Farmer v The State of Western Australia
[2007] WASCA 219
•19 OCTOBER 2007
FARMER -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2007] WASCA 219
| SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA | Citation No: | [2007] WASCA 219 | |
| THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA) | |||
| Case No: | CACR:146/2006 | 14 SEPTEMBER 2007 | |
| Coram: | OWEN JA WHEELER JA MILLER JA | 19/10/07 | |
| 16 | Judgment Part: | 1 of 1 | |
| Result: | Appeal allowed Sentence of 8 years 8 months reduced to 7 years 4 months | ||
| B | |||
| PDF Version |
| Parties: | GREGORY KEITH FARMER THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA |
Catchwords: | Sentencing Totality 18-year-old offender Indictment containing 17 counts Manslaughter and other serious offences Offender with bad record Whether total sentence of 8 years 8 months infringed totality principle |
Legislation: | Criminal Procedure Rules (2005) (WA), r 16(1) Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 32, s 59 |
Case References: | Herbert v The Queen [2003] WASCA 67; (2003) 27 WAR 330 Jarvis v The Queen (1993) 20 WAR 201 Mill v The Queen [1988] HCA 70; (1988) 166 CLR 59 Miller v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 163 |
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA) CITATION : FARMER -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2007] WASCA 219 CORAM : OWEN JA
- WHEELER JA
MILLER JA
- Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram : MARTINO DCJ
File No : IND 1331 of 2006
Catchwords:
Sentencing - Totality - 18-year-old offender - Indictment containing 17 counts - Manslaughter and other serious offences - Offender with bad record - Whether total sentence of 8 years 8 months infringed totality principle
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Legislation:
Criminal Procedure Rules (2005) (WA), r 16(1)
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 32, s 59
Result:
Appeal allowed
Sentence of 8 years 8 months reduced to 7 years 4 months
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant : Mr S B Watters
Respondent : Mr D Dempster
Solicitors:
Appellant : Robert Young
Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Herbert v The Queen [2003] WASCA 67; (2003) 27 WAR 330
Jarvis v The Queen (1993) 20 WAR 201
Mill v The Queen [1988] HCA 70; (1988) 166 CLR 59
Miller v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 163
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1 OWEN JA: I agree with the reasons to be delivered by Miller JA and with his Honour's conclusion that the appeal should be allowed and a substitute sentence imposed. There is nothing I can usefully add.
2 WHEELER JA: I agree with the conclusion reached by Miller JA, and wish to add only some brief observations of my own.
3 It could not be said that any of the sentences imposed on any of the counts on the indictment, or the total head sentence, was disproportionate to the criminality of the offending. So far as totality is concerned, Miller JA's table demonstrates that all but one of the burglaries, and all of the thefts of vehicles (many of which seem to have been targeted because of their likely performance) attracted in practical terms no penalty at all. I have no doubt that the learned sentencing judge found this sentencing task very difficult, and that the total sentence imposed represents a very significant allowance for the appellant's youth and personal circumstances.
4 However, in my view a further reduction in the total effective sentence, as indicated by Miller JA, is necessary. The appellant comes from an appallingly dysfunctional background; its inadequacy is vividly illustrated by the fact that his two young brothers accompanied him in the stolen car. The death of his girlfriend, which he plainly feels very much, is, of course, a consequence of his own unlawful behaviour. His distress at her loss gives rise to some prospect, although a remote one, that he will realise that he must reform. If he does not seek to reform at this stage it is almost certain, with his history and his surroundings, that he will become hopelessly entrenched in a pattern of offending. As Miller JA points out, too long a sentence gives rise to the risk that he will become "intractable", so that any chance of rehabilitation will be lost. At his age, 8 years 8 months is too long. Seven years and 4 months is also a long time to a very young man, but any further reduction would be unduly lenient.
5 MILLER JA: On 5 October 2006, the appellant appeared in the District Court at Perth on an indictment which contained 17 counts. There were six counts of stealing motor vehicles, five of aggravated burglary, one of burglary, one of robbery in company, one of unlawful killing and three of unlawfully doing bodily harm. The appellant pleaded guilty to all counts. He consented to a waiver of r 16(1) of the Criminal Procedure Rules (2005) (WA) which provides that an accused must not be required to plead to a charge in an indictment until at least 21 days after the date on which the indictment is lodged. The learned sentencing judge ordered
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- that r 16(1) should not apply. This fact illustrates that the pleas of guilty were entered at the earliest opportunity.
