Farrugia, Re Alfred Taxation, Ex parte Deputy Comm. of

[1988] FCA 304

:

R- -

BUDGMENT No. -.X.?.. . ! !

CATCHWORDS

BANKRUPTCY - Whether a bankruptcy notice is defective	if it
claims interemt on the judgment debt to	a date specified in
the notice which i8 earlier than the date	of issue of the
notice but doe8 not expressly abandon any claim	for interest
accruing after the date Specified	- requirements for validity
of a bankruptcy notice.

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth): 8 8 . 40, 41, 82

Federal Court of Aurtralia Act 1976 (Cth): S . 25

ALFRED FARRUGIA BX PARTE: DEPUTY COHHISSIONER OF TAXATION

P2472 of 1987

SYDNEY
COURT:	SWEENEY, LOCKHART and BURCHETT JJ.

4 JULY 1988

IN THE ?CDEML COURT OF AUSTRALIA )

ISION )	bENERlrL DIV
BANKRUPTCY DIS'Fn ICT IN THE STATE ) NO. P2472 of 1987
b? NEW SO urn WALES AND TEE 1
A U S W I A N CAPITAL T E R R m R Y )

RE :  AL?RED FARRUGIA

Debtor

EX PARTE:  DEPUTY COMMISSIONER O? TAXATION

Reapondent

JUDGES MAKING ORDER:	Sweeney, Lockhart and Burchett JJ.
DATE O? ORDER:	4 July 1988
WRERE ORDER MADE:	Sydney

HINUTES O? ORDER

The quertion arked in the care rtated pursuant to sub-s.

2 5 ( 6 ) of	the ?ederal Court	of	Aurtralia Act	1976	is	as
followr:

11 the bankruptcy notice defective by reason only of the

fact that it claim. interert to a date prior to the irrue of the notice but doer not waive or abandon any claim for interert accruing after the date specified in the notice?

We anrwer tho quertion arked in the case am follows:

The bankruptcy notice is not defective by reason only of tho fact that it claims intorest to a date prior to the

date of the irrue of the notice and doer not in terms

abandon or waive any claim	for interost accruing after
the date specified in the	notice.

It is unnocossary for the Court to answer any of the

other quertionr rairod by the rtated car..

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

There be no order for cortr with respect to the stated

case.

NOTE :	Settlomont and entry of orders	is dealt with in Order 36	of
the ?ederal Court Ruler.

IN THE ?EDCML COURT O? AUSTRALIA)

DIVISION 1

BANKBUPTCY D I m I C T IN THE STATE ) No. P2472 of 1987

b? NEW S-	WALE6 AND	THE	1
X~ISTIULIAN	CAPITAL	TERRITI~RY	1

RE :  ALFRED FARRUGIA

Debtor

EX PARTE:  DEPUTY COMMISSIONER O? TAXATION

Respondent

COURT :	Sweeney, Lockhart and Burchett	JJ.
DATE:	4 July 1988
PLACE:	sydne y

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT

A single Judge of this Court stated a case pursuant to sub-6.

2 5 ( 6 ) of the redoral Court of Australia Act 1976 for the consideration

of a ?ull Court of the Court concerning a matter	of importance in
bankruptcy law and	practice.

The question is whether a bankruptcy notice is defective if

it claims interest on the judgment debt to a date specified in the

notice which is earlier than the date of issue of the notice but does not in terms waive or abandon any claim for interest accruing after the date so specified.

L.

Judgment was signed by the creditor, the Deputy Commissioner

of Taxation, against the debtor, Alfred Farrugia,	in	the District
Court of New South Wales	at	Sydney on 21 July 1986. A draft

bankruptcy notice was presented to a Deputy Registrar in Bankruptcy in

Sydney together with an application for its issue on a day before the

notice was issued. On 29 June 1987 the bankruptcy notice was issued

by a Deputy Registrar. The date of issue was determined by the Deputy

Registrar, not by the creditor. It was served on the debtor on 8 July

1987. The notice was not complied with and on 27 November 1987 a

petition was presented by the creditor reeking sequestration of the
debtor's ertate. The hearing of the petition awaits the determination

of this stated case.

