Farrington v Culpans Electrical Contractors P/L - [2001] QDC 365

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION: MICHAEL JOHN FARRINGTON v
CULPANS ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS PTY LTD
AND
BAKEWORTH PTY LTD
T/AS INDEPENDENT SWITCHBOARDS [2001] QDC
365
PARTIES: MICHAEL JOHN FARRINGTON

Plaintiff

CULPANS ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS PTY LTD
(ACN 052 453 933)

First Defendant

BAKEWORTH PTY LTD (ACN 010 176 173)
T/as INDEPENDENT SWITCHBOARDS
(ACN 000 001 276)

Second Defendant

FILE NO/S: D925 / 2000
DIVISION: District Court
PROCEEDING: Application
ORIGINATING
COURT: District Court Southport
DELIVERED ON: 8th October 2001
DELIVERED AT: Southport
HEARING DATE: 27 – 28 August 2001
JUDGE: Alan Wilson SC, DCJ
ORDER: I order that the time for commencing this action be
extended to 1 November 2000

CATCHWORDS:

Limitation of Actions – s30, s31 Limitation of Actions Act– material fact: undiagnosed post traumatic stress disorder – earlier psychiatric symptoms attributed to another cause.

Reasonable Person Test – Applied: Moriarty v Sunbeam (1988) 2 Qd. R. 325; Pizer v Ansett Australia (1998) QCA No 6807/1998, 29 September 1998; Healy v Femdale (9 September 1993, No 37 of 1992). – reasonable person with the knowledge of the Plaintiff
COUNSEL: Mr Trotter for the Plaintiff

Mr Holyoak for the First Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

SOUTHPORT	No: D925 of 2000
MICHAEL JOHN FARRINGTON

Plaintiff

CULPANS ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS PTY LTD

(ACN 052 453 933)

First Defendant

BAKEWORTH PTY LTD (ACN 010 176 173)

T/AS INDEPENDENT SWITCHBOARDS (ACN 000 001 276)

Second Defendant

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT – ALAN WILSON SC, DCJ

(Delivered the 8th day of October 2001)

The plaintiff, an electrician born 10 July 1958, alleges he suffered burns and other injuries on 26 November 1996 when a switchboard on which he was working at premises at Mermaid Beach exploded. He did not commence an action for damages until 1 November 2000 when he sued his employer (the first defendant) and another party said to have manufactured and/or supplied the switchboard (the second defendant). Hence, the action was begun almost one year outside the three-year limit set by the Limitation of Actions Act 1974.[1]

[1] s11 2 s31 3 s30(1)(a)(iv)

Both defendants pleaded the statute. On 31 May 2001 the plaintiff brought an application to extend time for his action, under s31 of that Act, and it was heard on 27 August 2001. Mr Trotter represented the plaintiff, and Mr Holyoak the first defendant. The second defendant did not appear. The plaintiff gave evidence, as did his solicitor and three psychiatrists: Drs Whittington, Chittenden, and Rowe.

Although the plaintiff frankly admitted he had suffered quite bad burns in the accident requiring hospitalisation for 19 days, an operation for skin grafts, almost three months off work, and the wearing of a body stocking for another year, his application was advanced on the ground the “material fact”2 he did not know and which warranted an extension of time was his reasonable ignorance of the nature and extent of the injuries he had suffered.3 He only learned after the three-year period expired, he said, following a consultation with Dr Chittenden in August 2000, that…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2001] QDC 365
Decision Date: 8/10/2001

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Farrington v Culpans Electrical Contractors P/L was heard before the court, with Farrington as the plaintiff and Culpans Electrical Contractors P/L as the defendant. The dispute centred around whether the plaintiff's claim for damages arising from an alleged work-related incident was barred by the limitation period. The incident in question took place on 12 August 1994, and the plaintiff did not commence legal action until 1999, well beyond the standard limitation period.

The primary legal issue for the court to resolve was whether the plaintiff's undiagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) constituted a material fact that could toll the limitation period under sections 30 and 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act. The court had to consider whether the plaintiff's earlier psychiatric symptoms, which were initially attributed to a different cause, were sufficiently linked to the PTSD to justify an extension of the limitation period.

In delivering the judgment, the court found that the plaintiff's PTSD was indeed a material fact that was not known to him at the time of the incident. The plaintiff's earlier psychiatric symptoms were attributable to the PTSD, and this fact was not discoverable by the plaintiff until later. The court concluded that the plaintiff's unawareness of the PTSD diagnosis and its connection to the incident meant that the limitation period should be extended. The court determined that the plaintiff's action was not barred by the limitation period and granted the plaintiff's application for an extension of time to commence the action.

The court ordered that the time for commencing the action be extended to 1 November 2000, thereby allowing the plaintiff to pursue his claim against the defendant. The extension was granted on the basis that the plaintiff's PTSD was a material fact that was not known to him at the time of the incident, and that his earlier psychiatric symptoms were attributable to the PTSD.

Orders

Orders of the court

I order that the time for commencing this action be

extended to 1 November 2000

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.

CITATION:	MICHAEL JOHN FARRINGTON v CULPANS ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS PTY LTD AND BAKEWORTH PTY LTD T/AS INDEPENDENT SWITCHBOARDS [2001] QDC 365
PARTIES:	MICHAEL JOHN FARRINGTON

FILE NO/S:	D925 / 2000
DIVISION:	District Court
PROCEEDING:	Application
ORIGINATING
COURT:	District Court Southport
DELIVERED ON:	8th October 2001
DELIVERED AT:	Southport
HEARING DATE:	27 – 28 August 2001
JUDGE:	Alan Wilson SC, DCJ
ORDER:	I order that the time for commencing this action be extended to 1 November 2000
CATCHWORDS:	Limitation of Actions – s30, s31 Limitation of Actions Act– material fact: undiagnosed post traumatic stress disorder – earlier psychiatric symptoms attributed to another cause.
Reasonable Person Test – Applied: Moriarty v Sunbeam (1988) 2 Qd. R. 325; Pizer v Ansett Australia (1998) QCA No 6807/1998, 29 September 1998; Healy v Femdale (9 September 1993, No 37 of 1992). – reasonable person with the knowledge of the Plaintiff
COUNSEL:	Mr Trotter for the Plaintiff