6 The appellant also faced 12 Magistrate Court charges which were brought before the court pursuant to s 32 of the Sentencing Act1995 (WA). He requested that the court deal with those pending charges against him.
7 The appellant was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 8 years and 8 months and he was ordered to be eligible for parole. The sentences dated from 5 October 2006. At the time of sentencing, the appellant was serving a sentence or sentences of imprisonment and had been in custody since 20 January 2006. The sentence or sentences being served were due to expire on 10 December 2006.
8 The sentence of 8 years 8 months' imprisonment was made up by the accumulation of three sentences. They were:
Count 3: 1 year 4 months
Count 8: 2 years
Count 14: 5 years 4 months
9 All other sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed on count 14. Various penalties were imposed in relation to the s 32 matters and either ordered to be served concurrently with the sentences imposed on the indictment, or, in any case in which fines were imposed and remained unpaid, terms of imprisonment calculated in accordance with s 59 of the Sentencing Act1995 were to be served.
Appeal
10 The appellant was granted an extension of time within which to appeal on 19 March 2007. It was then ordered that his application for leave to appeal should be heard together with the appeal.
11 The grounds of appeal were originally four in number, but the first was abandoned. The remaining grounds are as follows:
2. The learned sentencing Judge erred in that the total sentence of 8 years and 8 months imprisonment was manifestly excessive having regard to the appellant's youth, pleas of guilty and remorse;
3. The learned sentence Judge failed to properly apply the totality principle in that the appellant had been in custody since 20 January 2006 in circumstances where the sentence imposed could not be
- backdated. The sentence imposed was not reduced to take into account that additional time in custody and the total time to be served, namely over 7 years and 4 months imprisonment, was crushing having regard to the age of the appellant;
- 4. The learned sentencing Judge erred in placing too much weight on considerations of punishment and deterrence in circumstances where the fact that the appellant committed the offences mere months after his 18th birthday required more weight to be placed on rehabilitation.
12 At the hearing of the appeal, it became apparent that there was really one ground of appeal, and that was that in all the circumstances, the sentence of 8 years 8 months' imprisonment infringed the totality principle and was a crushing sentence for an 18-year-old offender.
The facts
13 The facts revealed that the appellant's offending took place between 19 December 2005 and 20 January 2006. It was on the latter date that he committed the most serious offence; namely, that of unlawful killing. He drove a stolen motor vehicle in a criminally negligent manner and caused the death of one passenger and bodily harm to three others. His offending breached a supervised released order, following a period of detention ordered in the Children's Court for a number of offences of which the appellant was convicted on 15 June 2005. It was for this reason that he was taken into custody on 20 January 2006.
14 The catalogue of offences committed by the appellant between 19 December 2005 and 16 January 2006 can be summarised from the prosecutor's statement of facts before the learned sentencing judge in the following way.
Count 1
15 During the afternoon of 19 December 2005, the appellant went to Brian Gardner Motors in Cannington where he got into an unlocked 2004 Holden Monaro coupe on display on the front grass verge. He located a spare key in the glove box of the vehicle and drove it away. It was abandoned the following morning in Maddington and a fire extinguisher was activated inside it, in an attempt to destroy forensic evidence. The vehicle was a high-performance vehicle, valued at $65,000. Damage was calculated at $1,319.18.
(Page 6)
Count 2
16 Between 9.30 and 10.30 pm on 12 January 2006, the appellant went to an address in Marangaroo, where he found a 1990 Holden Commodore sedan in the driveway of a house. The rear door was unlocked and the keys were in the ignition. He got into the vehicle and drove it away. It was abandoned later that night in Wanneroo. It had sustained $4,000 by way of damage. Power and cabinet-making tools to the value of $2,500 were stolen from the boot of the vehicle.