The bankruptcy notice recites that the creditor claimed the

sum of $10,000 due by the debtor under the final judgment obtained	in
the District Court of New South Wales at Sydney on	21 July 1986, being

$16,016.54 due under the judgment, rince reduced by $6,016.54, and

interest amounting to	$2,018.94 calculated on the daily balance of the
judgment debt at the rate	of 19.50 dollars per centum per annum from
21 July

1986 to 26 June 1987, making a total of $12,018.94, the

judgment being a judgment the execution of which has not been stayed.

The notice then requires the debtor to pay the sum of $12,018.94 to

the Registrar of the DirtriCt Court of New South Wales at 225

Macquarie Street, Sydney or to secure the payment of that sum to the

satisfaction of the Federal Court or the creditor or to compound	it to
the satisfaction of the creditor. The notice doer not	in terms waive
or abandon any claim for interert after	26 June 1987.

.

3.

The notice was thus issued three days after the date up to

which intoreat was claimed in it. This means that $16.02 interest was

not claimed and not in terra waived or abandoned.It is common ground

that all calculations of amounts by way of judgment debt and interest

in the bankruptcy notice were correctly stated in the bankruptcy

notice.

It is well established that a claim for interest on a

judgmont dobt which bears interest may be included in a bankruptcy

notico: Re Lehmnn; Ex parte Hasluck (1890) 7 Morrell 181; 62 L.T.	941
per C8ve J. at 942; Re Cooper (1911) 2 K.B.	550 per Buckley L.J. at
555; Re O'Koofe (1963)	19 A.B.C. 101; (1964) A.L.R. 561;

Mullavey; Ex Darte A.N.Z. Banking Group Limited (1977) 20 A.L.R. 276;

Re Munson; Ex parte Deputy Couiaaioner of Taxation (1977) 29 F.L.R.

479; Re Ilanion; Ex parto Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1979) 23

A.L.R.	270; Ex parto Conmercial Banking	Co. Limited (1979) 23	A.L.R.
522.

Judgment dobta uaually bear interest theae days and creditors

seeking the isauo of bankruptcy notices generally include claims	for
interest.	Though this practice ia permissible, it has given rise to

questions, sometimer of difficulty, concerning the validity of

bankruptcy noticea. These questions have come before the courts	from
time to time.

If a judgment creditor chooses to claim interest on a

judg8ent dobt it ia neceasary for the calculation of the claim to be

accurately at8ted in the notice and for the period during which the

claim ia made to be specified:	Re Mullavey (supra) per C.A. Sweeney
J. at 284; Re Davir; Ex parte Deputy Commirrioner of Taxation	(1963)

19 A.B.C. 100; (1963) A.L.R. 764; Re McDonald; Ex parte Elder Smith

Goldrbrough Hort Ltd. (1978) 18 A.L.R. 505 per Riley J. at 507. It

har not to our knowledge been said	in any reported case	that a
bankruptcy notico	ir dofective if the period for which interest	on the

judgmont dobt	is clairod ir rpocified ar terminating on a date earlier
than the date on which tho bankruptcy notice	is irsued.

In Ro Sly; Ex parte Broadlands International Finance Limited,

a judgmont of Davies J.	delivered on 21 March 1988, unreported, his
Honour conridorod tho validity	of a bankruptcy notice which specified
a rate of intorort and	the amount of that interest calculated up to a
narod date which war throe weeks beforo the date of the issue	of the

bankruptcy notico. Hir Eonour, whilrt recogniring that a claim for

interort ray b . u d o in the notice to a date prior to the issue of the

notice, raid at p. 5:

"It was not perrirrible for tho judgment creditor so to

clair part only of tho debt, leaving another pa t of tho dobt rubsoquontly tg be claired. If interert was

dorandod, tho amount due up to tho date of the

bankruptcy notice had to bo specified or the claim for

intorost after the dato narod in the bankruptcy notice,

14 Hay 1979, had to be abandoned.
In my opinion, the notice on	ita term. claimed part

only of tho interert due under the judgment, a course
which was not opon unlers any claim to the remainder of
tho intorert war clearly abandoned. Not only was the
intorost aftor l4 May 1979 not abandoned, the recitals

indicatod that the judgment creditor regarded interest

up to the dato of payment ar due under the judgment."

Davier J. rertated that opinion a few weeks later in - Re

Mooller; Ex pacto Dairy ?armerr Employees' Credit Union Limited,

unreportod, 15 April 1988; and again some weeks later in - Re

.

