any other person, or in any other circumstances.
(3)Without limiting subsection (1), the Immigration Assessment Authority may invite a person, orally or in writing, to give new information:
(a) in writing; or
(b)at an interview, whether conducted in person, by telephone or in any other way.
The combined effect of s 473DA(1), s 473DB(1) and s 473DA(2) is that the Authority is required to conduct a review of the delegate’s decision on the papers and the common law rules of procedural fairness do not govern the way in which reviews are conducted under Part 7AA. There is no requirement for the Authority to invite an applicant to appear before it to give evidence and present arguments and the Authority must review the fast track reviewable decision by considering the review material provided to it without requesting or accepting new information and without interviewing the applicant: DGZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 12 at [75].
Thirdly, as stated above at paragraph [7], on 10 April 2017 the Delegate sent a copy of its decision and reasons to the postal address provided by the applicant in his Visa application, being the address of the applicant’s Representative. The applicant was notified of the Delegate’s Decision in accordance with s 66(1) and s 494B of the Act because it:
(1)was dispatched within 3 working days of the date of the Delegate’s Decision by prepaid post to the last address for service provided to the Delegate by the recipient for the purposes of receiving documents in accordance with s 494B(4); and
(2)was taken to have been received by the applicant 7 working days after the date of the document in accordance with s 494C(4)(a) (i.e., on 17 April 2017).
The applicant was therefore validly notified of the Delegate’s Decision.
As to Plaintiff M174/2016, that case offers no assistance to the applicant. The primary question before the Court in Plaintiff M174/2016 was stated by the majority (Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ) at [3] to be as follows:
…is a fast track reviewable decision nothing more than a decision to refuse to grant a protection visa to a fast track applicant that is made in fact? Or is a fast track reviewable decision limited to a decision to refuse to grant a protection visa to a fast track applicant that is not invalid for non-compliance with the code of procedure for dealing with visa applications set out in subdiv AB of Div 3 of Pt 2 of the Act?
At [5], the majority identified two further substantive questions which were raised on the agreed facts as follows:
… They concern whether the delegate of the Minister failed to comply with s 57 of the Act in dealing with the plaintiff’s application for a protection visa and whether the Authority acted unreasonably in failing to get or consider new information under ss473DC and 473DD of the Act.
Accordingly, the matters before the High Court in Plaintiff M174/2016 are not analogous in any way to those currently before this Court and reliance on Plaintiff M174/2016 in the current context is misplaced.
The applicant relies particularly on paragraph [21] of PlaintiffM174/2016 where the majority said:
There is no dispute between the parties that the various powers conferred on the Authority by Div 3 of Pt 7AA are conferred on the implied condition that they are to be exercised within the bounds of reasonableness, in the sense explained in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li, with the consequence that an unreasonable failure of exercise such a power can render invalid a purported performance by the Authority of the duty imposed on it by s 473CC to conduct a review and either affirm or to remit the decision under review.
At [76] the majority in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 342 held that in the exercise of a statutory discretion “unreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification”. It cannot be said in the present circumstance that the Authority’s decision to proceed in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Act lacks an evident and intelligible justification. The applicant’s reliance on this passage is misconceived.
Accordingly, Ground 1 discloses no jurisdictional error on the Authority’s behalf.
Ground 2
By Ground 2 the applicant submits that the Authority’s finding that his father was a “supporter” rather than a “member” of the LTTE was unreasonable or irrational. In oral submissions the applicant submitted that the finding that the applicant’s father was a supporter of the LTTE rather than a member of the LTTE was irreconcilable with the finding at paragraph [12] of the Authority Decision that the applicant’s father transported supplies for the LTTE.
Consideration
The characterisation, as irrational or illogical, of a finding made as part of the reasoning process underpinning a conclusion on a jurisdictional fact, is not easily made. The applicant must do more than merely disagree with the reasoning or resulting finding: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16 at [124] per Crennan and Bell JJ. Engaging in a process of reasoning that is illogical or irrational is taken to refer to “extreme illogicality or irrationality, measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one on which reasonable minds may come to different conclusions and against the framework of the inquiry being as to whether or not there has been jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal”: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317 at [148]. It is not enough that the applicant asserts dissatisfaction or disagreement with the Authority’s decision. The role of the Court on judicial review is not to undertake a general review of the Authority’s decision or substitute it with another decision. Merits review is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang & Ors [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259 at [272] per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ (Liang). Further, the weight to be given to particular evidence is a matter for the Authority: Lee v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 464 at [27].