Count 3
17 At about 6 am on 13 January 2006, the appellant entered a house in Hocking by putting his fingers through a flyscreen near the rear sliding door which he unlocked to gain entry. Inside the house, he stole a set of keys for the house and for a motor vehicle.
Count 4
18 With the stolen keys, the appellant took a 2002 Holden Clubsport from the driveway of the house in Hocking and drove it away. The vehicle was later recovered, but the keys were not. Locks at the residence required replacement at a cost of $1,150. The stolen vehicle was valued at $60,000.
Count 5
19 At about 12.15 pm on 14 January 2006, the appellant went to a residence in Michael Street, Yokine. He was in company with a juvenile. He smashed the glass partition adjacent to the front door and his co-offender entered the premises and stole a set of keys from the kitchen bench. These keys belonged to a motor vehicle parked in the driveway. The appellant took possession of the keys and drove away in the motor vehicle.
Count 6
20 At about 12.05 am on 16 January 2006, the appellant, in company with three other offenders, went to a house in Queen Street, Bentley. He forced open a glass sliding door at the side of the house and entered it. His co-offenders followed. The appellant removed a set of car keys which were on the floor beside the complainant's bed. A mobile phone, cash and a jewellery box were also stolen. Their value was approximately $600.
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Count 7
21 Following the burglary of the house in Bentley, the appellant unlocked a Toyota motor vehicle parked in the garage at the front of the premises. He got into the driver's seat and his co-offenders also got into the vehicle. The appellant then drove it away. It was located on 16 January in Shepperton Road, Victoria Park with significant damage to it. Stereo speakers, an amplifier and other items had been stolen.
Count 8
22 At about 6.00 pm on 16 January 2006, the appellant was driving the stolen Toyota in Eastwood Parade, Canning Vale. He was in company with a co-offender. He saw the complainant driving alone in a motor vehicle and followed her vehicle for a short time, until it pulled into the complainant's driveway at Eastwood Parade, Canning Vale. As she parked her vehicle in the garage, the appellant let his co-offender out of the Toyota and the co-offender went to the garage, opened the front passenger door of the complainant's vehicle and grabbed the complainant's handbag, which was on the front passenger seat. The complainant took hold of the bag to prevent it from being stolen and there was a struggle before the handbag strap broke. The co-offender jumped a side wall to the garage and ran to the vehicle in which the appellant was seated. It was then driven away. The handbag contained a set of keys, a mobile phone, cash and various personal items to the value of $540. The complainant suffered minor injuries.
Count 9
23 Between 9 pm on 17 January and 6 am on 18 January 2006, the appellant went to a house in Howick Street, Lathlain. He was in company with three others. The appellant and at least one of his co-offenders jumped the fence to enter the rear yard of the house. They opened the rear laundry door and went into the house. A wallet on the kitchen bench containing $2,075 in cash was located, together with other personal items of the complainant. These items and a set of car keys were stolen, amounting to a total value of $3,405.
Count 10
24 With the stolen car keys, the appellant went to a 1998 Holden Statesman Caprice parked in the driveway of the house in Howick Street. He drove the vehicle away. It was later wrecked in the events forming the subject of counts 13 - 17. Its value was $28,000.
(Page 8)
Count 11
25 At about 10 pm on 17 January 2006, the appellant went to a house in Gresham Street, Victoria Park. The front door of the house was open and the appellant was able to enter the house through an unlocked security screen. He went to the complainant's bedroom, where he located a laptop computer. In a study, he located a shoulder bag, a laptop carry bag and a digital camera. These items were stolen. They were valued at $4,113.
Count 12
26 At about 11 am on 19 January 2006, the applicant in company with another person went to a house in Discovery Circuit, Iluka. They made their way to a garden shed at the rear of the premises and removed from the shed a sledge hammer and pick. They then walked to the side of the house and used these tools to remove a security screen from a window. The appellant and the offender then entered the house. Upstairs in the house, they located a gun cabinet in a wardrobe. The door to the cabinet was forced and 22 antique revolvers and two antique shotguns were stolen. They were valued at $45,000. They were anonymously left at a police station on 21 January 2006, after the appellant's arrest.