5.

Stavrakakir; Ex parte Noronu Pty. Limited, unreported, 10 May

1988. In the latter care his Honour observed at p. 3, with

respect to abandonment of interest after the date to which

interert is claimed in the notice:

"Technical wordr of abandonment are not required but the

notice rhould rpecify the totality of the judgment debt
that ir claimed, to the end that, if the debtor pays
the whole of the sum claimed, no further rum can be
claimed under the judgment, for the balance has been
abandoned."

The judgment. of Davier J. in there three cases gave rise to thir stated care. If his Honour's opinion is correct many extant bankruptcy noticer will be invalid becaure notices irsued these dayr usually calculate interest on judgment debts to

dates prior to the irrue of the notices by the bankruptcy

regirtry and do not in termr abandon claim. for interert accruing

thereafter. The point is therefore important to creditors,

debtors, solicitorr and bankruptcy registries throughout

Aurtralia. Riley J. raid in Re Hunson (supra) at pp. 480-481:

"Obviourly it is not contemplated that the bankruptcy

notice will necerrarily be irrued immediately the
application is filed, or even on the day on which	it is
filed:	and an examination of twenty-five current files
choren at random rhows that	in practice it war 80
issued in only twelve of thoro carer and that	in the

other thirteen cares the dates of application and of irrue differed by from one to as many as fourteen days. "

Riley J. war rpeaking of the position as it was in 1977.

In recent times there ham been a considerable increase in the numberr of bankruptcy notices issued	by the Registrars	and
Deputy Regirtrarr in Bankruptcy throughout Aurtralia,	and	the
lapse of time between the dates of	application and of issue	is

not infrequently of several weeks duration.

Section 41 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 ("the Act") is

central to thir Batter.	Sub-rection 41(1) requires that a
bankruptcy notice rhall be in accordance with the pre6cribed	form
and rhall b. irsued by the Regirtrar.	Sub-section 41(2) provides
that the prescribed form of bankruptcy notice rhall be ruch	that
the notice:

"(a) require. the debtor named in it within a specified

time ... to -

(i) pay the judgment debt or rum ordered to be paid

in accordance with the judgment or order; or

(ii) recure the payment of the debt or rum to the

ratisfaction of the Court or the creditor or his agent, i f any, rpecified in the notice or

compound the debt or rum to the satirfaction of

the creditor or him agent, if any, specified in

the notice ... n

The Act thur demandr that a bankruptcy notice require the debtor

to pay the	judgnnt debt in accordance with the judgment. The
quertion before us is whether the bankruptcy notice	in thi6 case
fulfilr that statutory requirement.

It must b. kept in mind that a bankruptcy notice is the document of the Regirtrar (or a Deputy Registrar) in Bankruptcy, not of the creditor who 6eekr ita irrue. It is dated by the Registrar, not by the creditor. It i6 the Registrar who issues it (para. (41(l)(b)); it is the Registrar who fixes time for

compliance with it where it is to be served in Australia (para.

.

l .

40( 1) (g)	) ; and the Registrar who signs	it and issues it only when
he	is satisfied that the application has been "duly" made	and

that the bankruptcy notice	is in order for signature (rule 7 ( 5 )
of the Bankruptcy Rules):	Re nunson (supra) per Riley J. at p.
480.

A bankruptcy notice is a statutory document which must

be complied with by the debtor if he is to avoid committing an
act of bankruptcy. It must be unequivocal in its terms and clear

to the debtor. Strict compliance with the requisites of a

bankruptcy notico ir ersontial to its validity: James v.

Commissioner of Taxation (1955) 93 C.L.R. 631 at 644.

If a bankruptcy notice claims interest on a judgment

debt it must be so expressed that it is clear that all that is claimed by the croditor from the debtor in the notice is the

amount or are the amounts specified, so that the debtor is

informed that if h . wishes to comply with the requirements of the

notice he may do so and that, if he does not, he shall commit an

act of bankruptcy.

It is a question of interpretation of the bankruptcy

notice in each case whether this requirement is complied with.

But it is not necessary that the notice state	in terms that any
right to futuro accruals of interest on the judgment	is abandoned
or waived.	There is no reason in principle why this should be
so.	All that is necessary i n that the bankruptcy notice should
clearly and unequivocally state what the debtor	is required to do
to avoid the	comdssion of an act of bankruptcy. Such clear and

.