I consider that the finding by the Authority that the applicant’s father was a supporter of the LTTE was open to it on the evidence before it and reveals a logical and evident basis. I find no irrationality in the findings that the applicant’s father transported supplies for the LTTE as a Tamil living in an LTTE controlled area in the period immediately before and during renewed hostilities in 1990 but was not a member of the LTTE. In finding that the applicant’s father was not a member of the LTTE, but rather a supporter, the Authority relied upon the applicant’s evidence that his father was repeatedly detained and released by the SLA in an LTTE controlled area and that the applicant said this was because the SLA wanted to gather more evidence and identify more people and was trying to get his father to be an informer. The Authority also accepted that the applicant’s father may have fought with the LTTE and was later arrested by the SLA after the applicant moved to India but considered that this arrest was part of a “general round-up” rather than the applicant’s father being targeted for arrest.
As to the applicant’s assertions that the Authority irrationally:
(a)failed to consider that the applicant’s father may have provided assistance after the applicant left Sri Lanka;
(b)found that the applicant’s father was not killed by the SLA as a result of his active involvement with the LTTE; and
(c)found that the applicant was not known to Sri Lankan authorities on the sole basis that the applicant had not been questioned by Indian authorities,
those assertions are rejected for the following reasons.
Firstly, at paragraph [14] of its decision the Authority said:
The applicant claims that his father sent the family to India in 1990 and said that he would join them there. His father stayed to arrange the sale of property and livestock but the applicant also said that he thought his father may have wanted to stay and fight with the LTTE. These two circumstances are plausible and are not inconsistent with each other, and I also take into account the applicant's age at this time and the fact that much of what he knows of this time has been told to him by his mother. accept that he believes that his father may have stayed to fight with the LTTE but, as discussed below, I am not satisfied that his father became a member of the LTTE.
The Authority therefore did consider that the applicant believed his father may have provided assistance after the applicant left Sri Lanka. This matter was squarely before the Authority.
Secondly, at paragraph [16] of its decision the Authority said:
Having regard to all of the evidence and information above, I am satisfied that the applicant's father was suspected of an association with the LTTE and was questioned and released on a number of occasions. I am satisfied that he was later arrested by the SLA as part of a group, that he has not been seen or heard of since that time, and that he is now most likely dead. I am prepared to accept that his death was at the hands of the SLA but I am not satisfied that he was a member of the LTTE, or that he was arrested and killed because of this membership.
Accordingly, whilst the Authority was prepared to accept that the applicant’s father was now most likely dead and that his death was at the hands of the SLA, it was not satisfied that he was a member of the LTTE. The reasons for that are set out at paragraph [13] – [15] of its decision and disclose a logical and evidence basis.
Thirdly, as to the assertion that the applicant was not known to Sri Lankan authorities on the sole basis that the applicant had not been questioned by Indian authorities, I refer to and repeat my comments in relation to Ground 4 below.
Accordingly, Ground 2 discloses no jurisdictional error by the Authority.
Ground 4
By Ground 4 the applicant submits that the Authority’s finding that the applicant was not being monitored by the SLA because of the absence of interest by the Indian authorities with respect to his father’s activities with the LTTE was irrational.
Consideration
At paragraph [17] the Authority said:
I take into account that these events occurred 27 years ago, when the applicant was aged 12, and that he has not been in Sri Lanka since that time. He has not claimed that he has any other relatives in Sri Lanka who were involved with the LTTE, and he has not claimed that he or any other member of his family has been questioned by the Indian intelligence services in relation to his father’s activities with the LTTE or the family history in Sri Lanka. I am not satisfied that the applicant has any profile as a real or imputed supporter or associate of the LTTE arising from his father. I am not satisfied that he faces a real chance of harm at the hands of the Sri Lankan authorities for any reason associated with his father, now or in the foreseeable future.
Firstly, I consider that the applicant’s submissions proceed on a misreading of the Authority’s reasons. The Authority relied on an absence of evidence before it to suggest that there was any adverse interest by anyone with respect to the applicant’s father’s activity, be it Indian authorities or otherwise. Secondly, the paragraph must be read as a whole. Properly understood, the paragraph does not, as submitted by the applicant, provide that the applicant was not known to Sri Lankan authorities on the sole basis that the applicant had not been questioned by Indian authorities. In addition to the absence of interest by Indian intelligence services in questioning the applicant, the Authority also identifies that no other member of his family has been so questioned, the events took place 27 years ago, the applicant was then aged 12, he has not been in Sri Lanka since that time and no claim is made that any other relative was involved with the LTTE, as reasons why the Authority was not satisfied that the applicant has any profile as a real or imputed supporter or associate of the LTTE arising from his father’s activities. Accordingly, on these bases the Authority was not satisfied that the applicant faces a real chance of harm at the hands of the Sri Lankan authorities for any reason associated with his father.
Accordingly, there was a logical and evident basis for the Authority’s conclusion that was open to it on the evidence before it.
Accordingly, Ground 4 also discloses no jurisdictional error on the Authority’s behalf.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, the Application must be dismissed
The Minister seeks that the applicant pay its costs. I shall order that the applicant pay the Minister’s costs in an amount to be fixed if not agreed.
I certify that the preceding sixty-six (66) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge J Young. Associate:
Dated: 13 September 2024
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