Counts 13-17
27 These were undoubtedly the most serious counts faced by the appellant. They all arose out of an incident that began at about 8.30 am on 20 January 2006. At that time, police attended at an address in Berwick Street, St James, in the driveway of which was the stolen Holden Statesman Caprice. Shortly after police left that location, the appellant drove the vehicle away with the intention of driving to Maddington. He was accompanied by his sister, Leanne Farmer (19 years), his cousin, Daniel Ugle (17 years), his girlfriend, Nikkola Hayward (16 years) and his two younger brothers, Ashley and Clinton (12 and 11 years).
28 Police attempted to intercept the Holden Caprice because it was recognised as a stolen vehicle. Blue lights and the siren of the intercepting police vehicle were activated and in consequence the appellant initially slowed the vehicle, but then accelerated away. He refused to stop and a high-speed police pursuit followed. This pursuit went through the suburbs of Victoria Park, Queens Park, Cannington and Beckenham. The appellant drove at speeds up to 140 kilometres per hour. Whilst being pursued, he sped through several traffic lights against the red light and travelled to the incorrect side of the roadway to evade police.
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- He paid no attention to his sister, who yelled at him several times to stop the vehicle.
29 Police aborted the pursuit on Welshpool Road near William Street. The appellant continued to travel at speed and was travelling at a minimum of 115 kilometres per hour as he approached the intersection of Welshpool Road and Diamond Street, Beckenham. There, the appellant lost control of the motor vehicle. It went to the incorrect side of the roadway and collided with the kerb. It became airborne and struck a power pole restraining wire, then collided with a tree in the front garden of a house in William Street. The vehicle became wedged in the tree.
30 Nikkola Hayward suffered extensive injuries from which she died at the scene. Leanne Farmer was knocked unconscious and was bleeding from the head. Clinton Farmer was lying at the base of the tree and bleeding from his head. Ashley Farmer was also bleeding profusely. Each of these three suffered bodily injury and they were all admitted to hospital. The appellant and one remaining passenger ran from the scene to evade police. Later in the day, the appellant attended at the major crash investigation section, accompanied by legal representatives. He admitted to having driven the vehicle involved in the collision, but otherwise declined to be interviewed.
Sentencing
31 The learned sentencing judge first recounted the facts as they had been recited by the prosecutor. He concluded by saying:
These [counts 14 to 17] are very serious examples of offences of that kind and it's necessary in arriving at the appropriate sentence for all of these matters to punish you, to deter you from reoffending, and to deter others. People must know that when they commit offences such as stealing cars, driving recklessly, thereby risking serious injury and death to others, as has occurred here, they are committing very serious crimes and very serious penalties will be imposed for them. That's all I wish to say about the facts of the offences.
32 The learned sentencing judge dealt with matters personal to the appellant. He pointed out that he was born on 27 October 1987 and was about to turn 19 years of age. He was therefore just over 18 years of age when the offences the subject of the indictment were committed.
33 At the time of commission of the offences, the appellant was on a supervised release order. He had an extensive record for a young person. He was in custody and would be serving a sentence until 10 December
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- 2006. The learned sentencing judge said that this was a matter that he would take into account when looking at the totality of the sentences to be imposed.
34 The learned sentencing judge noted that the appellant was remorseful. He took account of his early plea of guilty and indicated that full credit would be given for the plea. He referred to the difficult life that the appellant had led and observed that much of his offending had been associated with drug abuse.
35 After imposing the individual sentences on the different counts, the learned sentencing judge said:
Some of these offences, as is clear from the facts, relate to courses of conduct together. Others are quite separate, but in looking at the total sentence to be imposed I consider not only those issues of which offences were committed separately and which were committed as part of one course of conduct, but also the fact that the total sentence must reflect the totality of your criminality and that is coupled with the sentence you are presently serving to which I have referred and that you, being so young and motivated to perform [sic reform?], as I accept you are, are given some hope and some prospect of doing so.
I have also borne in mind what was recently said by the Court of Appeal in a recent case called Miller that when looking at the question of totality it's useful to consider what the total sentence would have been before the changes to the sentencing legislation which removed remission to make sure that the total sentence is appropriate, having regards to the principles that I have just outlined; so I have decided that the sentence of one year and four months on count 3, of two years on count 8 and five years and four months on count 14, should be served cumulatively. That's a sentence of eight years and eight months.