8.

unequivocal statement in turn requires an accurate Statement of

the amount which the debtor	is	required to pay, secure	or
compound.

A bankruptcy notice is an essential element in the

scheme of bankruptcy logislation.	It is not a creature of the
general law, nor does compliance or non-compliance with	its

requirerentr by the debtor have diroct legal consoquencos outside

bankruptcy law.	Of course, if a debtor complies with the notice
the judgment dobt which underlies the issue of the notice will	be

dischargod; but this is because the payment operates as a

discharge of tho debt to the extont of the payment, not because

the bankruptcy notice has been complied with. The commission of

an act of bankruptcy MY b . an event which parties to agreements

specify as having an effoct upon thoir legal relationship: for

example, undor a deed of charge the commission of an act of

bankruptcy ray rosult in the crystallisation of the charge. But

that occurs bocause of the terms of the agreement, not as a

consoquonce of tho oporation of bankruptcy	law.
If the debtor fails to comply with the requirements a bankruptcy notico and thereby commits an act of bankruptcy, the	of

creditor ray include in his potition the full amount of the

judgment debt and interest accrued thereon to the date of

prosontation of the petition. Also, the creditor may prove in the bankruptcy for the full amount due to him for the judgment debt and interest accrued to the date of bankruptcy (sub-s.

82(1) 1 . There is no rule of bankruptcy law that requires a

creditor to abandon or waive, in the bankruptcy notice, his

entitlement to interert on the judgment debt accruing after the

date to which the claim is made in the notice.

DaVier J. appearr to have been persuaded by the judgment

of the English Court of Appeal in Re H.B. (1904) 1 K.B. 94 to

adopt tho view that, unlerr a claim	for interest after	a date
named in the bankruptcy notice	is abandoned, the notice	is

invalid i f there is a delay between the date named	in tho notice
and the date of irrue of the notice.	In particular, it appears
that	his Honour relied upon the following parsage from the
rearonr for judgment of Romer L.J.	at p. 103:

"Clearly, in a bankruptcy notice the debtor is

ontitled to soe from the notice exactly what is claimod to be due on the judgment debt. No doubt

a rum might be claimed which is less than the real

amount duo, and that would not of course be fatal

to tho notico so long as the notice made it clear

that nothing more war claimed to be due on the

judgront beyond the amount rpecified in the

notice. But a notice to pay part of a judgment

dobt, leaving any balance that may be due to be rubrequently claimed, is, to my mind, clearly bad.

In Re E.B. tho debtor and the creditor had reached an

agreement that the debtor owed a particular rum, that the debt

was to	be	repaid by certain inrtalmentr, and that the debtor
should conrent to judgment being signed against	him.	Judgment

war then signed against him by consent, but without any reference

to payment by instalments. Default was made by the debtor in the

payment of some of the monthly instalments which had become due.

Following an unsuccessful attempt to issue an earlier bankruptcy notice in relation to the whole amount of the judgment debt, a

.

10.

second bankruptcy notice war issued for the amount of the

overdue inrtalmantr, credit being given to the debtor in respect

of a rum that had been attached under a garnishee order. The

balance dum war described in the bankruptcy notice as "the amount

due on tha final judgment". Vaughan Williams	L.J.	raid at pp.
101 and 102:

"Tha quartion which we have to decide	is whether, at the
tira whan that sacond bankruptcy notice war issued,	it
war a notica sarved on the debtor, within	S. 4 , sub-6.
lip), of tha Bankruptcy Act, 1883,	'requiring him to

D ~ V the ludamant debt in accordance with the terms Of

Him Lordrhip raid at p. 102 that he regarded the bankruptcy

notice as raquiring the debtor to pay the debt in accordance with

the terms, not of tha judgmant, but of the agreement, which led

him to hold tha notice to be invalid.

Romer L.J. reached a similar conclusion, holding that

the notice was foundad, not rimply on the judgment according to

itr termr, but on the judgment am modified by the agreement. His

Lordrhip conrtruad tha notice	am if it required the debtor to pay
only part of tha judgrant debt, namely, that part which was due

according to tha tarms of the agreement.