Appeal
36 The question in issue in this appeal is whether a sentence of 8 years 8 months imposed upon such a young offender took proper account of the totality principle. The sentence, when added to the period of time served by the appellant between January and October 2006 amounted, in effect, to a total period in custody of 9 years 6 months. A sentence of 8 years 8 months equated to a sentence of 13 years prior to application of the transitional provisions contained within the Sentencing Legislation Amendment and Repeal Act 2003 (WA).
(Page 11)
The totality principle
37 The totality principle has been expressed in a number of cases and is well understood. In Mill v The Queen [1988] HCA 70; (1988) 166 CLR 59 at [62] - [63] Wilson, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ expressed it in these terms:
The totality principle is a recognized principle of sentencing formulated to assist a court when sentencing an offender for a number of offences. It is described succinctly in Thomas, Principles of Sentencing, 2nd ed (1979), pp 56-7 as follows (omitting references):
'The effect of the totality principle is to require a sentencer who has passed a series of sentences, each properly calculated in relation to the offence for which it is imposed and each properly made consecutive in accordance with the principles governing consecutive sentences, to review the aggregate sentence and consider whether the aggregate is "just and appropriate". The principle has been stated many times in various forms: "when a number of offences are being dealt with and specific punishments in respect of them are being totted up to make a total, it is always necessary for the court to take a last look at the total just to see whether it looks wrong["]; "when … cases of multiplicity of offences come before the court, the court must not content itself by doing the arithmetic and passing the sentence which the arithmetic produces. It must look at the totality of the criminal behaviour and ask itself what is the appropriate sentence for all the offences".'
See also Ruby, Sentencing, 3rd ed (1987), pp 38–41. Where the principle falls to be applied in relation to sentences of imprisonment imposed by a single sentencing court, an appropriate result may be achieved either by making sentences wholly or partially concurrent or by lowering the individual sentences below what would otherwise be appropriate in order to reflect the fact that a number of sentences are being imposed. Where practicable, the former is to be preferred.
38 In this Court the principle has been stated many times. In Jarvis v The Queen (1993) 20 WAR 201, Ipp J at 207 succinctly expressed the principle in the following terms:
The overriding principle is accordingly that the aggregate sentence (even when punishment is being imposed for multiple offences) should fairly and justly reflect the total criminality of the offender's conduct: Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465; Evangelista v The Queen [Unreported, WASCCA, Library No 920051, 30 January 1991]; R v Glenister [1980] 2 NSWLR 597 at 612; Lade v Mamarika (1986) 83 FLR 312.
(Page 12)
39 In Herbert v The Queen [2003] WASCA 67; (2003) 27 WAR 330, Malcolm CJ at [10] et seq gave a lengthy dissertation on the subject.
40 It is important when approaching the totality principle to ensure by way of a 'last look' that the term of imprisonment imposed does not have a crushing effect. In Jarvis, 206 - 207, Ipp J put it in the following way:
... in taking a 'last look' at the total imprisonment imposed, the court will continue to apply the principle that the sentence should be proportionate to the degree of criminality involved. That principle is, after all, basic to the law of sentencing: Wicks v The Queen (1989) 3 WAR 372 at 379 - 380. The crushing effect of a term of imprisonment is merely one of the mitigating factors that is to be taken into account when determining whether a particular term of imprisonment is proportionate to the criminality evinced.
41 In Mill, the High Court made it clear that the application of the totality principle in sentencing must take into account a pre-existing sentence of imprisonment which, when added to the term of imprisonment about to be imposed, will increase its length. That was the case here, as was recognised by the learned sentencing judge.
Application of the totality principle in the present case
42 The learned sentencing judge chose to accumulate the sentences on counts 3, 8 and 14. They were 1 year 4 months (aggravated burglary), 2 years (robbery in company) and 5 years 4 months (manslaughter). As I have pointed out, by aggregating those three sentences, the sentence of 8 years 8 months equated to 13 years prior to the application of the transitional provisions. It is relevant to look at the sentence in those terms: Miller v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 163, [22] (Wheeler JA, Steytler P and Buss JA concurring).