Stirling L.J. exprerred viewr substantially the same as

those exprasrad by Romer L.J.

Re H . B . turned on its own special factr, central to

which war the existence of the agreement made between the debtor
and the creditor before judgment was entered relating to the

manner of payrent of the judgment debt. The bankruptcy notice

was treated by each member of the Court as requiring the debtor

to pay in accordance with the terms of the agreement, not the

judgment (Vaughan Williams L.J.) or the terms of the judgment as

modified or varied by the agreement (Romer and Stirling L.JJ.1.

we mako one final observation about Re H.B. and it is

with reference to the last sentence of the passage from Romer

L.J.'s reasons, already cited:

I

... But a notice to pay	part of a judgment debt,
leaving any balance that may	be due to be subsequently
clai8.d'	is, to my nind, clearly bad."

This obsorvation must be read in the context of the sentences which procodo it, also proviously recited.

In spoaking of the second notice issued by the creditor

in Re: E.B., Vaughan Williams L.J. said at pp.101-2

"That notice is issued for the amount of the

ovorduo instalments, credit	being given to the
debtor in rospect of a sum that had been attached
under	a garnishor order; and the balance is

described	as	'the amount	due	on	the	final
judgment.

Tho quostion which we have to decide is wh ther, at

the time whon that second bankruptcy notice was

issuod, it was a notice served on the debtor,

within s.4, sub-s. l(g), of the Bankruptcy Act,

1883, 'requiring him to pay the judgment debt	in
accordance with-the termi if the judgment.	I do

not think it was. I think it was a notice

requiring the dobtor to pay a debt in accordance

with tho terms, not of the judgment, but of an

agroe~ont; and I think that in dealing with a section of thir nature in an Act of Parliament croating a new logislative act of bankruptcy, the actual anguage of the section ought o be considored."

It is in that renre, in our opinion, that the observation of

Romer L.J. murt be read.	Had the judgment in that case provided for
payment by inrtalmentr, it would have been open to the creditor	to

issue a bankruptcy notice in rerpcct of overdue instalments, because

such a notice would have been	in accordance with the terms of	the
judgment.

Indeed, Romer L.J. himrelf raid at pp.103-4

"That for. of notice clearly could only be

jurtified by the rpecial agreement alleged to exist

between the partier. That being 8 0 , this notice is

not one founded rimply on the judgment according to

ita termr; it ir founded on the judgment as

modified by the agreement, and it reems to me that

the notice ir no better than if it had, on the face

of it, rat forth the facta and required the debtor
to pay only part of the judgment debt, according to

the t e r m of the agreement, outride the judgment.

To my mind that la not a notice which, within the

provirion8 of the Act, 6.4, rub-r.l(g), requires

the debtor to pay the judgment debt	'in accordance
with the terms of the	judgment,' and therefore it
in, in my opinion, bad.	The Act rhould I think,
where it rpecifier acts of bankruptcy, receive	a
very careful and rtrict interpretation. On this rhort ground I think the appeal failr.".

But if hi8 Lordrhip meant that a bankruptcy notice must not only make

clear what rum ir to be paid in compliance with the notice, and that no further payment ir required to secure compliance, but must also expressly abandon any future claim (as, for example, by proof of debt in a rubrequent bankruptcy) which the terms of the original judgment

might enable the creditor to make, we murt respectfully disagree.

vaughan Williamr and Stirling L.JJ. laid down no such proposition, and

we can see no barir for it in principle.

.

13.

We therefore respectfully disagree with the conclusion of

Davies J. in the cares to which we have referred that it	is essential
for the creditor to abandon	his claim for interert after the date
named in the notice.

In our opinion the bankruptcy notice before us complies with

the statutory requirement of sub-s. 41(2), namely, that it require the

debtor to pay the judgment debt in accordance with the judgment. It is true that it doer not in terms state that the creditor abandons or waives any claim for interert accruing beyond 26 June 1987, but we see no baris in law for such a requirement.

By reciting that interest is claimed from 21 July 1986, being

the date of the judgment, to 26 June 1987, in the rum of $2,018.94,

making a total of $12,018.94 which must be paid in order to avoid the

corrisrion of	an act of	bankruptcy, the bankruptcy notice complies
with sub-s. 41(2).	There is no doubt, on a perural of this notice,	as

to what the crmditor is claiming from the debtor, namely, the sum of $12,108.94 having two component.: firrt, the balance due under the

judgment h i n g the amount for which judgment was signed against the

debtor less moneyr subsequently paid by the debtor; and, second,

interest thereon to a nominated date.