43 The combination of offences committed by the appellant was extremely serious. The unlawful killing and the offences of causing bodily harm which arose out of the criminally negligent driving of a motor vehicle were the most serious. This was recognised by the learned sentencing judge's sentences. The following table shows how they were structured:
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44 There is no doubt that personal and general deterrence were important factors in the sentencing process. Just punishment was necessarily called for. Apart from the offences committed by the appellant against property, he had unlawfully killed one person and injured three as a result of criminally negligent driving.
45 The rehabilitation of the appellant was also an important factor. In this respect, the learned sentencing judge had a pre-sentence and a psychological report. The pre-sentence report recorded that when interviewed on 1 September 2006, the appellant 'struggled emotionally relating the facts of the Manslaughter offence'. He became distraught and emotional when talking about the death of Ms Hayward and was described as 'at first attempting to keep his emotions in check before being overwhelmed with sobs and tears'. An aggravating factor revealed in the pre-sentence report is that on the morning of the manslaughter offence, the appellant admits he was 'coming down from using amphetamines'.
46 The appellant had several juvenile community based sanctions since the age of 14 years. He was sentenced to 10 months' imprisonment on 19 December 2002 for offences for which he had received an intensive supervision order. From that time, he had been released on five supervised release orders. He had reoffended in relation to four of them and breached the fifth through non-compliance.
47 The appellant's family background revealed that from the age of 9 years he had been placed in foster care. He had constantly absconded to be with his mother and was eventually returned to her care in 2000. His brothers and sisters returned to her care between 2001 and 2002. His father was in and out of prison throughout his childhood and records reveal that he had an extensive offending history. The appellant said that nobody in his family had ever been employed and that his whole family had been in trouble with the law. The appellant had begun using amphetamines at the age of 14 years and had an extensive history of amphetamine abuse.
48 The psychological report was written by Dr William Saunders. He interviewed the appellant on 4 September 2006. He noted the appellant's family history, drug history, record of convictions and the offences he was facing. He described the appellant as a bewildered and vulnerable young man and a second generation victim of the stolen generation. The appellant's mother exhibited a resigned acceptance to the fact that road deaths following police pursuits were a risk factor for urban Aboriginal
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- youths. The conclusion reached by Dr Saunders was the appellant was 'a high need, high risk of reoffending individual, that [sic who] poses a particular challenge to the Department of Corrective Services'. He recommended the best rehabilitative efforts that the department could employ.
Conclusion on appeal
49 Balancing the undoubted seriousness of the offences committed by the appellant against the matters personal to him, and in particular his age, I am of the opinion that a total sentence of 8 years 8 months' imprisonment did infringe the totality principle in this case. It was very much a value judgment for the learned sentencing judge, but, in my opinion, that judgment failed to take sufficient account of the appellant's youth and the need for his rehabilitation. As Wheeler JA observed in Miller, [24]:
It is recognised that one of the reasons for reducing an otherwise appropriate sentence of imprisonment, in order to avoid a crushing result, is that too long a term runs the risk that:
' ... the prisoner might become hopeless, aggressive, or otherwise intractable, and thus one of the purposes of punishment will be defeated through making it more rather than less likely that he will eventually offend again.'
(McGee v The Queen [1980] WAR 117 at 119 per Wickham J, Burt CJ and Wallace J agreeing.)
50 To avoid the risk that the length of the term of imprisonment imposed upon the appellant might cause him to become 'intractable', I consider that the total effective sentence imposed upon the appellant should be less than it was. Presently, when combined with the period of 10 months served by the appellant prior to the imposition of his sentence, it seems to me that it constitutes a crushing sentence. I would restructure the sentence by making the sentences on counts 8 and 14 cumulative, but all other sentences concurrent with that imposed on count 14. The result would be the accumulation of a sentence of 2 years with one of 5 years 4 months, leading to a total of 7 years 4 months.
51 I would therefore grant leave to appeal, allow the appeal, set aside the sentence imposed by the learned sentencing judge and in lieu thereof order that the total effective sentence should be 7 years 4 months' imprisonment by the accumulation of counts 8 and 14. I would order that
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all other counts be served concurrently with the sentence imposed on count 14.
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