We have not seen the bankruptcy petition in this matter as it

does not form part of the case stated. It may assert that the petitioning creditor claims from the debtor a sum which contains a

component of interest due after 26 June 1987. If a requestration

order is made against the debtor's estate the creditor's proof of debt

may likewise include such a claim for interest due to the date of bankruptcy when claims of credrtors are converted into rights of

proof. we see no inconsistency between these rights of the creditor

and his right to specify by reference to a particular date stated in

the bankruptcy notice, being a date preceding its issue, the period

for which by that notice, he claims interest on the judgment debt.

Since we wrote these reasons for judgment the High Court has

given judgment (on Friday, 1 July 1988) in Kleinwort Benson Australia - Ltd. v Crowl. We have read the rearonr for judgment in that matter

where the question war whether the understatement	in the bankruptcy
notice of the amount of interert due on the judgment	debt to the date

to which interert war expresred to	be calculated	in the notice	(an
underrtatement of	r o w $23,000)	invalidated the particular	notice.

That question is plainly different	from the question with which this
appeal is concerned.

All nembera of the Court, Mason C.J., Wilson, Brennan and

Gaudron JJ., in their joint judgment at 3 and 4 and Deane J. at 13

noted that a bankruptcy notice ir not necesrarily isrued on the date

on which the application for its isrue is lodged and that the judgment

creditor i# not therefore always able to calculate precisely the

amount due as at the date of irrue of that notice.

Deane J., although in dissent, but not on matters relevant to the prerent appeal, raid at 13 and 14:

"There is one further matter which should be

mentioned. Senior	counsel	for the	appellant
creditor drew	attention	tohe	procedural

difficulty in calculating the precise amount of

.	.
.	15.

interest up to the date of the bankruptcy notice

in circumstances where a petitioning creditor will
ordinarily be unaware, in advance, of the precise

date upon which a bankruptcy notice will issue.

Thoro are, however, a number of accepted ways of

avoiding that difficulty without waiving or

abandoning the entitlement to interest. One way is to refrain from including interest in the debt

upon which the bankruptcy notice is based (see,

McDonald; -Re Hullave ; Ex arte Aurtralia and New Z e a d n s	G r o w DLtd.
eig. , R	.

20 A.L.R. 276, at pp. 282-2841. Another is

to follow the courso adoDted in the Dresent	case,
~~	~~

namely, to include in ihe debt upon which the

bankruptcy notice is based interest only up to a

specified date (see, e.g., Be Munson, and see oenorallv, S. Cavanash, 'The Reauisites of

Australian Law Journal, vol. 5 4 (19801, 278, at	iankruptcy Notices - A- Survey of Ricent Cases'
pp. 280-282)."

The majority of the High Court referred (at 6) to Re H.B.

(supra) and oxpromsly rejectod the view that it was authority for the

proporition that any understatement of the judgment	debt invalidates a
bankruptcy notico unloss it is clear that the excess is waived by	the
judgront creditor.

Had WO found tho bankruptcy notice in the present appeal to

be in fact dofoctivo it would have beon necessary	for us to give
consideration to tho porrible effect of	rub-S. 306(1) of the Act
having rogard to what is raid about that provision	in the majority
judgmont in Crowl's Case at 8.

We answor tho question asked in the case	as follows:
The bankruptcy notice is not defective by reason only of	the

fact that it claims intorest to a date prior to the date of the issue of the notice and door not in terms abandon or waive any claim for

interert accruing after the date spocified in the notice.

.

L 16.

It is unnecessary for us to answer any of the other questions

raised by the stated case.

No order for corts with respect to the stated case is sought by the respondent, so we make no order for costs.

I certify that this and the preceding fifteen (15) pages are a true copy of

the reasons for judgment herein of	the
Court.

Counsel for Petitioning Creditor:	Mr. M.R. Aldridge
Solicitor for Petitioning Creditor:	Australian Government Solicitor
Solicitor for Debtor:	Mr. L. Davis
Date of Hearing:	25 nay 1988

Datee of Judgnent:  4 July 1988